ARMANDO MANDIH ALCAZAR

ARMANDO MANDIH ALCAZAR

CASE DIGEST- EVIDENCE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,                                                                             

                                Plaintiff-Appellee,                                                                           

-versus-

MICHAEL BOKINGO alias “MICHAEL BOKINGCO” and REYNANTE COL,

                             Accused-Appellants.

FACTS:

The victim, Noli Pasion (Pasion)  owned a pawnshop which formed part of his house.  He also maintained two (2) rows of apartment units at the back of his house, one of which is Apartment No. 5 and was being leased to Dante Vitalicio (Vitalicio), Pasion’s brother-in-law, while Appellants were staying in Apartment No. 3. Vitalicio was spin-drying his clothes inside his apartment when Pasion  passed by him and went out of the back door. He heard a commotion from Apartment No. 3.  He peeped through a screen door and saw Bokingco hitting something on the floor.  Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco  attacked him with a hammer in his hand.   Vitalicio was hit several times but managed to push him away.  Vitalicio proceeded to his house and was told by his wife that Pasion was found dead. Vitalicio went back to Apartment No. 3 and saw Pasion’s body lying flat on the kitchen floor.  Pasion and Vitalicio were brought to the hospital.  Pasion expired a few hours late. Elsa, the wife of Pasion, testified that she was in the master’s bedroom  when she heard banging sounds and her husband’s moans.  She immediately got off the bed and went down.  Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way.   Col then instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop but Elsa informed him that she does not know the combination lock.  Elsa tried offering him money but Col dragged her towards the back door but before they reached the door, Elsa saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: “tara, patay na siya.”  Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco.  Michael Bokingco (Bokingco) and Reynante Col (Col) were charged for the crime of Murder. , Bokingco entered a guilty plea while Col pleaded not guilty.

 The trial court rendered judgment finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.  

They appealed to the CA but the decision of the trial court was affirmed with modification finding  REYNANTE COL is found GUILTY as conspirator beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of nighttime and abuse of confidence, with no mitigating circumstances.

Appellants maintain that they could not be convicted of murder.  They question the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime considering that no one from the prosecution witnesses testified on how Pasion was attacked by Bokingco.  They also submit that evident premeditation was not proven in the case.  They belittle Bokingco’s extrajudicial admission that he and Col planned the killing.    

ISSUES:

1) whether the qualifying circumstances were properly appreciated to convict appellant Bokingco of murder and

 2) whether appellant Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.  

RULING:

1NO. We agree with appellants that treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the absence of any proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced.  For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.  Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he failed to see the victim at that time.

Bokingco admitted in open court that he killed Pasion. But the admitted manner of killing is inconsistent with evident premeditation.  To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. It is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. In the instant case, no proof was shown as to how and when the plan to kill was devised.  Bokingco admitted in court that he only retaliated when Pasion allegedly hit him in the head.  Despite the fact that Bokingco admitted that he was treated poorly by Pasion, the prosecution failed to establish that Bokingco planned the attack. 

2.NO. In order to convict Col as a principal by direct participation in the case , it is necessary that conspiracy between him and Bokingco be proved.  Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act.  It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime.  Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.  Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy.

As a rule, conspiracy must be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and must be shown as clearly as the commission of the crime.

The finding of conspiracy was premised on Elsa’s testimony that appellants fled together after killing her husband and the extrajudicial confession of Bokingco.

Nobody witnessed the commencement of the attack.  Col was not seen at the apartment where Pasion was being attacked by Bokingco.  In fact, he was at Elsa’s house and allegedly ordering her to open the pawnshop vault, thus:

 Based on these acts alone, it cannot be logically inferred that Col conspired with Bokingco in killing Pasion.  At the most, Col’s actuations can be equated to attempted robbery, which was actually the initial information filed against appellants before it was amended, on motion of the prosecution, for murder.

Elsa testified that she heard Bokingco call out to Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the place.  This does not prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime.  It only proves, at best, that there were two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crimes they separately committed.

G.R. No. 177407

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, PetitionerVS. BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents

FACTS:

Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up. She was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal, however,  her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation.     Private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza for removal of private respondent’s fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.             The complaint was heard by the [BOM].  Editha Sioson, filed her formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits “A” to “D,” which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM]. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order  contesting that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered. The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration,  hence,  the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

            WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD

RULING :

,It is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.

  From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals teaches:

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.

Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:

Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.

 As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:

            Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

            x x x x

            (y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha’s medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her “kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time” of her operation.

                The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her “kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time” of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.

Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.

Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:

1.         Best Evidence Rule

            Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

            (a)        When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

            (b)        When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

            (c)        When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

            (d)       When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

          The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.

Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Editha’s kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area. In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed. Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits “because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building.” Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.