tan, jr

G.R. No. 111692             February 9, 1996,                     FIRST DIVISION

ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

                Still professing innocence and insisting that he is a victim of mistaken identity, petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder.

                Petitioner stabbed Julieto Malaspina, the victim, in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.

                Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that "Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him.

                Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo.

Issue:

Whether or not the testimony of the accused-petitioner is admissible as a declaration against interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule.

Ruling:

No. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.

                There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

                The far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule. the records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify.

G.R. No. 152364               April 15, 2010, THIRD DIVISION

ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, assisted by her husband, ISAURO M. LAZARO; LEONCIO D. SANTOS; ADOLFO SANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR; ANGELINA S. SAGLES, assisted by her husband, ALBERTO SANTOS, JR.; REGINA SANTOS and FABIAN SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA AGUSTIN, MARCELINA AGUSTIN, PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A. DALALO, GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO AGUSTIN, Respondents.

Facts:

                The petitioners (plaintiff) file a complaint against the respondent (defendant) for claiming as one of the co-owners of a parcel of land Lot No. 10676. Alleging the following:

a.  that Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos, who are the children of Simeon Santos, consented that the parcel of land of this complaint be titled in the name of Basilisa, the latter being the eldest and so Original Certificate of Title No. 20742 in the name of Basilisa Santos was obtained although it was agreed among them that it did not and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of this parcel of land, and as embodied in the Title obtained in the name of Basilisa Santos;

b. that without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the lot with Original Certificate of Title No. 20742 was transferred into another title which is now Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20695 in the names of Modesta Agustin, Filemon Agustin, Venancia Agustin, Marcelina Agustin, Monica Agustin, Gregorio Agustin and Bienvenido Agustin who are the children of the late Basilisa Santos-Agustin who

c. that during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed the former, who are sisters, that the transfer of the title in the name of Basilisa Santos into the names of her children would erroneously imply that the lot is solely and exclusively owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin's children, but Basilisa Santos-Agustin replied [to] plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by her recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos, and her sister Alejandra Santos-Lazaro would each get one fourth (¼) share of the lot;

                The MTCC ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand, such that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay. The RTC affirmed the decision with modification. The CA affirmed also the decision of MTCC with modification.

Issue:

Whether or not the sworn statement of Basilisa S. Agustin is a declaration against interest which establishes the co-ownership of lot no. 10676 by and among the petitioners and respondents.

Ruling:

No. At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue that Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an admission against interest.

                Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity.  However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

                Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.  

                Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized documents. While indeed, a notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. The presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because the regularity in the execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well as on the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the questioned document was supposedly executed.

                A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person executing the said sworn statement. However, the notary public did not comply with this requirement

G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992, THIRD DIVISION

ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,                        

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992

VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.

Facts:

                In G.R. No. 74306 the Regional Trial Court of Manila declared that the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 is owned by the petitioner, but which was reversed by the Court of Appeals and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the owner of the said shares of stock.

                Stock Certificates No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant corporation was issued  and registered in the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the corporation. Later on said certificate of stock was personally delivered by Chuidian to the Corporate Secretary, since then Enrique Razon was in possession of said stock certificate even during the lifetime of the late Chuidian, from the time the late Chuidian delivered the said stock certificate to defendant Razon. By agreement of the parties such certificates were delivered for deposit with the bank under the joint custody of the parties.

                The certificates were delivered by the late Chuidian to Enrique because it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock in the defendant corporation and the understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have possession thereof.

                In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.

                The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of his agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock.

                In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian insists that the appellate court's decision declaring his deceased father Juan T. Chuidian as owner of the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. should have included all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible.

2. The main issue is whether or not the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 are owned by Juan T. Chuidian.

3. Whether or not all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accrues to the said 1,500 shares of stock.

Rulings:

1. Yes, it is admissible. Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the Revised Rules on Evidence) States:

Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship — The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein enumerated.

(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."       The purpose of the law is to "guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party."

                The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person.

                The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.

2. Yes, it is owned by Juan T. Chuidian. The records show that during his lifetime Chuidian was ellected member of the Board of Directors of the corporation which clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the corporation. From the point of view of the corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. the petitioner who claims ownership over the questioned shares of stock must show that the same were transferred to him by proving that all the requirements for the effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the corporation's by laws, if any, were followed or in accordance with the provisions of law.

                The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the certificate must be properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. To reiterate, indorsement of the certificate of stock is a mandatory requirement of law for an effective transfer of a certificate of stock.

3. The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights are all incidents of stock ownership, hence, it accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc., since 1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.