Ong
Ching Po vs. CA
G.R.
Nos. 113472-73
December
20, 1994
FACTS:
On July 1947,
Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent Soledad Parian, the wife
of Ong Yee, who died in January 1983. The said sale was evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Sale written in English. Subsequently, the document was
registered with the RD of Manila, which issued a TCT dated September 2, 1947 in
the name of private respondent Parian.
According to private
respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and building to the
brother of her husband, petitioner Ong Ching Po when the spouses settled in
Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded that the lot be vacated because she
was going to sell it. Unfortunately, petitioners refused to vacate the said
premises.
On March 19, 1984,
Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer against petitioner Ong Ching Po
before the MTC of Manila. The inferior court dismissed her case, and so did the
RTC, Manila and the CA, the CA decision final and executory.
Petitioners, on the
other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1946, petitioner Ong Ching Po
bought the said parcel of land from Joi Jong. The sale was evidenced by a photo
copy of a Deed of Sale written in Chinese. An English translation of said
document read as follows:
Deed of Sale
I, Ong Joi Jong, a
party to this Deed of Sale hereby sell in absolutely (sic) manner a lot located
on No. 4 Fundidor Street, San Nicolas an (sic) area consisting 213 square
meters including a one-story house erected thereon unto Mr. Ong Ching Po for
the sum of P6,000.00 the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by me and
consequently I have executed and signed the government registered title (sic)
the said lot inclusive of the house erected thereon, now belong (sic) to Mr.
Ong Ching Po unequivocally. And the purpose of this document is to precisely
serve as proof of the sale.
Addendum: I have
acceded to the request of Mr. Ong Ching Po into signing another
document in favor of Soledad Parian (She is the Filipino wife of Ong
Yee, brother of Ong Ching Po) for the purpose of facilitating the
issuance of the new title by the City Register of Deeds and for the
reason that he is not yet a Filipino. I certify to the truthfulness of this
fact.
Lot Seller: Ong Joi
Jong
On Dec. 6, 1983,
petitioner Ong Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to his
children, petitioners Jimmy and David Ong, the same property sold by Joi Jong
to private respondent Parian in 1947.
On Dec. 12 1985,
petitioners Ong Ching Po, Jimmy and David filed an action for reconveyance and
damages against private respondent in the RTC, Manila.
On July 26, 1986,
private respondent Parian filed an action for quieting of title against
petitioners Ong Ching Po and his wife, petitioner Yu Siok Lian, in the RTC,
Manila. Upon her motion, the case was consolidated with the earlier civil case.
(petitioner Ong Ching Po died in October 1986.)
On May 30 1990, the
trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent.
On appeal by
petitioners to the CA, the said court affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
According to
petitioners, the CA erred:
(1) When it gave full
faith and credit to the Deed of Sale (Exh. A) in favor of private respondent,
instead of the Deed of Sale (Exh, B) in favor of petitioner Ong Ching Po.
(2) When it concluded
that the acts of petitioners were not acts of ownership; and
(3) When it ruled that
no express nor implied trust existed between petitioners and private respondent
(as stated in Exh. B)
RULING:
The petition is
dismissed
1. The CA did not give
any credence to Exhibit “B” and its translation, because these documents had
not been properly authenticated. Petitioners likewise failed to adduce evidence
as to the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale, Exhibit “B”.
On the other end of
the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Joi Jong in favor of private
respondent (Exh. “A”) is a notarized document.
2. As to the
contention of petitioners that all the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental
receipts, deed of sale (Exh. “B”) and transfer certificate of title were in
their possession, private respondent explained that she and her husband
entrusted said lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.
As observed by the
Court of Appeals:
We find, however, that
these acts, even if true, are not necessarily reflective of dominion, as even
a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform them pursuant
to his appointment or employment
It is markworthy that
all the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent and her husband.
The rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.
3. We cannot go along
with the claim that petitioner Ong Ching Po merely used private respondent as a
dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name because
being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the Philippines. To
sustain such an outrageous contention would be giving a high premium to a
violation of our nationalization laws.
Assuming that Exhibit
“B” is in existence and that it was duly executed, still petitioners cannot
claim ownership of the disputed lot by virtue thereof.
Section 5, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Section 14, Article
XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands in the public domain.
Section 7, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands in the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution
reserved the right to participate in the “disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization” of all “lands of the public domain and other
natural resources of the Philippines” for Filipino citizens or corporations at
least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens,
whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring
public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private
lands.
Petitioner Ong Ching
Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and
owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of
Exhibit “B” has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary
to law.
On
expressed trust:
There is no document
showing the establishment of an express trust by petitioner Ong Ching Po as
trustor and private respondent Parian as trustee. Not even Exhibit “B” can be
considered as such a document because private respondent, the registered owner
of the property subject of said “deed of sale,” was not a party thereto.
The oral testimony to prove the existence of the express trust will not
suffice.
Under Article 1443 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, “No express trust concerning an immovable or
any interest therein may be proved by parole evidence.”
On
implied trust:
Undaunted, petitioners
argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in writing, they can prove an
implied trust orally. While an implied trust may be proved orally (Civil Code
of the Philippines, Art. 1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and received
by the courts with extreme caution, because such kind of evidence may be easily
fabricated. It cannot be made to rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on
loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Petitioners do not
claim that Ong Yee was not in a financial position to acquire the land and to
introduce the improvements thereon. On the other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife
of petitioner Ong Ching Po, admitted in her testimony in court that Ong Yee was
a stockholder of Lam Sing Corporation and was engaged in business.
1. It is not correct
to say that private respondent never took possession of the property. Under the
law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance. Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “when the
sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.” If what petitioners
meant was that private respondent never lived in the building constructed on
said land, it was because her family had settled in Iloilo.
2. Under Section 4,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:
Secondary
Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed.
When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, upon proof of its execution and lost or destruction, or unavailability,
its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the recollection of the witnesses.
Secondary evidence is
admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But
prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish
the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if necessary in
the discretion of the court.
The due execution of
the document may be established by
1. the person or persons who executed it;
2. by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged;
3. or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who
after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures;
4. or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution thereof.
Petitioner Yu Siok
Lian testified that she was present when said document was executed, but the
trial court rejected her claim and held:
If it is true that she
was present, why did she not sign said document, even merely as a witness? Her
oral testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate. Furthermore, she was married
only on September 6, 1946 to the plaintiff, Ong Ching Po, in Baguio City where
she apparently resided, or after the deed of sale was executed. The Court does
not believe that she was present during the execution and signing of the deed
of sale involved therein, notwithstanding her pretensions to the contrary.
Kneedler V. Paterno G.R. No.
L-1349 December 29,
1949
85 Phil 183
FACTS:
On October
14,1941, the Kneedler Realty Co. sold to Simon Paterno a parcel of land
situated in the municipality of Pasay (now Rizal City), continuing an area of
6,830.81 square meters, and more particularly described in transfer certificate
of title No. 6555, for the sum of P111,000. Paterno made an initial payment of
P30,000 and agreed to pay the balance of P81,000 in eleven monthly installments
of P7,000 each and a twelfth installment of P4,000, with interest at 9 % per
annum. To guarantee the payment of the said balance of P81,000 plus interest,
attorney's fees, and the cost of collection, Paterno mortgaged the same
property to the Kneedler Realty Co., and the mortgage was duly annotated on new
transfer certificate of title No. 44470 issued in his name by virtue of the
deed of sale. The last mentioned transfer certificate of title was subsequently
lost.lawphi1.net
On May
24,1946, this action was commenced to foreclose said mortgage. On June 26,1946,
the defendant Simon Paterno wrote to the plaintiff H.D. Kneedler, in his
capacity as liquidator of the Kneedler Realty Co., as follows:
Dear Sir:
With
reference to our conversation of the 22nd instant and the suit you instituted
against myself, Vicente Madrigal, and the Registers of Deeds of Manila and Rizal,
Civil Case No. 7729, I beg to confirm the arrangement we have entered into in
settlement of that suit.
I acknowledge
an indebtedness to you of P81,000, together with the interest at the rate of 5
% per annum from ..........................., exclusive of the time of the
Japanese occupation. of this amount I will pay you P5,000 upon your accepting
this letter and the dismissal of that suit. The balance, I will pay as follows:
P20,000.00
within 90 days
P20,000.00
within 180 days
P20,000.00
within 270 days
Balance —
within 360 days
With interest
at 5% per annum on unpaid balances. These payments will be guaranteed by don
Vicente Madrigal. In case you accept the foregoing, kindly advise me ad send me
a copy of your motion to dismiss the case, whereupon I will send you Mr.
Vicente Madrigal's guaranty.
Very truly
your,
(Sgd.) Simon
Paterno
Because
Paterno refused to sign a mortgage to guarantee the new schedule of payments as
contained in the foregoing letter, the plaintiff did not move to dismiss this
case.
On July
6,1946, the defendants Paterno and Madrigal filed their answer, wherein they
admitted the purchase by Paterno of the property in question and the execution
by him of a mortgage thereon to guarantee the payment of P81,000 plus interest,
attorney's fees, and the cost of collection, as alleged in paragraph III of the
complaint; but averred as a special defense "that during the Japanese
occupation Simon Paterno paid to the Japanese currency, due and owing under the
mortgage referred to in paragraph III of the complaint."
After due
trial His honor Judge Eulalio Garcia declared proven the alleged payment to the
Japanese Enemy Property Custodian but held that such payment was null and void
and that therefore the obligation in favor of the plaintiff had not been
extinguished. Hence the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff
never admitted the alleged payment of the mortgage to the Japanese and insists
in his brief before this court: "In the absence of the documentary proof
plaintiff-appellee cannot accept the allegation of payment and wishes to invite
the attention of the Court to the contradictions in the testimony of Mr.
Paterno with regard thereto. . ."
ISSUE:
Whether or
not defendant paterno has discharged the burden of proof required of a debtor
to entitle him to be relieved by the court from paying his debt.
RULING:
The
following are the main considerations that lead us to this conclusion:
1. Said
defendant has not presented the best evidence of which the case is susceptible.
The payment was alleged to have been made by checks on the Yokohama Specie
Bank. The records of said bank existed in the office of the Philippine Alien
Property Administration of the United States in Manila, and the fact that it
would have taken at least two weeks to locate the checks in question was not a
sufficient ground for the acceptance of oral testimony as to the alleged
payment. The present action was commenced on May 24, 1946, and the trial was
not held until October 25, 1946. Defendant then had sufficient opportunity to
produce the best evidence available had he exercised due diligence. If the
intervening period of five months between the filing of the complaint and the
date of the trial were not sufficient, said defendant could and should have
asked the trial court for the postponement of the trial to enable him to locate
the necessary documentary evidence in support of his defense.
"It is
an elementary principle of the law of evidence that the best evidence of which
the case in its nature is susceptible and which is within the power of the
party to produce, or is capable of being produced, must always be adduced in
proof of every disputed fact. Secondary evidence is never admissible unless it
is made manifest that the primary evidence is unavailable, as where it is shown
that it has been lost or destroyed, is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or
is in the hands of the opposite party who, on due notice, fails to produce it .
. . According to the great weight of authority . . ., where primary evidence is
not available so that a fact may be proved by secondary evidence is required to
produce the best secondary evidence which exists and which is in his power to
produce." (20 Am. Jur., Evidence, secs. 403, 404, pp. 364, 365.)
2. From the
records of cases that have come before us, we take judicial notice of the
practice of the Japanese to issue a cancellation of mortgage in due form in a case
like the present. In the present case, however, no such cancellation of
mortgage is claimed to have been issued to the defendant-mortgagor. It is
strange that in paying off a mortgage for such a big amount of money (more than
P96,000 ) the defendant Paterno contented himself with a mere receipt in
Japanese characters instead of securing a cancellation of the mortgage as other
debtors of enemy nationals who made payments to the Japanese did. Thus it
appears from defendant's own testimony and that of his witnesses that the
Japanese Military Administration did not cancel or release the mortgage in
question. under the circumstances the court must consider it still subsisting
and enforceable.
3. Even if
the oral evidence adduced in this case be held valid, it is too vague,
uncertain, and full of contradictions to be relied on. According to Mr. Paterno
the checks were paid to the "Alien Property Custodian "
of the Japanese, whereas according to Mr. Pañganiban, who prepared said checks,
they were paid to the Japanese Military Administration. According
to Mr. Paterno the checks were issued in November or December,
1943, whereas according to Mr. Panganiban they were issued in March, 1943, and
according to Mr. Bayani in January orFebruary, 1944.
While these discrepancies do not necessarily indicate pre-variation, they
demonstrate the frailty and unreliability of human memory.
Realizing the
frailty and unreliability of human memory, especially with regard to figures,
after the lapse of more than five years, we find no sufficient basis upon which
to reverse the trial court's finding that this claim had not been
satisfactorily proven.
In the
judgment of the trial court we not two errors in favor of the
defendant-appellant, to wit: (1) the exemption of defendant from paying
interest during the years 1942 to 1944, for which there was no legal basis, and
(2) the suspension of the payment until the lifting of the moratorium, which
law has not been pleaded and invoked by the defendant. But inasmuch as the
plaintiff has not appealed from said judgment, we are not justified in
modifying it in this respect.
The judgment
is affirmed, with cost against the appellant.
SANTOS V. CA and Philippine Geriatric
Foundation Inc.
G.R. No.
135481. October 23, 2001
FACTS:
In 1969,
private respondent PGFI occupied the ground floor of the Geriatrics Center on
Lions Road, Mayor Antonio J. Villegas Street, Ermita, Manila, upon the
invitation of the president of the Philippine Federation of Medical
Practitioners. In 1971, PGFI built a gymnasium adjacent to said
building. This was later on converted into a canteen and leased to
one Victor Jimenez. Jimenez later on vacated the space after he
failed to pay rentals therefor.
In 1989,
petitioner occupied the canteen by virtue of a letter-contract executed
between her and Vicente Pulido, president of PGFI.
Meanwhile,
the City Mayor of Manila requested PGFI to vacate its office at the Geriatrics
Center. It agreed and planned to transfer to the canteen beside the
Geriatrics Center. On December 27, 1993, PGFI asked
petitioner to vacate said space in a letter advising the latter of the
termination of the lease contract. However, petitioner refused to
vacate. In the meantime, the city government of Manila forcibly
ejected PGFI from the Geriatrics Center on January 7, 1995. On
October 11, 1995, PGFI through counsel, sent another demand letter
to petitioner asking her to pay rentals in arrears and to vacate the canteen
space within ten days of receipt of the letter. Still, petitioner refused.
Thereafter,
PGFI filed an ejectment case against petitioner with a prayer for the payment
of rentals in arrears for the period September 15, 1993 to September 30, 1995
totaling P36,750.00. The parties agreed that the only issue to be
resolved was whether or not petitioner may be ejected from the premises on the
ground of non-payment of rentals.
The
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the complaint on the ground that PGFI
failed to establish the existence of a lease contract between the parties. PGFI
claimed that the contract had been lost when it was forcibly ejected from the
Geriatrics Center. The contract was a letter-offer signed by
petitioner and addressed to PGFI, stating petitioner’s intention to lease
PGFI’s canteen under certain terms and conditions. It was later on
signed by Pulido as PGFI president, indicating its conformity with the terms
thereof.
To prove the
existence of the contract, PGFI presented affidavits of its trustees and
officers and presented to the trial court an unsigned
photocopy of the same. However, the trial court refused to
admit the photocopy as secondary evidence. Consequently, in a
decision dated February 26, 1997, the MeTC ruled that there is no
evidence that would warrant ejectment of petitioner from the subject premises.
On appeal,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the decision of the
MeTC. PGFI filed a motion for reconsideration on October 6, 1997 and
a motion to treat said motion as a motion for new trial on October 27, 1997, on
the ground of newly discovered evidence. A few days earlier, on October
11, 1997, PGFI found its copy of the lease contract signed by petitioner
and Pulido, as well as by its other trustees. PGFI presented said
contract to the RTC, which rejected it as “forgotten evidence”.
PGFI raised
the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the ruling of the
RTC. According to the CA, the unsigned copy of the lease contract
that was presented before the trial court qualified as secondary evidence under
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The CA noted that PGFI was
able to prove the existence and due execution of the lease contract through the
affidavits of its witnesses. Finally, the contents of the contract
itself were proven through the unsigned copy held by PGFI. There is,
thus, a valid lease contract executed between the parties, contrary to the
ruling of the trial court.
The CA ruled
that petitioner’s failure to abide by the terms stated in the contract,
particularly the payment of rentals, warranted her eviction from the
premises. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
“WHEREFORE,
this petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court affirming the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court which dismissed
plaintiff’s complaint is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered ordering
the defendant Ligaya Santos, a.k.a. Ligaya Salvador, to vacate the premises in
question subject of the complaint and surrender possession thereof to
plaintiff; and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P24,500.00 as unpaid rentals
from September 15, 1993 to September 30, 1995 at the rate of P1,000.00 a month
as provided in the letter-contract and the further sum of P1,000.00 a month
from October, 1995 until she vacates the premises as reasonable compensation
for the use and occupancy thereof, and to pay the costs of suit.
Costs against
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or
not the court erred;
I. …IN
HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE FACT OF THE EXECUTION OF
THE LETTER-CONTRACT OF LEASE.
II. …WHEN IT ADMITTED
AS NEWLY FOUND EVIDENCE THE ALLEGEDLY SIGNED LETTER-CONTRACT OF LEASE EVEN
THOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT FORMALLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL.
III. …IN ITS
DECISION, DATED JUNE 23, 1998, SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WHICH DISMISSED
THE COMPLAINT OF THE PLAINTIFF
RULING:
The parties
anchor their respective arguments on the admissibility, or non-admissibility in
the case of petitioner, of the unsigned copy of the alleged letter-contract of
lease executed between petitioner and PGFI.
Admittedly,
the original copy of the contract was not presented during trial, so PGFI as
plaintiff therein resorted to presentation of secondary evidence. It
presented the disputed unsigned copy of the contract as well as affidavits of
persons who saw the contract and signed thereon representing PGFI.
The Rules of
Court provides, in case the original of the document is lost:
SEC. 5. When
original document is unavailable. -- When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated. (Rule 130, Rules of Court).
Before the
contents of an original document may be proved by secondary evidence, there
must first be satisfactory proof of the following: (1) execution or existence
of the original; (2) loss and destruction of the original or its non-production
in court; and (3) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the
part of the offeror.[27] Proof
of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute
the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence.[28]
In the
present case, the existence and due execution of the lease contract had been
established by the affidavits of trustees of PGFI who were signatories thereto.[29] The
loss of said contract was likewise established by the affidavit of Vicente
Pulido, who attested to the fact that he kept the original and a duplicate copy[30] of
the contract at the PGFI office at the Geriatrics Center. These
copies were lost in the chaos that ensued when PGFI was forcibly evicted from
its office. Without a place to immediately move to, its files and
records were left for sometime[31] on
the street where they were susceptible to theft. Secondary evidence, then,
may be admitted to prove the contents of the contract.
The contents
of the original document may be proved (1) by a copy; (2) by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document; or (3) by the recollection of witnesses,[32] in
the order stated.
There is
testimonial evidence on record to prove the contents of the lost lease
contract. The affidavits of the witnesses for PGFI contain a recital
of the offer of petitioner to occupy the subject premises for a specified
amount payable every month, and the conformity to these terms by the trustees
of PGFI who signed thereon.[33] Thus,
even dispensing with the unsigned copy that was presented at the trial of this
case, there is still evidence of the contents of the contract in the form of
testimonial evidence.
Petitioner’s
emphasis on the admissibility of the unsigned copy of the contract is
misplaced. The contents of the lost original copy may not only be
proved by a copy thereof but also by the testimony of witnesses.[34] At
best, the original copy of the contract that was later
found merely affirms what had already been established by secondary evidence.
When the
original copy of the contract[35] was
found, PGFI attempted to present it before the trial court by moving for a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. On this point, we
note that petitioner did not offer any objection as to the genuineness of the
original contract or her signature thereon.[36] She
objected only insofar as claiming that PGFI could no longer present the
document since it was not offered in evidence during the trial of this
case. We take this as an indication that, indeed, there is nothing
questionable about the original contract insofar as its genuineness is
concerned.
Having thus
shown that a lease agreement exists between the parties, we come to the
question of whether or not petitioner may be ejected from the subject premises
for non-compliance with the terms of the agreement.
Under the
contract, petitioner obligated herself to pay a monthly rental, denominated as
donation per PGFI policy, to PGFI in the amount of P1,000.00 a
month. The lease period was two years.[37] PGFI
issued receipts,[38] whose
existence and issuance petitioner admitted,[39] for
petitioner’s monthly payments which was eventually increased from P1,000.00 to
P1,500.00. The agreement expired in December 1991. In
December 1993, petitioner admittedly stopped paying PGFI,[40] while
still occupying the subject premises.
We agree with
the CA that after December 1991, with petitioner still in the premises, the
lease was impliedly renewed on a month-to-month basis, per Article 1670, in
relation to Article 1687, of the Civil Code.[41]
Article 1670
of the Civil Code provides:
Art.
1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee should continue
enjoying the thing leased for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor,
and unless a notice to the contrary by either party has previously been given,
it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the
period of the original contract, but for the time established in
articles 1682 and 1687. The other terms of the original contract
shall be revived. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other
hand, Article 1687 states:
Art.
1687. If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is
understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from
month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly;
and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid
daily. xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner’s
obligation to pay rentals did not cease with the termination of the original
agreement. When she failed to remit the required amounts after
December 1993, the time when she stopped paying, PGFI was justified in
instituting ejectment proceedings against her. Thus, under Article
1673 of the Civil Code:
Art.
1673. The lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the
following causes:
(1) When the
period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under
articles 1682 and 1687, has expired;
(2) Lack of
payment of the price stipulated;
(3) Violation
of any of the conditions agreed upon in the contract;
xxx
Petitioner
clearly violated the provisions of the lease when she stopped making payments
to PGFI. Hence, we find no reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions of respondent appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DENIED. The decision dated June 23, 1998, of the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 46629 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against
petitioner.
