THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, and ALFONSO E. MENDOZA

THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA, and ALFONSO E. MENDOZA as President of the Partido Radical vs. SEGUNDO AGUSTIN, representative of the Frente Popular - G.R. No. 45844, November 29, 1937

LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:

                There are two political parties involved in the case, Partido Radical and Frente Popular. It was during the impending December, 1937 election that the municipal board of the city of Manila, granted the Partido Radical an inspector and a substitute inspector for each and every election precinct in the City of Manila. Frente Popular claimed a better right as an opposition party and instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila mandamus proceeding to compel the municipal board of the City of Manila to appoint the election inspectors and substitutes for the party.

                After hearing and presentation of the evidence by the parties, the Court of First Instance of Manila found "that the Radical Party is the oldest active party of the opposition in the locality, or the one that has been first organized" and is, therefore, the party entitled to one inspector and one substitute inspector of election under the provisions of subsection (d) of section 417 of the Election Law, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 233. Accordingly the petition for mandamus was dismissed. The Frente Popular, appealed to the CA which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance. From this decision of the CA, the Partido Radical has come before the Supreme Court on a petition for a writ of certiorari.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the CA erred in reviewing and altering the conclusions of fact of the Court of First Instance of Manila, notwithstanding the failure of the respondent Frente Popular to present a motion for new trial in the latter court.

(2) Whether the CA erred in assuming the date of formation of the Sakdalista Party without such date having been proved or in any way disclosed by competent evidence.

HELD:

(1)  NO. The rule in civil case is that, in the absence of a motion for new trial, the appellate court will not review the evidence presented before the lower court.  But a judicial proceeding with reference to elections, whether of primary character and involving a contest, or merely inspectors, is urgent in character. There can be no election without election inspectors. We hold that in special proceedings involving the rights of contending parties to inspectors of election, a motion for new trial is not indispensable to enable the appellate court to review the decision of the lower court and the evidence supporting it, because the appeal therein partakes of the nature of appeal in criminal cases and also because of the urgent character of such proceedings. We, therefore, approve of and confirm the action taken by the CA in this case.

 (2) YES. The Frente Popular, as petitioner or party plaintiff in the mandamus proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila, had the burden of proving the date when the Sakdalista Party, from which it pretends to have derived its right to representation on the boards of election inspectors in Manila, was organized. This it has failed to do.

It is contended in the answer filed by the respondent that the Court of Appeals acted properly in taking judicial notice of the current political history of the Frete Popular in accordance with the decisions of this court in Bustos vs. Municipal Council of Masantol (43 Phil., 290), and Ysip vs. Municipal Council of Cabiao (43 Phil., 352). There are facts, indeed of which courts should take judicial cognizance. These facts refer to a variety of subjects - legislative, political, historical, commercial, scientific, and artificial - in addition to a wide range of matters, arising in the ordinary course of nature or the general current of human events. The matter of judicial notice is ever expanding and will surely keep pace with advance of the sciences and the arts. But, a matter to be judicially cognizable must be well-established or authoritatively settled, or of common or general knowledge. Obviously, courts should take notice of whatever is or should be generally known because judges should not be more ignorant than the rest of mankind.

Assuming without deciding that courts may take notice of the existence of the Sakdalista organization at one time or another, as matter of contemporary social and political history, the date of its organization or the time of its birth for the purposes of the application of the Election Law cannot be said to be of public knowledge. This information is not available from printed books, records or current literature. And though the judge himself or some other persons may known exactly when the Sakdalista Party came of public knowledge. A matter may be personally known to the judge and yet not be a matter of judicial knowledge and, vice versa, a matter may not be actually known to an individual judge and, nevertheless, be a proper subject of judicial cognizance. While judges will not live in monastic seclusion, they being expected to be live spectators of passing national events, they will not spread the mantle of judicial notice over the different dates of organization of divers political groups, when such dates are not recorded or found in books of general information or otherwise possessed of general public recognition. In the present case, where priority of organization is a material element for purposes of political representation on the board of inspectors, this fact must be proved and satisfactorily established.

The judgment of the CA is, accordingly, reversed and that of the Court First Instance declared in full force and effect.