gonzales

UNCHUAN vs. LOZADA
(G.R. No. 172671,April 16, 2009)

 FACTS:         

Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were the registered co-owners of 2 lots in Cebu City.

The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their nephew Antonio J.P. Lozada  under a Deed of Sale. Armed with a Special Power of Attorney from Anita, Peregrina went to the house of their brother, Dr. Antonio Lozada (Dr. Lozada), Dr. Lozada agreed to advance the purchase price of US$367,000 or P10,000,000 for Antonio, his nephew. The Deed of Sale was later notarized and authenticated at the Philippine Consul’s Office and new TCTs were issued in the name of Antonio Lozada.

Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa R. Unchuan caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the lots. Marissa claimed that Anita donated an undivided share in the lots to her under an unregistered Deed of DonationAntonio and Anita brought a case against Marissa for quieting of title with application for preliminary injunction and restraining order. Marissa filed an action to declare the Deed of Sale void and to cancel the new TCTs.

At the trial, respondents presented a notarized and duly authenticated sworn statement, and a videotape where Anita denied having donated land in favor of Marissa. In a Decision dated June 9, 1997, RTC disposed of the consolidated cases, ruling among others that:

1. Plaintiff Antonio J.P. Lozada is declared the absolute owner of the properties in question;

2. Defendant Marissa R. Unchuan is ordered to pay Antonio J.P. Lozada and Anita Lozada damages.

On motion for reconsideration by petitioner, the RTC issued an Order dated April 5, 1999. Said order declared the Deed of Sale void, ordered the cancellation of the new TCTs in Antonio’s name, and directed Antonio to pay Marissa damages, P100,000 attorney’s fees and P50,000 for expenses of litigation.

Respondents moved for reconsideration. On July 6, 2000, Presiding Judge, the RTC reinstated the Decision dated June 9, 1997, but with the modification that the award of damages, and attorney’s were disallowed.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 23, 2006 the appellate court affirmed with modification the July 6, 2000 Order of the RTC.

ISSUES:

1.       Whether or not the deed of donation executed in favor of the petitioner is void.

2.       Whether or not videotaped statement is hearsay.

RULING:

1.

NO. When the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute and indispensable. Pertinent to this, the Rules require a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, to account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall, as in this case, not be admissible in evidence.

2.

NO. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath. It is a hornbook doctrine that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its maker did not take the witness stand. Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of this kind because she did not appear in court to affirm her averments therein. Yet, a more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party; the videotaped statement of Anita appears to belong to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declaration against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declaration against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. Thus, a man’s acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. However, as a further qualification, object evidence, such as the videotape in this case, must be authenticated by a special testimony showing that it was a faithful reproduction. Lacking this, we are constrained to exclude as evidence the videotaped statement of Anita. Even so, this does not detract from our conclusion concerning petitioner’s failure to prove, by preponderant evidence, any right to the lands subject of this case.

G.R. No. 148775 ,January 13, 2004

SHOPPER’S PARADISE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. ROQUE

FACTS:

Petitioner Shopper’s Paradise Realty & Development Corporation, represented by its president, Veredigno Atienza, entered into a twenty-five year lease with Dr. Felipe C. Roque, now deceased, over a parcel of land covered with a TCT in the name of Dr. Roque. Simultaneously, petitioner and Dr. Roque likewise entered into a memorandum of agreement for the construction, development and operation of a commercial building complex on the property.

The contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, both notarized, were to be annotated on the TCT. The annotations, however, were never made because of the death of Dr. Felipe C. Roque. The death of Dr. Roque compelled petitioner to deal with respondent Efren P. Roque, one of the surviving children of the late Dr. Roque but the negotiations broke down due to some disagreements. Respondent filed a case for annulment of the contract of lease and the memorandum of agreement, Efren P. Roque alleged that he had long been the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of a deed of donation inter vivos executed in his favor by his parents, Respondent, while he resided in the United States of America, delegated to his father the mere administration of the property. Respondent came to know of the assailed contracts with petitioner only after retiring to the Philippines upon the death of his father.

The trial court dismissed the complaint of respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held to be invalid the Contract of Lease and Memorandum of Agreement

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is estopped from repudiating the contract.

RULING:

NO. The respondent estopped from repudiating the contracts. The essential elements of estoppel in pais, in relation to the party sought to be estopped, are: 1) a clear conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or, at least, calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; 2) an intent or, at least, an expectation, that this conduct shall influence, or be acted upon by, the other party; and 3) the knowledge, actual or constructive, by him of the real facts. With respect to the party claiming the estoppel, the conditions he must satisfy are: 1) lack of knowledge or of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; 2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and 3) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to change his position or status calculated to cause him injury or prejudice. It has not been shown that respondent intended to conceal the actual facts concerning the property; more importantly, petitioner has been shown not to be totally unaware of the real ownership of the subject property.

CEQUEÑA and LIRIO vs. BOLANTE                             G.R. No. 137944 , April 6, 2000

FACTS:

Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of respondent and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. Petitioners were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. Respondent is the present occupant of the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, Respondent and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of petitioners, during the cadastral survey had a dispute on the ownership of the land.

The only issue involved was who was the lawful owner and possessor of the land subject of the case.

After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of petitioners.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had not been sufficiently established. The notary public or anyone else who had witnessed the execution of the affidavit was not presented. No expert testimony or competent witness ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.

The CA further ruled that the affidavit was insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent and her mother. The former testified that the latter, never having attended school, could neither read nor write. Respondent also said that she had never been called "Leonor," which was how she was referred to in the affidavit.

Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners' tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with respondent's proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the affidavit presented can be considered as an exception to the general rule that an affidavit is classified as hearsay evidence, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand;

2. Whether or not the ownership of the disputed land can be established on a series of tax declarations and tax receipts.

Ruling

1.

The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first. And before a document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify. 

In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who testified that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if the declarant is available to testify as a witness. Such declarant should be confronted with the statement against interest as a prior inconsistent statement.

2.

We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land was established before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against the state and other interested parties.

However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.  At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.