People
of the Philippines vs. Mary Lou Omicitin y Singco
(G.R. No. 188130, July 26,
2010)
Facts:
In
January 2004, after Primo Arvin Guevarra’s employment contract expired in
September 2003, he had a meeting with Omicitin, the accused-appellant, together
with Anthony Ambrosio and Elisa Donitas. In the meeting, they three agreed to
pay Omicitin Php 40,000 each for their deployment in London as caregivers. All
three gave her, there and then, Php
10,000 as initial payment and she assured them that they would leave for London
within 60 to 90 days.
Guevarra completed his medical examination
on which occasion he paid an additional Php 10,000 and his placement payment by
giving Omicitin the balance of Php 20,000. Upon said payment, Omicitin informed
Gueverra that she would schedule an orientation and contract signing at a later
date but that never took place. Sometime in February 2004, Guevarra wa able to
meet Omicitin, who promised to return his money during the first week of March.
But the promise to reimburse remained infulfilled. And this also happened to
Veronica Caponpon who paid Php 20,000, Roy Fernandez Mago who paid the
placement fee of Php 40,000, and Anthony Ambrosio who was able to pay Php
16,000. And Omicitin promised them all employment but never materialized.
She was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa. The RTC rendered a decision finding
Omicitin guilty as charged. And the CA affirmed this decision in toto.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether or not Primo Guevarra’s testimony is unsubstantiated
and hearsay because it was not supported by Dotenes
testimony who was not presented by the prosecution. Guevarra was not the one
who paid the accused, but Elisa Dotenes, who issued a check in favor of
accused-appellant in behalf of Guevarra.
(2) Whether or not the testimony of private complainant Ambrosio
was uncorroborated and self-serving for not presenting receipt to show payment
to accused-appellant.
Ruling:
·
The petition is denied for lack of
merit.
·
The Court is not being a
trier of facts, will not delve once more into the factual findings of the trial
court as affirmed by the appellate court.
1.
First, the testimony of Ambrosio cannot be considered as
self-serving evidence. The phrase “self-serving evidence” is a
concept which has a well-defined judicial meaning. Hernandez v.
Court of Appeals clarified what self-serving evidence is and what it
is not, thus:
The common objection known as “self-serving” is not correct
because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection
is “hearsay” (Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections, 69).
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between
self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements
are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not
include a party’s testimony as a witness in court (National Development Co. v.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).
Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party
is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and their admission would
encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party’s testimony
in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing
party for cross-examination.
·
This principle was
reiterated in the more recent People
v. Villarama, where the Court
ruled, “x x x [A] self-serving declaration is one that is made by a party, out
of court and in his favor. It
does not include the testimony he gives as a witness in court.” Assayed against the foregoing
standards, Ambrosio’s testimony is not self-serving and is admissible in
evidence.
2.
The unsubstantiated and
self-serving nature of said testimonies would not carry the day for Omictin,
since she admitted, during trial, the substance of their testimonies.
Ø
Through her testimony,
Omictin admitted and established the fact that she was paid by Guevarra the
amount of PhP 40,000 and Ambrosio the amount of PhP 16,000.
·
In all, the Supreme Court
found no compelling reason to disturb the findings and core disposition of the
CA, confirmatory of that of the trial court.
Restaurante
Las Conchas vs. NLRC
(G.R. No. 119085, September 9, 1999)
Facts:
Private
respondents were employees of petitioner Restaurante Las Conchas, operated by
Restaurant Services Corporation and by petitioners David Gonzales and Elizabeth
Anne Gonzales who are members of the board. The petitioners got involves in a
legal battle over the land being occupied by the petitioners, on which Ayala
Lands, Inc. got a favorable judgment.
Petitioners
transferred in Ortigas Center but to no avail, they shut down their business on
February 28, 1994 which resulted in the termination of employment of private
respondents. The latter filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for payment of
separation pay and 13th month pay but it was dismissed. On their
appeal to the NLRC, a decision, favorable to them was rendered. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but it was denied by the NLRC.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether
or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in reversing the decision of the labor arbiter a quo.
(2) Whether
or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in not giving consideration to the evidence presented
by herein petitioners in support of their defense.
Ruling:
·
The petition was dismissed by Supreme
Court.
·
The law does not obligate an employer to pay separation benefits
when the closure is due to losses, petitioners
have the burden to prove that such losses actually exist.
·
The evidence presented by petitioners to prove that they are
suffering business losses consists merely of statements of the corporation’s
assets and liabilities which were not even certified by a certified public
accountant or an accounting firm. Neither
were the corporation’s Income Tax Return (ITR) which they submitted in evidence
duly certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as true copies of the
original. They were mere
self-serving declarations which
under the law are inadmissible as evidence.
·
In Uichico vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, we
ruled that:
xxx. It is true that administrative and
quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure in the adjudication of cases. However,
this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain
fundamental evidentiary rules. While
the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not
controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence presented before it
must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative
value. The Statement of
Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to prove its alleged losses,
without the accompanying signature of a certified public accountant or audited
by an independent auditor, are nothing but self-serving documents which ought
to be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative value.
·
While it may be true that the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC,
still, the court cannot admit the self-serving evidence presented by
petitioners since there is no way of ascertaining the truth of their
contents. To admit them
would open the floodgates to violations of employers of the provisions of the
Labor Code to the detriment of labor which, under the Constitution is to be
protected.
·
Well-settled is the rule
that while lack of objection to a hearsay testimony or evidence results in the
admittance thereof as evidence, said evidence cannot be given any credence and
probative values unless it is shown that it falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. In the present
case, petitioners failed miserably to show that the financial statements and
income tax returns are exceptions to the hearsay rule, thus, their contents
have no probative value whatsoever.
·
In Gudez vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, the
Court ruled in this wise:
Where
the employer corporation is no longer existing and unable to satisfy the
judgment in favor of the employee, the officers should be held liable for
acting on behalf of the corporation.
·
In Valderrama vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, it
was held that:
A
corporation can only act through its officers and agents. That is why the cease and desist order
was directed to the “officers and agents” of A.C. Ransom, which was actually
found guilty of unfair labor practice. But
that case clearly also holds that any decision against the company can be
enforced against the officers in their personal capacities should the
corporation fail to satisfy the judgment against it. The quoted portion of that decision
explaining the basis for such ruling makes that clear. Agreeably with the ruling in A.C.
Ransom Labor Union – CCLU it was held in another case that where the employer
corporation is no longer existing and [is] unable to satisfy the judgment in favor
of the employee, the officer should be held liable for acting on behalf of the
corporation.”
·
In the present case, the employees can no longer claim their
separation benefits and 13th month pay from the corporation because it has
already ceased operation. To
require them to do so would render illusory the separation and 13th month pay
awarded to them by the NLRC. Their
only recourse is to satisfy their claim from the officers of the corporation
who were, in effect, acting in behalf of the corporation. It would appear that, originally,
Restaurante Las Conchas was a single proprietorship put up by the parents of
Elizabeth Anne Gonzales, who together with her husband, petitioner David
Gonzales, later took over its management. Private respondents claim, and rightly
so, that the former were the real owners of the restaurant. The conclusion is bolstered by the
fact that petitioners never revealed who were the other officers of the
Restaurant Services Corporation, if only to pinpoint responsibility in the
closure of the restaurant that resulted in the dismissal of private respondents
from employment. Petitioners
David Gonzales and Elizabeth Anne Gonzales are, therefore, personally liable
for the payment of the separation and 13th month pay due to their former
employees.
Sunga
vs. Chua (G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001)
Facts:
On June 22, 1992,
Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a complaint against Lilibeth
Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner
Cecilia), daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga
(hereafter Jacinto), for “Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting,
Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Attachment” with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte.
Issue/s:
(1) Whether
or not the Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that laches
and/or prescription did not apply in the instant case.
(2) Whether
or not the Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that there was
competent and credible evidence to warrant the finding of a partnership, and
assuming arguendo that indeed there was a partnership,
the finding of highly exaggerated amounts or values in the partnership assets
and profits.”
Ruling:
The
petition was DENIED.
1.
The action for accounting filed by respondent three (3) years
after Jacinto’s death was within the prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an action
to enforce an oral contract prescribes in six (6) years while the right to demand an
accounting for a partner’s interest as against the person continuing the
business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary
agreement. Considering that the
death of a partner results in the dissolution of the partnership, in this case,
it was after Jacinto’s death that respondent as the surviving partner had the
right to an account of his interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while
Jacinto’s death dissolved the partnership, the dissolution did not immediately
terminate the partnership. The
Civil Code expressly provides
that upon dissolution, the partnership continues and its legal personality is
retained until the complete winding up of its business, culminating in its
termination.
2.
Based on the intention of the parties,
as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and conduct, a
verbal contract of partnership may arise. The
essential points that must be proven to show that a partnership was agreed upon
are (1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the
profits. Understandably so, in
view of the absence of a written contract of partnership between respondent and
Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of documentary and testimonial
evidence to prove said partnership.
·
Two reasons forestall the application of the “Dead Man’s Statute”
to this case.
Ø
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondent in their answer
before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners
themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the “Dead Man’s
Statute”. Well entrenched is the
rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the
estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may
testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim. Moreover, as
defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying
as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action
not having been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased.
Ø
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the “Dead
Man’s Statute” for the simple reason that she is not “a party or assignor of a
party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted”. Records show that respondent offered
the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership
between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners’
insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an
assignor because the term “assignor” of a party means “assignor of a cause of
action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any
cause of action has arisen.” Plainly
then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party
plaintiff.
·
Petitioners’ reliance alone on the “Dead Man’s Statute” to defeat
respondent’s claim cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between respondent
and Jacinto. Based not only
on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial
court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient
to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.
Ø
Josephine’s testimony do not lack probative value because she was
not coerced, forced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to be a witness in his
favor. The fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of the respondent does
not diminish the value of her testimony since relationship per se does not
affect the credibility of witness.
·
Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor
during trial. By the weight of judicial precedents, a factual matter like the
finding of the existence of a partnership between respondent and Jacinto cannot
be inquired into by this Court on review. This
Court can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties
and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and the
appellate court were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece
of evidence of one party or the other. It must be also pointed out that
petitioners failed to attend the presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot now turn to this
Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the documentary
evidence of respondent when petitioners failed to object to the admissibility
of the evidence at the time that such evidence was offered.
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