G.R. No.
143340 August 15, 2001
LILIBETH
SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners,
vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
FACTS
Lamberto Chua alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered
into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane LPG. For business convenience, Lamberto and
Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership,
SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER, under the name of Jacinto as a sole
proprietorship. Both Lamberto and
Jacinto contributed P100,000.00 to the partnership, with the intention that the
profits would be equally divided between them.
The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted
by Josephine Sy, sister-in-law of Lamberto.
Upon Jacinto’s death in the later part of 1989, his daughter, Lilibeth
took over the operations of Shellite without Lamberto’s consent. Despite Lamberto’s repeated demands for
accounting, she failed to comply.
On June 22m 1992, Lamberto filed a complaint against
Lilibeth with the RTC. RTC decided in
favor of Lamberto.
Lilibeth questions the correctness of the finding that a
partnership existed between Lamberto and Jacinto. In the absence of any written document to
show such partnership between Lamberto and Jacinto, Lilibeth argues that these
courts were proscribed from hearing the testimonies of Lamberto and his
witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three (3) years after
Jacinto’s death.
To support the argument, Lilibeth invokes the “DEAD MAN’S
STATUTE OR SURVIVORSHIP RULE” under Sec. 23, Rule 130. Lilibeth thus implores this Court to rule
that the testimonies of Lamberto and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have
been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto).
ISSUE
Whether or not the “DEAD MAN’S STATUTE” applies to this
case so as to render inadmissible Lamberto’s testimony and that if his witness,
Josephine.
HELD
No. The “Dead Man’s Statute” provides that if one party
to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or
other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue
advantage of giving his own contradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.
Lilibeth filed a compulsory counterclaim
against Lamberto in their answer before the RTC, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, Lilibeth herself effectively removed this case from the ambit of
the “Dead Man’s Statute”. Well
entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, Lamberto, may
testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in
the counterclaim, Lamberto is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of
fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been
bought against but by the estate or representatives of the deceased.
The testimony of Josephine is not
covered by the “Dead Man’s Statute” for the simple reason that she is not “a
party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted”. Lamberto offered the
testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
Lamberto and Jacinto. Lilibeth’s
insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of Lamberto does not make her an
assignor because of the term “assignor” of a party means “assignor of a cause
of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any
cause of action has arisen”. Plainly
then, Josephine is merely a witness of Lamberto, latter being the plaintiff.
Lilibeth’s reliance alone on the “Dead
Man’s Statue” to defeat Lamberto’s claim cannot prevail over the factual
findings that a partnership was established between Lamberto and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence,
but the documentary evidence as well, they considered the evidence for Lamberto
as sufficient to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.
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