socorro lim's digest

Case No. 1

G.R. No. 124737 June 26, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
RIZALINO FUNDANO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

            In this case the accused-appellant RizalinoFundano seeks to reverse the 1996 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape. Rizalino was charged with this crime that he had committed towards Melody Fundano, his 15-year old daughter with his common-law wife Maria Fundano.

            It was alleged in the complaints filed by Melody and her mother that she was first raped by Rizalino on the night of September 10, 1993. Melody was again raped by Rizalino on the next two succeeding nights. However, Melody was only able to reveal about her ordeal on October 26, 1993 because she was afraid and ashamed of what had happened.On November 11, 1993, Melody, accompanied by her mother Maria and her sister-in-law Lucita, went to the NBI and accomplished a complaint sheet, executed a sworn statement, and submitted herself to a medical examination.

            Dr. Rolando Victoria, who examined Melody, found no extra-genital physical injuries norhymenal lacerations, and while her hymen was intact, it admitted a 2.8-centimeter diameter tube without producing any injury. Dr. Victoria thus concluded that MELODY's hymenal orifice could admit an adult male organ in full erection without suffering injury, and that it was possible she engaged in sexual engaged in sexual intercourse.

            The trial court found Rizalinoquilty of rape. It gave full faith & credit to Melody's testimony who declared in court, "in a straight forward and categorical manner," and exhibited no ulterior motive which "could have removed the sense of modesty and shame in a 15-year old girl and impelled her to concoct a story that would certainly bring ignominy, dishonor and humiliation to her and her family." Also, the trial court found unworthy the credence of Rizalino’sdefense of alibi, which was belied by the witnesses for the prosecution.

ISSUES:

1.            Whether or not the victim Melody is a credible witness given that the accused alleged that she has an ill motive in blaming her father for the crime.

2.            Whether or not the defendant Rizalino may question the expertise and credibility of Dr. Rolando Victorio as an expert witness in the case.

3.            Whether or not the Trial Court erred in disregarding the surrebuttal testimony of the defense.

RULING:

1.            Yes. Critical to any rape prosecution is the complainant's credibility, for that factor alone is sufficient to convict the accused. It is to be expected then that the defense will attempt to destroy the complainant's trustworthiness. In this case, the defenselabored to ascribe ill motive to Melody in that she hated her father because he did not give her support and he cohabited with another woman. However, Rizalino failed to prove these allegations with credible evidence. Thus does a sound and time-tested judicial dictum come to fore, that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that she was not so actuated and her testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

2.            No. Rizalino, moreover, may not decry Dr. Victoria's alleged lack of expertise. Before one may be allowed to testify as an expert witness, his qualifications must first be established by the party presenting him, i.e., he must be shown to possess the special skill or knowledge relevant to the question to which he is to express an opinion.In Dr. Victoria's case, the prosecution examined his past and present employment, his experience and duties as an NBI medico-legal officer, and the lectures and seminars he attended and conducted. An expert witness may be impeached, or the weight of his opinion lessened, by introducing evidence or pointing out paradoxes in his testimony; and the cross-examination of such a witness, great latitude is allowed the examining counsel to test the credibility of the expert for the guidance of the court. In the instant case, defense counsel's lone remark was that "the prosecution has not established the qualification of" Dr. Victoria, which, by itself, did not impair the expertise already established by the prosecution. At any rate, neither the medical report nor the testimony of witnesses other than the complainant is indispensable when, as here, the complainant's testimony is credible.

3.            No. While the Trial Court made no reference to Rizalino'ssurrebuttal testimony, such did not indicate that the court a quo harbored doubts as to his guilt. On the contrary, this silence only meant that the trial court did not find the testimony credible or found nothing therein to alter the fact of his presence in Comembo on the questioned dates. More importantly, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by credible witnesses that the accused in this case was the perpetrator of the offenses charged. 

Case No. 2

G.R. No. 123546     July 2, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

            JoeralGalleno was charged with statutory rape committed against Evelyn Obligar, a five year old girl. The prosecution presented three expert witnesses namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, and Dr.Machael Toledo, whose testimonies convinced the trial court that rape was committed against Obligar. Galleno contended that he should be acquitted since the expert testimonies were not impeccable considering that the doctors found that there was no presence of spermatozoa, and that they were not sure as to what caused the laceration in the victim's vagina.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the Trial Court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical doctors when the same failed to conclusively and sufficiently establish the cause of the laceration in the offended party’s vagina.

RULING:

            No. As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.

In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's interference is wrong.

The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina. In rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ.

Case No. 3

ADM. CASE No. 3319          June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

FACTS:

            A complaint for disbarment was filed by the complainant, Leslie Ui against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the grounds of immorality, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant’s husband, Carlos Ui, with whom the respondent had begot two children. According to complainant, Carlos Ui had admitted to her about the relationship between himself and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront said respondent to stop the illicit affair between the latter and the former’s husband but it was to no avail.

            However, according to Atty. Bonifacio, she is a victim in the situation. When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor but with children to a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. Moreover, the two got married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their relationship. When respondent knew of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent further claims that she and Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually accept the situation. Respondent however presented a misrepresented copy of her marriage contract.

            During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation.

            After hearing on the case, the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that it fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution stating that the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the complainant provided enough proof of evidence to sustain her complaint against the respondent.

RULING:

            No. The facts of this case leads the Court to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him. All the facts and evidence taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

            Also, the Court has held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. This, herein complainant miserably failed to do.

            On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, the Court finds improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable. Also, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

            WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

Case No. 4

G.R. No. L-1137          November 4, 1948

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
BENJAMIN ABIBUAG, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

            On October 16, 1945, during an amateur contest, appellant Benjamin Abibuag and PatricioLobaton were engaged in a fight in which Napoleon Rodriguez approached them for the purpose of separating them. Because they would not separate, Napoleon whipped appellant twice with a whip, and appellant ran away.

On November 13, 1945, at about 7 o'clock in the evening while taking supper in the house of Sabino Tan with three companions, Napoleon Rodriguez was shot in the head and died.No one in the house saw who fired, but Florencio Tribotante testified that at about 7:30 of the same evening, Abibuag went to his house, related to him that he got some trouble while in the beach, and confessed having shot Napoleon Rodriguez, saying that he was a spy of the Japanese. He was carrying with him a carbine and stated as reason for his act the fact that he was whipped by Napoleon. Abibuag dismantled the carbine, wrapped it in a sack, and placed it in a corner under the house, and requested Tribotante to notify his parents regarding the incident.

            When chief of police arrested appellant, appellant made the admission that when he saw Napoleon Rodriguez eating in a house he shot him with his carbine, because of the personal grudge due to the fact that about two weeks before the shooting, appellant was whipped and kicked by the deceased in the town plaza of Sagay. Because appellant had been laughed at, he decided to kill Napoleon to alleviate his humiliation.

On November 15, 1945, when appellant was brought before the acting justice of the peace of Sagay, for preliminary investigation, because appellant was reluctant to answer, the complaint was read to him several times, and he admitted having committed the offense on reasons for which he would not plead guilty.

The lower court found appellant guilty of murder, with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity and a mitigating circumstance of obfuscation and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P2,000 and the costs.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not the testimonies of Benjamin Abibuag and his witnesses as to his good conduct are with merit.

RULING:

            No. Appellant’s testimony in the hearing and his witnesses’ testimonies as to his good conduct are without merit in the face of the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution which conclusively show his guilt.

            The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, with costs against the appellant.

Case No. 5

G.R. No. 107699 March 21, 1997

ALEX JACOBO y SEMENTELA, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

            At around 5 A.M. of April 14, 1987 in Extremadura, Sampaloc, Manila, during a wake over the dead son of EdilbertoBermudes, Bermudes was gathering the drinking glasses used by the mourners when he heard Jacobo ask if anybody would kill him. Jacobo, who was holding a foot-long knife, approached Jessie Peralta who was seated asleep on a chair, and took aim at Peralta. Bermudes shouted at him to stop. Jacobo desisted but next approached Romeo de Jesus who was lying down on a bench. De Jesus woke up and a quarrel between the two ensued. Jacobo and de Jesus, who was likewise armed with a 'beta', stabbed each other and then separated, both appearing not seriously injured because they were still standing. De Jesus asked Jacobo why the latter was going away instead of finishing the fight. Jacobo and de Jesus resumed stabbing each other until the latter suddenly fell down and the former ran away. On April 23, 1987, Jacobo was brought to the police station by an agent of the NBI to whom he had surrendered.

            Upon arraignment, Jacobo pleaded not guilty. At the trial, he invoked self-defense. Finding that Jacobo's narration was "well-nigh inconceivable" due to his vacillating statements at different stages of the trial, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court ruled as finding the accused guilty of the crime charged in the Information beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the strategy adopted by appellant was "diametrically opposed to what jurisprudence exacts from an accused who professes a justifying circumstance to secure exoneration.”

            Petitioner seeks acquittal based on the supposed unlawful aggression directed against him by the deceased. The defense intended to prove self-defense with the following evidence: (1) Bermudes' sworn statement that petitioner was walking away when he was attacked by the deceased; (2) petitioner's testimony to the same effect; and (3) the notorious character of the deceased which buttresses the allegation of unlawful aggression against petitioner.

ISSUE:

            Whether prosecution witness Bermudes' testimony was worthy of credence despite his earlier sworn statement corroborating the petitioner's testimony.

RULING:

            Yes. It is the peculiar province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and related questions of fact because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. Thus, it has become a well-settled rule that where the issue touches on the credibility of witnesses or factual findings, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, unless some facts or circumstances that may affect the result of the case have been overlooked.

            The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, giving full faith and credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Bermudez despite his earlier affidavit or "Salaysay" for the reason that affidavits are incomplete reproduction of what the declarant had in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to him. An affidavit will not always disclose all the facts and will, oftentimes and without design, describe some occurrences without the deponent detecting inaccuracies or contradictions.

            As a matter of fact, the Salaysay and Bermudes' testimony in court are not grossly inconsistent with each other.Clearly, in both the Salaysay and Bermudes' testimony, the deceased and the petitioner agreed to fight. This was what the trial court had found and what the Court of Appeals affirmed. It must also be mentioned that the defense counsel allowed the case to be submitted for decision without cross-examining Bermudes, failing thereby to take advantage of an opportunity to impeach (assuming that he could) Bermudes' credibility and testimony.

            Thus, the Supreme Court quotes with concurrence the decision of the trial court that “there were two individuals who testified on how the crime was committed: EdilbertoBermudes for the prosecution, andthe accused for the defense. Of these two witnesses, EdilbertoBermudes testified in a more credible manner and his testimony is more credible; hence, his testimony is given full weight and credence.”

Case No. 6

G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992

ERNESTO MARTIN, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondents.

FACTS:

            Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o’clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by NestorMartin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging that he was liable to it as the employer of Nestor Martin. The petitioner’s main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his employee. However, petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint based on his ground was denied. The case was considered submitted for decision with the express waiver by Martin of his right to present his own evidence. Ernesto Martin thus did not rebut the Meralco's allegation that he was Nestor Martin's employer. On the other hand, Meralco did not present any evidence to prove that Nestor Martin was the employee of Ernesto Martin.

ISSUE:

            Whether or not Ernesto Martin can be held liable for the incident.

RULING:

No. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is liable for the torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned task. But it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in that article.

           

In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by the plaintiff to show that the defendant was the employer of Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. The trial court merely presumed the existence of the employer-employee relationship and held that the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It noted that although the defendant alleged that he was not Nestor Martin's employer, "he did not present any proof to substantiate his allegation."

Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty “to present evidence on the fact in issue necessary to establish his claim” as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its action. As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. It was enough for the defendant to deny thealleged employment relationship, without more, for he was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. The Supreme Court has consistently applied the rule that “if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligationto prove his exception or defense.”Petitionwas granted.

Case No. 7

G.R. No. 137932       March 28, 2001

CHIANG YIA MIN, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, PAPERCON (PHILIPPINES), INC. and TOM PEK, respondents.

FACTS:

            On February 7, 1979, Chiang Yia Min, a Chinese national based in Taiwan, had Hang Lung Bank Ltd. Of Hong Kong send US$100,000.00 through the Pacific Banking Corporation to respondent bank’s head office. The remittance was for petitioner’s own account and was intended to qualify him as a foreign investor under Philippine laws.

            However, when petitioner checked on his money sometime in mid-1985, he found out that the dollar deposit was transferred to the Shaw Boulevard branch of respondent bank and converted to a peso account, which had a balance of only P1,362.10 as of October 29, 1979. A letter of respondent bank stated that petitioner’s Current Account No. 12-2009 was opened on February 8, 1979, with an initial deposit of P729,752.20; a total of P728,390.00 was withdrawn by way of five checks respectively dated February 13, 19 and 23, 1979 and October 5 and 29, 1979, apparently issued by petitioner in favor of Papercon (Phils.), Inc., (hereafter, "Papercon") one of the herein private respondents and a business venture of Tom Pek. Thus, the balance of the account was reduced to P1,362.10 as of October 29, 1979 and no transactions were made on the account since. In the same letter, the bank stated that it was no longer able to locate the microfilm copies of the issued checks, specimen signature cards, and other records related to the questioned account, since the account had been inactive for more than five years.

            Petitioner insisted that he did not cause the transfer of his money to the Shaw Boulevard branch of RCBC, as his instructions in the telegraphic transfer were for the money to be remitted to the RCBC head office in Makati, nor its conversion to pesos and the subsequent withdrawals. Nor did he authorize anyone to perform these acts.

The trial court determined that the withdrawals were not made by petitioner nor authorized by him, and held respondent bank liable for the US$100,000.00 (and the interest thereon from date of filing of the complaint), damages, attorney’s fees, and costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, found that the opening of the current account and the withdrawals therefrom were authorized by petitioner; accordingly, it reversed the decision of the RTC and absolved private respondents of liability.

ISSUE:

            Whether petitioner has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that respondent bank connived with private respondents and third party defendants Papercon and Tom Pek in allowing the withdrawals from Current Account No. 12-2009, knowing these to be unauthorized by petitioner, and with the purpose of defrauding him.

RULING:

            No. The person who alleges fraud or negligence must prove it, because the general presumption is that men act with care and prudence. Good faith is always presumed and it is the burden of the party claiming otherwise to adduce clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. No judgment for damages could arise where the source of injury, be it fraud, fault, or negligence, was not affirmatively established by competent evidence

A review of the complaint filed before the RTC, indicates that petitioner originally sued upon an allegation of negligence on the part of respondent bank’s officers and employees in allowing the said withdrawals. Under either theory of fraud or negligence, it is incumbent upon petitioner to show that the withdrawals were not authorized by him. If he is unable to do so, his allegations of fraud or negligence are unsubstantiated and the presumption that he authorized the said withdrawals will apply.

            Moreover, petitioner’s signatures on the questioned check amounts to prima facie evidence that he issued those checks. By denying that he issued the said checks it is he who puts into question the genuineness and authenticity of the signatures appearing thereon, and it is he who has the burden of proving that those signatures were forgeries.No shared of evidence was presented by petitioner to show that the signatures were not his. All that this petition relies on insofar as concerning the authenticity of the signatures is the finding of the trial court judge that there was a discrepancy between the signatures on the bank form and petitioner’s passport.

            The Court, however, believes that since what is at issue here is whether petitioner issued the questioned checks the essential comparison should be between the signatures appearing on the checks and the specimen signatures on the depositor’s card. Such is the normal process followed in verifying signatures for purposes of bank withdrawals. Considering that the depositor’s card was not produced in evidence in the instant case, resort may thus be made to such other documents as would bear the authentic signature of petitioner. The record is replete with documents bearing petitioner’s signature, among them, his residence certificate, alien certificate of registration, investor’s passport, tourist’s passport, and the application forms for an RCBC current account. From the Supreme Court’s examination of these records they find no significant disparity between the signatures on the checks and those on the abovesaid documents, and will not risk a finding of forgery where the same had not been clearly alleged nor proved. Forgery, as any other mechanism of fraud, must be proven clearly and convincingly, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.

            There is thus no evidence to demonstrate that respondent bank and respondent Papercon and Tom Pek colluded to defraud petitioner of his money. What the evidence in fact establishes is that the opening of the account and the withdrawals were authorized by petitioner, and that the signatures appearing on the questioned checks were petitioner’s. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.