cezar digests

KAREN JOY C. CEZAR

FLORENCIA T. HUIBONHOA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses Rufina G. Lim and ANTHONY LIM, LORETA GOJOCCO CHUA and Spouses SEVERINO and PRISCILLA GOJOCCO, respondents.

Topic: Interpretation of Documents

Facts:

            On June 8, 1983, Florencia T. Huibonhoa entered into a memorandum of agreement with siblings Rufina Gojocco Lim, Severino Gojocco and Loreta Gojocco Chua stipulating that Florencia T. Huibonhoa would lease from them (Gojoccos) three (3) adjacent commercial lots at Ilaya Street, Binondo, Manila described as lot nos. 26-A, 26-B and 26-C, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 76098, 80728 and 155450, all in their (Gojoccos’) names.

On June 30, 1983, pursuant to the said memorandum of agreement, the parties inked a contract of lease of the same three lots for a period of fifteen (15) years commencing on July 1, 1983 and renewable upon agreement of the parties. Subject contract was to enable the lessee, Florencia T. Huibonhoa, to construct a “four-storey reinforced concrete building with concrete roof deck, according to plans and specifications approved by the City Engineer’s Office.” The parties agreed that the lessee could let/sublease the building and/or its spaces to interested parties under such terms and conditions as the lessee would determine and that all amounts collected as rents or income from the property would belong exclusively to the lessee.  The lessee undertook to complete construction of the building “within eight (8) months from the date of the execution of the contract of lease.

The parties also agreed that upon the termination of the lease, the ownership and title to the building thus constructed on the said lots would automatically transfer to the lessor, even without any implementing document therefor.  Real estate taxes on the land would be borne by the lessor while that on the building, by the lessee, but the latter was authorized to advance the money needed to meet the lessors’ obligations such as the payment of real estate taxes on their lots.  The lessors would deduct from the monthly rental due all such advances made by the lessee.

During the construction of the building which later became known as Poulex Merchandise Center,^[4] former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. was assassinated.  The incident must have affected the country’s political and economic stability.  The consequent hoarding of construction materials and increase in interest rates allegedly affected adversely the construction of the building such that Huibonhoa failed to complete the same within the stipulated eight-month period from July 1, 1983.  Projected to be finished on February 29, 1984, the construction was completed only in September 1984 or seven (7) months later.

Under the contract, Huibonhoa was supposed to start paying rental in March 1984 but she failed to do so.  Consequently, the Gojoccos made several verbal demands upon Huibonhoa for the payment of rental arrearages and, for her to vacate the leased premises.  On December 19, 1984, lessors sent lessee a final letter of demand to pay the rental arrearages and to vacate the leased premises.  The former also notified the latter of their intention to terminate the contract of lease.

However, on January 3, 1985, Huibonhoa brought an action for reformation of contract before Branch 148 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati.  Docketed as Civil Case No. 9402, the Complaint alleged that although there was a meeting of the minds between the parties on the lease contract, their true intention as to when the monthly rental would accrue was not therein expressed due to mistake or accident.

Issue: Whether or not contract must be reformed

Held:

No. Reformation is that remedy in equity by means of which a written instrument is made or construed so as to express or conform to the real intention of the parties.

Article 1359 of the Civil Code provides that “(w)hen, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such intention may be expressed.  xxx.” An action for reformation of instrument under this provision of law may prosper only upon the concurrence of the following requisites:  (1) there must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contact; (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties; and (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident.

The meeting of the minds between Huibonhoa, on the one hand, and the Gojoccos, on the other, is manifest in the written lease contract duly executed by them.  The success of the action for reformation of the contract of lease at bar should therefore, depend on the presence of the two other requisites aforementioned.

Such contention betrays Huibonhoa’s confusion on the distinction between interpretation and reformation of contracts.  In National Irrigation Administration v. Gamit,^[34] the Court distinguished the two concepts as follows:

“‘Interpretation’ is the act of making intelligible what was before not understood, ambiguous, or not obvious.  It is a method by which the meaning of language is ascertained.  The ‘interpretation’ of a contract is the determination of the meaning attached to the words written or spoken which make the contract.  On the other hand, ‘reformation’ is that remedy in equity by means of which a written instrument is made or construed so as to express or conform to the real intention of the parties.  In granting reformation, therefore, equity is not really making a new contract for the parties, but is confirming and perpetuating the real contract between the parties which, under the technical rules of law, could not be enforced but for such reformation.  As aptly observed by the Code Commission, the rationale of the doctrine is that it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the enforcement of a written instrument which does not reflect or disclose the real meeting of the minds of the parties.”

By bringing an action for the reformation of subject lease contract, Huibonhoa chose to reform the instrument and not the contract itself.^[35] She is thus precluded from inserting stipulations that are not extant in the lease contract itself lest the very agreement embodied in the instrument is altered.

TOMAS SEE TUAZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOHN SIY LIM, respondents.

Topic: Interpretation of Documents

Facts:

     On July 15, 1987, spouses Tomas S. Tuazon and Natividad S. Tuazon sold to John Siy Lim (Lim) a 650 square meter conjugal lot covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. 860,^[3] along A. del Mundo Street, 7^th Avenue, Kaloocan City, with a two-storey building and Apartment Units Nos. 161 and 163 existing thereon.

Atty. Crisostomo, lawyer of the Tuazons, drafted the Absolute Deed of Sale, which was duly registered. By virtue of the said deed, TCT No. 860 in the name of the Tuazons was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 152621 was issued in the name of John Siy F. Lim.

On October 1, 1990, the Tuazons brought a Complaint for Reformation of Contract, Quieting of Title with Damages against John Siy F. Lim, docketed as Civil Case No. C-14542 before Branch 131 of Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; the Tuazons theorizing that the real intention of the parties was to enter into a loan accommodation.

Issue: Whether or not the contract needs to be reformed as an equitable mortgage

Held:

     No. Article 1365 of the New Civil Code on reformation of contracts applies only if there is evidence, clear and convincing, that the parties did agree upon a mortgage of subject property. Here, everything appears to be clear and unambiguous and nothing is doubtful, within the contemplation of Article 1602. When the words of the contract are clear and readily understandable, there is no room for construction. The contract is the law between the parties. Said this Court:

“‘A contract’, according to Article 1305 of the Civil Code, ‘is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.’ Once, the minds of the contracting parties meet, a valid contract exists, whether it is reduced to writing or not. And, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement, except when it fails to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto, in which case, one of the parties may bring an action for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.”

For an action for reformation of an instrument as provided for in Article 1359 to prosper, the following requisites must concur, to wit: (1) there must have been a meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract; (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties; and (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident.^[26] Here, petitioner has not shown or established the presence of the aforestated requirements for the reformation of the deed in question.

What is more, any doubt as to the real meaning of the contract must be resolved against the person who drafted the instrument and is responsible for the ambiguity thereof.^[27]Prepared by the lawyer of the herein petitioner, Tomas See Tuazon, subject Deed of Absolute Sale executed on July 15, 1987 is couched in clear terms and conditions. John Siy Lim had no hand in its preparation. Besides, the voluntary, written and unconditional acceptance of contractual commitments negates the theory of equitable mortgage.

Juan D. Victoria, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent

Topic: Statutory Construction

Facts:

Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. Under the law, Azana’s position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking Sangguniang member, a post being contested by petitioner and private respondent. In answer to private respondent’s petition for his declaration as senior Sanggunian member for the Province of Albay, the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first in the order of ranking, garnering 21.78% out of the total registered voters while petitioner herein as second ranking member with 21.19%. The COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district. However the petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claims in ranking the Sangguniang members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained but also on the number of voting in the district

HELD:           

No. The Local Government provides: For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election. The law is clear. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. Petitioner’s contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, which leaves no room for other interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which has no power to change the law.

NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY, ROSELINDA GERALDEZ, RAMON SARGAN and ADELINA A. YAP, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND HONGFIL SHIPPING CORPORATION, respondents.

Topic: Statutory Construction

Facts:

            National Food Authority (NFA), thru its officers then, Emil Ong, Roselinda Geraldez, Ramon Sargan and Adelina A. Yap, entered into a “Letter of Agreement for Vessel /Barge Hire”^[3]with Hongfil Shipping Corporation (Hongfil) for the shipment of 200,000 bags of corn grains from Cagayan de Oro City to Manila.

NFA sent Hongfil a Letter of Advice that its (Hongfil) vessel should proceed to Cagayan de Oro City.  On February 6, 1987, M/V DIANE/CHARLIE of Hongfil arrived in Cagayan de Oro City 1500 hours.  Hongfil notified the Provincial Manager of NFA in Cagayan de Oro, Eduardo A. Mercado, of its said vessel’s readiness to load and the latter received the said notification on February 9, 1987.

A certification of charging rate was then issued by Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. (INPORT), the arrastre firm in Cagayan de Oro City, which certified that it would take them (INPORT) seven (7) days, eight (8) hours and forty-three (43) minutes to load the 200,000 bags of NFA corn grains.

On February 10, 1987, loading on the vessel commenced and was terminated on March 4, 1987.  As there was a strike staged by the arrastre workers and in view of the refusal of the striking stevedores to attend to their work, the loading of said corn grains took twenty-one (21) days, fifteen hours (15) and eighteen (18) minutes to finish.

On March 6, 1987, the NFA Provincial Manager allowed MV CHARLIE/DIANE to depart for the Port of Manila.  On March 11, 1987, the vessel arrived at the Port of Manila and a certification of discharging rate was issued at the instance of Hongfil, stating that it would take twelve (12) days, six (6) hours and twenty-two (22) minutes to discharge the 200, 000 bags of corn grains.

Unfortunately, unloading only commenced on March 15, 1987 and was completed on April 7, 1987.  It took a total period of twenty (20) days, fourteen (14) hours and thirty-three (33) minutes to finish the unloading, due to the unavailability of a berthing space for M/V CHARLIE/DIANE.

After the discharging was completed, NFA paid Hongfil the amount of P1,006,972.11 covering the shipment of corn grains.  Thereafter, Hongfil sent its billing to NFA, claiming payment for freight covering the shut-out load or deadfreight as well as demurrage, allegedly sustained during the loading and unloading of subject shipment of corn grains.

When NFA refused to pay the amount reflected in the billing, Hongfil brought an action against NFA and its officers for recovery of deadfreight and demurrage, docketed as Civil Case No. 55892 before Branch 165 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasig City.

 Issue: Whether or not petitioners can be held liable for demurrage

Held:

     No. Demurrage is the sum fixed in a charter party as remuneration to the owner of the ship for the detention of his vessel beyond the number of days allowed by the charter party for loading or unloading or for sailing. Liability for demurrage, using the word in its strict technical sense, exists only when expressly stipulated in the contract.

Shipper or charterer is liable for the payment of demurrage claims when he exceeds the period for loading or unloading as agreed upon or the agreed “laydays”.  The period for such may or may not be stipulated in the contract. A charter party may either provide for a fixed laydays or contain general or indefinite words such as “customary quick dispatch” or “as fast as the steamer can load.”

In the case under scrutiny, the charter party provides merely for general or indefinite words of “customary quick dispatch.”

Delay in loading or unloading, to be deemed as a demurrage, runs against the charterer as soon as the vessel is detained for an unreasonable length of time from the arrival of the vessel because no available berthing space was provided for the vessel due to the negligence of the charterer or by reason of circumstances caused by the fault of the charterer.

In the present case, charterer NFA could not be held liable for demurrage for the delay resulting from the aforementioned circumstances.  The provision “Laydays: Customary Quick Dispatch” invoked by Hongfil is unavailing as a basis for requiring the charterer to pay for demurrage absent convincing proof that the time for the loading or unloading in question was beyond the “reasonable time” within the contemplation of the charter party.  Here, the Court holds that the delay sued upon was still within the “reasonable time” embraced in the stipulation of “Customary Quick Dispatch.”

Furthermore, considering that subject contract of affreightment contains an express provision “Demurrage/Dispatch:  NONE,” the same left the parties with no other recourse but to apply the literal meaning of such stipulation. The cardinal rule is that where, as in this case, the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt over the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations is controlling.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDELCIANO AMACA @ “EDDIE” and “JOHN DOE”  @ “OGANG,” accused, EDELCIANO AMACA @ “EDDIE,” accused-appellant.

Topic: Testimonial Evidence

Facts:

            The ante mortem statement of the victim is sufficient to identify the assailant in the case at hand. On December 17, 1990, an Information was filed by Bais City Prosecutor Epifanio E. Liberal, Jr. against Appellant Amaca and one known only by his alias “Ogang, charging them in  mutually helping one another and with evident premeditation and at nighttime did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with the use of a firearm one Wilson Vergara who, as a result thereof, suffered fatal gunshot wound as reflected in the medical certificate which was the immediate cause of his immediate death.

Warrant for the arrest of accused-appellant was issued on January 16, 1991. However, this was returned unserved on two different occasions for the reason that the subject had already changed address and “his whereabouts [were] unknown.” A motion for reinvestigation filed by appellant’s Counsel de Oficio Marcelo Ondoy was denied in an Order dated April 15, 1991 on the ground that the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the accused who was then still at large.^[6] Jurisdiction over the person of appellant was acquired by the said court only on July 1, 1991 when he was arrested by police authorities.^[7] Thereafter, reinvestigation was conducted but the prosecutor, reiterating his prima facie findings, resolved to continue the prosecution of the accused.

Arraigned on September 25, 1991, the accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Ondoy, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued in due course.

The appellant contends that had he survived, the declarant would not have been a competent witness to identify his assailant.  He emphasizes that the victim was shot twice at the back at nighttime and that “ x x x the witness/victim based on the foregoing circumstance was not able to see the alleged assailants

Issue: Whether or not declarant is a competent witness

Held:

Yes. True, the victim, Wilson Vergara, was hit at the back by two bullets.  But as the prosecution clearly showed by other evidence, Wilson did not lose consciousness upon being shot.  In fact, his ante mortem statement clearly indicates that he was able to see and recognize who shot him.  In this light, appellant is assailing the credibility, not the competency, of the victim.  Competency of a witness to testify requires a minimum ability to observe, record, recollect and recount as well as an understanding of the duty to tell the truth.^[16] Appellant does not dispute that the victim was capable of observing and recounting the occurrences around him; appellant merely questions whether the victim, under the circumstances of this case, could have seen his assailant. In effect, appellant challenges merely the credibility of the victim’s ante mortem statement.  We hold that the serious nature of the victim’s injuries did not affect his credibility as a witness since said injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter.  The Court had occasion in the past to rule on a similar issue as follows:

“ x x x(‘) The question as to whether a certain act could have been done after receiving a given wound,(‘) according to Wharton and Stilles (Vol. III, Medical Jurisprudence, p. 212), ‘is always one that must be decided upon the merits of a particular case.’  They cited a case from Vibert’s Precis de Med. Leg., 4th ed., p. 286, where a man after being shot in the chest threw a lamp at his adversary.  The lamp started a fire; and to extinguish the fire, the wounded man fetched a pail of water from the courtyard.  When the fire was extinguished, the man lay down in bed and died.  Vibert performed the autopsy, and found that the left ventricle of the heart had been perforated by the revolver’s bullet.  It is evident from the foregoing that Dr. Acosta’s assertion that the victim of a gunshot wound would immediately lose consciousness, after infliction of the wound, may not be true in all cases. x x x”^[17]

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs.UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee.

Topic: a lawyer shall avoid being a witness for a client

Facts:

            On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.

Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14, 1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.

On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net

Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300. In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land.

The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.

One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested in buying it.

Issue: Whether or not lawyers shall avoid being a witness for a client

Held:

Yes.  With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:

When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELBERTO BASE, accused-appellant.

Topic: Extrajudicial Confession

Facts:

While in the camp of the 217th PC Company Elberto Base executed a written Sworn Statement with the assistance and presence of Atty. Romeo Reyes of Rosario, Batangas, who testified in court, to the effect that he assisted the accused in the execution of his statement, by telling Elberto Base of his constitutional rights before said execution. He further testified that throughout the proceedings he was present and the accused read the contents of his statement before swearing to the truth of the same.

A perusal of the statement of Elberto Base shows that he was well aware of the intended plot to kill Julianito Luna, by admitting that a week before the killing he was with the assassins surveiling the residence of Julianito Luna.

He also admitted to be with accused Frederick Lazaro and Patrocinio when the jeep in question was borrowed by the two and was with accused Lazaro and Patrocinio when they left Kalayaan, Pasay City in proceeding to San Juan, Batangas that day when Julianito Luna was shot.

Accused Base also admitted that he was left on a shed in Ibaan, Batangas when Frederick Lazaro and Patrocinio returned to Rosario and when they came back, he was fetched and was with them in going to San Jose, Batangas in the house of one June Vale and later on in Barangay Lodlod, Lipa City where they left the jeep in the premises of the house of Amelia Quizon. And finally Base admitted in his statement that he was told to recover the jeep in Lodlod, Lipa City.

Accused-appellant denied having anything to do with the fatal shooting of the victim and alleges, in sum, that he was tortured to admit the crime. As culled from his testimony, at around 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. in the afternoon of February 8, 1990, he had just disembarked at the bus stop at Mataas na Lupa, Lipa City after visiting his uncle Mauro Espina, his sister-in-law Perla Ronquillo and Opring Espina in Maricaban, Pasay City. From there, he intended to proceed on board a jeepney to the terminal near the market in Lipa City.

Accused-appellant, however, claimed that although Sgt. Mercado asked him questions, the latter did not take down accused’s real answers and instead the said investigator typed what he wanted to type therein. Accused further testified that he was not given any opportunity to read in whole or in part the typewritten statement^[22] and that it was only upon arrraignment that he came to know that the written statement taken from him which he was forced to sign was actually a confession.

With regard to the manner in which the custodial interrogation was conducted and the Sworn Statement was executed, accused-appellant testified that his pleas to his interrogators that they observe his constitutional rights went unheeded. He likewise claimed that although the sworn statement bore the attesting signature of Atty. Romeo Reyes, he neither knew nor saw Atty. Reyes at the 217th PC Detachment on February 8, 1990.^[26] Accused-appellant denied thet he knew his co-accused Conrado Guno, Frederick Lazaro and Eduardo Patrocinio.^[27] He likewise denied knowing Leo Valle and Erlinda Angeles.

The crux of accused-appellant’s appeal hinges on the admissibility of the Sworn Statement dated February 8, 1990. In challenging its probative value, he insists in sum that the document is inadmissible in evidence because it was executed in violation of his constitutional rights, firstly his right to counsel of his own choice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sworn statement is admissible and has probative value

Held:

            Yes. Section 12, Article III of the Constitution embodies the mandatory safeguards afforded a person under investigation for the commission of a crime and the concomitant duty of the State and its agencies to enforce such mandate. It declares that:

SEC. 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(1).....No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(2).....Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Missc

(3).....The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Numerous decision of this Court rule that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must be: 1.] voluntary; 2.] made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; 3.] express; and 4.] in writing.

Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]n extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti." In this case the prosecution presented other evidence to prove the two elements of corpus delicti, to wit: a.] a certain result has been proven, i.e. a man has died; and 2.] some person is criminally responsible.

In this case, it is indubitable that a crime has been committed and that the other pieces of prosecution evidence clearly show that accused-appellant had conspired with the other accused to commit the crime. In fact, he was seen by the prosecution witnesses in the company of his other co-accused. Furthermore, Atty. Romeo T. Reyes and the interrogator, Sgt. Romulo Mercado, testified to the voluntariness of his confession. In this regard, it must be stressed that the aforementioned rule merely requires that there should be some other evidence "tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession." 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. OSCAR ROBLES Y MOANA, ANTONIO MANAS Y FLAVA, VICENTE ANTONIO Y HAYA, accused, OSCAR ROBLES Y MOANA, accused-appellant.

Topic: Corpus Delicti

Facts:

            On January 30, 1987, at around 1:00 P.M., Patrolmen Rey Cocson, Edgar Amurao, and C. Tabanera were on board a police vehicle patrolling the vicinity of Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila. The police car came alongside a taxicab with two male passengers. When the policemen noticed that the passengers were acting suspiciously and could not look directly at them, they signalled the taxicab driver to stop for routine inspection. The policemen asked the names of the passengers. The one seated beside the driver was identified as Manas, while the one at the back seat was appellant Robles. The policemen saw two bags on the floor of the back of the taxicab. When asked whether the bags belonged to them, the two men initially refused to answer. However, Robles broke down and admitted that they had robbed the house of one Jose Macalino in Makati. Manas remained silent. Patrolman Cocson frisked Robles and found a .38 cal. revolver. Patrolman Tabanera frisked Manas, and recovered a fan knife (balisong) from him.

In the bags were shoes, cameras, watches, and assorted items. Robles admitted taking them from the residence of Jose Macalino. After apprising them of their constitutional rights, the policemen brought Robles and Manas to the police headquarters. Since Patrolman Cocson noticed a bag with the nametag Beth M. Puzon and a telephone number, he called up the number and spoke with Beth M. Puzon, a daughter of Jose Macalino. Subsequently, Robles and Manas were turned over to the Makati Police Department.

Detective Ernesto Gatpayat of the Makati Police Station proceeded to the house of Jose Macalino and found the house ransacked. He discovered two dead persons inside the house, later identified as Marilou Dalugdugan and Diego Limato, household helpers of Macalino. Gatpayat recovered a screwdriver beside the body of Dalugdugan.

After apprising Robles and Manas of their constitutional rights and in the presence of counsel, Patrolman Celso Noriega, Makati Police station investigator, took down their statements.

Issue:  the ADMISSIBILITY of the extrajudicial confession of the appellant

Held:

            Yes.  The extrajudicial confessions of appellant and his co-accused are admissible against them. The allegation that they were not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation is belied by the records, which clearly show that Atty. Eugenio C. Macababayao Jr. was present during the entire investigation. Further, the same lawyer acted as counsel for appellant Robles during trial.^[20] Atty. Macababayao did not dispute that he was present and he assisted the appellant and his co-accused at the time they executed their confessions. Neither did he deny his signatures attesting that he was present in the preparation of the extrajudicial confessions and assisted appellant and his co-accused. As pointed out by the trial court, appellant Robles never brought to the attention of his counsel that he was threatened by the policemen into making his extrajudicial confession. Accused Manas even corrected the middle initial of his name from "L" to "F" in the preparation of his extrajudicial confession. Further, the prosecution and defense entered into a stipulation during pre-trial.

We note that Section 3 of Rule 133 of the Rule requires that an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, means a crime has actually been committed.^[31] Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. In this case, aside from the extrajudicial confessions, the police found the stolen goods, the murder weapons, and the dead bodies, thereby conclusively establishing the needed corroborating evidence of corpus delicti.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERONIMO SOLIMAN Y BUENAVENTURA alias EMONG and SOFRONIO PALIN Y PAZ alias POLONIO,defendants-appellants.

 Topic: conviction of a crime of moral turpitude

Facts:

            Appellants were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Manila and were sentenced each to suffer the extreme penalty of death..

Appellant Soliman testified that prior to the present incident, or on April 21, 1955, the deceased tried to borrow his pushcart and, as he was not able to lend it to him, the deceased boxed him and as a consequence, he suffered physical injuries; that incident was settled amicably on the same day by the companions of the deceased; that on another occasion the beat up Soliman with an iron pipe and the latter had to undergo medical treatment; that in the night of April 29, 1955, after he had eaten in Folgueras St., he proceeded to a truck by the United Bus Line of which he was a watchman; that while he was passing Sto. Cristo Street, the deceased called him and asked for a drink; that he told the deceased he had no money, but the deceased forced him to give him money and even boxed him; that because the deceased had three companions, he pulled out his knife and upon seeing this, the three companions ran away; that he and the deceased fought in the course of which he stabbed him; that while they were fighting, one Sofronio Palin came and separated them; and that when they were separated Palin advised him to surrender to the police, so he went home and asked his brothers to accompany him to the Meisic Station.

Appellant Palin merely corroborated the testimony of his co-accused by declaring that while he was eating at a restaurant at the corner of Sto. Cristo and Azcarraga Streets in the morning in question, he saw Soliman and the deceased grappling with each other; that he tried to separate them and succeeded in doing so; that after the two were separated, he asked Soliman to surrender and the latter heeded his advice.

The defense, however, claims that the testimony of Ernesto Balaktaw should not be given credit because it is self-contradictory and inconsistent with the testimony of Pat. Tolentino and Det. Senen. But, aside from the fact that the alleged contradictions refer to unimportant details or circumstances, they can be explained and reconciled.

Issue: Whether or not the appellants are disqualified to be a witness for the reason of conviction of moral turpitude

Held:

            No. In this respect, we notice that the trial court has been most careful in taking notice not only of the conduct of the witness during the trial, but of other extraneous matters that may help in reaching a correct conclusion. The Court found the testimony of Balaktaw worthy of credence not only because it is in part corroborated by the testimony of appellant Soliman himself who admitted having inflicted the wounds that caused the death of the victim, (although by way of self-defense) but also because it is supported by the nature of the wounds as found by Dr. Lara in his autopsy.

The fact that a person has been previously convicted of a crime does not necessarily disqualify him as a witness for he may still prove to be a truthful one.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.EDUARDO DE DIOS y EXCONDE, defendant-appellant.

Topic: Right to self-incrimination

Facts:

            As grounds for the appeal, the appellant, through counsel, questions the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support his conviction.

The record of this case shows that immediately prior to the occurrence of the incident complained of, the complainant, Concepcion Guanzon, then twenty four (24) years of age and an industrial pharmacist by profession, and the accused, Eduardo de Dios, were sweethearts, Connie, as the complainant is called, was in love with the accused, nick-named Eddie, in the latter part of 1972. Connie was very much in love with Eddie and she sent him many affectionate letters, sometimes three (3) in a day, including one (1) where she wrote nothing else but "I love you" twenty-nine (29) times. Her love for Eddie did not diminish despite her having been informed that Eddie had contracted marriage with one Venus Joy Mesina, for she (Connie) had been assured that steps had been taken to annul said marriage. Connie, in her letters, would now and then re-assure Eddie of her trust and love for him. She would also ask Eddie to seek comfort in prayers and to ask for heavenly intercession so that the petition for the annulment of his marriage would be granted and they could be "free as a bird." 

When arraigned, the accused pleaded not guilty to the commission of the offense. However, the accused did not take the witness stand to contradict or rebut the testimony of the complainant as to the manner she was raped by the accused. The accused, instead, presented the love letters sent to him by Connie, and the testimonies of the driver Julian Cartano, and their neighbors in Baguio City, Josefa Solano and Federico Estoque, who both claimed to have seen the complainant and the accused holding each other's shoulders ("magka-akbay") and talking and laughing like newly-weds. They also stated that they did not see any injuries on the complainant.

The appellant, in his Brief, contends that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of the complainant that she had been raped by the appellant, pursuant to the rule of "Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus," since the trial court itself did not give weight and credence to her claim that she had been forcibly abducted by the appellant from the Makati Medical Center at Makati, Rizal, to Baguio City.

Issue: Whether or not the accused can be compelled to testify against himself

Held:

            No. It cannot be denied, however, that only the complainant and the appellant, and no other, can testify to the rape committed in this case. Consequently, the testimonies of the defense witnesses who did not actually see the commission of the offense cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the complainant that she was raped by the appellant with a full and straightforward revelation of its details. Besides, it is possible that the defense witnesses could not have seen the injuries sustained by the complainant since the injuries on her breast, thigh and private part were amply covered by her clothes while the injuries on her neck were covered by her long hair.

Going over the voluminous record of the case, the Court cannot escape the thought that there had surged an overpowering fit of passion which blinded the appellant and led him to commit the crime. Was he overcome by bestial instinct? Or was he provoked or incited to execute the act? Only the appellant knows. Unfortunately, he did not take the witness stand to explain his side. But we cannot hold this against him, for an accused has the right to remain silent and no adverse inference should be drawn from that silence. Besides, settled is the rule that in order to gain conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence rather than on the weakness of the defense. In the instant case, the Court is satisfied that the guilt of the appellant has been proven with moral certainty and beyond reasonable doubt; hence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners, 

vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAÑADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.

Topic: Right to self-incrimination

Facts:

            On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.

Issue: Whether or not the right to self-incrimination may be invoked in administrative proceedings

Held:

            Yes. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights'." 

In another case —

... The mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. 

One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. This right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.

This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. 25 thus —

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions.

Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit

It was held that:

We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.