SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119005 December 2, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SABAS RAQUEL, VALERIANO RAQUEL and AMADO PONCE, accused.
SABAS RAQUEL and VALERIANO RAQUEL, accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:p
The court a quo found herein accused-appellants Sabas Raquel
and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused Amado Ponce, guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to pay the heirs of Agapito Gambalan, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00
as indemnity for his death, and the amount of P1,500.00 representing the value
of the stolen revolver. 1 The Raquel brothers now
plead for their absolution in this appellate review.
In an information dated August 27, 1986, the aforementioned accused
were indicted for robbery with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of
Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 16, 2 allegedly committed on
July 4, 1986 in Barangay Osias of the Municipality of Kabacan.
Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
While trial was in progress, however, and before he could give his testimony,
accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. 3
The factual antecedents of the case for the People, as borne out by
the evidence of record and with page references to the transcripts of the court
hearings, are summarized by the Solicitor General in the appellee's brief:
At midnight of July 4, 1986,
tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr.
Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at the
backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at
the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. (pp. 4-6, TSN,
January 25, 1988)
Juliet went out of their room
after hearing gunshots and saw her husband's lifeless (sic) while a man
took her husband's gun and left hurriedly. (p. 7, ibid.)
She shouted for help at their
window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran
away. (p. 9, ibid.)
George Jovillano responded to
Juliet's plea for help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came
and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8
meters from the victim's house. He was identified as Amado Ponce. (pp. 5-7,
TSN, October 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, March 21, 1988)
Amado Ponce was first treated at a
clinic before he was brought to the police station. (p. 27, ibid.)
Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt.
Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the
perpetrators of the crime and that they may be found in their residence.
However, the police failed to find them there since appellants fled immediately
after the shooting incident. (pp. 12-14, ibid.)
Appellants were later on
apprehended on different occasions. (pp. 5-6, TSN, April 2, 1991) 4
Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense,
on the bases of facts which are presented in their brief in this wise:
Accused Valeriano Raquel testified
that on July 2, 1986, with the permission of his parents he left Paatan,
Kabacan, Cotabato and went to Tunggol Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He stayed in the
house of his sister-in-law, the wife of his deceased brother. Together with Boy
Madriaga and Corazon Corpuz, he harvested palay on July 3 and 4. On July 5,
while he was still asle(ep), police authorities accompanied by his father
arrested him and brought him to the municipal jail of Kabacan, Cotabato. He
already heard the name of accused Amado Ponce, to be an owner of a parcel of
land in Paatan.
On cross-examination, he admitted
that their house and that of Gambalan are located in the same Barangay. Before
July 4, he entertained no grudge against victim Agapito Gambalan. (TSN, April
2, 1991, pp. 2-20).
Antonio Raquel, 64 years old,
testified that on July 2, 1986 he was at home when his son Valeriano Raquel
told him that he was going to Tungol, Pagalungan, Maguindanao to harvest palay.
On (the) same date, his other son, Sabas Raquel, also asked his permission to
leave since the latter, a soldier, was going to his place of assignment at
Pagadian. On July 5, 1986, several policemen came over to his house, looking
for his two (2) sons. He gave them pictures of his sons and even accompanied
them to Tungol where they arrested his son Valeriano. (TSN, April 3, 1991, pp.
3-26).
T/Sgt. Natalio Zafra, of the 102
Brigade, Aurora, Zamboanga, testified that on July 4, 1986, he was assigned in
the 2nd Infantry Battalion, First Infantry Division, Maria Cristina, Iligan
City. Sabas Raquel was under his division then, and was on duty on July 4,
1986. (TSN, Nov. 6, 1992, pp. 2-20). 5
On August 10, 1993, the trial court, as stated at the outset,
rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged and sentenced them accordingly. 6
Not satisfied therewith, herein appellants filed a notice of appeal
wherein they manifested that they were appealing the decision to the Court of
Appeals. 7 The lower court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case
to the Court of Appeals. 8 In view of the penalty
imposed, the Court of Appeals properly forwarded the same to us. 9
Before us, the defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e.,
that the trial court erred in convicting accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano
Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating
them as the perpetrators of the crime.
We find such submission to be meritorious. A careful review and
objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of,
much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the
assailants of her husband. In her testimony on direct examination in court she
declared as follows:
Q: You said you shouted right
after the incident and pip (sic) at the window, did you see any when you
pip (sic) at the window?
A; Yes, sir.
Q: What did you see if you were able
to see anything?
A: I saw a person who fel(l) down
beside the water pump and I saw again two (2) persons who were running away,
sir.
Q: Were you able to identify this
persons who fel(l) down near the jetmatic pump and two (2) persons running
away?
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you said somebody fel(l)
down near the jetmatic pump, who is this person?
A: I do not know sir. I have known
that he was Amado Ponce when the Police arrived. 10 (emphasis
ours.)
On cross-examination she further
testified:
Q: For the first time when you
shouted for help, where were you?
A: I was at the Veranda sir and I
started shouting while going to our room.
Q: In fact you have no way (of)
identifying that one person who was mask(ed) and got the gun of your husband
because he was mask(ed), is that not right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In fact, you saw only this one
person got inside to your house and got this gun?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And this Amado Ponce cannot be
the person who have got this gun inside?
FISCAL DIZON:
Already answered.
She was not able to identify, your
Honor.
Q: You only saw this Amado Ponce
when (h)e was presented to you by the police, is that right?
A: Yes, sir. 11
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You testified in direct
testimony you pip (sic) in jalousie after you shouted for help and you
saw two (2) person(s) running, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you saw these persons
running on the road, is that not right?
A: I saw them running sir going
around.
Q: These two (2) persons were
running going around?
A: They were running towards the
road.
ATTY. DIVINO:
Going to the road.
Q: And you cannot identify
these two (2) persons running towards the road?
A: No, sir. 12 (Emphases
supplied.)
Even the corroborating witness, George Jovillano, in his testimony
made no mention of who shot Agapito Gambalan. In fact, in his sworn statement
executed in the Investigation Section of the Kabacan Police Station on July 5,
1986, he declared that:
19Q: By the way, when you saw
three persons passing about 5 meters away from where you were then drinking,
what have you noticed about them, if you ever noticed any?
A: I noticed that one of the men
ha(d) long firearm which was partly covered by a maong jacket. The other one
wore a hat locally known as "kipis" meaning a hat made of cloth with
leaves protruding above the forehead and seemed to be holding something which I
failed to recognize. The other one wore a shortpant with a somewhat white
T-shirt with markings and there was a white T-shirt covering his head and a
part of his face as he was head-down during that time.
20Q: Did you recognized any of
these men?
A: No. Because they
walked fast. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that
the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on
the extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his
co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from
jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused
may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open
court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused
on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay
as against said accused. 14 That is exactly the
situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with
the confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused. A distinction,
obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The
former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the
confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for
cross-examination and rebuttal. 15
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An
extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding
upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and
declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers;
and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. 16
Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential
exceptions, 17 those exceptions do not however apply to the present case.
Firstly, except for that extrajudicial statement of accused Amado
Ponce, there exists no evidence whatsoever linking appellants to the crime. In
fact, the testimony of police Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellant Sabas Raquel
was wounded and went to the clinic of Dr. Anulao for treatment using the name
Dante Clemente, 18 was negated by Dr. Anulao himself who testified that he treated no
person by the name of Danny Clemente. 19
Secondly, this extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as
prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the constitutional rights of
accused Amado Ponce. This was unwittingly admitted in the testimony of the same
Sgt. Andal S. Pangato who was the chief of the intelligence and investigation
section of their police station:
Q: During the investigation did
you inform him (of) his constitutional right while on the process of
investigation?
A: No sir, because my purpose was
only to get the information from him . . . And after that I checked the
information that he gave.
Q: Of course, you know very well
that the accused should be assisted by counsel?
A: What I know is if when a person
is under investigation you have in mind to investigate as to against (sic)
him, and you have to inform his constitutional right but if the purpose is to
interrogate him to acquire information which will lead to the identity of the
other accused we do not need to inform him.
Q: Don't you know that under the
case of PP vs. Galit; the accused should be (re)presented by
counsel that is the ruling of the Supreme Court?
A: I do not know if it is actually
the same as this case.
Q: But it is a fact that you did
not even inform him (of) his right?
A: No sir.
Q: At the time when you asked him
he has no counsel.
A: No counsel, Sir. 20
Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in
the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such
waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. 21 These rights, both
constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
A conviction in a criminal case must rest on nothing less than a
moral certainty of guilt. 22 Without the positive
identification of appellants, the evidence of the prosecution is not sufficient
to overcome the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights to
them. 23 While admittedly the alibi of appellants may be assailable, the
evidence of the prosecution is probatively low in substance and evidentiarily
barred in part. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of the defense to
enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. In fact,
alibi need not be inquired into where the prosecution's evidence is weak. 24
It would not even have been necessary to stress that every
reasonable doubt in criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused.
The requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of
guilt. In the instant case, the test of moral certainty was neither met nor
were the standards therefor fulfilled.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED
and accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED
of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Fabiana
Inserto-Tejada.
2 Original Record, 2.
3 Ibid., 100-101.
4 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee,
2-3; Rollo, 199-200.
5 Appellant's Brief, 6-8; Rollo,
142-144.
6 Ibid., 49-58.
7 Ibid., 59.
8 Ibid., 60.
9 Ibid., 1.
10 TSN, January 25, 1988, 8-10.
11 Ibid., id.,
35-36.
12 Ibid., id., 40.
13 Exhibit "A"; Original
Record, 15.
14 People vs. Ola, L-47147, July
3, 1987, 152 SCRA 1.
15 People vs. Flores, et al., G.R.
No. 71980, March 18, 1991, 195 SCRA 295.
16 People vs. Tena, G.R. No.
100909, October 21, 1992, 21 SCRA 43; People vs. Pamon, G.R. No. 102005,
January 25, 1993, 217 SCRA 501.
17 The writer of this opinion has
elsewhere compiled these exceptions as follows: (a) If the co-accused impliedly
acquiesced in or adopted said confession by not questioning its truthfulness
(People vs. Orenciada, et al., 47 Phil. 970 [1924]), as where it was made in
his presence and he did not remonstrate against his being implicated therein
(People vs. Amajul, et al., L-14626-27, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 612);
(b) If the accused persons
voluntarily and independently executed identical confessions without collusion,
commonly known as interlocking confessions (People vs. Encipido, et al., G.R.
No. 70091, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478) which confessions are corroborated
by other evidence (People vs. Argana, et al., L-19448, February 28, 1964, 10
SCRA 311; People vs. Provo, et al., L-28347, January 20, 1971, 37 SCRA 19;
People vs. Mateo, et al., G.R. No. 65165, June 29, 1984, 130 SCRA 282); and
without contradiction by the other co-accused who was present (People vs.
Molleda, et al., L-34248, November 21, 1978, 86 SCRA 667);
(c) Where the accused admitted the
facts stated by the confessant after being apprised of such confession (People
vs. Narciso, L-24484, May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 844);
(d) If they are charged as
co-conspirators of the crime which was confessed by one of the accused and said
confession is used only as a corroborating evidence (People vs. Linde, et al.,
L-10358, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 38; People vs. Simbajon, L-18073-75,
September 30, 1965, 15 SCRA 83; People vs. Sta. Maria, L-19929, October 30, 1965,
15 SCRA 222; People vs. Cortez, et al., L-31106, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 309);
(e) Where the confession is used
as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the
co-conspirator (People vs. Condemena, et al., L-22526, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA
910; People vs. Pareja, et al., L-21937, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693; People
vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 54117, April 27, 1982, 113 SCRA 772);
(f) Where the confessant testified
for his co-defendant (People vs. Villanueva, et al., L-12687, July 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 672); or
(g) Where the co-conspirator's
extrajudicial confession is corroborated by other evidence of record (People
vs. Paz, et al., L-1505-53, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 667; People vs. Agdeppa,
et al., L-17489, December 24, 1969, 30 SCRA 782).
18 TSN, March 21, 1988, 14-16.
19 TSN, January 21, 1993, 4-5.
20 TSN, March 21, 1988, 27-28.
21 See People vs. Salangga,
et al., G.R. No. 100910, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 407.
22 People vs. Argawanon, et al.,
G.R. No. 106538, March 30, 1994, 231 SCRA 614.
23 People vs. Salguero, et al.,
G.R. No. 89117, June 19, 1991, 198, SCRA 357.
24 People vs. Salguero, et al., supra;
People vs. Dural, et al., G.R. No. 84921, June 8, 1993, 223 SCRA 201.
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