COMILANG V
BURCENA
GR 146853,
Feb13, 2006
FACTS
Francisco and Mariano Burcena (respondents),
together w/ their mother, Dominga Reclusado Vda. de Burcena (Dominga), filed a
complaint for annulment of document w/ damages against Salvador Comilang
(petitioner).
The complaint alleges that: respondents are
the owners of a 918-sqm parcel of land located in Manueva, Santa, Ilocos Sur
and the house with a floor area of 32 sqm built thereon; respondents acquired
the subject property through their earnings while working abroad; the subject
property was declared for taxation purposes in Dominga's name as administrator
thereof; petitioner caused the execution of a Deed of Donation over said
property by taking advantage of Dominga's blindness, old age and physical
infirmity; the said Deed of Donation is null and void because: (a) Dominga had
no right to donate the same since she is not its owner, (b) Dominga did not
give her consent and was misled to the execution of such document, (c) granting
Dominga had authority to donate, the donation is void because the property
donated is the only property declared in her name and therefore she could not
have reserved for herself in full ownership sufficient property to support
herself; petitioner is in possession of the subject property, depriving
respondents of its ownership and enjoyment of its fruits.
In
his Answer, petitioner contends that: the Deed of Donation was freely and
voluntarily executed by Dominga in consideration of her love and affection for
him; the subject property was acquired by Dominga together w/ her 2 sisters,
Aniceta and Juana Reclusado, long before respondents went to Hawaii; Dominga
erected a house on the land long before the outbreak of World War II; Dominga
financed out of her own money the construction of the house and subsequent
improvements thereof, she being a merchant when she could still travel to
Cagayan Valley; granting that respondents had been sending money to Dominga,
said money already belonged to her; if Dominga used said money for improving
the house, respondents have no right over the house.
During
the pendency of the case and before she could take the witness stand, Dominga
died. Following pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Witnesses for the
plaintiffs were respondents and their aunt, Margarita Burcena (Margarita);
while petitioner testified on his own behalf.
RTC held that the donation is void because Dominga
could not have validly disposed of the subject property since it was bought
with the money sent by respondents while working abroad, although declared for
taxation purposes in Dominga's name. (petitioner found in good faith -only has
to turnover property)
Dissatisfied,
petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. The CA found no cogent reason to
disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as well as the latter's assessment of
the credibility of witnesses. The CA held that the case involves an implied
trust known as purchase price resulting trust under Article 1448, CC where
property sold is granted to one party but the price is paid for by another;
that the evidence presented by the respondents convincingly show that the
subject property was bought with money belonging to respondents but declared in
Dominga's name as administrator thereof; and that Dominga's act of donating the
property to petitioner was beyond her authority and capacity, done without the
consent of the real owners, herein respondents. Thus, the CA sustained the
conclusion of the RTC that the donation is void.
Petitioner's
MFR was denied.
ISSUE/S
1. WON CA erred in discussing an issue not brought before it
(implied trust)
2. WON Margarita's statement on the witness stand
(that Dominga told her that the respondents sent her money to buy the subject
property) should not have
been given weight or credence by the RTC and the CA because it is hearsay and
has no probative value.
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning An appellate court is
clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as
errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but
affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors
on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some
bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the
lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely
related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent.
(See R51, sec 8, ROC)
In this case, since the petitioner directly
brought in issue on appeal in his Appellants Brief the declaration of the RTC
that Dominga could not have validly disposed of the subject property because
respondents are the real owners of the subject property since it was bought
with money sent by them, it was well-within the CAs authority to review and
evaluate the propriety of such ruling. In holding that an implied trust exists
between respondents and Dominga in relation to the subject property and
therefore Dominga had no right to donate the same to petitioner, the CA merely
clarified the RTC's findings.
The trust created under
the 1st sentence of Art 1448, CC is sometimes referred to as a purchase money
resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a) an actual payment of money,
property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration;
and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a
resulting trust.
Respondents have shown that the two elements are present in the instant
case. Dominga was merely a trustee of the respondents in relation to the
subject property. Therefore, Dominga could not have validly donated the subject
property to petitioner, as expressly provided in Article 736, CC (guardians and
trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.)
2. NO.
Ratio While it is true that the
testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if
intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is
clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the
statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was
made or the tenor of such statement. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a
statement, when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule
does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as
to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement
itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to
the existence of such a fact.
Reasoning What was sought to be
admitted in evidence, and what was actually admitted in evidence, was the fact
that the statement was made by Dominga to Margarita, not necessarily that the
matters stated by her were true. The statement attributed to
Dominga regarding the source of the funds used to purchase the subject property
related to the court by Margarita is admissible if only to establish the fact
that such statement was made and the tenor thereof.
Besides, the testimony of Margarita is not
the main basis for the RTC decision. In fact, her testimony is not
indispensable. It merely serves to corroborate the testimonies of the
respondents on the source of the funds used in purchasing the subject property.
The testimonies of all three witnesses for the plaintiffs were found to be
convincing and credible by the RTC. This Court will not alter the findings of
the RTC on the credibility of witnesses, principally because trial courts have
vastly superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood
as they have the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of witnesses
while testifying.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
People of The Philippines
vs Antonio Silvano
G.R. No. 144886, April 29,
2002
Facts:
This
is an appealed case of the crime of rape
committed by the accused ANTONIO SILVANO on October 7, 1991 in Inudaran,
Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato. More than a year after, a criminal complaint was
filed in the MCTC of Pigcawayan-Alamada Cotabato. After preliminary
investigation, the acting judge found probable cause and remanded the case to the
provincial prosecutor. And then, in a resolution, the provincial prosecution
office in Kidapawan, Cotabato modified the judge's findings and recommended the
filing of consummated rape with homicide against the accused-appellant for the
following reasons:
That
the said accused, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, willfully and
feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with one MARAMANAY TOMAS against her will, that after the
occasion the said accused, with intent to kill,
stabbed the victim hitting her on the different parts of her body, which is the
direct and proximate cause of her death thereafter.
Four
witnesses were presented by the prosecution: Constancio Jimenez, accused-appellant's
nephew; Samotor Polayagan, the person who found the body of the victim at the
crime scene; Onotan Tomas, the victim's father; and Dr. Ebenezer Demetillo who
conducted the necropsy. When Doctor Demetillo testified, he described how the
victim died, how many stab wounds inflicted and its wounds' location and he's
examination on the genetalia of the victim. According to him, there are two
fatal stab wounds inflicted, one in the supracelanicular area penetrating the
upper right lung and the other is at the neck cutting the jugular vein, which
can cause the immediate dead of the victim even if it was only the wounds
inflicted, as earlier mentioned. Also, he conducted an examination the
different parts of the victim's body, from head to foot, including the victim's
genitalia which he repeated stated that he did not find any in his findings.
When Constancio Jimenez was presented, the accused-appellant allegedly
confessed to him, at the birthday party of his son, that the accused-appellant
had raped and killed the girl. On his cross-examination, however, he stated that
he did not see the crime and was only told of the confession of the accused
during the birthday party. Also, it was found out that Jimenez only testified
as an act of vengeance due to his hatred against the accused. The father of the
victim only testified with regards to the expenses he had incurred during his
daughter's wake and death anniversary. Polayagan testified on what he saw and
where she found the body of the victim.
Issues:
Whether
or not the accused is guilty of consummated rape with homicide
Ruling
Jimenez was competent to testify only as to the substance of what he had
heard, but not as to the truth thereof. However, despite its ruling during
trial that it is admitting Jimenez’s account as an independently relevant
statement, the trial court considered the substance of accused-appellant’s
alleged statements to Jimenez as true and then proceeded to justify conviction
of accused-appellant on circumstantial evidence. In its consideration of the
contents of accused-appellant’s alleged statements to Jimenez, the trial court
treated them as an extrajudicial confession made to a private party, and not
just as an independent relevant statement. This is error. As previously noted,
Jimenez admitted on cross-examination that there was bad blood between him and
accused-appellant. It was, therefore, improbable that accused-appellant went to
Jimenez’s house for the birthday of the latter’s son, on the occasion of which
accused-appellant confessed to the crime. It is even more improbable that
accused-appellant confessed to the crime. It is even more improbable that
accused-appellant made his confession in the presence of other people. Jimenez
named three persons as being allegedly present when accused-appellant made his
confession. These were Garcia Payot, Donita Payot, and Orlando Mojado. However, not one of this persons was
presented to corroborate Jimenez’s claim.
We are more
inclined to believe accused-appellant’s claim that on the date in question he
was in his house in Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato and that he had never gone to
Sitio Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato. Accused-appellant
denied Constancio Jimenez’s allegation that he had transferred residence
several times, as well as Onotan Tomas’ allegation that accused-appellant was
his neighbor in Sitio Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato. Accused-appellant maintained
that he had been a resident of Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato since his
childhood.
Second. There is no evidence that the victim was raped. However, in finding
that the victim had been raped, the trial court stated:
Dr. Demetillo testified that he also examined the [genitalia] of the
victim but he did not enter any finding in the report as he did not find any.
The Supreme Court consistently ruled that a medical certificate is not
[indispensable] to prove the commission of rape. The Highest Court also
consistently ruled that lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual
intercourse.
The trial
court is correct in ruling that the
absence of lacerated wounds in the genitalia does not necessarily mean that
rape had not been committed. Rape, however, is never presumed. We agree with
the Solicitor General, who recommends that accused-appellant be absolved of the
charge of rape, that there
must at least be some evidence of finger grips and contusion on the body of the
victims, torn garment, and lacerations, redness, and swelling, especially of
the genital area, to prove rape.
Indeed, not
only is there no proof of rape in this case but the witness for the prosecution
who conducted the necropsy categorically stated that he did not have any
findings concerning victim’s genitalia.
Third. Nor can accused-appellant be held responsible for the death of the
victim. Evidence showing a mere possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant
a conviction. In this case, the trial court stated –
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one
circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
From the very start of the investigation, accused Silvano was the
principal suspect. After the incident, the accused left Macabasa, Alamada and
transferred his residence to Midsayap, Cotabato and finally at Libungan,
Cotabato where he was arrested. The accused’s flight is a strong indication of
guilt for flight evidences culpability
and a guilty conscience, and it strongly indicates a guilty mind or betrays the
existence of a guilty conscience. The accused never explained why he fled after
the incident took place. The accused’s admission is corroborated by evidence of
corpus delicti e.g. the corpse of victim Maramanay Tomas. The accused’s
admission that he stabbed and killed the victim is further corroborated by the
findings of Dr. Ebenezer Demetillo that the victim sustained twenty-one (21)
stab wounds.
There is no
circumstantial evidence to show accused-appellant's guilt:
1. Disregarding accused-appellant’s
alleged admission, the only factual circumstance left is that of flight. Even
this is in question in the face of accused-appellant’s assertion that he is
actually a resident of Brgy. Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato since childhood.
2. The assertion that
accused-appellant was a principal suspect from the start of the investigation
is not corroborated by evidence.
3. There is no proof that
accused-appellant was, or could have been, in the place and at the time of the
commission of the crime in question.
4. The injuries sustained by the
victim Maramanay Tomas, do not indicate the probability that accused-appellant
raped and killed her, if at all.
5. The tubao allegedly found near the
cadaver of the victim and turned over to the police was not identified, marked,
and offered as evidence nor in any case shown to belong to accused-appellant.
As we have
held:
Accused-appellant’s conviction by the trial court hinged on
circumstantial evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be
shown that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the
inferences derived are proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must
constitute an unbroken chain of events that can reasonably lead to the
conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the author
of the crime. . . . Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when
interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
Fourth. The prosecution thus failed to prove accused-appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. To secure a conviction, it is not enough that the evidence
establishes a strong suspicion or even a probability of guilt. Moral certainty
that the accused committed the crime is required. That alibi (which accused-appellant
invokes) is the weakest defense is irrelevant. For when the prosecution fails
to discharge its burden, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
The decision
was reversed and set aside. The accused-appellant ANTONIO SILVANO was acquitted
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
