G.R. No. 126094 January 21, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TITO REDUCA y ABARA, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When
the prosecution fails to establish that the wound inflicted on the
victim would have caused his or her death had medical help not been
provided, the accused may be convicted only of attempted, not
frustrated, murder or homicide. In denying this appeal, we also
reiterate the following doctrines: (1) the trial court's assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect; (2) a dying declaration made under a consciousness of impending
death is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule;
and (3) an unsubstantiated alibi cannot overcome positive and credible
evidence pointing to the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the February 8, 1996 Decision 1
of the Regional Trial Court of Bukidnon, Branch 8, in Criminal Case
Nos. 7191-95, 7192-95 and 7193-95, finding Tito Reduca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated
murder.
In three
separate Informations, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo G.
Ching charged appellant with two counts of murder and one count of
frustrated murder. Filed on February 13, 1995 and similarly worded
except for the name of the victim, 2 the two Informations for murder read:
That
on or about the 4th day of December, 1994, in the evening, at Sayre
Highway, [B]arangay Sinanguyan, [M]unicipality of Don Carlos, [P]rovince
of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a bladed weapon, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and
stab RICKY RENEGADO, hitting and inflicting upon his person the
following wounds, to wit:
— Multiple Stab wounds
which caused the instantaneous death of RICKY
RENEGADO, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of RICKY
RENEGADO in such amount as may be allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. 3
Subsequently,
on February 14, 1995, a third Information was filed, charging Reduca
with frustrated murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That
on or about the 4th day of December, 1994, in the evening, at Sayre
Highway, [B]arangay Sinanguyan, [M]unicipality of Don Carlos, [P]rovince
of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a bladed weapon, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and
stab MANOLO CABACTULAN, hitting and inflicting upon his person the
following wounds, to wit:
— Wound at the right portion of the back of his body
which wound would have caused the death of MANOLO
CABACTULAN were it not for the timely medical assistance accorded him,
thus the accused had performed all the acts of execution which would
have produced the crime of [m]urder, but which nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes [of] the will of the accused, to the
damage and prejudice of MANOLO CABACTULAN in such amount as may be
allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code. 4
Considering
that the crimes were allegedly committed on one occasion at the same
place and by the same suspect, both the prosecution and the defense
agreed to hold a joint trial for the three cases. During the arraignment
on March 16, 1995, the accused, assisted by Counsel Nemesio G. Beltran,
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial proceeded in due course. On
February 8, 1996, the court a quo rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
the guilt of accused Tito Reduca having been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, and pursuant to the provision of R.A. 7659, he is hereby
sentenced as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 7191-95, for murder, accused is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
to indemnify the heirs of Ricky Renegado P50,000.00 for civil
indemnity, P20,000.00 for moral damages and P6,000.00 as actual
expenses;
2) In Criminal Case No. 7192-95, for murder, accused is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA to
indemnify the heirs of Jose Ebangcara the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P20,000.00 for moral damages, and P9,000.00 as actual
expenses;
3) In Criminal Case No. 7193-95, for frustrated
murder, accused is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as
maximum, to indemnify his victim Manolo Cabactulan the sum of
P25,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 for moral damages and
P16,000.00 as actual expenses.
SO ORDERED. 5
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this appeal was filed directly with this Court. 6
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
In the Appellee's Brief, the solicitor general 7 presented the following narration of facts:
On
December 4, 1994, at around 10:00 in the evening. Jose Ebangcara, Ricky
Renegado, Felix Temple and Manolo Cabactulan left the house of Ricky
Renegado at Purok 4, North Poblacion, Don Carlos, Bukidnon to proceed to
Barangay Sinangoyan, Don Carlos[,] to attend a dance. The four (4)
walked abreast [of] each other, on the right side of Sayre Highway. The
relative positions of the group were such that Jose Ebangcara was
walking along the right side of Cabactulan while on his left side was
Renegado followed by Temple on the extreme left (pp. 3-5, TSN, August
18, 1995). While they were walking, Cabactulan saw appellant coming from
the cornfield at their right side and almost instantaneously heard
Ebangcara utter, "I was stabbed, part (meaning partner in local lingo)".
The place was illuminated by the street lamp and fluorescent light
coming from a house nearby (pp. 6, 11, ibid.).
While glancing at Ebangcara, Cabactulan also felt
that he was stabbed on his back. He immediately looked around and saw
appellant armed with a bolo. Cabactulan ran away towards Maramag,
Bukidnon (p. 6-7, ibid.). After running about half a kilometer,
Cabactulan fell down in front of a house and lost consciousness,
Cabactulan realized that he was being loaded [into] an ambulance. He was
brought to the Maramag District Hospital where he was confined for
twenty-nine (29) days (pp. 12-13, 23-26, ibid.).
That same evening of December 4, 1994, Rodrigo
Fernandez was at his house at Don Carlos Norte, Don Carlos, Bukidnon,
listening to a radio program of DXMB. He was at the balcony of. his
house when he saw somebody running along the highway towards Barangay
Sinangayonan and shouting for help. Fernandez went out of his house and
approached the person. He asked the bloodied person who he was and the
person identified himself as Ricky Renegado and asked for Simplicio
Bariga. Fernandez, on hearing the name of Simplicio Bariga, summoned the
latter from his house which was some twenty meters away. When they
returned to the place where Fernandez left Renegado, Bariga immediately
asked the bloodied person, "Ricky, what happened to you?" [Renegado]
replied, "Noy[,] I was stabbed". When asked further who stabbed him,
Renegado said it was Reduca. (pp. 49-50, TSN, September 18, 1995).
Fernandez, who was some two meters away from Bariga and Renegado, heard
them exchange the same question and answer for at least three times. (p.
50, ibid.).
Simplicio Bariga was watching television at his
residence at Don Carlos Norte, Don Carlos, Bukidnon at around ten
o'clock in the evening of December 4, 1994 when his neighbor, Rudy
Fernandez summoned him to help someone. Bariga took his flashlight and
together with Fernandez and his younger brother Ponciano, Bariga
proceeded to Sayre highway and there saw Ricky Renegado bloodied and
lying on his belly. Bariga asked Renegado three (3) times who stabbed
him and . . . everytime[,] the latter replied "Reduca" (pp. 4-6, TSN,
September 18, 1995). Not long thereafter, Renegado died. Bariga then
instructed someone to fetch the parents of Renegado but it was the
latter's elder brother Momoy Reduca who arrived. Thereafter the
policemen arrived and loaded Renegado's body [into] an ambulance (p. 7, ibid.).
Renegado died because of multiple stab wounds he
sustained, namely, one at the anterior chest wall above the clavicular
line, another on the right upper "quadra" abdomen and one at the
interphal[ange]l joint between the thumb and index finger Dr. Filipina
Villa, who conducted the postmortem examination on the [sic]
Renegado, concluded that the wounds were caused by a knife or bolo (Exh.
"A", p. 4, Record[s]; Criminal Case No. 7191-95; pp. 5-6, TSN,
September 27, 1995).
Ebangcara also died as he sustained wounds on the
abdomen, on the upper left arm and on the wrist. Dr. Villa, [who] also
conducted the postmortem examination on the body of Ebangcara, testified
that the wounds were caused by a knife or bolo (Exh. "B", p. 4,
Record[s]; Criminal Case No. 7192-95; pp. 9-10, TSN, ibid.).
Evidence for the Defense
In his
Brief, Appellant Reduca interposes alibi as his defense and disputes the
credibility of the testimonies of Manolo Cabactulan and Felix Temple,
both of whom identified him as the perpetrator of the crimes. In his
"Appeal," 8 Reduca narrates his whereabouts during the night of the crime as follows: 9
1.
That at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon[,] Bonifacio Abara went to the
store of Lenie Gomez at [P]urok 4. (Sinangguyan, Don Carlos, Bukidnon)
where he met the accused[,] Tito Reduca.
2. That both of them went to Purok 1, to the store of
Rudy Guevara where they drank [t]uba and took supper, staying there
[until] around 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
3. That both of them went to Purok 4[,] where they played basketball until around 10:00 o'clock in the evening.
4. That at about 8:30 PM, more or less, [the]
Baran[gay] Captain[,] together with [the] Kag[awad] and Chairman of
[P]eace and [O]rder[,] Percy Tumana, confirmed the presence of Tito
Reduca playing basketball on the court which [was] adjacent to the
Baran[gay] Hall.
5. That Baran[gay] [C]aptain Gomez, Percy Tumana and their CVO's conducted a roving, going first to Purok 7.
6. That David Umali, a CVO and in charge of the
Baran[gay] Hall together with Bonifacio Abara and Tito Reduca slept in
the Baran[gay] Hall at about 10:00 pm that night of December 4th[,]
1994.
7. That Baran[gay] Captain Gomez and Percy Tumana
broke up their roving at about 10:30 pm and Capt. Gomez walked to Don
Carlos Norte where he was to sleep in the house of his aunt; [t]hat on
the way he met four noisy and drunk young men, two of whom he recognized
as Ricky Renegado and Felix Temple. The latter was his student when he
was still teaching in Don Carlos.
8. That on the other hand[,] Peroy Tumana and his
CVO's went back to the Baran[gay] Hall, checked[,] and saw David Umali,
Tito Reduca and Bonifacio Abara sleeping.
9. That at about 11:00 pm[,] Captain Gomez, who was
already in Don Carlos Norte, learned of the stabbing in his Baran[gay]
and immediately[,] he called for assistance asking for [an] ambulance,
using his handset radio, and the assistance was immediate.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The
trial court concluded that appellant's defense of alibi cannot overthrow
the clear and convincing eyewitness accounts of Manolo Cabactulan and
Felix Temple, both of whom identified appellant as the assailant. The
defense failed to show that Cabactulan and Temple had any motive to
single out and falsely accuse appellant. In addition, two other
witnesses testified that they heard one of the victims, Ricky Renegado
utter before his death that "Reduca" had stabbed him. Finally, the trial
court ruled that treachery attended the commission of the crimes, as
shown by the suddenness of the assault which prevented the victims from
defending themselves.
Assignment of Errors
In assailing the trial court's Decision, appellant interposes the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
WITNESSES OF THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR LACK OF GOOD
OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY THE CULPRIT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
WITNESSES OF THE PROSECUTION WHO ALLEGEDLY HEARD THE LATE RICKY RENEGADO
TO HAVE SAID THAT THE ONE WHO STABBED HIM [WAS] "REDUCA"
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAID TESTIMONIES WERE BELATEDLY GIVEN TO THE
POLICE.
III
THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED ON THE GROUND THAT HIS GUILT HA[D] NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. 10
The Court will discuss the following issues seriatim:
(1) probative value of the prosecution's evidence; (2) admissibility of
Renegado's dying declaration; and (3) alibi as a defense. In addition,
we shall also take up the characterization of the crimes committed, as
well as the legality of the money awards handed down by the court a quo.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue:
Probative Value of the Prosecution's Evidence
The defense argues that Witnesses Cabactulan and
Temple could not have identified appellant as their attacker because, at
the time, they were drunk and, in any event, it was dark. Furthermore,
based on Cabactulan's testimony, they immediately scampered away as soon
as the attack began; thus, it was impossible for them to identify who
their attacker was. Assailing the credibility of the said witnesses,
appellant also points to various inconsistencies in their testimonies,
as well as to alleged irregularities pertaining to Felix Temple's
affidavit.
Appellant's
contentions are not persuasive. The trial court, which had the
opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, was
convinced of their credibility. We find no reason to reverse or alter
the evaluation of the trial court. "It is a time tested doctrine that a
trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to
great weight — even conclusive and binding if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence." 11
The
witnesses positively identified appellant as the attacker. Moreover,
while the crimes were committed at night, it was not completely dark in
the vicinity of the locus criminis. There was enough light for
the four victims to see the road they were walking on, and for the
barangay captain to have seen them walking on the road. Cabactulan
testified:
Q: And how were you able to recognize your assailant when that was already 10:00 o'clock in the evening?
A: Because we were very near each other.
Q: Other than that distance, what else made you recognize him?
A: [T]here was also the light of the fluorescent lamp.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said there was light, how far was that light [from] the place where the incident . . . happened?
A: About twenty (20) meters. 12
Immaterial
is the fact that the victims may have drunk liquor a few hours prior to
the attack, since it was not shown "just how drunk they were" as they
walked along the road. Verily, it was not established how much liquor
they had consumed. Indeed, no evidence was offered to show that
intoxication had debilitated their senses to the point of negating their
claim of having seen their attacker. Nor did Cabactulan positively say
that they had scampered away before they were able to see their
attacker. Quite the contrary, Felix Temple positively testified that he
saw appellant stab the victims thus:
Q:
Now, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of December 4, 1994, while
you were walking at the Sayre Highway going to Sinangoyan to attend the
dance, do you know what transpired if there was any?
A: There was stabbing.
Q: Who was stabbed?
A: Jose Ebangcara.
Q: When you saw Jose Ebangcara was stabbed, was Ebangcara hit?
A: He was hit.
Q: And when he was hit, what happened to him?
A: He died.
Q: After Jose Ebangcara was stabbed, what happened next?
A: He stabbed Manolo Cabactulan.
Q: And was Manolo Cabactulan hit?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: After Manolo Cabactulan was stabbed, what happened next?
A: He stabbed Ricky Renegado.
Q: And was Ricky Renegado hit?
A: He was hit.
Q: And after Ricky Renegado was stabbed, what happened next?
A: Then he faced me and hacked me.
Q: And were you hit?
A: No, because I noticed his action of hacking me. (witness demonstrated by swinging his right arm towards his front)
Q: Did you recognize that person who stabbed Jose Ebangcara, Manolo Cabactulan, Ricky Renegado and yourself?
A: Yes, he is Tito Reduca. 13
The
defense claims that Cabactulan had never seen appellant before the
incident and, thus, could not have identified him as the attacker. True,
Cabactulan had not known appellant prior to the attack, but it
does not follow that the witness, who saw him during the track, was
incapable of identifying him. Thus, when Cabactulan again saw appellant
during the course of the investigation and the trial, he positively
pointed to him as the attacker. We quote his testimony hereunder:
Q: And when for the first time [did] you know that his name [was] Tito Reduca?
A: At the time when the policeman told me his name.
Q: At the time you were stabbed and you said you
recognized that assailant, did you already know that his name [was] Tito
Reduca?
A: Not yet.
Q: Before the incident, did you already see that assailant of yours?
A: Not yet.
Q: That assailant which you recognized at the time
you were stabbed and that person you saw at the police station[,] were
these the same person?
A: He is the same person. 14
The
defense likewise misappreciated Cabactulan's testimony that he Chief of
Police Estanislao load him into the ambulance which brought him to the
hospital. However, Cabactulan simply testified that he was loaded into
the ambulance, not that the police chief rode and accompanied him
therein.
Q: Who loaded you in the ambulance?
A: Chief Estaniel and his companion. 15
Likewise,
Temple's credibility is not diminished because of an alleged
inconsistency between his testimony and his affidavit in respect to the
number of times he had previously seen appellant. "The general rule has
always been that discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in
his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit him," 16 because "affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate . . . ." 17
Second Issue:
Renegado's Dying Declaration
The defense contends that Ricky Renegado's
alleged dying declaration that it was "Reduca" who stabbed him does not
necessarily refer to Appellant Tito Reduca in particular. Appellant also
seeks to impugn the credibility of Simplicio Bariga and Rodrigo
Fernandez, who had both testified on Renegado's statement, because they
did not volunteer the above information when they were first questioned
by the police. Furthermore, Bariga seems to be confused as to the date
he executed his affidavit.
Sec. 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court allows a
dying person's declaration made under consciousness of impending death
to be received as evidence in a case involving said person's death:
Sec. 37. Dying Declaration.
— The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death.
In People v. Almeda, 18
this Court held that "there are four requisites which must concur in
order that a dying declaration may be admissible, to wit: (a) it
concerns the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a
consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a
witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant was the victim."
In the case
at bar, there is no question that all of the above requisites are
present, including the fact that Renegado, the declarant, was aware of
his impending death. "It has been held that the degree and seriousness
of the wound and the fact that death supervened shortly afterwards, may
be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by
the victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition." 19
Therefore, considering the seriousness of the stab wound inflicted on
Renegado and the fact that he died shortly thereafter, it can be
concluded that he was aware of his impending death when he uttered that
it was "Reduca" who stabbed him.
It is
important to note that Renegado's dying declaration, as testified to by
Bariga and Fernandez, was not the sole evidence relied upon to
incriminate the accused; it merely corroborated the positive
identification already made by Cabactulan and Temple. That Bariga and
Fernandez did not immediately report Renegado's utterance to the police
is understandable and in no way discredits them. What is important is
that they testified, and the trial court found their testimonies
credible and believable. Thus, in People v. Ompad Jr., 20 this Court held:
It
is settled that delay in divulging names of perpetrators of crimes, if
sufficiently explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness
and his testimony. The initial reluctance of a witness due to reprisal
is common and does not impair his testimony.
Finally,
Bariga's confusion regarding the date when his affidavit was executed
is trivial. It pertains to a minor detail and does nor affect his
credibility. Moreover, this Court has previously explained that "even
the most truthful witnesses can sometimes make mistakes, but such
innocent lapses do not necessarily affect their credibility." 21
Third Issue:
Alibi
Appellant interposes the defense of alibi,
stating that on December 4, 1994, he played basketball from 8:00 p.m. to
10:00 p.m. and slept in the barangay hall from 10:00 p.m. onwards.
Thus, he could not have been the author of the crime committed around
10:00 p.m. that day.
This claim
must also be rejected. Alibi is one of the weakest defenses, because it
is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. For alibi to prosper, it
would not be enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when
the crime was committed; he must further demonstrate that it would have
been physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. 22
Evidence
shows that the distance between the barangay hall and the site of the
alleged stabbing incident was only around four hundred (400) meters.
Thus, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be present at
the locus criminis. Finally, an unsubstantiated alibi cannot
overcome positive and credible evidence pointing to the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime.
The Crime
The trial court correctly convicted appellant of two counts of murder. The qualifying circumstance of alevosia was
proven beyond reasonable doubt, for the bolo attack upon the unarmed
victims was sudden and unexpected, thereby depriving them of any chance
to defend themselves. Although the crime was committed during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659, which prescribed for murder the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, we agree with the trial court that only reclusion perpetua should be imposed for each count of murder. 23
Aside from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, no proof of any
other aggravating circumstance was presented during the trial or alleged
before this Court to justify the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death. Evident premeditation was alleged in the Informations, but it
cannot be appreciated in the absence of "evidence that the execution of
the criminal act [was] preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the
resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment." 24
Although
we affirm appellant's conviction of two counts of murder, we hold that
under the third Information he is guilty of attempted, not frustrated,
murder. While the prosecution established that there was intent to kill,
it failed to present evidence showing that the wound inflicted on
Cabactulan was fatal and would have caused his death had medical help
not been provided. Where the wounds inflicted on the victim were not
proven to be sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted
murder, as the accused has no performed all the acts of execution that
would have brought about the victim's death. 25
Civil Liability
The
civil liabilities awarded by the trial court are correct. The heirs of
Jose Ebangcara and Ricky Renegado are entitled to the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000) each as indemnity ex delicto. They are
also entitled to moral damages, as the mothers of the two victims
testified to the anxiety, the worry and the sadness caused by the death
of their respective sons. Lastly, the expenses incurred as a result of
the two deaths and Cabactulan's medical treatment were sufficiently
proven.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED
insofar as it convicted Appellant Tito Reduca of two counts of murder
and sentenced him to two terms of reclusion perpetua. However,
his conviction for frustrated murder is MODIFIED to attempted murder,
for which he is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2
months and 1 day of prision correccional (maximum), as minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor (maximum), as maximum. Costs against appellant.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.Footnotes
2 The victim in the other Information is Jose Ebangcara.
3 Information for Criminal Case No. 7191-95, p. 1; rollo, p. 5.
4 Information for Criminal Case No. 7193-95, p. 1; rollo, p. 9.
5 Assailed Decision, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 26-27.
6 The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 12, 1998, upon the filing of the Appellee's Brief. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none was filed within the reglementary period.
7 The Appellee's Brief was signed by Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz, Assistant Solicitor General Mariano M. Martinez, Assistant Solicitor General Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo.
8 This 15-page "Appeal for Tito Reduca" dated November 3, 1995 was signed by Atty. Nemesio G. Beltran and filed on May 2, 1996.
9 The Appellant's Brief did not contain a detailed statement of facts.
10 Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-4.
11 People vs. Romeo Nell, GR No. 109660, 10 July 1, 1997, per Panganiban, J. See also People v. Barredo, GR No. 122850, October 7, 1998; People v. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649, February 27, 1989; People v. Pascual, 204 SCRA 618, December 5, 1991; People v. Naparan, 225 SCRA 714, August 30, 1993; People v. Deopante, 263 SCRA 691, October 30, 1996; and People v. Escandor, 265 SCRA 444, December 9, 1996.
12 TSN, August 18, 1995, pp. 9-10.
13 TSN, August 18, 1995, pp. 24-25.
14 TSN, August 18, 1995, p. 9.
15 TSN, August, 18, 1335, p. 13.
16 People vs. Calegan, 233 SCRA 537, 544-545, June 30, 1994, per Bellosillo, J. See also People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218, January 27, 1981; People v. Garcia , 105 SCRA 6, June 11, 1981; People v. Bermoy, 105 SCRA 106, June 17, 1981; and People v. Canumay, 130 SCRA 301, July 9, 1984.
17 People vs. Villanueva, 215 SCRA 22, 28, October 21, 1992, per Feliciano, J. See also People v. Roldan, 224 SCRA 536, July 6, 1993; People v. de Dios, 187 SCRA 228, July 6, 1990; People v. Riego, 189 SCRA 445, September 12, 1990; Biala v. CA, 191 SCRA 50, October 31, 1990; People v. Segwaben, 194 SCRA 239, February 19, 1991; People v. Magdadaro, 197 SCRA 151, May 15, 1991; People v. Patilan, 197 SCRA 354, May 23, 1991; People v. Salguero, 198 SCRA 357, June 19, 1991; People v. Urquia, 203 SCRA 735, November 19, 1991; People v. Fule, 206 SCRA 652, February 28, 1992; and People v. Dimaano, 209 SCRA 819, June 15, 1992.
18 124 SCRA 486, 491, September 2, 1983, per Relova, J. See also People v. Gutierrez, 209 SCRA 206, May 22, 1992; People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459, April 30, 1991; People v. Araja, 105 SCRA 133, June 29, 1981; People v. Balbas, 122 SCRA 859, June 24, 1983; People v. Onarosa, 127 SCRA 810, February 29, 1984, People v. Nabor, 185 SCRA 615, May 21, 1990; People v. Talingdan, 191 SCRA 333, November 9, 1990; People v. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642, July 1, 1991; and People v. Lazarte, 200 SCRA 361, August 7, 1991.
19 People v. Apa-ap Jr., 235 SCRA 468, 473, August 17, 1994, per Melo, J. See also People v. Obnguyan, 55 SCRA 465, January 31, 1974; People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218, January 27, 1981; People v. Aquino, 133 SCRA 283, November 20, 1984; People v. Jacinto, 133 SCRA 498, November 29, 1984; and People v. Amoncio, 144 SCRA 384, September 24, 1986.
20 233 SCRA 62, 66, June 10, 1994, per Bellosillo, J. See also People v. Obnguyan, 55 SCRA 465, January 31, 1974; People v. Mendoza, 223 SCRA 108, June 3, 1993; and People v. Ocampo, 226 SCRA 1, September 1, 1993.
21 People v. Calegan, 233 SCRA 537, 547, June 30, 1994, per Bellosillo, J. See also People v. Arias, 102 SCRA 303, January 27, 1981; People v. Rosario, 134 SCRA 496, February 25, 1985; People v. Cabato, 160 SCRA 98, April 15, 1988; People v. Pasco, 181 SCRA 233, January 22, 1990; Peneyra v. IAC, 181 SCRA 244, January 22, 1990; and People v. Chatto, 219 SCRA 785, March 10, 1993.
22 People v. Esquilina, 145 SCRA 139, 144, September 8, 1995. See also People v. Añonuevo, 262 SCRA 22, September 18, 1996; People v. Barera, 262 SCRA 63, September 19, 1996; People v. Soria, 262 SCRA 739, October 4, 1996; People v. Cordero, 263 SCRA 122, October 11, 1996; People v. Sumaoy, 263 SCRA 460, October 22, 1996; People v. Rosare, 264 SCRA 398, November 19, 1996; People v. Layno, 264 SCRA 558, November 21, 1996; People v. Balamban, 264 SCRA 619, November 21, 1996; and People v. Preja, 265 SCRA 429, December 9, 1996.
23 Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
. . . In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules should be observed in its application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
24 People v. Danque, 228 SCRA 83, 91, November 19, 1993, per Puno, J. See also People v. Alberto Medina, GR No. 113691, February 6, 1998; People v. Salvador, 224 SCRA 819, July 30, 1993.
25 People v. Trinidad, 169 SCRA 51, 59, January 9, 1989, per Melencio-Herrera, J. See also People v. Catipon, 139 SCRA 192, October 9, 1985; and People v. Mission, 194 SCRA 432, February 26, 1991.
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