5%
PER ITEM.
CASE
PROBLEM NO. 1. Rederick A. Recio,
a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[i][4]
They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [ii][5]
a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen,
as shown by a “Certificate of Australian Citizenship” issued by the Australian
government.[iii][6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on
January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[iv][7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent
was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”[v][8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[vi][9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[vii][10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January
12, 1994. She claimed that she learned
of respondent’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993,
he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.[viii][11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had
been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[ix][12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couple’s
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending --
respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.”[x][13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be
dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of action.[xi][14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[xii][15] The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.[xiii][16] After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was
submitted for resolution.[xiv][17]
Question: Respondent contends
that (1) the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied
with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws
of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. (2) Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine
courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice
of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion. Are these contentions (1)
and (2) correct? Why?
ANSWER:
The burden of proof lies with “the party who alleges the existence
of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.”[xv][41]
In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations
of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the
burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters.[xvi][42]
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws.[xvii][43]
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.[xviii][44]
The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.(Garcia v. Recio, GR 138322, Oct. 2, 2007).
CASE
PROBLEM NO.2. Plaintiffs-appellants,
with co-plaintiffs-appellants Leonora Prietos and Luzviminda Antig who were
lessees of the apartment units, filed a case for damages against
defendants-appellees Harry John Viloriam [sic], Margarita Milagros Viloria, and
John P. Young. The complaint alleged
that by reason of the gross negligence and want of care of the construction
workers and employees of the defendants-appellees, the bunkhouse or workers'
quarters in the construction site caught fire spreading rapidly, burning the
adjacent buildings owned by plaintiffs-appellants. Due to the negligence of defendants-appellees
which resulted in the fire, plaintiffs-appellants suffered actual damages
representing the value of the buildings and other personal properties.
Defendant-appellee John Young, the building
contractor, in his answer, contended that he can not be held responsible even
if there was negligence on the part of the employees for he had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
workers. Plaintiffs-appellants had no
cause of action against him. As
counterclaim, defendant-appellee Young sought for moral damages in the amount
of P200,000.00, and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 and
attorney's fees of P10,000.00.
Defendants-appell[ees] Harry and Margarita Viloria
also alleged that plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of action against
them. The fire court not have been
caused by gross negligence of their workers for they did not have any worker in
the construction of their building. The
said construction was being undertaken by the independent contractor, John
Young, who hired and supervised his own workers. The newly constructed building was partially
destroyed by the fire. As counterclaim, defendants-appell[ees]
prayed for moral damages in the sum of P2,500,000.00, exemplary damages
of P100,000.00 and attorney's fees of P20,000.00.
One of the documentary evidences offered is the Fire Investigation
Report, duly signed by the officer of the day. Petitioners assert that the Fire Investigation Report[xix][21] by an official of the Cebu City Fire Station should have
been admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. Some confusion surrounds the issue of admissibility of
the Fire Investigation Report (Exhibits “A,” “A-1” to “A-4” inclusive). The
record discloses that the officer who signed the report, Fire Major Eduardo P.
Enriquez, was subpoenaed at the request of and testified in open court for
petitioners. He identified the Report,
which petitioners offered in their Offer of Exhibits[xx][25]
as:
(1) Part of the testimony of Major Eduardo
P. Enriquez;
(2) To prove that an impartial
investigation has determined that the "fire started at the generator ...
within the construction site" (Exhibit "A-3").
Private
respondents objected to Exhibits “A,” “A-1” to “A-4,” inclusive, for being
“hearsay and incompetent evidence.”[xxi][26] The trial court then denied their admission “for being hearsay,
this fact admitted by witness himself, F/Maj. Eduardo Enriquez, as part of
whose testimony said exhibits were offered.”[xxii][27]
Question: Is the Court correct in
not admitting the Fire Investigation Report for being hearsay and incompetent?
What is the applicable rule on the matter ?
if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on his report, would your
answer be different?.
ANSWER: In light of
the purposes for which the exhibits in question were offered, as aforestated,
the trial court erred in rejecting all of them as hearsay. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness
stand and was available for cross-examination, the portions of the report which
were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and
conclusions were not hearsay. The rest
of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the parties based on
their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as well as the
latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer, may then be
considered as independently relevant statements which were gathered in
the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof.
It has been said that:
“Where, regardless of the truth or
falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay
rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.”[xxiii][28]
When Major Enriquez took the
witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made himself
available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it
proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively
removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away
with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record,
considers the matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries
in said official record admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence
of the facts therein stated. The
underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and
trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon:[xxiv][29]
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is
daily needed; the occasions in which the officials would be summoned from his
ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily
work something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official
sources. Were there no exception for official
statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of
their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering their deposition
before an officer. The work of
administration of government and the interest of the public having business
with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a
certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to private
documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular
confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their
several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they
do in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be
true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each
case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez
was not presented to testify on his report.
In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 130 would have been
ripe for determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of
Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third
requisite was not satisfied. The
statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to
qualify as "official information," there being no showing that, at
the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.(Rodriguez
v. Viloria, GR 121964, JUNE 17, 1997)
CASE PROBLEM NO. 3. On May 21,
1982, petitioner Dumez Company, a French company, through petitioner
Trans-Orient Engineers, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines, engaged the services of private respondent Veronico
Ebilane as carpenter for one of its projects in the Middle East, with Riyadh,
Saudi Arabia, as his place of actual employment. The parties executed and
signed a one-year overseas employment agreement embodying the terms and
conditions of private respondent's employment.
Private respondent commenced performance of said
contract on July 3, 1982. On August 31, 1982, while at the job site,
private respondent was suddenly seized by abdominal pain and rushed to the
Riyadh Central Hospital were appendectomy was performed on him. During
his confinement, he developed right-sided weakness and numbness and difficulty
of speaking which was found to have been caused by Atrial Fibrillation and CVA
embolism.
In a letter dated September 22, 1982, petitioners
formally terminated private respondent's employment effective September 29,
1982, up to which time petitioners paid private respondent his salaries under
his employment contract. Thereafter, on October 13, 1982, private
respondent was repatriated to Manila.
On November 23, 1982, private respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners. Such complaint was
filed with the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA.
In deciding the case in favor of respondent, the POEA took judicial
notice of Social Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia.
Question:
is the POEA correct in taking judicial notice of the Social Insurance Law of
Saudi Arabia, which was not duly proved during the hearing? Explain.
ANSWER: The POEA Administrator, in finding petitioners liable to
private respondent for medical benefits accruing to the latter under the Social
Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia, took judicial notice of the said law. To this extent, the POEA Administrator's
actuations are legally defensible. We
have earlier ruled in Norse Management Co. (PTE) vs. National Seamen
Board[xxv][12]
that evidence is usually a matter of procedure of which a mere quasi-judicial
body is not strict about. Although in a
long line of cases, we have ruled that a foreign law, being a matter of
evidence must be alleged and proved, in order to be recognized and applied in a
particular controversy involving conflicts of laws, jurisprudence on this
matter was not meant to apply to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies in the light of the well-settled rule that administrative and
quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. (Dumez Company
v. NLRC, GR 74495, July 11, 1996)
CASE PROBLEM NO.
4. Petitioner was born
on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived
at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he
has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started
his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July
4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as
required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law,
stated —
17. That he has
heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the
Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was
not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on
Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such
that processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was
suspended;
During
the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac
Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the
court whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness
against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor,
with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the
sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of
the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that
petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And
for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute
the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner
himself. 3
Accordingly,
on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known;
(2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No.
473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known
lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient
or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his
petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4
The Court of Appeals reversed
the lower court, and appreciated the documents annexed to the records but which
were not offered by the Solicitor General.
The petitioner appealed to the
Supreme Court assigning as error: that the appellate
court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the
State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally
offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary
value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered.
Rule on the assigned error: was
it correct for the CA to appreciate evidence not formally offered?
ANSWER:
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in
considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its
appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the
trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as
evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary
value,"[1][12] so it
was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The
contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143[2][13] of the
Rules of Court which provides that -
These
rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added)
Prescinding
from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied
by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and
convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the
more practical and convenient course of action considering that decision in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.[3][14]
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later
on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the
same documents.(Ong Chia v. Republic, GR 127240, March 27, 2000)
CASE PROBLEM
NO. 5.
Private respondents are brothers who were engaged in the business of forwarding
and transporting "balikbayan" boxes from California, U.S.A. to Metro
Manila, Philippines. Manuel J. Salazar (hereinafter "Manuel") managed
the Philippine side via MANSAL Forwarders, a business registered in his
name with principal office at No. 48 Scout Tobias Street, Quezon City. On the
other hand, Mario J. Salazar (hereinafter "Mario") handled the U.S.
side of the forwarding business as General Manager of M.J.S. International,
Inc., a corporation with principal office at No. 3400 Fletcher Drive, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
According
to the petitioner, sometime in February of 1989, while he was in Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., Mario tried to convince him to invest some money in the
said business. Mario had allegedly represented that petitioner's money will be
held in trust and administered by both him and his brother for the exclusive
use of their forwarding and transporting business. Petitioner further alleged
that Mario promised him a return on his investment equivalent to ten per centum
(10%) for one month, at the end of which, his money plus interest earned shall
be returned to him.
When
petitioner returned to the Philippines, it was Manuel's turn to persuade him to
part with his money under the said investment scheme. Eventually convinced by
the private respondents’ representations and assurances, petitioner agreed to
invest the total amount of US $34,000.00 which he entrusted to his aunt,
Liwayway Dee Tanzo, who was residing in the U.S.A. Thus, petitioner issued
several personal checks made out to Liwayway Dee Tanzo,. or
to "Calfed", or
payable to cash. Except for California Federal Check No. 322 which was encashed
by Mario himself, private respondents received the proceeds of the above checks
through Liwayway Dee Tanzo on several occasions in August 1989.
Meanwhile,
Mario encountered serious liquidity problems that
prompted him to petition the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for a release from his debts
on September 27, 1990. He was ordered "released from all dischargeable
debts" by the said court on January 25, 1991.
Upon
the expiration of the thirty (30) day investment period, petitioner demanded
from Mario in the States and Manuel in Quezon City proper accounting of his
financial investment and/or the return of his capital plus interest earned. At
the outset, private respondents avoided their obligation to petitioner by
making various excuses but after persistent demands by the latter, Manuel
finally admitted that their shipments had encountered some problems with the
Bureau of Customs. Thus, on January 29, 1990, Manuel executed a letter
authorizing the petitioner to withdraw documents to assist in the release of
their shipments from the Bureau of Customs. However, when petitioner attempted
to secure the release of the "balikbayan" boxes from the Bureau of
Customs, he discovered that the same had actually contained smuggled goods and
were accordingly seized and forfeited in favor of the government.
To
prove that the money was not in trust, but a loan, the respondents offered as
evidence its previous transactions of loan with other friends in the U.S. .
Manuel offered in evidence copies of the contracts of loan entered into between
M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo, which are contracts of loan and
not trust agreements.
Petitioner
object to the admissibility of said evidence, as they are irrelevant to the
contract of trust agreements that was entered between him and Mario.
Rule
on his contention.
ANSWER: The contention is wrong. The Supreme
Court rules: “We agree with the petitioner that these loan contracts do not by
themselves prove that his agreement with the private respondents was also a
loan. As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, he is not a party to these
contracts that clearly stipulate "Liwayway Dee Tanzo" as creditor and "M.J.S.
International represented by its General Manager, Mario J. Salazar" as
debtor.
These loan contracts may, however, be given
evidentiary value in support of Manuel's claim that the agreement with
petitioner was no different from the loan contracts with Liwayway
Dee Tanzo. Under the rule of res inter
alios acta, evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time
is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing
at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the
like.[4][13]
Elaborating thus, we have held that:
[C]ollateral
facts may be received as evidence under exceptional circumstances, as when
there is a rational similarity or resemblance between the conditions giving
rise to the fact offered and the circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to
be proved. Evidence of similar acts may frequently become relevant,
especially in actions based on fraud and deceit, because it sheds light on the
state of mind or knowledge of a person; it provides insight into such person's
motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme, design or plan; or it reveals a
mistake.[5][14]
(Underscoring supplied). S-jcj
The
series of transactions between M.J.S. International and Liwayway
Dee Tanzo were entered into under similar
circumstances as those surrounding the contract between petitioner and Mario.
Just like the alleged trust agreement between petitioner and Mario, the loan
contracts between M.J.S. International and Liwayway Dee Tanzo provide that the creditors shall
lend to the debtor a specific amount for use by the latter in its business
operations.[6][15]
Petitioner also admits that he entrusted the checks to Liwayway
Dee Tanzo for investment in private
respondents' business. This shows that private respondents were transacting
directly with Liwayway Dee Tanzo
in the usual manner that they conduct business, that is the loan of money for
stipulated interest. Hence, private respondents' modus operandi, if
there ever was one, in raising additional capital for M.J.S. International was
to borrow money from willing investors. It is thus unlikely, considering the
scheme of things, that private respondents would all of a sudden deviate from
an established business practice to enter into a trust agreement with the
petitioner” (Tanzo v. Drilon, GR 106671, March 30, 2000).
PROBLEM NO. 6. In a land
dispute, the parties appeared before the barangay council,which rendered a
decision of the conflicting claims which they presented before said
council.Said barangay decision was contained in a document termed as Administrative Case No. 4,
During
trial said documentary exhibit was offered, which the court admitted and
appreciated in deciding in favor of the appellants.In their first assignment,
appellants assail the admission in evidence over the objection of the appellant
of Exhibit "3." This exhibit is a decision in favor of the
defendant-appellee against herein plaintiff-appellant Grace Ventura, by the council
of Barrio of San Pascual, Tuba, Benguet, in its Administrative Case No. 4, for
the settlement of ownership and possession of the land.
Question: Is Exh. 3 admissible as evidence in court?
ANSWER: The
decision of the Barrio Council of San Pascual, Tuba, Banguet, in its
Administrative Case No. 4, for the settlement of ownership and possession of
the land in question is ultra vires because barrio councils, which are not
courts, have no judicial powers (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, Constitution; see Sec. 12,
Rep. Act No. 2370, otherwise known as the Barrio Charter). Said administrative
order if presented as exhibit is inadmissible in a judicial proceeding as
evidence for ascertaining the truth respecting the fact of ownership and
possession (Sec. 1, Rule 128, Rules of Court). (MIGUEL V. Catalino [G.R. No. L-23072. November 29, 1968.])
PROBLEM NO 7.How would you state your objections to the following:
A)
: “You stated in your last testimony that you saw A driving the car, why are
you now insisting that A was not driving”, when what the witness had merely
said was that he had seen A seated on the front seat of the vehicle.
B) : Does ABC or did
ABC produce the goods that your company was intending to buy?
C) “Tell us in your
own words, what happed?”
d) “How is it that you
can recollect a date as long ago as that and you cannot remember the day of the
week?”
E) : “Did you know
that the accused had been beating his wife nightly?:, when there is no prior
evidence that such was the case. Or if the accused is the one asked: “When did
you stop beating your wife?”, when there is no evidence that he had been
beating his wife.
Answers: A)Objection, Your Honor, the question is
misleading.”
B)“Objection, Your Honor, it is compound
question”.
C)“Your Honor, the question calls for a
narrative answer”.
D)“Objection,
Your Honor, the question is argumentative. ”or“Objection, Your Honor, the
question is harassing the witness.”
E)“Objection,
Your Honor, the question assumes facts not in evidence.
Problem no. 8: What is a judicial admission? When is it mandatory? Discretionary? And
when is hearing necessary?
ANSWER: Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts
of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions. (1a)
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions. (1a)
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce
its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After the
trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material
issue in the case. (n)
Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written,
made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (2a)
PROBLEM NO. 9. When the original of document is in the custody of public
officer or is recorded in a public office, how would you prove its contents?
ANSWER: Section 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.
— When the original of document is in the custody of public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
PROBLEM NO. 10. Who are the persons under the rules
of evidence who cannot testify because of a “Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication.”?
ANSWER: Section
24. Disqualification
by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot
testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The
husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without
the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the
other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or
the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
(b) An
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the
client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity;
(c) A
person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil
case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or
treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient;
(d) A
minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the
confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him
in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the
church to which the minister or priest belongs;
(e) A
public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as
to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that
the public interest would suffer by the disclosure. (21a)
PROBLEM NO. 11. When is “Previous Conduct as
Evidence” admissible and when is it not admissible?
ANSWER: 4. Previous Conduct as Evidence
Section 34. Similar acts as evidence. — Evidence that one did or did not
do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did
not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it may be received to
prove a specific intent or knowledge; identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage, and the like. (48a)
Section 35. Unaccepted offer. — An offer in writing to pay a particular
sum of money or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal property
is, if rejected without valid cause, equivalent to the actual production and
tender of the money, instrument, or property. (49a)
PROBLEM NO. 12.Delfin I. Cruz and Adoracion Cruz were spouses and their children
were Thelma, Nerissa, Arnel and Gerry Cruz.
Upon the death of Delfin I. Cruz, [his] surviving spouse and children
executed on August 22, 1977 a notarized Deed of Partial Partition (Exhibit 2)
by virtue of which each one of them was given a share of several parcels of
registered lands all situated in Taytay, Rizal.
The following day, August 23, 1977, the same mother and children
executed a Memorandum Agreement (Exhibit H) which provided:
“That the parties hereto are common co-owners pro-indiviso
in equal shares of the following registered real properties, all situated at
Taytay, Rizal, Philippines, x x x.
x x x
That sometime on August 22, 1977, a Deed of Partial Partition was
executed among us before Atty. Virgilio J. Tamayo, Notary Public on and for the
Province of Rizal, per Doc. No. 1776; Page No. 14; of his Notarial Register No.
XLIX, Series of 1977;
x x x
That as a result of said partial partition, the properties
affected were actually partitioned and the respective shares of each party,
adjudicated to him/her;
That despite the execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and
the eventual disposal or sale of their respective shares, the contracting
parties herein covenanted and agreed among themselves and by these presents do
hereby bind themselves to one another that they shall share alike and received
equal shares from the proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted to and
adjudicated in their individual names by virtue of this deed of partial
partition.’
That this Agreement shall continue to be valid and enforceable
among the contracting parties herein up to and until the last lot covered by
the Deed of [P]artial [P]artition above adverted to shall have been disposed of
or sold and the proceeds thereof equally divided and their respective shares
received by each of them.”
This Memorandum Agreement was registered and annotated in the
titles of the lands covered by the Deed of Partial Partition.
Subsequently, the same parties caused the consolidation and
subdivisions of the lands they respectively inherited from the late Delfin I.
Cruz per Deed of Partial Partition.
After that, they registered the Deed of Partial Partition and subdivision
plans and titles were issued in their names.
In the case of Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, the following titles were issued to
her in her name: TCT No. 502603 (Exhibit A), TCT No. 502604, (Exhibit B), TCT
No. 502605 (Exhibit C), TCT No. 502606 (Exhibit D), TCT No. 502608 (Exhibit E),
TCT No. 502609 (Exhibit F), TCT No. 502610 (Exhibit G), hereinafter called the
lands in question. Naturally, the
annotation pertaining to the Memorandum Agreement was carried in each of said seven
(7) titles and annotated in each of them.
Meanwhile, the spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos filed Civil
Case No. 31231 against the spouses Nerissa Cruz-Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo for a
sum of money. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI (Quezon City) rendered a decision of June 1, 1981
in favor of Eliseo and Virginia condemning the spouses Nerissa and Nelson
Tamayo to pay them P126,529.00 with 12% interest per annum from the
filing of the complaint plus P5,000.00 attorney’s fee. After the finality of that decision, a writ
of execution (Exhibit J) was issued on November 20, 1981.
Enforcing said writ, the sheriff of the court levied upon the
lands in question. On June 29, 1983,
these properties were sold in an execution sale to the highest bidders, the
spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos.
Accordingly, the sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale (Exhibit K) over
–
‘… all the rights, claims, interests, titles, shares, and
participations of defendant spouses Nerissa Tamayo and Nelson Tamayo..’
Nerissa Cruz Tamayo failed to exercise her right of redemption
within the statutory period and so the final deed of sale was executed by the
sheriff conveying the lands in question to spouses Eliseo and Virginia
Malolos. The Malolos couple asked
Nerissa Cruz Tamayo to give them the owner’s duplicate copy of the seven (7)
titles of the lands in question but she refused. The couple moved the court to compel her to
surrender said titles to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for cancellation. This was granted on September 7, 1984. But Nerissa was adamant. She did not comply with the Order of the
court and so the Malolos couple asked the court to declare said titles as null
and void.
During the trial of the civil case, some of the documentary
evidence presented were mortgage and sale transactions entered by the other
sisters and brothers of Nerissa Tamayo.Said evidence were objected for being
immaterial and irrelevant.
The trial court that these pieces of evidence are applicable under
the res inter alios acta rule and the principle of independent and relevant
statements. Do you agree? What do you understand concerning the said
principles?
ANSWER: Res inter alios acta,
as a general rule, prohibits the admission of evidence that tends to show that
what a person has done at one time is probative of the contention that he has
done a similar as act at another time.[xxvi][24] Evidence of similar acts or occurrences compels the dependant to
meet allegations that are not mentioned in the complaint, confuses him in his
defense, raises a variety of irrelevant issues, and diverts the attention of
the court from the issues immediately before it. Hence, this evidentiary rule guards against
the practical inconvenience of trying collateral issues and protracting the
trial and prevents surprise or other mischief prejudicial to litigants.[xxvii][25]
The rule,
however, is not without exception. While
inadmissible in general, collateral facts may be received as evidence under
exceptional circumstances, as when there is a rational similarity or
resemblance between the conditions giving rise to the fact offered and the
circumstances surrounding the issue or fact to be proved.[xxviii][26] Evidence of similar acts
may frequently become relevant, especially in actions based on fraud and
deceit, because it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of a person’s;
it provides insight into such person’s motive or intent; it uncovers a scheme,
design or plan; or it reveals a mistake.[xxix][27]
In this
case, petitioners argue that transactions relating to the other parcels of land
they entered into, in the concept of absolute owners, are inadmissible as
evidence to show that the parcels in issue are not co-owned. The court is not persuaded. Evidence of such transactions falls under the
exception to the rule on the res inter alios acta. Such evidence is admissible because it is
relevant to an issue in the case and corroborative of evidence already
received.[xxx][28] The relevancy of such transactions is readily apparent. The nature of ownership of said property
should be the same as that of the lots on question since they are all subject
to the MOA. If the parcels of land were
held and disposed by petitioners in fee simple, in the concept of absolute
owners, then the lots in question should similarly be treated as absolutely
owned in fee simple by the Tamayo spouses.
Unmistakably, the evidence in dispute manifests petitioners’ common
purpose and design to treat all the parcels of land covered by the DPP as
absolutely owned and not subject to co-ownership.[xxxi][29]
Under the
principle of estoppel, petitioners are barred from claiming co-ownership
of the lands in issue. In estoppel,
a person, who by his deed or conduct has introduced another to act in a
particular manner, is barred from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude
or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to another.[xxxii][30] It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has, in
the contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and proceedings of
judicial or legislative officers or by the act of the party himself, either by
conventional writing or by representations, express or implied or in pairs.[xxxiii][31]
In their
transaction with others, petitioners have declared that the other lands covered
by the same MOA are absolutely owned,
without indicating the existence of a co-ownership over such properties. Thus, they are estopped from claiming
otherwise because, by their very own acts and representations as evidenced by
the deeds of mortgage and of sale, they have denied such co-ownership. (CRUZ
V.MALOLOS, GR126713, JULY 27, 1998)
PROBLEM NO. 13 A) In
a land dispute, the defendants offered to compromise the case by offering
P20,000 cash for the dismissal of the case. The plaintiffs did not agree, and
so the case for recovery of possession pushed through. During trial, the plaintiff
testified about the offer of compromise. The defendant objected to its
admissibility. As judge would you admit said testimony?
B) In a criminal case
for malicious mischief, the accused offered to pay 5,000 pesos to pay for the
broken bottles of beer, and asks for the dismissal of the criminal case. During
the trial, the offer was used as evidence to prove the criminal liability of
the accused. Is said evidence admissible as an implied admission of guilt?
Would your answer be the same is the crime charged is reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide?
c) In a physical
injuries case, the accused offered to pay the medical and hospital expenses.
Can this be considered as proof of civil or criminal liability of the accused?
ANSWER:
Section 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil cases, an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal
cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromised by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
A plea of
guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of guilty to lesser
offense, is not admissible in evidence against the accused who made the plea or
offer.
An offer to
pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an
injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal liability
for the injury. (24a)
PROBLEM NO. 14. Some examples of the exceptions
to the hearsay rule are the following:
Section 37. Dying
declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made underthe
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death. (31a)
Section 38.
Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the
fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary
to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons. (32a)
Section 39.
Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons
is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
"pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree. (33a)
Section 40.
Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or
tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness
testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings
on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree. (34a)
Section 41.
Common reputation. — Common reputation existing previous to the
controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty
years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence.
Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of
common reputation. (35)
Section 42.
Part of res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a starting
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res
gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae. (36a)
QUESTION: State the other five exceptions, and
explain each.
ANSWER: Section
43. Entries
in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of transactions
to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a
position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty. (37a)
Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or
by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38)
Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of
matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list,
register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending
to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used
and relied upon by them therein. (39)
Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise, periodical or
pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending
to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial
notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his
profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a)
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same
parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party
who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a)
Problem No. 15:
The general rule is that leading questions are not allowed during trial. State
some exceptions to the rule.
ANSWER: Section
10. Leading
and misleading questions. — A question which suggests to the witness
the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not
allowed, except:
(a) On
cross examination;
(b) On
preliminary matters;
(c) When
there is a difficulty is getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness
who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a
deaf-mute;
(d) Of an
unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a
witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party.
PROBLEM NO. 16. In a criminal
case for murder, a thumbmarked affidavit was presented as evidence. The
affidavit was not testified in court by
the affiant. The affidavit runs (excerpt) as follows:
Q: Do
you believe in GOD?
A: Yes.
Q: What
is your name?
A: Paulino
Baquiran, Jr.
Q: What
happen (sic) to you:
A: I
was shot.
Q: Who
shot you?
A: Cpl.
Tuting Ugaddan.
Q: When?
A: At
about 9:00 o’clock, January 27, 1991.
Q: Where?
A:: At
the Geraldine (sic) Canteen, Lingaling, Tumauini, Isabela.
Q: How
do you feel?
QUESTION: Is such affidavit
admissible to prove the guilt of the accused? Why?
ANSWER: The defense simply failed to offer any piece of evidence
attributing to said prosecution witness any foul motive to falsely accused and
incriminate a fellow officer in so grave a crime.[xxxv][23] Absence of evidence as to improper motive actuating said witness
of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain that no such motive existed and,
thus, his credibility is strengthened[xxxvi][24] and his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[xxxvii][25]
Dying declaration though generally hearsay are admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to Section 37 of Rule
130.[xxxviii][26] The above declaration under the factual milieu of this case, has
the vestiges of the accepted elements for the admissibility of a dying
declaration which are:
-- the declaration must concern the crime and sorrounding
circumstances of the declarant’s death;
-- it was made at a time when the declarant was under the consciousness
of an impending death;
-- the declarant would be competent to testify;
Said
declaration pertains to the identity of the declarant’s assailant and the instances
that transpired concerning what happened to him. At the time that declaration was made, the
declarant was hospitalized, wounded on the throat, and was very weak.[xl][28] Combining these circumstances with the victim-declarant’s aversion
of pain creates upon the latter impression that his death is imminent and
immediate. The enigma of contemplating
of a death-at-hand produces the most powerful consideration that impels and
induces the mind to speak the truth – “a situation so solemn and awful as to be
considered by law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by
an oath administered in court.”[xli][29]
On his competency to testify, there is no allegation nor evidence
on record which would support the slightest impression that the declarant would
have been incompetent to testify had he survived. At the time of his death he was a member of
the police force and is presumably capable of perceiving, retaining what has
been perceived and expressing what has been retained. These circumstances suffice to sustain the
presumption of his competency to testify at the material time.(UGADDAN V. CA,
124914, July 2, 1997).
PROBLEM NO. 17 What is an “interlocking
confession”? What is its significance in the admissibility of evidence?
ANSWER: Extrajudicial confessions
which are independently made without collusion, identical with each other in their material
respects and confirmatory of the other are called interlocking confessions. They are, therefore, also admissible as
circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated therein to show the
probability of the latter’s actual participation in the commission of the
crime. They are also admissible as
corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and
circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves
participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an
exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are
admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.”(SANTOS V.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 71523, Dec. 8, 2000)
PROBLEM NO. 18. Does an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of Sale
sufficiently prove conveyance of title to a property?
ANSWER: In sum,
considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax
declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property and inasmuch as
the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on the petitioners
to adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of the said
document, the exhortations of petitioners regarding the existence of said deed
of sale must fail. (EBREO V. EBREO, 71523, DEC. 8, 2000)
PROBLEM NO. 19.What
do you understand by the “totality of circumstances test”, and how is it
related to “out-of-court identification”?
Answer: In People v. Teehankee,
Jr.,[xlii][25] the Court, through Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno, explained the procedure for out-of-court
identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such
identification. It listed the following
ways of identifying the suspects during custodial investigation: show-ups, mug
shots and line-ups. The Court there
ruled:
“x x x. Out-of-court
identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a
witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification
during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its
fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility
of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted
the totality of circumstances test where they consider
the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that
time: (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.” (PEOPLE V. TIMON,GR NO.
97841-42, NOV. 12, 1997)
PROBLEM NO. 20.
Can a birth certificate be both an evidence of fact of birth and filiation?
Explain.
Answer: While
under the Family Code, filiation can be established by, among others, the
record of birth appearing in the civil register,[7][80] yet the rule is where the birth certificate presented was not
signed by the father against whom
filiation is asserted, such may not be accepted as evidence of the alleged
filiation. In Angeles v.
Maglaya,[8][81] we held:
x x x Such certificate, albeit
considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its
execution: the fact of birth of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate,
to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of
recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother
alone if the father refuses. x x x[9][82]
In Angeles v.
Maglaya, we
refused to give evidentiary weight to the birth certificate as proof of
filiation in a case for settlement of estate to support a claim of legitimacy
because the same was unsigned by the alleged father. With more reason we should
not accord value to the birth certificate in this case considering that its
effect would be to increase the penalty to be imposed on the appellant. This is
a criminal case wherein an interpretation unfavorable to the accused is
generally unacceptable.
The Solicitor General cites this
Court’s pronouncement in Heirs of Cabais v. Court of Appeals,[10][83] that “[a] birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie
evidence of filiation and a
high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained
in such public document.”[11][84] The pronouncement is not
applicable to this case. It was made merely as an elucidation of the limited
evidentiary value of a baptismal certificate in this jurisdiction vis-à-vis a birth certificate. In that case, presented was the baptismal
certificate of the person whose filiation was sought to be established. The
birth certificate itself was not presented. In the case at bar, the birth
certificate of AAA was presented.
We thus hold that the birth
certificate of AAA is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to
appellant. After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not AAA’s biological
father.(PP V. DELANTAR, 169143, Feb, 2, 2007)
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