1. Petitioners Jacinto Olan and Renato Eballe were defendants
in Ejectment Case No. 929 in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Los Baños,
Laguna filed by herein respondent spouses Librado Villanueva and Tomasa
Ignacio. The MTC
ordered OLAN and EBALLE to entirely vacate Lot
3839 and Lot 3842, both of the Los Baños
Cadastre 450-D, situated at Brgy. Timugan, Los Baños, Laguna, which lots said
defendants are now unlawfully occupying, and to turn them over to the possession
of plaintiffs LIBRADO VILLANUEVA and TOMASA L. IGNACIO
Petitioners
appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna
which affirmed the decision of the MTC.
A writ of execution pending appeal was granted by the RTC which petitioners
moved to quash in the Court of Appeals[5]
(CA. G.R. No. 30812) on the ground that the lot occupied by petitioners was
different from the lots ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the
MTC decision.
Meanwhile,
petitioners appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (C.A. G.R. No.
31618) which affirmed the RTC decisionThe Court of Appeals ruled that:
“In
their petition for review, the herein petitioners simply reiterates/repeats
their above-mentioned argument that the lot occupied by Olan is not the lot
“ordained or decreed to be delivered to respondents herein in the dispositive
portion of the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Los Baños, Laguna,
which decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court on appeal”
Petitioners seek to compel the Court
of Appeals through the Writ of Mandamus to receive into evidence a
certification made by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) to the effect that the lot possessed by petitioner OLAN is different
from the lots decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision as newly discovered evidence.
Question: 1) Can the Court of
Appeals be compelled to receive said evidence?
2)What is a “newly discovered evidence” to
warrant a “new trial”?
ANSWERS: The Court of Appeals cannot be compelled to receive said
evidence, it not being a newly discovered evidence..
“SECTION
1. Grounds of and period for filing
motion for new trial. – Within the period for perfecting appeal, the
aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment and grant a
new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the
substantial rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired
in his rights;
(b) Newly discovered evidence,
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered, and produced at
the trial, and which if presented would probably alter the result;
(c) Award of excessive
damages, or insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, or that the
decision is against the law.
SEC.
2. Contents of motion for new trial
and notice thereof. – The motion shall be made in writing stating the
ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the
movant on the adverse party.
When the motion is made for the causes mentioned in subdivisions,
(a) and (b) of the preceding section, it shall be proved in the manner provided
for proof of motions. Affidavit or
affidavits of merit shall also be attached to a motion for the cause mentioned
in subdivision (a) which may be rebutted with counter-affidavits. xxx”
Instead
of filing a petition for review of the RTC decision affirming the MTC and a
motion to quash the writ of execution issued by the RTC, merely attaching
thereto the alleged “newly discovered evidence”, petitioners should have filed a motion for new trial
with the RTC on the ground of newly discovered
evidence in accordance with the aforequoted Rule 37 of the
1964 Rules of Court. Petitioners
failed to support their claim with affidavits to show compliance with the
following requisites for newly discovered evidence as a ground for new trial: (a) the evidence was discovered after the
trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted will
probably change the judgment.[vii][14]
Even assuming
that petitioners complied with the above-mentioned requirements, we are not
convinced that the certification in question is “newly discovered evidence”. Petitioners did not prove that, even with the
use reasonable diligence, they could not have obtained the certification during
the trial. The fact that petitioners’ request
with the DENR to determine whether there was a relationship between Lot 3839
and 3842 with Lot 8253 was made only on April 13, 1993[viii][15] or almost ten years after the decision of
the MTC was rendered on May 18, 1992 shows that petitioners did not exercise
reasonable diligence to obtain this evidence (OLAN v. Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 116109. September 14, 1999]
2.
WHAT IS A DYING DECLARATION? WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES IN ORDER THAT IT MAY BE
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE IN COURT?
ANSWER:The
declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending
death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry,
as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death. In
order that a dying declaration may be admissible, to wit: (a) it concerns the
crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) at the
time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending
death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is
offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the
declarant was the victim.
3. The case of PP V. GONZALES (311 SCRA
547) ENUMERATED THE THREE REQUISITES FOR A CHILD WITNESS TO BE COMPETENT, WHAT
ARE THESE?
ANSWER:
1. CAPACITY OF OBSERVATION 2. CAPACITY OF RECOLLECTION AND 3. CAPACITY OF
COMMUNICATION.
4. In the absence of a marriage
certificate, how is marriage proved under the rules on evidence?
ANSWER: In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No.
118904, April 20, 1998, citing Pugueda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849, 855 [March
31, 1962] cited also in Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals 305 SCRA 138) the Supreme
Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a
witness to the matrimony; b) the couple’s public and open cohabitation as
husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal
certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such
nuptial in subsequent documents.
5.
Appellant hinges his bid for
exoneration on whether he was properly identified by the two (2) eyewitnesses
as one of the killers of the victims. He
contends that eyewitnesses Bonifacio and Elmer Vasquez presented an
“incredible” story because it is “highly improbable” that they could have
“distinctly and positively recognized accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crimes."[i] According to appellant, Bonifacio, who was in the dark
portion of the yard hiding behind a coconut tree, could not have identified
appellant by the light emanating from gas lamp inside the camalig where
Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos were staying at the time of the
incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez,
who declared that he saw his grandfather shot by appellant, could have
identified appellant because of the poor lighting coming from the gas lamp
being carried by his grandfather.
Appellant claims that the gas lamp carried by Elmer's grandfather was “a
small can about two (2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette”
and the lamp inside the camalig “was placed inside a bigger can so that
the direction of the light emanating therefrom was upwards and not sidewise.”
QUESTION: Considering said lighting
conditions, in the decided cases of the supreme court, is an illumination
coming from a gas lamp sufficient to support identification? If the
illumination comes from a “star light”, would that be also considered
sufficient illumination for identification purposes?
ANSWER: Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of
whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a
crime. However, it is settled that when
conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be
biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient
to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or
starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination,
making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground
unmeritorious.(Pp. v. Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1).
6. In the
early morning of December 8,
1995, accused-appellant hired Jimbo Pelagio, a tricycle driver
working the night shift, to take him to Paco, Obando, Bulacan. When they reached their destination, he
ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle.
Then, accused-appellant robbed Pelagio of his money and repeatedly
struck him on the head with a gun. Pelagio fell on the ground unconscious. Accused-appellant shot him on the head and
fled on board his tricycle.
That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital
stating that a man had been shot on the head and was in their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana rushed
to the hospital and found the still conscious Pelagio lying on a stretcher.
SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio in a question and
answer method, which he took down on two sheets of yellow paper. After his statement was taken, Pelagio
affixed his thumbmark on both sheets.The statement is as follows:
T: Alam mo
ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency
Hospital at kinukunan ka
ng salaysay?
S: Opo,
dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL PEÑA sa ulo at kinuha and tricycle
kong minamaneho.
T: Taga saan itong si Ramil Peña?
S: Sa Dulong Tangke, Valenzuela, (Malinta), M.M.
T: Saan, kailan at anong oras nangyari ito?
S: Sa Paco, Obando, Bulacan, kaninang ika-8 ng Disyembre 1995 sa
ganap na ika-4:15 ng umaga.
T: Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Peña?
S: Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela,
M.M.
T: Dati mo bang kilala si Ramil Peña?
S: Opo.
T: Ano ba
ang tatak ng tricycle mo?
S: Yamaha
RS-100, kulay itim.
T: Sino and
may-ari ng tricycle?
S: Si Rey
Dagul.
T: Binaril
ka ba ni Ramil?
S: Muntik
na ho.
T: Bakit sa
iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
S: Ewan ko
ho.[i][4]
Eventually, Pelagio died, and Ramil Peña was charged for the death
of Pelagio. On the basis of said statement as above-written, would you consider
the same admissible as a “dying declaration”? Can it be admitted as part of the
“res gestae”? What are the elements of res gestae?
ANSWER: 1.The requisites
for the admissibility of dying declarations have already been established in a
long line of cases. An ante-mortem
statement or dying declaration is entitled to probative weight if: (1) at the
time the declaration was made, death was imminent and the declarant was
conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death; (3) the
declaration relates to facts which the victim was competent to testify to; (4)
the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal
case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of the inquiry.[i][5]
The first element is
lacking in the case at bar. It was not
established with certainty whether Pelagio uttered his statement with
consciousness of his impending death.
While he was in pain when he made his statement, he expressly stated
that accused-appellant only pistol-whipped him and almost shot him.
2. A declaration made spontaneously
after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2)
the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.[i][9]
In People v. Naerta,[i][10] this Court
held that:
The term “res gestae”
comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence
sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which
interval certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack
of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of their content.
Pelagio’s declaration is admissible as part
of the res gestae since it was made shortly after a startling occurrence
and under the influence thereof. Under
the circumstances, the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive his
statement beforehand.[i][11PEOPLE vs. RAMIL PEÑA,[G.R.
No. 133964. February 13, 2002]
7. Is
circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict an accused? Explain.
ANSWER:
Yes. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on
which to anchor a judgment of conviction if the following requisites are
established: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived have been established; and, (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
8. When is there a conspiracy? What proof is necessary to prove
conspiracy? Can it be presumed?
ANSWER: Article 8 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit
a crime and decide to commit it. Direct
proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, and may be inferred from the
collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime.[i][36] Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the
accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interests.[i]
9. What
degree of proof is required to prove the qualifying circumstance of alevosia?
For the court to appreciate alevosia what “burdens” would the prosecution
prove?
ANSWER: The
prosecution was burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, not only the crime
itself, but also the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.[i][60] Treachery cannot be based on speculations and
surmises. In order that treachery may be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove that (a) the malefactor employed
means, method or manner of execution affording the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and, (b) the means, method or
manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. (Pp. v. Buntag, GR 123070, April 4, 2004).
10. The
general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or
admission of one accused is admissible only against the said accused but is
inadmissible against the other accused. The same rule applies if the
extrajudicial confession is made by one accused after the conspiracy has
ceased. State the exception to this rule.
ANSWER: The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission
of one accused is admissible only against the said accused but is inadmissible
against the other accused.The same rule applies if the extrajudicial confession
is made by one accused after the conspiracy has ceased. However, if the declarant/admitter repeats in
court his extrajudicial confession during trial and the other accused is
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, such confession or
admission is admissible against both accused. The erstwhile extrajudicial
confession or admission when repeated during the trial is transposed into
judicial admissions.
11. Distinguish an admission from a
confession.
ANSWER:In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a
confession. It is but a statement of
facts by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense
with which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths
charged.[i][48] It is an acknowledgment of
some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to authorize a
conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt.[i][49] A confession, on the other
hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his guilt of the crime
charged.
12. In cases where the victim could not testify
on the actual commission of the rape because she was rendered unconscious at
the time the crime was perpetrated, can the accused be still convicted of rape?
What rules of evidence are applicable when met with this particular
prosecutorial deficiency?
ANSWER: In cases where the victim could not testify on the actual
commission of the rape because she was rendered unconscious at the time the
crime was perpetrated, Rule 133, Section 4, of the Revised Rules on Evidence
sanctions the courts to rule on the basis of circumstantial evidence, viz:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial
evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
(a)
There
is more than one circumstance;
(b)
The
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c)
The
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
A related rule is that the totality or the
unbroken chain of the circumstances proved leads to no other logical conclusion
than the guilt of the appellant.[i][9]
There have already
been instances when this Court convicted an accused of the crime of rape,
committed while their victims were unconscious, based on circumstantial
evidence. In People v. Villanueva,[i][10] the Court affirmed the conviction for rape,
overruling the defense’s posture that the prosecution failed to present
evidence of the actual defloration. In
that case, the accused-appellant claimed that if the victim was unconscious
during the sexual assault, she would be incapable of knowing that, indeed, she
was raped. Debunking the claim of the
accused-appellant that the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to prove
rape, the Court, taking into consideration the events that transpired before
and after the victim lost consciousness, i.e.,
the perpetrator compulsorily commanded her to remove her panty and forced her
to lie down then punched her in the stomach which rendered her unconscious and
that when she came to, she felt pain in the nest of womanhood, found
accused-appellant guilty of rape.(PP. V. eduardo moran jr. y Gordula, GR. 170849, MARCH 7, 2007, 3rd
division, decided by Justice Chico-Nazario).
13. In a buy bust operation,
is a “prior surveillance” necessary for the conviction of the accused?
Answer: Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior
surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust
operation. There is no textbook method
of conducting buy-bust operations. The
Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of
effective means to apprehend drug dealers.[i][24] A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy
one, is not necessary especially where the police operatives are accompanied by
their informant during the entrapment.[i][25] Flexibility is a trait of good police work.[i][26] In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation
was conducted without need of any prior surveillance for the reason that the
informant accompanied the policemen to the person who is peddling the dangerous
drugs.(PP V. NICOLAS, GR 170234, Feb.
8, 2007)
14. Accused is charged of murder. The
Judge issued a warrant of arrest without bail. Accused filed a motion for bail
alleging that evidence against him is not strong. The bail hearing was
conducted, and Elizabeth
was offered as witness. The bail was not granted on the basis of her testimony.
In the trial proper, Elizabeth
was presented as principal witness. Due to lack of material time, and in giving
the defense ample time to cross-examine Elizabeth,
the trial was set on another date for the cross-examination.
Before
the cross-examination could be conducted, Elizabeth
died of cardiac arrest.
The
defense moved that the testimony of Elizabeth
be expunged for lack of cross-examination.
On
the other hand, the prosecution moved that the testimony of Elizabeth during the bail hearing be adopted
as part of her main testimony.
As
judge how would you rule on the two motions.
ANSWER:As to the first motion, the same has to be denied. Lack of cross-examination due to the death of the witness
does not necessarily render the deceased’s previous testimony expungible. Thus, this Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,[i][19]
citing Fulgado v. CA, [i][20]
said that:
“The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a
solution to the procedural impasse because it prejudiced the party whose only
fault was to die before he could be cross-examined. The prudent alternative
should have been to admit the direct examination so far as the loss of
cross-examination could have been shown to be not in that instance a material
loss. And more compelling so in the instant
case where it has become evident that the adverse party was afforded a
reasonable chance for cross-examination but through his own fault failed to
cross-examine the witness.
"Where death prevents cross-examination under such
circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be ascribed to the
plaintiff or the witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that
has obtained in the direct examination." (Italics supplied)
Besides, mere opportunity and not
actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine.[i][21]
Appellants lost such opportunity when they sought the deferment of their
cross-examination of Elizabeth,
and they only have themselves to blame in forever losing that right by reason
of Elizabeth’s
demise. This Court held that the right
to cross-examination
“is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.
Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but
failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will
be received or allowed to remain in the record. x x x (W)aiver of the right to
cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic principle underlying
the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given
the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to
take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.”[i][22]
(Italics supplied)
As to the second motion, the same should be granted.The Supreme
Court ruled once that “We also find unmeritorious appellants’ argument that Elizabeth’s testimony,
having been taken during the bail hearings, cannot be used against them.
Section 1(f) of Rule 115 provides that “either party may utilize as part of its
evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased x x x given in
another
case or proceeding”, and under Section 8 Rule 114[i][23]
as amended by Circular 12-94,[i][24]
“evidence presented during the bail hearings,” like the testimony of deceased
witness Elizabeth, are “considered automatically reproduced at the trial”
subject only to the possible recall of the “witness for additional examination
unless the witness is dead, outside the Philippines or otherwise unable
to testify.”” (PP. V. Narca, GR 108488, July 21, 1997)
15. The accused was caught in flagrante
sniffing shabu inside a beach cottage in a resort. He was arrested by the
police officers P01 Redoble and P02 Rosete,, accosted by Huling, the caretaker
of the cottage, and Romel, the errand boy of the resort.
In convicting the accused, the Judge relied on the testimony
of P01 Redoble, since Huling and Romel
were not presented as witnesses for the prosecution.
On appeal the accused
assigned as one of the errors the non-presentation of PO1 Rosete, Huling and
Romel, claiming that the prosecution willfully suppressed other evidence which
gives the presumption that the same is adverse to the prosecution, and could
have resulted to his acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Rule on said assigned
error.
ANSWER: Accused-appellant
faults the prosecution for its failure to introduce the independent testimonies
of the workers at the resort, which amounts to a willful suppression of
evidence and gives rise to the presumption that the same is adverse to the
prosecution if produced, pursuant to Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Revised
Rules of Court.
The contention is without merit.
The prosecution has the prerogative to present the witnesses
it needs to meet the quantum' of evidence necessary to merit the conviction of
the accused.47 Hence, the prosecution cannot be faulted for
presenting only the three (3) police officers involved in the arrest of
accused-appellant. As these officers enjoy a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty,48 it was likewise error for the
defense to question their testimonies solely on the ground that they were the
very officers who conducted the arrest. Besides, the trial court had sufficient
opportunity to observe the demeanor of these witnesses and to determine the
truth or falsity of their testimonies. We see no reason, therefore, to overturn
the findings of facts of the lower court.(PP V. DANILO DE GUZMAN, GR 117952-53,
FEB 14, 2001)
16. Arriving home one
late afternoon of April 4,
1987, Amador Organez was informed by his wife that their six (6)
year old daughter, Maritess, was missing. Upon inquiry, Cristy Manalastas, one
of his neighbors, told Amador that a pregnant woman was seen near the vicinity
of his house. This was corroborated by two other neighbors, namely, Julie and
Baby Wycoco. Amador searched for the pregnant woman at Tondo. She chanced upon
Shirley Martinez whose child was also missing. Shirley related to Amador that,
after one, Zenaida Isla, who was her former classmate, visited her at her
house, her child disappeared. Amador, continued his search in Caloocan and met Lola Danding whose
grandchild was also missing. She told Amador that it was appellant who took her
granddaughter when the latter went to her house.
On July
18, 1987, the police authorities from Malabon went to Amador’s
house and informed him that appellant had been arrested. Amador then went to
the Malabon Police Headquarters where appellant told him to proceed to San
Simon, Pampanga to fetch his child. On that same day, Amador went to Pampanga
together with six Malabon policemen, Lola Danding, appellant, and Mrs. Loring
whose child was also missing. After coordinating with the police authorities of
Pampanga, they proceeded to the town of Sta.
Monica, to meet Maura “Orang” Mabalot.
Upon reaching the house of Maura, the police authorities
showed her a picture of Maritess and she identified the child in the picture as
the same child who was with appellant when the latter went to her house in
April, 1987. She also related that during the said visit, appellant told
her that she was looking for someone to adopt the child known as Maritess.
Appellant, upon hearing Maura’s statement reacted by telling the group that she
sold the child at Angeles
City. Thereafter, the
same group went to a dry goods store at the Angeles City
Market. The owner of the said store answered positively when the policemen
inquired if a child was sold to her but, upon verification, the child was not
Maritess. Then the group checked on another child, who was sold but again upon
verification, did not turn out to be Maritess.
Subsequently, appellant was brought back to the Malabon
Police Department but was transferred to the Western Police District of Manila. On July 21, 1987, appellant
was investigated before P/Cpl. Pablito Marasigan, an investigator at the WPD
General Assignment Section. Thereafter, she executed an extrajudicial statement
wherein she admitted that she took Maritess Organez and brought her to Teofilo
Ablaza for adoption. Said extrajudicial statement was executed with Atty.
Domingo Joaquin of the Citizen’s Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Department of
Justice, beside her.
Appellant on the other hand, denied the charges hurled
against her. She claimed that she has no knowledge of the contents of the sworn
statement attributed to her which is marked as Exhibit “B” nor had she read it.
She alleged that she was lured into signing the said document when Marasigan
promised to release her after affixing her signature thereat. More so, she
alleged that when she affixed her signature in the document, she was not
assisted by a counsel as Atty. Domingo Joaquin of CLAO arrived at the police
station after the document was already prepared and finished.
In this appeal, appellant interposes the following as
errors of the court a quo:
“The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused
guilty of kidnapping, inasmuch as:
1. The decision was
basically based on hearsay evidence;
2. The alleged
extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence, being extracted in
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused(sic).”
Rule on the assigned errors on the basis of PP. V. Isla,
GR 96176, Aug. 21, 1997)..
ANSWER: PEOPLE vs. ZENAIDA ISLA,[G.R. No. 96176. August 21, 1997] 1. Based on the facts of the
case the decision was based on hearsay.
Indeed, in the case at bench, the evidence presented dismally failed to pierce
the shield of presumptive innocence, as the prosecution merely relied on
hearsay evidence. As can be gleaned from the facts the testimony of the father
of the victim and that of the other prosecution witnesses were merely hearsay
as they were not personally aware of the facts surrounding the alleged
kidnapping of Maritess Organez. They all just averred that they were informed
or matters were merely related to them, which, taken as a whole, could not
legally sustain a conviction.
2. The extra-judicial confession is
inadmissible as it was taken not in the presence of a lawyer. n Gamboa v.
Cruz, we ruled that the
moment there is a move of investigator to elicit admissions or even plain
information from the suspect which may appear innocent or innocuous at the
time, the suspect should be assisted by counsel, unless he waives his right,
but the waiver should be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. The
legal tenet was reiterated in the case of People v. Ayson and other cases.
So, in the case at bar,
when P/cpl. Marasigan started his investigation without providing appellant
with counsel of her choice, the former violated her rights as enshrined in the
Constitution. It was only after he
conducted an investigation on appellant that P/Cpl. Marasigan summoned Atty.
Domingo Joaquin of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office and detailed at the
Western Police District as inquest lawyer, to assist the appelant in giving a
confession. This is the testimony of Atty. Joaquin:
“Q: After
you were summoned by Marasigan, (sic) then what did you do?
A:
When I arrived at the General Assignment Section of the Western Police
District, I was briefed or informed by P/Cpl. Marasigan that he was
investigating the suspect Zenaida Isla and the suspect intend to give an
extrajudicial confession.”
On this basis, there is
reason to believe appellant’s assertion that Atty. Joaquin did not assist her
during the investigation, inasmuch as the statement was already finished and
prepared before he arrived at the police station.
17. In a case for property heirship, the alleged niece testified
about her ‘being a niece” to the decedent. She testified that allegedly, her
deceased childless Aunt, the owner of the property in questions, since her
lifetime had always declared her as her niece, who would be capacitated to
inherit her property.
The adverse party claims that it is hearsay evidence, and
hence inadmissible.
The Judge sustained the
objection. Is the Judge Correct?
Answer: The Judge is
wrong. The Supreme Court ruled in Tison V. Court of Appeals ([G.R. No.
121027. July 31, 1997] “The primary
proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared
that the former is Teodora’s niece. Such a statement is
considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to
the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to
the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject
of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam,
that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject
matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.” As
the statement is a declaration about pedigree,the same can be admitted as
evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule.
18.In a rape case, the
following witnesses testified as follows:
Witness Lucela testified
that she saw the victim a retardate, who went voluntarily with the accused in
the bushes, where the accused had sex with her. The accused removed his pants,
sat on the grasses where the victim sat on top of him. Her affidavit beforehand
submitted did not mention of said fact.
Witness Rosario, an Aunt
of the retardate, testified that the accused after the incident left their
place, and even wrote a letter asking for forgiveness.
The retardate testified
and pointed to the accused as the person who had sex with her in the bushes.
The trial court
convicted the accused on the basis of said testimonies.
On appeal, the accused
assigned the following errors:
(1) The testimony of the
retardate is inadmissible and should not have been believed.
2) That his asking for
forgiveness and his leaving the place are irrelevant matters and should not
have been considered by the court.
3) The testimony of
Lucela should have been discredited as it did not jibe with her affidavit.
Rule on the three
assigned errors.
ANSWER: 1) A retardate is not disqualified to testify. “The
fact that the victim in this case is a mental retardate is no consequence, as
it is a settled rule that a mental retardate, for that reason alone, is not
disqualified from being a witness. This Court has
likewise held that a mental retardate who has the ability to make perceptions
known to others is a competent witness”.
2) The flight of the accused and his asking for forgiveness
are relevant matters, and are considered as indicia of guilt. “While the flight
of an accused person after the commission of an offense creates no legal
presumption of guilt, it is nevertheless a circumstance which is admissible in
evidence against him, and, if not explained in a manner consistent with his
innocence, is to be considered as tending to show that he was the person who
committed the deed.
The
Supreme Court has ruled that such an act (of asking for forgiveness) is
undeniably indicative of guilt.
3) the Testimony of Lucila cannot just be
discredited. X x x testimonial evidence in court carries more weight than
affidavits.
Testimonies given during trials are much more precise and elaborate than those
stated in sworn statements. Ex-parte affidavits are almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate for varied reasons, at times because of partial
or innocent suggestion or for want of specific inquiries. Witnesses
cannot be expected everytime, except when told, to distinguish between what may
be consequential and what may be mere insignificant details.” (PP V. ERARDO, G.R.
No. 119368. August 18,
1997]
19. Do you agree with the ruling of the judge when he decided
that ” Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove
ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that
tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in
land registration cases” ? Why? What is the correct rule with respect to
tax declarations used as evidence to prove ownership of land?
ANSWER: See, Palomo v. CA, G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997] and Heirs of Segunda Maningding
v. CA,G.R. No. 121157 July 31, 1997: “While tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when
coupled with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax
declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.”
20. In a criminal case
for murder, the prosecution presented as evidence the pictures of the
reenactment depicting the participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense. The accused objected saying that said evidence is inadmissible as
evidence, as he was not assisted by counsel when the reenactment was done. The
prosecution objected saying that the reenactment was voluntarily done by the
accused before he was charged, and the pictures were taken thereon without any
objection from him.
The
Judge ruled that said pictures are admissible as evidence and that they are not
covered by the right against self-incrimination.
Rule of
the contentions of the parties. Is the judge correct?
ANSWER: The pictures of the
reenactment depicting Lara' s role in the commission of the crime cannot be utilized as
evidence of his participation as a principal therein as that reenactment was
conducted without any lawyer assisting appellant. We have held that
reenactments are covered by the right against self- incrimination. Atty. Ranin himself
admitted on the witness stand that no lawyer assisted Lara during the
reenactment because he could not find any available lawyer at that time who
could act as his counsel. (People v.
Suarez, G.R.
No. 111193. January
28, 1997])
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