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HAROLD V. TAMARGO, Petitioner, 
vs.
ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and LICERIO ANTIPORDA, JR., Respondents.

G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010

FACTS:

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed. Reynaldo Geron executed an affidavit and states that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that Columna was the one who did the killing.

Columna admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, Lloyd Antiporda. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.

Licerio presented Columna’s unsolicited handwritten letter to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna’s jail. In the letter, Columna disowned the contents of his affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings. Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.

Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.

In another handwritten letter, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail.

In a decision the CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she held that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was not admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made only after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

ISSUE: whether or not Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his affidavit is admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.

RULING:

NO. Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that: on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

 This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

 

PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE WILLELMO C. FORTUN, PRESIDING JUDGE, CFI OF PANGASINAN, LINGAYEN BRANCH I, ASUNCION TORIO ONG AND BEN ONG, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44959 April 15, 1987

FACTS:

The Spouses Ong, private respondents herein, owners of the discount Restaurant in Lingayen, Pangasinan, insured themselves with petitioner Overseas Insurance Corporation (OIC) against any liability, not exceeding P15,000.00 per employee, that might be adjudged against them by the Workmen's Compensation by reason of injury and/or death of any of their employees in said establishment. To that end, OIC issued to them Policy.  

The policy being then in force, a waitress employed by the Ongs died of illness. Her heirs filed against the Ongs and OIC a compensation claim for her death with the DOLE and awarded an amount of P6,000.00 in favor of the heirs.

OIC having refused, despite demand, to pay the amounts awarded, the Spouses Ong sued it in the Court to compel payment.  OIC's answer alleged in the main that the complaint stated no cause of action because the Ongs, had not yet paid the award to the deceased employee's heirs, and hence had sustained no loss; and that when the complaint was filed, OIC was already under receivership, with Pioneer insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC) as the statutory receiver, appointed by the Insurance Commissioner pursuant to the Insurance Code.

Judgment was rendered ordering defendant OIC to pay to plaintiffs the sums of P6,000.00. Defendant PISC, Statutory Receiver of OIC, is ordered to pay to plaintiffs said amounts in the event that OIC fails to make such payments. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not PISC is subsidiarily liable for the Ongs' claim for payment on their insurance policy

RULING:

NO. Petitioner was a complete stranger to this award of death benefits, or the insurance contract insuring the Ongs' liability therefor, or any of the events giving rise to the Ongs' claim against OIC. Petitioner cannot therefore be held liable upon such a claim, even in a subsidiary capacity.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet

Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not able beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent. 

Since the amended judgment clearly makes petitioner liable, on its own account, for the Ongs' claim under the policy issued to it by OIC in the event that the latter fail to pay the same, it is to that extent erroneous.

Petition is granted. Decision may be satisfied from any available assets of OIC in the custody of Pioneer as receiver.

 

PIONEER SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE CA and MANUEL P. SANTOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 105419 September 27, 1993

FACTS:

Complaint for delivery of personal property

Plaintiff Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank (PSLB) acquired ownership over a motor vehicle (Toyota Corolla) by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed through a finance bank.

Defendant Santos, in his capacity as manager of plaintiff bank's General Services Department, was given the privilege to use and possess the aforementioned vehicle coterminous with his employment. PSLB, through its President, and First Vice President, for a consideration of P40,000.00 in cash actually received from Santos in the presence of a bank employee, sold, transferred and conveyed unto the defendant the motor vehicle, free from all liens and encumbrances.

When Santos ceased to be employed with petitioner bank, he took the car with him. Petitioner then filed a complaint against Santos for recovery of the motor vehicle, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.

Petitioner said is that there was no consideration in the sale of the motor vehicle to Santos, that the deed of sale merely served as security for the time deposit placements of Santos’ relatives with the petitioner bank. Petitioner avers that the "underlying agreement," a special arrangement between petitioner and Santos was that in the event Santos’ relatives failed to recover their time deposits due to the bank's closure, then respondent could keep the car as recompense.

Judgment was in favor of Santos and affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: whether or not the deed of sale of the vehicle to Santos may be proved or altered by parol evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule.

RULING:

NO. The petition is devoid of merit.

Principle of law that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument.

While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.

We find merit in the private respondent's contention that petitioner failed to produce any instrument or written document which would prove that the deed of sale in question was only a security for the time deposit placements of respondent's relatives in the petitioner bank. The witnesses for the petitioner, were bank officers; one being a lawyer, and supposed to be steeped in legal and banking knowledge and practices. As such, they were expected to know the consequences of their act of signing a document which outrightly transferred ownership over the subject vehicle in favor of Santos. They could have incorporated in the deed of sale (if such was the intention or agreement of the parties) a stipulation that transfer of ownership and registration of the vehicle in Santos' name were conditioned on the failure of his relatives to recover their time deposit placements in petitioner bank. No such stipulation was incorporated in the deed of sale which was an outright and unconditional transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle to respondent Santos.

Appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against petitioner.