JIREH F. UBAY

NORA BUENO PASION, Petitioner, vs.   SIMPLICIO R. MELEGRITO, represented by ANSELMA TIMONES, Respondent   G.R. No. 166558             March 28, 2007

Facts:

·         On 4 February 1999, respondent Simplicio R. Melegrito (respondent), represented by Anselma Timones, filed a complaint¹lawphil.net for forcible entry against Filipina M. Bueno, Divina M. Bueno, and Regina M. Bueno (Bueno sisters) with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Gerona, Tarlac. As plaintiff, respondent claimed that the Bueno sisters constructed a two-story concrete residential structure on his land located in Nilasin, Pura, Tarlac through stealth and strategy and without his knowledge and consent. He further claimed that despite notice and demand, the Bueno sisters still retained possession of the land and refused to remove the structure.

·         On 22 July 1999, the MCTC rendered its judgment in favour of Simplicio R. Melegrito, ordering defendants to vacate the premises and to pay for attorney’s fees and damages. Acting on the appea^. Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63, Tarlac, Tarlac set aside the 22 July 1999 judgment of the MCTC and ordered the case dismissed. The RTC denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

·         On 16 June 2000, the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated in toto the MCTC’s judgment^. On remand of the case, the MCTC granted respondent’s motion for execution and that led to the issuance of a writ of execution on 28 June 2001. On 24 January 2002, the MCTC granted respondent’s motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition for failure of the Bueno sisters to comply with the 22 July 1999 judgment.

·         Subsequently, on 12 September 2002, an alias writ of demolition⁸ was issued directing the sheriff or his deputies to demolish the improvements erected by the Bueno sisters on the subject land belonging to respondent.

·         On 4 November 2002, herein petitioner Nora Bueno Pasion (petitioner), the recognized agricultural tenant on a portion of respondent’s land and sister of the Bueno sisters, filed with the RTC, Branch 65, Tarlac, a Complaint⁹ for Injunction with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order and Damages against respondent, Judge Luisito T. Adaoag,¹⁰ and the Provincial Sheriff of Tarlac, seeking to restrain the enforcement of the writ of demolition issued in Civil Case No. 1243-99. Petitioner claimed that the judgment in Civil Case No. 1243-99 was being implemented against her although she was not a party to the case.

·         On 7 November 2002, the RTC, Branch 65, granted a temporary restraining order. On 8 January 2003, petitioner filed a Petition¹⁶ for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 65 in allowing a writ of demolition to be enforced against her although she was not a party to Civil Case No. 1243-99 and in finding that she was not the owner of the house sought to be demolished.

·         On 5 May 2004, the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit. In denying petitioner’s petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of demolition issued by the 5th MTC of Gerona-Ramos-Pura, public respondent Judge had as its basis the findings of [the] MTC, which was later affirmed by the 4th Division of this court. Their findings indicate that the house which is now the subject of a writ of demolition, was erected by the sisters of the petitioner and not by petitioner herself.

·         Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules.

ISSUE: Whether the denial of petitioner’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a writ of demolition issued in another case to which she was not a party is tenable.

RULING:

·         The petition is without merit. An ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein judgment is binding only upon parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard.²³ However, the rule admits of the exception that even a non-party is bound by the judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee; (e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.

·         In the case at bar, it is not disputed that petitioner falls under situation (f) above because she is a relative of the Bueno sisters, the defendants in Civil Case No. 1243-99. She herself admitted this fact in her complaint in Civil Case No. 9420 when she referred to the Bueno sisters as her legitimate sisters.

·         Besides, petitioner cannot deny her knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. 1243-99. Even the judgment in the said case acknowledges the fact that she went to the hearings with Geronimo Zafra, the representative of her sisters.

·         Indeed, if she truly had an interest in the structure sought to be demolished as she claims, she could have so informed respondent even before the filing of the case to enable the latter to take the necessary and appropriate action.

·         Verily, the principle of equitable estoppel would now operate to prevent petitioner from asserting her alleged ownership over the structure and defeating the alias writ of execution issued in execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 1243-99. The principles of equitable estoppel, sometimes called estoppel in pais, are made part of our law by Art. 1432 of the Civil Code. Coming under this class is estoppel by silence, which obtains here

·         In the case at bar, petitioner had, by her silence, induced respondent to believe that she did not have any interest on respondent’s property other than being his tenant. Thus, respondent rightfully acted on this belief and filed the forcible entry case only against petitioner’s sisters whom he thought were the owners of the structure constructed on his land. Verily, to permit petitioner to deny the fact that she does not own the structure would work to prejudice the rights of respondent as the winning litigant in Civil Case No. 1243-99. Indeed, petitioner is conclusively estopped from interposing her claim of ownership against the writ of demolition issued to execute the decision in said case.

·         Further, a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued upon a clear showing: (1) that there exists a right to be protected, and (2) that the action sought to be enjoined is violative of that right. In the case at bar, the RTC found that, in accordance with the MCTC’s findings in Civil Case No. 1243-99 as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the Bueno sisters, and not petitioner, were the owners of the structure sought to be demolished. Clearly, the trial court found that petitioner had no actual right that needs to be protected by a writ of preliminary injunction.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GAW LE JA CHUA, respondents.

G.R. No. 106858.  September 5, 1997

FACTS:

·         In 1984, Philippine Bank of Communication (PBCom) filed two (2) collection suits against, among  others, Joseph L. G. Chua, husband of herein private respondent, who acted as one of the sureties for the financial obligations of Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. and the Forte Merchant Finance, Inc., with the petitioner.   After the filing of the complaint, the co-defendants of Joseph L.G. Chua  had no more properties left to answer for their obligations to the bank.   Since Joseph L.G. Chua bound himself solidarily with the two principal debtors, the bank chose to run after Joseph L.G. Chua who was found to own a property situated in Dasmarinas, Makati.  Said property was, however, discovered to have been earlier transferred to Jaleco Development Corporation by virtue of a Deed of Exchange dated October 24, 1983 executed by Joseph L.G. Chua with the conformity of private respondent.   The bank considered such transfer as in fraud of creditors and thereby sought its annulment before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No.7889.  A notice of Lis Pendens was thereafter registered on July 17, 1984.

·         Meanwhile, the collection suits filed by petitioners (Civil Case No. 84-25159 and Civil Case No. 84-25260) which reached this  Court and the Court of Appeals, respectively, became final in xecut of  PBCom.

·         On  July 24, 1991,  private respondent Gaw Le Ja Chua, wife of Joseph L. G. Chua, filed a Third Party Claim with the Sheriffs of Branches 8 and 9 of RTC, Manila.   At the same time, she initiated two separate reinvindicatory actions on the subject property in the lower court.

·         Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion to Direct the Sheriff to Enforce the Writ of Execution/Auction Sale.

·         On August 15, 1991, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion.  The Motion for Reconsideration with a motion to quash the third party claim was, likewise, denied in an Order dated October 21, 1991.

·         Dissatisfied, the petitioner came to this Court assailing the RTC’s Orders. The matter was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition. On August 31, 1992, the respondent court dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:  Whether or not private respondent is considered a stranger within the meaning of Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as to entitle her to the remedy of a third-party claim or reinvidicatory actions over the subject property.

RULING:

·         NO. A stranger is a third-party who is any person other than the judgment debtor or his agent.   While we are aware of the  legal maxim that no man shall be affected by proceedings to which he is a stranger,^[4] the attendant circumstances, however,  in the case at bar constrain us to rule that private respondent cannot be considered a stranger within the purview of the law. .  In the present case, although Ignacio was not named as defendant there is no doubt that as wife of defendant Sunga she shares a common interest with him in the litigation.  Indeed she represented herself to be the agent of Sunga by signing the answer in their behalf. She is therefore as much a judgment debtor and agent of the defendant and not a third party to the litigation.

·         Private respondent gave her marital consent or conformity to the Deed of Exchange and that by that act she became necessarily a party to the instrument..   She cannot, therefore, feign ignorance to the simulated transaction where the intention was really to defraud her husband’s creditors.

·         In a last ditch effort to retain the property,   private respondent now contends that it  belongs to the conjugal partnership which should not answer for the obligations of the husband.  While previously in the Deed of Exchange, private respondent conceded that the property was solely owned by her husband and that it was ceded to Jaleco Development Corp.,  after  this Court  ruled against the husband, she changed task by claiming that the  property is conjugal and, as an afterthought, she filed a third party claim.  Notably, she never intervened in said case where the validity of the Deed of Exchange was being questioned to protect her rights and interests if indeed she truly believed that the property belonged to the conjugal partnership.  At the very least,  private respondent is now xecuto from  claiming that property in question belongs to the conjugal partnership.  She cannot now take an inconsistent stance after an adverse decision in G.R. No. 92067.

·         Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation and concealment of facts, so as to raise an equitable xecutor.  When the silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it would become a fraud on the other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an xecutor.  This doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent.  He who remains silent  when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent.’

·         Finally, we take special note of the fact that this case has been going on for several years.  Because of a dubious third party claim filed by private respondent, petitioner has been deprived of the fruits of the  judgment in its xecut which has become final and xecutor since 1991.

ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992

VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992

FACTS:

·         The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on the ownership of 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 issued on April 23, 1966 and registered under the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the corporation. The then Court of First Instance of Manila, now Regional Trial Court of Manila, declared that Enrique Razon, the petitioner in G.R. No. 74306 is the owner of the said shares of stock. The then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court's decision and ruled that Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No. 74315 is the owner of the shares of stock. Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration. Enrique Razon wanted the appellate court's decision reversed and the trial court's decision affirmed while Vicente Chuidian asked that all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accruing to the 1,500 shares of stock be ordered delivered to him. The appellate court denied both motions. Hence, these petitions.

·         On June 29, 1971, and amended on November 16, 1971, Vicente B. Chuidian prayed that defendants Enrique B. Razon, E. Razon, Inc., Geronimo Velasco, Francisco de Borja, Jose Francisco, Alfredo B. de Leon, Jr., Gabriel Llamas and Luis M. de Razon be ordered to deliver certificates of stocks representing the shareholdings of the deceased Juan T. Chuidian in the E. Razon, Inc. with a prayer for an order to restrain the defendants from disposing of the said shares of stock, for a writ of preliminary attachment v. properties of defendants having possession of shares of stock and for receivership of the properties of defendant corporation.

·         In their answer filed on June 18, 1973, defendants alleged that all the shares of stock in the name of stockholders of record of the corporation were fully paid for by defendant, Razon; that said shares are subject to the agreement between defendants and incorporators; that the shares of stock were actually owned and remained in the possession of Razon.

·         The evidence of the plaintiff shown that he is the administrator of the intestate estate of Juan Telesforo Chuidian in Special Proceedings No. 71054, Court of First Instance of Manila.

·         On April 23, 1966, stock certificate No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant corporation was issued in the name of Juan T. Chuidian.

·         On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and after him, the plaintiff-appellant, were elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of them actually served and were paid compensation as directors of E. Razon, Inc. From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to April 1971, Enrique Razon had not questioned the ownership by Juan T. Chuidian of the shares of stock in question and had not brought any action to have the certificate of stock over the said shares cancelled.

·         In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Which states that “Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.” According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.

ISSUE:

1.        Whether the oral testimony of Enrique Razon is within the prohibition of Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 if the Revised Rules on Evidence) thus, rendering it inadmissible.

2.        Whether his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true nature of his agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. is sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock.

RULING:

1.        The testimony of the petitioner is NOT within the prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it filed upon claims against the estate.

·         In the instant case, the testimony excluded by the appellate court is that of the defendant (petitioner herein) to the affect that the late Juan Chuidian, (the father of private respondent Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of the estate of Juan Chuidian) and the defendant agreed in the lifetime of Juan Chuidian that the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. are actually owned by the defendant unless the deceased Juan Chuidian opted to pay the same which never happened. The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian.

·         Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.

2.        NO. Petitioner’s testimony is not enough. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the questioned 1,500 shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. are in the name of the late Juan Chuidian in the books of the corporation. Moreover, the records show that during his lifetime Chuidian was ellected member of the Board of Directors of the corporation which clearly shows that he was a stockholder of the corporation. (See Section 30, Corporation Code) From the point of view of the corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such a case, the petitioner who claims ownership over the questioned shares of stock must show that the same were transferred to him by proving that all the requirements for the effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the corporation's by laws, if any, were followed (See Nava v. Peers Marketing Corporation, 74 SCRA 65 [1976]) or in accordance with the provisions of law.

·         The petitioner failed in both instances. The petitioner did not present any by-laws which could show that the 1,500 shares of stock were effectively transferred to him. In the absence of the corporation's by-laws or rules governing effective transfer of shares of stock, the provisions of the Corporation Law are made applicable to the instant case.

·         Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the appellate court's factual findings that the shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian for value. Juan T. Chuidian was the legal counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation. We give credence to the testimony of the private respondent that the shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian in payment of his legal services to the corporation. Petitioner Razon failed to overcome this testimony.

·         BY: JIREH F. UBAY

*DEAD MAN’S RULE section RULE 130, Section 23

GO CHI GUN alias CHIPBUN GOCHEGO, GO AWAY alias LIM KOC and FEDERICO M. CHUA HIONG, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CO CHO, TECSON, DONATO GO TIAK GIAP, CESARIO GO TEK HONG, ALFONSO GO TEK BIO, MARIANO TEK LIONG, DOMINGO GO TEK LUNG, GO GIOK TE, GO CHUNG TE AND PACIFIO YAP, defendants-appellants.

Facts:

·         On March 7, 1914, his on Paulino Gocheco instituted judicial proceedings for the distribution of his estate in the court of First Instance of Manila. The intestate left children by two marriages. In the first marriage with Ong So, who died in 1908, he was survived by his children Paulino Gocheco, 26 years, Go Tua Tia, 20 years, Go Pan Gui, 18 years, Go Tua Ting, 16 years, Go Chi Gun, 14 years, and Go Away, 8 years. By his marriage with Yu Ui, who survived him, left two, Go Cheng Siu, 7 years and a child 20 months old. The estate left by the intestate was, according to assessments made by the commissioners on appraisal, valued at P44,017.00. Each of his children received properties or cash amounting to P3,995.56. The project of partition is signed by one Joaquin A. Go Cuay as guardian ad litem of the minors and was approved by the court on May 11, 1916. Upon the termination of the intestate proceedings, Paulino Gocheco instituted guardianship proceedings for his minor brothers and sisters, and he was appointed guardian for their persons and properties on May 20, 1916. These guardianship proceedings continued until September 15, 1931 when all the wards had become of age. The proceedings were closed on said date and the guardian relieved of liability as such.

·         Paulino Gocheco died on April 24, 1943, and on January 10, 1944 his eldest son instituted intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate. These were terminated on March 23, 1947.The present action was instituted by Go Chi Gun and Go Away on July 31, 1948.

·         On the basis of the above facts, plaintiffs claim that Paulino Gocheco by fraudulent means obtained the properties adjudicated to him in the project of partition and so he acquired same in trust for their (plaintiffs’ and defendants’) common benefit; and that the properties and business conducted by the said deceased Paulino Gocheco in his lifetime were owned in common by them with the deceased, in the proportion of 1/3 for each of the plaintiffs and 1/3 for the deceased Paulino Gocheco.

·         The parties went to trial and thereafter the Court of First Instance found the allegations of the complaint to have been established by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, it annulled the project of partition in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Gocheco, as the same was found to have been procured through fraud, collusion and connivance to the prejudice of the plaintiffs; declared that the properties obtained by the deceased Paulino Gocheco in the said partition proceedings are the common properties of plaintiffs Go Chi Gun and Go Away and the deceased Paulino Gocheco in the proportion of 1/3 for each of them; and ordered defendants to render a correct and detailed accounting of the said properties and business interest of said deceased Paulino Gocheco to the plaintiffs from 1916 up to the present. It also dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim. Against the above decision the defendants and intervener have appealed to this Court.

ISSUE/s:

1.        Whether or not the testimony of the plaintiffs are well within the prohibition under  Section 26 © of Rule 123 of the Rules of court (now RULE 130, Section 23 which is known as Dead man’s Rule)

2.        Whether the alleged fraudulent act of the decedent shall constitute as an exception to the prohibition proven by mere preponderance of evidence

RULING:

1.        YES. In the case at bar, the testimonies of the plaintiffs as to the alleged statements of the deceased to him are well within the purpose and intent of the prohibition. The reason for the rule is that if persons having a claim against the estate of the deceased or his properties were allowed to testify as to the supposed statements made by him (deceased person), many would be tempted to falsely impute statements to deceased persons as the latter can no longer deny or refute them, thus unjustly subjecting their properties or rights to false or unscrupulous claims or demands. The purpose of the law is to”guard against the temptastion to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party.” (Tongco vs. Vianzon, 60 Phil., 698.) The administration of the properties of plaintiffs’ father was judicially made, and the exsistence thereof and of the properties had left were in public records.

For 40 years during which Paulino Gocheco was living, plaintiffs herein had remained silent and had done nothing to check the truth of the supposed statements of their deceased brother, which could easily be done because the facts they had interest in were in public records. It was only after Go Checo had died, such that he can no longer deny their statements, and after all possible witnesses or papers or circumstances hacve already gone beyond recall because of the destruction of the public records, that the supposed statement is now brought forth and made the basis of the plaintiffs’ action. We cannot help but induced to believe that it is the death of the decedent, and the latter’s inability to deny the supposed statement made by him, as well as the destruction of the records of the judicial proceedings, that must have tempted plaintiffs to bring action. The case clearly falls within the spirit and terms of the prohibition contained in the rule. We find, therefore, that the trial court committed an error in allowing the plaintiffs-appellees, over the objections of the attorneys for the defendants-appellants, to testify as to the supposed statements made to them by the deceased Paulino Gocheco.

2.        NO. To raise even a suspicion of fraud, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the personal properties assigned to the plaintiffs-appellees were overruled. Nothing to this effect was submitted. We are aware of the existence of an exception to the rule, where the decedent had been guilty of fraud. The rule has been adopted to promote justice and not to shield fraud. We have so held in the case of Ong Chua vs. Carr, 53 Phil., 975. But in that case, before he testimonies of witnesses were allowed to be introduced, the fraud perpetrated by the deceased had been established beyond all doubt, not by mere preponderance of the evidence alone In the case at bar, no such amount of proof of the supposed fraudulent acts on the part of the deceased was introduced by the plaintiffs, so there was no showing made to bring the case within the exception enunciated in the case of Ong Chua vs. Carr, supra.

Claim is also made that the deceased Paulino Gocheco connived with the guardian ad litem of the minors in keeping the latter ignorant of his appointment as guardian ad litem of all the proceedings in the distribution and guardianship, and in assessing the properties at low prices in connivance with the deceased. The rule is that fraud is not presumed. As fraud in character, it must be proved by clear preponderance of evidence. (37 C.J.S., 393.) There is absolutely no evidence in the case at a bar that the plaintiffs have not been advised of the pendency of the administration proceedings or of the appointment of the guardian ad litem, and the incidents thereof, except the testimonies for the plaintiffs with regard to the supposed statements of Paulino Gocheco, which have been discarded as incompetent. Neither is there any iota of evidence to upport the supposed connivance between the administrator and the guardian ad litem.