ortega

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34613 January 26, 1989

ANTONIO J. CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GAVINO DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

Puno Law Office for petitioner.

FACTS

The petitioner presents for review the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the findings made by the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District, Branch I of Malolos, Bulacan that there is no tenancy relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent with respect to the disputed piece of agricultural landholding.

The subject matter of this case is a piece of landholding with a perimeter of roughly 50 meters by 100 meters situated at the northern portion of the petitioner's land devoted to sugar crusher operations in Banga Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of 7,114 square meters, more or less.

On November 10, 1967, the private respondent initiated an action for accounting and damages against the petitioner with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Fifth Regional District in Malolos, Bulacan. The case was docketed as CAR Case No. 1963. The complaint alleged, among others, that the private respondent is the present lessee of the petitioner over a certain parcel of riceland formerly owned by the late Gregorio Santos in Banga, Plaridel, Bulacan with a total area of about 5 hectares; that as rentals, the petitioner is paid 45 cavans of palay for the regular crop and 28 cavans of palay for the "binato" or "palagad" crop; that since 1935, the private respondent has been the tenant of the petitioner's agricultural landholding situated in the northern side of the latter's sugar crusher area planted with mango trees; and  that on April 25, 1964, the petitioner and the private respondents entered into a tenancy contract captioned "Kasunduan ng Pamumuwisan ng Lupang Sakahan" containing a stipulation under paragraph 9 thereof that the fruit trees planted by the former on the subject landholding shall be divided on a 50-50 basis is smudged by the former and if harvested on season, 30% shall go to the farmer.

In his answer with court-claim, the petitioner, by way of special and affirmative defenses, averred, among others, that the leasehold relationship between him and the private respondent is limited to the five hectare landholding at Barrio Banga, Plaridel, Bulacan which is described in their tenancy agreement embodied in a document known as "Kasunduan ng Pamumuwisan ng Lupang Sakahan" entered into on April 25, 1964; that his sugar crusher area is a piece of land which is entirely separate and distinct from the five-hectare land which is the object of his leasehold relationship with the private respondent; and that the private respondent has never been a tenant in any portion of the petitioner's sugar crusher area.

ISSUE.

 Whether or not the private respondent is a bona fide tenant of the particular piece of landholding disputed in this case?

RULING

NO.The claim of the private respondent that he was a tenant of the late Gregorio Santos was established purely by the self-serving testimony of the private respondent alone. Moreover, with respect to the sugar crusher area in question where banana plants were planted, there was no evidence of any sharing arrangement between the late Santos and the private respondent regarding the banana fruits. The act of giving the late Santos the cream of the crop of the banana harvests as presents or gift is definitely not the element of sharing contemplated by law to establish a tenancy relationship. Hence, the private respondent's right to security of tenure as a tenant over the sugar crusher land does not find any evidentiary support. The leasehold contract between the petitioner and the private respondent designated as "Kasunduan ng Pamumuwisan ng Lupang Sakahan" defines the landholding subject matter of the leasehold contract as:

l. . . . isang lupang sakahan sa Banga, Plaridel, Bulacan, na may sukat na limang (5) ektarya, humigit kumulang, at may binhing apat (4) kaban na palay.' (Rollo, p. 35)

There is no doubt that the northern portion of the petitioner's landholding is excluded from the leasehold agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent. Moreover, the private respondents own testimony admitted that the five-hectare landholding is adjacent to the petitioner's sugar crusher area thereby supporting the latter's claim that the said five hectare land is entirely separate and distinct from the portion under consideration. The leasehold agreement covers land primarily planted to rice. The disputed property is a piece of sugar crusher land.

Rule 130, section 7 of the Rules of Court categorically provides that:

SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements — when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.

xxx xxx xxx

If the parties in the aforementioned leasehold agreement intended to include the sugar crusher area in question then they could have embodies the same, with its bananas and mangoes, in their written agreement.

When the respondent agreed to be tenant over five hectares of riceland, he was not a tenant over the sugar crusher land. There was nothing to relinquish. What the respondent is trying to do is to include sugar crusher land in the riceland.

It is apparent from the records of this petition that after the execution of the leasehold agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent in 1964, the private respondent was prohibited from entering the northern portion of the petitioner's sugar crusher area. From the very start, the terms of the agreement are clear. The petitioner even fenced the said area and placed "no trespassing" signs around it. Disclosing the area in controversy disallowed the private respondent from exercising personal acts of cultivation as regards the said area. It did not form part of their agreement. Absent the elements of consent and personal cultivation by the alleged tenant, no tenancy relationship can be deemed created, not to mention the fact that no sharing arrangement is borne by the circumstances of the present case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION is GRANTED. The judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations dated December 14,1970 is REINSTATED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47045 November 22, 1988

NOBIO SARDANE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO J. ACOJEDO, respondents.

Y.G. Villaruz & Associates for petitioner.

Pelagio R. Lachica for private respondent.

FACTS

An action in the City Court of Dipolog for collection of a sum of P5,217.25 based on promissory notes executed by the herein private respondent Nobio Sardane in favor of the herein petitioner. Petitioner bases his right to collect on Exhibits B, C, D, E, F, and G executed on different dates and signed by private respondent Nobio Sardane.

It has been established in the trial court that on many occasions, the petitioner demanded the payment of the total amount of P5,217.25. The failure of the private respondent to pay the said amount prompted the petitioner to seek the services of lawyer who made a letter (Exhibit 1) formally demanding the return of the sum loaned. Because of the failure of the private respondent to heed the demands extrajudicially made by the petitioner, the latter was constrained to bring an action for collection of sum of money.

During the scheduled day for trial, private respondent failed to appear and to file an answer. On motion by the petitioner, the City Court of Dipolog issued an order dated May 18, 1976 declaring the private respondent in default and allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte. Based on petitioner's evidence, the City Court of Dipolog rendered judgment by default in favor of the petitioner.

Private respondent filed a motion to lift the order of default which was granted by the City Court in an order dated May 24, 1976, taking into consideration that the answer was filed within two hours after the hearing of the evidence presented ex-parte by the petitioner.

After the trial on the merits, the City Court of Dipolog rendered its decision on September 14, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:

(a) Ordering the defendant to pay unto the plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand Two Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Twenty-five centavos (P5,217.25) plus legal interest to commence from April 23, 1976 when this case was filed in court; and

(b) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P200.00 as attorney's fee and to pay the cost of this proceeding. 3

Therein defendant Sardane appealed to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte which reversed the decision of the lower court by dismissing the complaint and ordered the plaintiff-appellee Acojedo to pay said defendant-appellant P500.00 each for actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Plaintiff-appellee then sought the review of said decision by petition to the respondent Court. The petitioner appealed to court of appeals and said said court affirmed the decision of the City Court of Dipolog.

ISSUE                                       

 "Whether or not the ruling of the trial court is correct that the herein appellant can avail of the parol evidence rule to prove his side of the case and that i the said amount taken by him from appellee is or was not his personal debt to appellee, but expenses of the partnership between him and appellee."

RULING

The parol evidence rule in Rule 130 provides:

Sec. 7. Evidence of written agreements.—When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing except in the following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure to express the the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.

As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court the exceptions to the rule do not apply in this case as there is no ambiguity in the writings in question, thus:

In the case at bar, Exhibits B, C, and D are printed promissory notes containing a promise to pay a sum certain in money, payable on demand and the promise to bear the costs of litigation in the event of the private respondent's failure to pay the amount loaned when demanded extrajudicially. Likewise, the vales denote that the private respondent is obliged to return the sum loaned to him by the petitioner. On their face, nothing appears to be vague or ambigous, for the terms of the promissory notes clearly show that it was incumbent upon the private respondent to pay the amount involved in the promissory notes if and when the petitioner demands the same. It was clearly the intent of the parties to enter into a contract of loan for how could an educated man like the private respondent be deceived to sign a promissory note yet intending to make such a writing to be mere receipts of the petitioner's supposed contribution to the alleged partnership existing between the parties?

It has been established in the trial court that, the private respondent has been engaged in business for quite a long period of time--as owner of the Sardane Trucking Service, entering into contracts with the government for the construction of wharfs and seawall; and a member of the City Council of Dapitan (TSN, July 20, 1976, pp. 57-58).<äre||anº•1àw> It indeed puzzles us how the private respondent could have been misled into signing a document containing terms which he did not mean them to be. The Court of Appeals held, and the Supreme Court agrees, that even if evidence aliunde other than the promissory notes may be admitted to alter the meaning conveyed thereby, still the evidence is insufficient to prove that a partnership existed between the private parties hereto. On the foregoing premises and considerations, the respondent Court correctly reversed and set aside the appealed decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte and affirmed in full the decision of the City Court of Dipolog City in Civil Case No. A-1838, dated September 14, 1976.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against herein petitioner.

SO ORDERED

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997

RAFAEL S. ORTAÑES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES AND ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents.

FACTS

 The herein  respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The first deed of absolute sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628 and the second deed absolute sale covering TCT. No. 243273. Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from the former the delivery of said titles. ³ Private respondents, however, refused on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, ⁴ and petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.

The petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions ⁵ which were never reflected in the deeds of sale: ⁶

3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements have been met:

(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;

(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation;

(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants' lot to segregate his right of way;

(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred by reason of sale. . .

During trial, private respondent orally testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, ⁷ although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court still admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo.

ISSUE

Whether or not the parol evidence is admissible to establish the alleged oral conditions-precedent to a contract of sale even if the deeds of sale are silent on the four(4) conditions presented by the herein respondent?

RULING

NO. The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible on the following grounds;

 First, private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. ⁸ Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. ⁹ Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 ¹⁰ of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents

Secondly, the  argument of the private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation ¹⁴ where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may be established by parol evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this case. In the former, the contract sought to be enforced ¹⁵ expressly stated that it is subject to an agreement containing the conditions-precedent which were proven through parol evidence. While the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any pre-conditions or other agreement.

Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, ¹⁶ hence, contrary to the rule that:

The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to . . . the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. ¹⁷

Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." ¹⁸ No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.

Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible under the exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance:

[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper, interpretation of the instrument. ¹⁹

In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.

Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents' contention that they "put in issue by the pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record shows ²⁰ that private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the
intention ²¹ of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such issue must be, "squarely presented." ²² Private respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to prove during trial by parol evidence. ²³ Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. ²⁴ Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the records of this case REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition in accordance with this ruling.

SO ORDERED