pelpinosas

INTERPACIFIC TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
RUFO AVILES and JOSEPHINE AVILES, respondents.

Balane, Barican, Cruz, Alampay Law Office for petitioner.

Francisco G. Mendoza private respondents.

G.R. No. 86062 June 6, 1990

Facts:

This case hinges on the proper interpretation and application of the rules on the admissibility of documentary evidence and the viability of a civil action for damages arising from the same acts imputed to the defendant in a criminal action.

The prosecution introduced photocopies of the airway bills supposedly received by the accused for which they had not rendered proper accounting during the trial. The defense objected to their presentation, invoking the best evidence rule. The prosecution said it would submit the original airway bills in due time. The trial court allowed the marking of the said documents as Exhibits. The prosecution did not submit the original airway bills nor did it prove their loss to justify their substitution with secondary evidence. Nevertheless, when the certified photocopies of the said bills formally were offered, in evidence, the defense interposed no objection.

The Judge of the Regional Trial Court acquitted the accused and held that the relationship between the petitioner and Rufo Aviles was that of creditor and debtor only. It is also declared that "Under such relationship the outstanding account, if any, of the accused in favor of ITI would be in the nature of indebtedness, the non- payment of which does not Constitute estafa." 

The court held that the certified photocopies of the airway by were not admissible under the rule and that "there can be no evidence of a writing the content of which is the subject of inquiry other' than the writing itself." However, the petitioner seeks to press the civil liability of the private respondents, on the ground that the dismissal of the criminal action did not abate the civil claim for the recovery of the amount and the evidence of the airways bills should not have been rejected so as to establish sufficiently the indebtedness of the private respondents.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, and declared that: Since no evidence of civil liability was presented, no necessity existed on the part of the private respondents to present evidence of payment of an obligation, which was not shown to exist.

Issue: Whether or not the accused has civil obligation to ITI on the basis of the admissibility in evidence of the xerox copies of the airway bills?

Ruling:

That the photocopies were secondary evidence and as such were not admissible unless there was ample proof of the loss of the originals; and other exceptions allowed by the Rules. However, it is the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time is premature.

The first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered as part of the evidence of the party.

The Identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the Identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.

In this case, the photocopies of the airway bills were objected to by the private respondents as secondary evidence only when they were being identified for marking by the prosecution. The defense did not object when the exhibits as previously marked were formally offered in evidence. The earlier objection should be considered a continuing objection under Sec. 37 of Rule 132, for that provision refers to a single objection to a class of evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first offered is considered to encompass the rest of the evidence.

The rule is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. As it is universally accepted that when secondary or incompetent evidence is presented and accepted without any objection on the part of the other party, the latter is bound thereby and the court is obliged to grant it the probatory value it deserves.

Remegio P. Yu, Michael S. Cosue and Julieta M. Fernandez, petitioners,
vs.
Sandiganbayan, Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, Minita V. Crico-Nazario and Edilberto G. Sandoval (SB 1^st Division), Ron. Aniano Desierto, Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo, Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, Prosecutor Henedina A. Pulgar, Eddie Patawaran, Susan P. Casareno, Leon Licudo, Jr. and Cris Coloma, respondents.

G.R. No. 128466 May 31, 2001

Facts:

A petition alleging the Ombudsman for committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly section 3 (e) hereof including the Sandiganbayan in sustaining the findings.

On March 23, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon received a Joint Affidavit and Criminal Complaint from the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Rosales, Pangasinan charging Municipal Mayor Remegio P. Yu, Municipal Vice-Mayor Michael S. Cosue and Municipal Treasurer Julieta M. Fernandez and Rodolfo Macabunga, the proprietor of Rosales Lumber and Hardware with violation of R. A. No.3019, Section 3 (e) thereof attaching Rodolfo Macabunga’s affidavit that. he did not make any delivery of gravel and sand to the Rosales, Public Market; that the delivery receipt was not signed by an employee of the Municipal Government of Rosales, Pangasinan, that he was not aware how the Municipal Government came into possession of a delivery receipt and the voucher amounting to P20,000.00 for the gravel and sand.

On March 18, 1996, OMB investigator Perfecto Lawrence D. Chua Cheng V after evaluation of the evidence for both parties recommended the dismissal of the case but the Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation for dismissal and relying on affidavit of Rodolfo Macabunga that he had not entered into any contract with the municipality of Rosales for the delivery of the subject materials.

On September 11, 1996, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) against petitioners and Rodolfo Macabunga, for acting in conspiracy and making it appear that the gravel and sand was delivered by Rosales Lumber and Hardware on October 1, 1993, when in fact no delivery was ever made.

On November 11, 1996, petitioner Yu and Femandez filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the indictment based on the following grounds:

"1. There was indeed delivery of the subject materials;

"2. The check in payment thereof was received and endorsed/encashed by Rodolfo Macabunga (proprietor of Rosales Lumber and Hardware); and that

"3. There was no damage or prejudice caused to the municipality of Rosales."

Issue:

1. Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that there was probable cause against petitioners?

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the finding of probable cause of the Ombudsman.

Ruling:

·         No evidence exists to indict the respondent for violating Sec. 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019 and that there is a complete absence of evidence to prove the non-delivery of the subject materials. The statement of accused Macabunga that he did not make deliveries of the subject materials is inadmissible under the rule of "res inter alios acta, alteri nocere non debit".

·         That under Rule 130, Section 28 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that "the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided" that the relationship between Macabunga and the petitioners does not make out an exception under Rule 130, Section 30 (admission by co-conspirator) for the simple reason that they were not co-conspirators.

·         That the main function of the government prosecutor during preliminary investigation is merely to determine the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so. As the probable cause so defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of crime for which he was prosecuted.

·         It is well settled that in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, courts will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman, who, depending on his finding and considered evaluation of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it as well as the Sandiganbayan.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCIANO GONZALES, defendant-appellant.

Eduvigio E. Antona for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Zulueta for appellee.

G.R. No. 46310 October 31, 1939

Facts:

At the trial, the appellant testified that at midday on June 2, 1938, testified that he looked for her wife, Sixta Quilason and found her with Isabelo Evangelio near the toilet of his house in a place covered with underbush, who was standing and buttoning his drawers, immediately took to his heels. The accused went after him, but unable to overtake him, he returned to where his wife was and, completely obfuscated, attacked her with a knife without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead body to his house. Thus, lower court has found him guilty of parricide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs.

The appellant asserted that under such circumstances, he was entitled to the privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised Penal code providing: "Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill either of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is entitled of Article 247 of Revised Penal Code under such indicative circumstances?

Ruling:

The husband has no right to take the life of his wife even on the ground of conjugal infidelity. The law does not punish such infidelity by death. The law establishes one exception, whereby it justifies, the husband kills his wife upon surprising her "in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person." (Article 247 Revised Penal Code.) It is because the law considers the husband as acting in a justified burst of passion so as to avail himself of the exception, that is, he has surprised his wife in the carnal act with another, or under such circumstances.

But there is no evidence that they committed adultery in the afternoon of the same day. An accused cannot be found guilty of one crime just because he committed the same crime before. One of the rules covered by the principle res inter alios acta is that "evidence that one did or committed to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or committed to do the same or a similar thing at another time."

Taking into account the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention on the part of the accused to commit such crime, the appealed judgment is modified, and the accused is sentenced to the penalty of twelve years and one day to twenty years of reclusion temporal and indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000 with the costs.