etcubañas

COMILANG V BURCENA

GR 146853, Feb13, 2006

FACTS

                Francisco and Mariano Burcena (respondents), together w/ their mother, Dominga Reclusado Vda. de Burcena (Dominga), filed a complaint for annulment of document w/ damages against Salvador Comilang (petitioner).

                The complaint alleges that: respondents are the owners of a 918-sqm parcel of land located in Manueva, Santa, Ilocos Sur and the house with a floor area of 32 sqm built thereon; respondents acquired the subject property through their earnings while working abroad; the subject property was declared for taxation purposes in Dominga's name as administrator thereof; petitioner caused the execution of a Deed of Donation over said property by taking advantage of Dominga's blindness, old age and physical infirmity; the said Deed of Donation is null and void because: (a) Dominga had no right to donate the same since she is not its owner, (b) Dominga did not give her consent and was misled to the execution of such document, (c) granting Dominga had authority to donate, the donation is void because the property donated is the only property declared in her name and therefore she could not have reserved for herself in full ownership sufficient property to support herself; petitioner is in possession of the subject property, depriving respondents of its ownership and enjoyment of its fruits.

                In his Answer, petitioner contends that: the Deed of Donation was freely and voluntarily executed by Dominga in consideration of her love and affection for him; the subject property was acquired by Dominga together w/ her 2 sisters, Aniceta and Juana Reclusado, long before respondents went to Hawaii; Dominga erected a house on the land long before the outbreak of World War II; Dominga financed out of her own money the construction of the house and subsequent improvements thereof, she being a merchant when she could still travel to Cagayan Valley; granting that respondents had been sending money to Dominga, said money already belonged to her; if Dominga used said money for improving the house, respondents have no right over the house.

                During the pendency of the case and before she could take the witness stand, Dominga died. Following pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Witnesses for the plaintiffs were respondents and their aunt, Margarita Burcena (Margarita); while petitioner testified on his own behalf.

                RTC held that the donation is void because Dominga could not have validly disposed of the subject property since it was bought with the money sent by respondents while working abroad, although declared for taxation purposes in Dominga's name. (petitioner found in good faith -only has to turnover property)

                Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. The CA found no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as well as the latter's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The CA held that the case involves an implied trust known as purchase price resulting trust under Article 1448, CC where property sold is granted to one party but the price is paid for by another; that the evidence presented by the respondents convincingly show that the subject property was bought with money belonging to respondents but declared in Dominga's name as administrator thereof; and that Dominga's act of donating the property to petitioner was beyond her authority and capacity, done without the consent of the real owners, herein respondents. Thus, the CA sustained the conclusion of the RTC that the donation is void.

                Petitioner's MFR was denied.

ISSUE/S

                1. WON CA erred in discussing an issue not brought before it (implied trust)

                2. WON Margarita's statement on the witness stand (that Dominga told her that the respondents sent her money to buy the subject property) should                 not have been given weight or credence by the RTC and the CA because it is hearsay and has no probative value.

HELD

                1. NO.

                Reasoning An appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. (See R51, sec 8, ROC)

In this case, since the petitioner directly brought in issue on appeal in his Appellants Brief the declaration of the RTC that Dominga could not have validly disposed of the subject property because respondents are the real owners of the subject property since it was bought with money sent by them, it was well-within the CAs authority to review and evaluate the propriety of such ruling. In holding that an implied trust exists between respondents and Dominga in relation to the subject property and therefore Dominga had no right to donate the same to petitioner, the CA merely clarified the RTC's findings.

The trust created under the 1st sentence of Art 1448, CC is sometimes referred to as a purchase money resulting trust, the elements of which are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. Respondents have shown that the two elements are present in the instant case. Dominga was merely a trustee of the respondents in relation to the subject property. Therefore, Dominga could not have validly donated the subject property to petitioner, as expressly provided in Article 736, CC (guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.)

                2. NO.

                Ratio While it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.

Reasoning What was sought to be admitted in evidence, and what was actually admitted in evidence, was the fact that the statement was made by Dominga to Margarita, not necessarily that the matters stated by her were true. The statement attributed to Dominga regarding the source of the funds used to purchase the subject property related to the court by Margarita is admissible if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof.

Besides, the testimony of Margarita is not the main basis for the RTC decision. In fact, her testimony is not indispensable. It merely serves to corroborate the testimonies of the respondents on the source of the funds used in purchasing the subject property. The testimonies of all three witnesses for the plaintiffs were found to be convincing and credible by the RTC. This Court will not alter the findings of the RTC on the credibility of witnesses, principally because trial courts have vastly superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying.

Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

People of The Philippines vs Antonio Silvano

G.R. No. 144886, April 29, 2002

Facts:

                This is an appealed case of the  crime of rape committed by the accused ANTONIO SILVANO on October 7, 1991 in Inudaran, Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato. More than a year after, a criminal complaint was filed in the MCTC of Pigcawayan-Alamada Cotabato. After preliminary investigation, the acting judge found probable cause and remanded the case to the provincial prosecutor. And then, in a resolution, the provincial prosecution office in Kidapawan, Cotabato modified the judge's findings and recommended the filing of consummated rape with homicide against the accused-appellant for the following reasons:

               

                                That the said accused, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, willfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation,                                                 succeeded in having carnal knowledge with one MARAMANAY TOMAS against her will, that after the occasion the said accused, with intent to                                            kill, stabbed the victim hitting her on the different parts of her body, which is the direct and proximate cause of her death thereafter.

                Four witnesses were presented by the prosecution: Constancio Jimenez, accused-appellant's nephew; Samotor Polayagan, the person who found the body of the victim at the crime scene; Onotan Tomas, the victim's father; and Dr. Ebenezer Demetillo who conducted the necropsy. When Doctor Demetillo testified, he described how the victim died, how many stab wounds inflicted and its wounds' location and he's examination on the genetalia of the victim. According to him, there are two fatal stab wounds inflicted, one in the supracelanicular area penetrating the upper right lung and the other is at the neck cutting the jugular vein, which can cause the immediate dead of the victim even if it was only the wounds inflicted, as earlier mentioned. Also, he conducted an examination the different parts of the victim's body, from head to foot, including the victim's genitalia which he repeated stated that he did not find any in his findings. When Constancio Jimenez was presented, the accused-appellant allegedly confessed to him, at the birthday party of his son, that the accused-appellant had raped and killed the girl. On his cross-examination, however, he stated that he did not see the crime and was only told of the confession of the accused during the birthday party. Also, it was found out that Jimenez only testified as an act of vengeance due to his hatred against the accused. The father of the victim only testified with regards to the expenses he had incurred during his daughter's wake and death anniversary. Polayagan testified on what he saw and where she found the body of the victim.

               

Issues:

                Whether or not the accused is guilty of consummated rape with homicide

Ruling

                Jimenez was competent to testify only as to the substance of what he had heard, but not as to the truth thereof. However, despite its ruling during trial that it is admitting Jimenez’s account as an independently relevant statement, the trial court considered the substance of accused-appellant’s alleged statements to Jimenez as true and then proceeded to justify conviction of accused-appellant on circumstantial evidence. In its consideration of the contents of accused-appellant’s alleged statements to Jimenez, the trial court treated them as an extrajudicial confession made to a private party, and not just as an independent relevant statement. This is error. As previously noted, Jimenez admitted on cross-examination that there was bad blood between him and accused-appellant. It was, therefore, improbable that accused-appellant went to Jimenez’s house for the birthday of the latter’s son, on the occasion of which accused-appellant confessed to the crime. It is even more improbable that accused-appellant confessed to the crime. It is even more improbable that accused-appellant made his confession in the presence of other people. Jimenez named three persons as being allegedly present when accused-appellant made his confession. These were Garcia Payot, Donita Payot, and Orlando Mojado. However, not one of this persons was presented to corroborate Jimenez’s claim.

We are more inclined to believe accused-appellant’s claim that on the date in question he was in his house in Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato and that he had never gone to Sitio Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato. Accused-appellant denied Constancio Jimenez’s allegation that he had transferred residence several times, as well as Onotan Tomas’ allegation that accused-appellant was his neighbor in Sitio Mapurok, Alamada, Cotabato. Accused-appellant maintained that he had been a resident of Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato since his childhood.

Second. There is no evidence that the victim was raped. However, in finding that the victim had been raped, the trial court stated:

Dr. Demetillo testified that he also examined the [genitalia] of the victim but he did not enter any finding in the report as he did not find any.

The Supreme Court consistently ruled that a medical certificate is not [indispensable] to prove the commission of rape. The Highest Court also consistently ruled that lack of lacerated wounds does not negate sexual intercourse.

The trial court is correct  in ruling that the absence of lacerated wounds in the genitalia does not necessarily mean that rape had not been committed. Rape, however, is never presumed. We agree with the Solicitor General, who recommends that accused-appellant be absolved of the charge of rape,  that there must at least be some evidence of finger grips and contusion on the body of the victims, torn garment, and lacerations, redness, and swelling, especially of the genital area, to prove rape.

Indeed, not only is there no proof of rape in this case but the witness for the prosecution who conducted the necropsy categorically stated that he did not have any findings concerning victim’s genitalia.

Third. Nor can accused-appellant be held responsible for the death of the victim. Evidence showing a mere possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant a conviction. In this case, the trial court stated –

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

From the very start of the investigation, accused Silvano was the principal suspect. After the incident, the accused left Macabasa, Alamada and transferred his residence to Midsayap, Cotabato and finally at Libungan, Cotabato where he was arrested. The accused’s flight is a strong indication of guilt  for flight evidences culpability and a guilty conscience, and it strongly indicates a guilty mind or betrays the existence of a guilty conscience. The accused never explained why he fled after the incident took place. The accused’s admission is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti e.g. the corpse of victim Maramanay Tomas. The accused’s admission that he stabbed and killed the victim is further corroborated by the findings of Dr. Ebenezer Demetillo that the victim sustained twenty-one (21) stab wounds.

There is no circumstantial evidence to show accused-appellant's guilt:

1. Disregarding accused-appellant’s alleged admission, the only factual circumstance left is that of flight. Even this is in question in the face of accused-appellant’s assertion that he is actually a resident of Brgy. Kapayawi, Libungan, Cotabato since childhood.

2. The assertion that accused-appellant was a principal suspect from the start of the investigation is not corroborated by evidence.

3. There is no proof that accused-appellant was, or could have been, in the place and at the time of the commission of the crime in question.

4. The injuries sustained by the victim Maramanay Tomas, do not indicate the probability that accused-appellant raped and killed her, if at all.

5. The tubao allegedly found near the cadaver of the victim and turned over to the police was not identified, marked, and offered as evidence nor in any case shown to belong to accused-appellant.

As we have held:

Accused-appellant’s conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences derived are proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events that can reasonably lead to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the author of the crime. . . . Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

Fourth. The prosecution thus failed to prove accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To secure a conviction, it is not enough that the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or even a probability of guilt. Moral certainty that the accused committed the crime is required. That alibi (which accused-appellant invokes) is the weakest defense is irrelevant. For when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.

The decision was reversed and set aside. The accused-appellant ANTONIO SILVANO was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.