G.R. No. 99379 April 22, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO JORGE Y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Nestor M. Hermida for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EDUARDO JORGE Y RAMIREZ appeals from the decision of the Court a quo finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. 1
On
15 June 1989, an amended information was filed charging Eduardo Jorge,
Romeo Lajera and Remedios Bernales with murder for the killing of
Francisco Palma with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation. However, only Jorge was tried by the court a quo because
Lajera and Bernales managed to remain at large, although Bernales was
eventually arrested in August 1991 to face separate trial. 2
The case of the government is woven mainly around the testimony of Patricio Ocenar, a barangay tanod of
Barangay Doña Imelda, Quezon City. Ocenar narrates that on 26 June
1990, at around nine-thirty in the evening, he was at the barangay hall.
Then a person informed him that Francisco Palma was being molested by
three men. 3 Taking with him his "knife-stick," 4 Ocenar proceeded to Paui Street pointed to by the informer. There, at a distance of some ten arms length, 5 Ocenar saw Eduardo Jorge and Romeo Lajera holding the hands of Palma and a woman 6
stabbing him on the left chest with a long instrument. Ocenar could not
tell exactly what kind of weapon was used. He shouted at them and all
three ran away leaving Palma behind to chase
his aggressors but he collapsed immediately on Baloy Street. 7 According to
Dr. Renato Bautista who examined the victim, the stab wound on his left chest was the cause of his death. 8
his aggressors but he collapsed immediately on Baloy Street. 7 According to
Dr. Renato Bautista who examined the victim, the stab wound on his left chest was the cause of his death. 8
Corazon
Palma, widow of the victim, was also presented to testify for the
prosecution. But the trial court correctly discounted her testimony —
. .
. because as per Patricio Ocenar she came to know of the incident only
from him. Besides, according to Mrs. Palma, when someone came (sic) to
her house to call her attention as regards her husband, the caller said
"Cory, Cory, your husband is stabbed dead and he is in Baloy."
Hence, her testimony that she saw her husband being mauled and then
stabbed does not appear credible. Her testimony also reads like that of
Mr. Ocenar which, considering her interest in this case, renders
doubtful her narration on the identity of her husband's killers.
As the court a quo observed,
"her testimony that she saw her husband being mauled and then stabbed
does not appear credible." It was obviously perjured. We can only
commiserate with the widow and say to her, it was good effort in aid of
the prosecution but it was not good enough to pervert the facts and
convince the court that she was telling the truth.
On the part of appellant Jorge, he denies any
participation in the crime. He claims he was sleeping in his house at
the time of the killing and was only awakened when policemen, led by the
widow, forced him out of his house despite his protestations and
profession of innocence, and brought to the police station. But, as
earlier mentioned, the trial court convicted him of murder with abuse of
superior strength.
Jorge now imputes eight errors to the trial court the
salient points of which are: (a) in finding the prosecution evidence
sufficient to establish his guilt; (b) in giving full faith to the
testimony of Patricio Ocenar; (c) in finding him guilty of murder as
principal without sufficient proof of conspiracy among him and his
co-accused; and, (d) in qualifying the killing to murder with abuse of
superior strength when such circumstance is not alleged in the
Information.
Indeed, under the facts of the case, we cannot assert
with moral certainty that the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
The evidence for the prosecution does not meet the quantum of proof
required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of the
accused. We are not saying here that appellant is innocent but that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; hence, he should be
acquitted.
In order to
convict appellant as a principal by direct participation in the case
before us, it is necessary that conspiracy among him and his co-accused
be proved. No conspiracy here was established. Conspiracy; like any
other ingredient of the offense, must be proved as sufficient as the
crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not only by mere
conjectures. 9 Proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish the presence of criminal conspiracy. 10 In fact, the appealed decision does not mention, much less discuss, conspiracy.
Unity of purpose and unity in the execution of the unlawful objective are essential to establish the existence of conspiracy. 11
In this case, no unity of purpose was shown. The only involvement of
appellant was his holding of the hand of Palma when he was stabbed by
Bernales on the left chest. There was no other evidence to show unity of
design. The simultaneousness of the act of stabbing the victim by
Bernales with the holding of the hand of the same victim by appellant
does not of itself demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose
and action. 12
For, it is possible that the appellant had no knowledge of the common
design, if there was any, nor of the intended assault until the victim
was actually stabbed. The thrust could have been made at the spur of the
moment, totally unexpected by appellant. The mere holding of the
victim's hand does not necessarily prove intention to kill. If the
tragedy was a chance stabbing, there can be no conspiracy to speak of. 13
Perhaps it would have been different if the victim was stabbed more
than once and appellant still held on to the hand of the victim. That
would have indicated intent to kill and a community of purpose and
design. But the evidence does not show that appellant knew that Bernales
had a knife; that she intended to use it to stab the victim; and, even
if she had such intention and appellant knew it, that he held the
victim's hand to insure the effectiveness and fatality of Bernales'
attack.
While the
holding of the hand of the victim could demonstrate unity of purpose,
yet, it could also mean a desire on the part of appellant to avoid a
physical encounter between Palma and Bernales, a woman, who was not
known to appellant to be armed with a knife. The distance of some ten
arms length from the startling occurrence could have blurred the vision
of Ocenar, the only eyewitness for the prosecution, who could no longer
identify the weapon used except to say it was a long instrument. This
also casts doubt on some of his factual accounts. The rule is well
settled that if the facts apparently inculpatory may equally be
explained consistent with one's innocence, the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty to support a conviction. 14
Although
Ocenar appears credible in his version, his testimony unfortunately
does not establish the existence of conspiracy. It is elementary that,
in the absence of conspiracy, each of the accused is responsible only
for the consequences of his own acts. 15 All that appellant did was to hold the hand of Palma, which is not a crime.
Neither can
the appellant be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation,
nor an accomplice in the crime of murder. To be a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal
resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in
the commission of the offense by performing another act without which
it would not have been accomplished. 16
In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, the following
requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs
with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of
the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to
the person charged as accomplice.
The
cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or
intentionally rendered, which cannot exist without previous cognizance
of the criminal act intended to be executed. 17
It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by
indispensable cooperation, or as an accomplice, that the accused must
unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.
There is indeed nothing on record to show that appellant knew that
Bernales was going to stab Palma, thus creating a doubt as to
appellant's criminal intent.
The
appellant asserts that it was error for the trial court to consider
"abuse of superior strength" as qualifying the killing to murder when
such circumstance is not alleged in the Information. The accused is
correct, although it could have been considered nonetheless as a generic
aggravating circumstance even if not so alleged. 18 However, this is no longer significant considering the conclusion herein reached.
The defense
of the accused is alibi, which is the weakest of defenses. But the case
against him must still fail since the evidence of the prosecution is
even weaker; for, as it has been repeated often enough, the conviction
of the accused must not rest on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the prosecution. 19
WHEREFORE,
the decision appealed from is REVERSED and accused-appellant EDUARDO
JORGE Y RAMIREZ is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Accordingly, it
appearing that he is detained, his immediate release from custody is
ordered unless he is held for another cause.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
2 Appellant's Brief, p. 2.
3 TSN, 18 January 1989, pp. 3-4.
4 Presumably a "night stick."
5 TSN, 18 January 1989, p. 10.
6 Later identified as Remedios Bernales, also known as "Ache."
7 TSN, 18 January 1989, pp. 5, 8-10, 15.
8 TSN, 25 August 1989, p. 4.
9 People v. Marquez, No. L-31403, 14 December 1981, 110 SCRA 91.
10 People v. Saavedra, No. L-48738, 18 May 1987, 149 SCRA 610.
11 Orodio v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57519, 13 September 1988, 165 SCRA 316.
12 US v. Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386 (1909).
13 People v. Agapinay, G.R. No. 77776, 27 June 1990, 186 SCRA 812.
14 People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924).
15 Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43527, 3 July 1990, 187 SCRA 123.
16 Padilla, Criminal Law Book I, 1974 Ed., p. 517.
17 Id., p. 527.
18 People v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-30449, 31 October 1979.
19 People v. Cruz, G.R. No. 87884, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 339.
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