"x x x the presumption of fencing under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1612 x x x must be upheld in the light of petitioner’s shallow demurrer premised on a denial and alibi, since a disputable presumption on this score is sufficient until overcome by contrary evidence."

First of all, contrary to petitioner’s contention, intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D. 1612.

The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called "acts mala prohibita."^[6] This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated?^[7] When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.^[8]

In the case of Lim v. Court of Appeals^[9] involving violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, we said:

"On the aspect of animus furandi, petitioner is of the belief that this element was not clearly established by the People’s evidence and he, therefore, draws the conclusion that respondent court seriously erred in presuming the existence of intent to gain. Again, this supposition ignores the fact that intent to gain is a mental state, the existence of which is demonstrated by the overt acts of a person (Soriano vs. People, 88 Phil. 368 [1951]; 1 Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Eleventh Rev. Ed., 1977, p. 45; 1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 Ed., p. 197). And what was the external demeanor which petitioner showed from which the trial court and respondent court inferred animus furandi? These circumstances were vividly spelled in the body of the judgment which petitioner chose to blandly impugn and over which he remains indifferent even at this crucial stage. Withal, the sinister mental state is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act in bringing out the tires from his bodega which were loaded on his pick-up (People vs. Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil. 52 [1929]; 1 Reyes, supra at P. 46; Section 3(b), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence). At any rate, dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special stature like the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 [1909]; 1 Reyes, supra at p. 58) because it is the act alone, irrespective of the motives which constitutes the offense (U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng, et al., 30 Phil. 577 [1915]; 1 Reyes, supra, at p. 59; 1 Aquino, supra, at p. 52)."

Secondly, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner, as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing.^[10]

It was incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence but he failed to do so. All petitioner could offer, by way of rebuttal, was a mere denial and his incredible testimony that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his establishment and left them there.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 111343, August 22, 1996 ]

ERNESTINO P. DUNLAO, SR., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, AND LOURDES DU, RESPONDENTS.