Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute, which provides as follows:
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living.[11]
Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime."[12] It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent.[13] The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said contract/ promise to sell, petitioner Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
"Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated:The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony.[9] It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.[10]
"(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
The case at bar, although instituted against the heirs of Praxedes Villanueva after the estate of the latter had been distributed to them, remains within the ambit of the protection. The reason is that the defendants-heirs are properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living.[11]
Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined private respondent Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime."[12] It must further be observed that petitioners presented a counterclaim against private respondent Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of Praxedes Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person.
Likewise, under a great majority of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify. But the testimony of the adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had with the agent.[13] The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney-in-fact (apoderado) of Praxedes Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by private respondent Vicente with respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former's lips, does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that petitioner Goñi could and did not negate the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the said contract/ promise to sell, petitioner Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
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