(1)PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JOEL DE GUZMAN
G.R. No.132071 (October 16, 2000)
Facts:
Corazon Deliso y
Reyes (Private complainant) alleged that she was rape by her husband cousin
Joel De Guzman, which the latter poked a
knife on her neck and warned private complainant not to report the incident to
anyone.
Defendant-Appellant
In his defense said, he and private complainant were lovers and they have
engaged in sexual intercourse many times during their six-month affair. The
night of the alleged rape, private complainant told appellant that she was
ready to leave her husband to go with him. But, appellant rebuffed her as he
informed private complainant of his plan to go to Manila. At this juncture,
private complainant allegedly told him that if he left she would charge him
with rape.
Upon
arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court rendered judgment
against the appellant founding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of rape.
Appellant
avers that the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the victim.
ISSUE: Whether or not the
trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the victim?
RULING:
To begin with,
appellant's claim that their sexual intercourse was consensual is concoction
born out of desperation. It is true that this Court has sustained the defense
of consensual sex in a number of rape cases. It is to be noted, however, that
in these cases, evidence like love notes, mementos and witnesses attesting to a
consensual relationship were presented. Here, other than appellant's story he
only had a fellow detainee to corroborate his tale. Ironically, his fellow
detainee, Barro, contradicted him on major details.
We
also note that the records show that private complainant cried during her
direct examination. The cry of the victim during her testimony bolsters the
credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and
experience.
What
is significant is that she was clear and consistent in asserting that appellant
had threatened and raped her. Thus, we see no reason to doubt private
complainant's story. There is nothing to show that private complainant was
actuated by ill motive to implicate appellant in the commission of the crime.
The logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and the testimony
of private complainant is worthy of full faith and credit.
(2)PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DELA TORRE
G.R No. 121213 and 121216-23 (January 13, 2004)
FACTS:
Appellant-spouses
Butchoy and Fe de la Torre employed Baby Jane Dagot as housemaid, That on or
about the 2nd week of September, 1992 At around 12:00 o’clock
midnight, appellant Fe de la Torre woke Baby Jane and her husband Butchoy , Fe
then ordered Butchoy to have sex with Baby Jane. The accused Butchoy de la Torre, in
conspiracy and confederating with his wife, Fe de la Torre, by means of force,
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with BABY JANE DAGOT, a girl of 16 years of age against
her will and consent.
The
rape was repeated once a week from the second week of September 1992 on to the
fourth week of October 1992 and repeated again in the second week of December.
Appellant-spouses
Butchoy and Fe de la Torre were charged in nine (9) separate Amended
Complaints with rape.
The
appellant-spouses denied the allegations of rape; the appellants profess that
the imputations of rape against them may have been instigated by Baby Jane’s
father, Rafael Dagot, who was also an employee of the spouse appellants. She
allegedly caught him stealing. The appellants also insist that Baby Jane was
already married to one Eddie Tabi when they took her as their maid. This explains why, according to them, Baby Jane
was no longer a virgin.
The
nine criminal cases were consolidated and joint trial conducted before the
Regional Trial Court, the Court found the appellants guilty of all nine (9)
counts of rape charged in the nine Amended Complaints and sentenced them
to reclusion perpetua for each count.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in
believing the private offended party accounts of the supposed rape?
RULING:
From the outset it
should be noted that while the appellants assail the credibility of the
complainant’s testimony, they actually do not point to specific inconsistencies
or contradictions in her testimony.
True, the trial court relied solely on the testimony of the complainant
regarding the rape incidents, but the determinative question before the trial
court was whether the complainant’s testimony is credible.
The
test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in
conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. Further, the credibility of witnesses can
also be assessed on the basis of the substance of their testimony and the
surrounding circumstances.
The
greatest weight is accorded to the findings and conclusions reached by the
lower court regarding the credibility of witnesses and their testimony, owing
to the court’s unique position to see, hear and observe the witnesses
testify. Unless it is shown that the
court overlooked or misunderstood some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which would affect the outcome of the case, or that its findings of
fact and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are not supported by the
evidence on record, its determination is left undisturbed. In the present case,
we see no need to overturn this well-settled principle.
But
then, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the appellants
may be convicted only of the rape committed in the first week of September
1992. The evidence for the prosecution
proves only the first charge of rape.
Baby Jane’s testimony on the commission of the eight other charges does
not satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt to justify the
appellants’ conviction.
Each
and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime; hence, each of the
eight other rape charges should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE,
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is MODIFIED. In Criminal Case No. 11199, the appellants
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape.
(3)PEOPLE
VS. GODOY
G.R. Nos. 115908-09
(December 6, 1995)
FACTS:
Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the maximum
penalty of death in both cases by the Regional Trial Court.
The private complainant Mia
Taha allegedly said that her teacher Danny Codoy(Appellant) by means of force,
threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, have carnal
Knowledge with her and kidnap or detained her, for a period of five (5).
The defense presented a
different version of what actually transpired.
His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the
letters wrote by the complainant (Mia Taha) to the accused and the same was
corroborated by the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
ISSUES:
Can Godoy be convicted of rape
and kidnapping with illegal detention?
RULING:
No. They were in fact lovers.
This notwithstanding, the
basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the
nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains
at all times upon the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and
the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution has
failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in
reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These
are: (1) while rape is a most detestable crime,
and ought to be severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind
that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be
defended by the party accused, though innocent;(2)
that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) that
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate
and ineluctably convince this Court that there was no rape committed on the
alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was the contrivance of an
afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress of an actual wrong.
The challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court
below made no serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider the
totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in
various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must
not be accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that
the crime of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that
portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the incident and conveniently
deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was
indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony
concerning the events which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the
court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed or declined to appreciate,
the actual truth could have been readily exposed.
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the
offended party of her liberty. In the present charge for that crime, such
intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the
fact that the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they
themselves instituted, several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil
the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the guilt of
appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in
rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor
to their character humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be
that complainant's mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody
knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's indiscretion
and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave
the scenario of this rape drama.
(4)PEOPLE
VS LIWAG
G.R. No. 89112 (August 3, 1993)
FACTS:
In the
morning of September 9, 1979, Ely A. Lee was been murdered. Before the said
killing took place, the prosecution witnesses Emilio Cerillo about five (5)
meters away, saw appellant Mario Bolaños hand a gun to accused Liwag while
talking to each other. Moments later, they heard gunshots. Cerillo stood up
from the dug-out of the machine where he had been and saw accused Liwag with a
gun, shooting at someone, whom he later on identified as the deceased Ely A.
Lee.
Purita Lee, wife of the deceased, rushed to the ricemill and there she
saw the victim lying on his own blood. Purita cradled her husband and asked:
"Daddy, who shot you?" In his dying words, the victim uttered:
"Si Mario" The victim was taken to the hospital, but was pronounced
dead on arrival.
The Police arrived at the area and cordoned the same knowing that the
gunman was still inside, but appellant Bolaños met with the police officers and
denied that the gunman was still inside the building. However an hour after
Bolanos informed the police that the gunman liwag will surrender.
Accused Liwag refused to give any statements to the police. Sworn
statements obtained from several witnesses, including Emilio Cerillo, Domingo
Hallare, Roger Castañeda, and Dionisio Orbon, implicated accused Liwag. Thereafter, the police conduct a search where
Bolaños and his family lived and where the gunman had sought refuge after the
shooting but Bolaños refused to allow the search, this time invoking the
absence of a warrant therefore.
One day after, the police searched the Bolaños residence after having
obtained the proper search warrant. In the course thereof, the lethal weapon
was found inside and it was fully loaded .22 caliber licensed in the name of,
and admittedly owned by appellant Bolaños.
A ballistic examination was then
conducted by the PC Crime Laboratory on the said firearm. It was confirmed that
the specimen slugs as well as the test slugs were fired from the gun recovered
from the Bolaños residence. In other words, the specimen and test slugs were all
fired from the same .22 caliber owned by Bolaños.
Accused Liwag made a confession
before the Station Commander of Iriga City, claiming that it was appellant
Bolaños who had ordered the killing of Lee, it was made with the assistance of
counsel, Atty. Rudito Espiritu, whom the police asked to assist the said
accused.
The trial court rendered a
decision convicting the accused Andres Liwag and appellant Mario Bolaños of the
crime of murder attended by the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and
cruelty. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
A.WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION OF ACCUSED ANDRES LIWAG?
B. WHETHER
OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AGAINST
DEFENDANT BOLANOS ALL HIS ACTS?
RULINGS:
A. Well-settled is the rule that the extrajudicial
confession of an accused is binding only upon himself and is not admissible
against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as other accused
are concerned. However, this rule is not without exceptions, one of which
provides that the extrajudicial confession of an accused is admissible against
his co-accused where the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show
the probability of participation of the co-accused in the killing of the
victim.
More
importantly, the extra-judicial confession of accused Liwag was made with the
assistance of counsel, Atty. Rudito Espiritu, under the circumstances, Liwag's
earlier affidavit with the assistance of counsel implicating appellant Bolaños
cannot easily be set aside. More, Liwag's confession contained details which
were corroborated on material points by the witnesses for the prosecution in
establishing the link of circumstantial evidence which, among others, warrant
the conviction of herein appellant.
B. Circumstantial
evidence is the evidence of collateral facts or circumstances from which an
inference may be drawn as to the probability or improbability of the facts in
dispute. Not only the prior and coetaneous actuations of the accused in
relation to the crime, but also his acts or conduct subsequent thereto can be
considered as circumstantial evidence of guilt. To warrant conviction in
criminal cases upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must be more than
one, derived from facts duly proven, and the combination of all of them must be
such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The
confession of accused Liwag with respect to the fact that accused-appellant was
the one who handed him the murder weapon was corroborated by the testimony of
witness Cerillo that he saw accuse-appellant give accused Liwag a gun
immediately before the shooting.
WHEREFORE, the
judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
appellant.
(5)People
of the Philippines vs. Honesto Manuel y Padilla
G.R. No. 121539 (October 21, 1998)
FACTS:
The Private offended
party Nestcel Marso y Gorospe,eleven (11) years of age,
a minor was left in the care of spouses HONESTO
MANUEL and ANNABELLE MANUEL. On the night of May 23, 1993, when only the
accused and the private offended party are left in the house, Honesto by mean
of violence and intimidation have carnal knowledge with Nestcel.
On arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty, the
prosecution presented a Medico-legal Officer of the PNP crime Laboratory as an
expert witness, the father of the victim and the victim itself was presented as
witness for the prosecution.
The victim was subjected to a medical examination with
the following finding: Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of violence.
The victim Nestcel testified that she was awakened
from sleep to see accused-appellant by her side looking down at her. The latter
the undressed and embraced her. Thereafter, accused-appellant played with his
organ and tried to penetrate her from behind. Before Nestcel could close her legs,
she felt accused-appellant penis touch her vagina and thereafter felt a
fluid-like sticky substance flowing thereon.
The accused appellant denied the allegations, saying
that he managed to relieve himself of his urge by means of masturbation.
The trial court gave credence to the version of the
victim.
Accused-appellant Honesto Manuel was found to be
guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the crime of Statutory Rape,
defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely
erred in giving credence to the testimony of the minor witness Nestcel Marzo
(VICTIM)?
RULING:
Time and again, this
Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of the
witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial courts observation and
conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality, unless there
appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight which the lower
court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if
properly considered, would alter the results of the case. The trial judge
enjoys the advantage of observing the witness deportment and manner of
testifying, her furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant
or sneering tone, calmness, sigh or the scant or full realization of an
oath.—all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness
honesty and sincerity.
It is settled that
where there is no evidence to show any dubious
reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness would testify
falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the testimony
is worthy of full faith and credit.
It is settled
jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full
weight and credit, since when a woman or
a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all the is
necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
(6)PEOPLE
VS. PILONES
G.R. No. L-32754-5 (July
21, 1978)
FACTS:
Manuel Pilones was convicted by the Circuit
Criminal Court of Manila for the crime of murder, for the killing of Antonio G.
Renolia (A.K.A Tony), and frustrated murder against Nicanor Ilagan.
Ilagan
was shot in the knee. Tony went to assist and tried to lift llagan but was shot
buy the same assailant. Llagan saw his assailants face, because of the light of
the electric lamp on the street. The assailant and his companions, Danny
Banlag, Milo and others, who were armed with arrows and carried stones, ran
away.
Tony died on the way to the hospital. Ilagan
was also brought to the hospital where he was treated for two weeks.
Pilones refused to give any statement or
comment upon investigation.
At the trial Pilones relied on an alibi, but
the same was not corroborated by testimonies of possible witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether
Pilones was sufficiently identified by the prosecution's sole eyewitness,
Ilagan?
RULING:
Pilones conspired with his companion in
shooting llagan and killing Renolia.
The decisive fact is that Pilones was
not only Identified by Ilagan but at the confrontation in the police precinct
between accuser and accused, Pilones, as the accused, just kept silent and did
not deny Ilagan's accusation and the Identification made by Renolia's mother.
"He who remains silent when he
ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent".
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 23. Admission by silence. —
Any act or declaration made in the presence and within the observation of a
party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally
to call for action or comment if not true, may be given in evidence against
him.
Silence is assent as well as consent,
and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded
under some circumstances as a quasi-confession. An innocent person will
at once naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of
self-preservation and self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing
himself. A person's silence, therefore, particularly when it is persistent,
will justify an inference that he is not innocent.
The trial court erred in holding that
the crime as to Ilagan is frustrated murder. The wound in his knee was not
sufficient to cause his death. The crime is only attempted murder.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is affirmed with the
modification.
(7)PEOPLE
VS. RAQUEL
FACTS:
At midnight of July
4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito
Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person
knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed
men emerged at the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him.
Juliet went out of
their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband’s lifeless while a man
took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly. She shouted for help at their window
and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away but
she did not seen their faces. The police came and found one of the perpetrators
of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim’s house. He
was identified as Amado Ponce.
Amado Ponce revealed
to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the
perpetrators of the crime.
Upon arraignment
thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress,
however, and before he could give his testimony, accused Amado Ponce escaped
from jail. Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense and
presented witnesses to support their alibi.
The trial court
rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them accordingly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in
convicting the appellants of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence
positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime?
RULING:
A careful review and
objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed to
establish beyond reasonable doubt the real identities of the perpetrators of,
much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
The lone eyewitness,
Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband as base
from his testimonies.
A thorough review of
the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein
appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of
accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped
from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.
The
extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be
utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court. If the
accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the
latter’s extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay
as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged
plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
The res inter
alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another.
An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is
not admissible against his co-accused.
The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual
convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon him, and are evidence against
him. So are his conduct and
declarations. Yet it would not only be
rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by
the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound
by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.
This
extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was
made in violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado Ponce. Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in
the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such
waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. These rights, both
constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and
accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are hereby ACQUITTED of
the offense charged, with costs de oficio.
(8)People
of the Philippines VS. Solito Tena
G.R. No.100909 (October 21, 1992)
FACTS:
Alfredo Altamarino Sr was found dead in
his own residence, bore eight (8) Stab wounds and his personal properties are
missing. The Daughter of the victim sought the help of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
The NBI conducted
their investigation. Mauban Police Station Commander informed the NBI that
suspicion as to the authorship of the crime had shifted to a syndicate. This
syndicate was reportedly involved in the robbery at nearby Municipalities and a
member thereof was in detention named Adelberto Camota. The NBI agents
interrogated Camota.
Sensing that Camota
knew of the incident, the NBI agents conducted polygraph examination on Camota,
allegedly with his consent. Alberto Camota executed an extrajudicial confession
in the presence of a lawyer, admitting participation in the robbery-killing of
Alfredo Almarino and pointing to Solito Tena and three others as his companions
in the crime. Solito Tena pleaded not guilty.
Solito Tena with
other accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to a prison term of 20 years of
Reclusion Perpetua.
Only Solito Tena
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial confession of
Camota is binding against other co-accused?
RULING:
The judgment of
conviction was based chiefly on the extrajudicial confession of accused
Adelberto Camota which repudiated by Camota in open court. Used of Camota’s
extrajudicial confession is precluded by section28, of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
Section
28. Admission by third Party.—the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the
act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.
This rule admits of
certain exceptions, to be sure, one of which is found in section 30 of rule 130
of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 30. Admission by
conspirator.—The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
This exception does
not however apply. In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received
against his co-conspirator, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first
proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates
to the common object; (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.
Several factors bar
the application of said Section 30 to the case at bar. More importantly, camota
, instead of conforming his
extrajudicial confession in court, repudiated the same, denied knowledge of the
crime charged and denied knowing accused-appellant Tena.
The extrajudicial
confession of Camota thus being inadmissible against his co-accused and being
no evidence independently of said confession,linking accused appellant Tena to
the crime, this Court declares Tena not guilty of the complex crime of Robbery
with homicide with which he is charged.
(9)PRIME WHITE CEMENT VS IAC
G.R. No. L-68555 (March
19, 1993)
FACTS:
Zosimo
Falcon and Justo Trazo entered into an agreement with Alejandro Te whereby it
was agreed that, Te shall be the sole dealer of 20,000 bags Prime White cement
in Mindanao. Falcon was the president of Prime White Cement Corporation (PWCC)
and Trazo was a board member thereof. Te was likewise a board member of PWCC.
It was agreed that the selling price for a bag of cement shall be P9.70.
Before the bags of cement can be delivered,
Te already made known to the public that he is the sole dealer of cements in
Mindanao. Various hardware’s then approached him to be his sub-dealers, hence,
Te entered into various contracts with them.
But then apparently, Falcon and Trazo were
not authorized by the Board of PWCC to enter into such contract. Nevertheless,
the Board wished to retain the contract but they wanted
some amendment which includes the increase of the selling price per bag to
P13.30 and the decrease of the total amount of cement bags from 20k to 8k only
plus the contract shall only be effective for a period of three months and not
6 years.
Te refused the counter-offer. PWCC then
awarded the contract to someone else.
Te then sued PWCC for damages. PWCC filed a
counterclaim and in said counterclaim, it is claiming for moral damages the
basis of which is the claim that Te’s filing of a civil case
against PWCC destroyed the company’s goodwill. The lower court ruled in favor
Te.
ISSUE: Whether
or not the "dealership agreement" referred by the President and
Chairman of the Board of petitioner corporation is a valid and enforceable
contract?
HELD:
No. Te is
what can be called as a self-dealing director – he deals business with the same
corporation in which he is a director. There is nothing wrong per se with that.
However, Sec. 32 provides that:
SEC.
32. Dealings of directors, trustees or officers with
the corporation. —- A contract of the corporation with one or more of its
directors or trustees or officers is voidable, at the option of such
corporation, unless all the following conditions are present:
1. That
the presence of such director or trustee in the board meeting in which the
contract was approved was not necessary to constitute a quorum for such
meeting;
2. That
the vote of such director or trustee was not necessary for the approval of the
contract;
3. That
the contract is fair and reasonable under the circumstances; and
4. That
in the case of an officer, the contract with the officer has been previously
authorized by the Board of Directors.
In this
particular case, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that the contract
between PWCC and Te through Falcon and Trazo was not reasonable. Hence, PWCC
has all the rights to void the contract and look for someone else, which it
did. The contract is unreasonable because of the very low selling price. The
Price at that time was at least P13.00 per bag and the
original contract only stipulates P9.70. Also, the original contract was for 6
years and there’s no clause in the contract which protects PWCC from inflation.
As a director, Te in this transaction should protect the corporation’s interest
more than his personal interest. His failure to do so is disloyalty to the
corporation.
(10)Soriano v. Compania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas
G.R.
No. L-17392 (18 SCRA 999)
FACTS:
Defendant was the creditor of the plaintiff appellant;
they executed a deed of mortgage in favor of defendant, entitled "Credito
Sobre Azucar Renovacion De hipoteca Con Garnatia Adicional" granting
the defendant authority to export or sell the sugar of the plaintiff delivered
to it by the latter and
mortgaging to the defendant the properties specified and described therein,
that to guarantee the payment of this crop loans plus the interest that would
be due thereon as well as the payment of the outstanding balance under the
previous crop loans, plaintiff mortgaged in favor of defendant the same sugar
plantations formerly mortgaged under the previous deed; that as additional
security therefore, plaintiff likewise mortgaged the sugar cane crops that
would be planted and harvested during the 1941-42 crop year, the proceeds of
which sale to be credited to plaintiff's account.
Plaintiff
was informed by the defendant that said sugar was destroyed during the war.
Plaintiff
investigated as to what really happened to the export sugar he delivered to
defendant and discovered that, instead of having been burned and destroyed
during the last war as falsely represented by the defendant to plaintiff, had
actually been shipped to and sold by the defendant in the United States on
different dates in 1941, months before the outbreak of the war; that the
proceeds of such sale were kept and retained by defendant for its own use
without crediting the same for the account of plaintiff.
Defendant
alleged that the totality of the export sugar produced by plaintiff and
delivered to it for the 1940-41 crop year; that in accordance with the
agreement, plaintiff irrevocably authorized defendant to receive the former's
export sugar in the latter's own name and for the latter's sale and disposition
under the obligation to sell the same for the account of the plaintiff,
whenever ordered to do so; that it was and has been the long established
practice known to plaintiff for defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the long established
practice is controlling over the written agreement?
RULING:
This contention is untenable. Although defendant
presented evidence to show its alleged practice of first securing its client's
permission to sell sugar, the evidence is inadmissible. The agreement between
the parties had been reduced to writing, and under its terms defendant could
sell and was so authorized to sell plaintiff's sugar in any manner it deemed
convenient, provided that the proceeds thereof be credited to plaintiff's
account. Defendant now cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove its alleged
practice, which to all purposes, would alter the terms of the written
agreement.
Section 22, Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court provides: "When the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is to be considered as containing all those terms, and
therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the
writing, except in the following cases: ...." Whatever therefore is not
found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.
Inasmuch as the case at bar does not fall
under any of the exceptions mentioned in the Rule cited, defendant may not
adduce evidence to show a practice other than that permitted by the terms of
the agreement.
The lower court therefore
correctly ruled against the admissibility of such evidence.
(11)PEOPLE VS. ADOFINA
G.R. No. 109778 (December 8, 1994)
FACTS:
Diomedes
Adofina y Alcantara was convicted by the RTC for the crime of MURDER, committed
against the deceased Julio San Marcos y Pontipedra. Both parties are security guard of same
school.
The court based its
judgment of conviction on what it considered as circumstantial evidence, after conceding that there
was no eyewitness to the incident.
The Prosecution presents the testimonies of witnesses to string the
circumstances.
·
Accused was seen roaming around the compound where the shooting incident
happened, before the shooting incident.
·
Accused had threatened the deceased because the latter is testifying on
a case against the accused.
·
Accused was subjected to a paraffin test. His both hands were found
positive of gun powder.
·
One Alicia Urrera saw Accused run towards the house of Sgt. Raymundo and
that he fled afterwards, but the same failed to testify.
While dependant Adofina base his defense on ALIBI.
This was supported by the testimony of his Brother.
·
Accused said that when the killing happened, he was already off duty and
was sleeping in his house.
·
Accused said that he fired a toy gun three or four times. This toy gun,
is filled with powder called "perminante" .
ISSUE:
Whether the testimonial evidence
presented by the prosecution is sufficient to overcome the constitutional
right of appellant to be presumed innocent?
RULING:
NO. We
are convinced that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt with the moral
certitude mandated by reglementary standards derived from a constitutional
foundation. We do not believe that the judicial conscience can rest easy upon a
conviction anchored upon intrinsically flawed evidence collated through a
labored correlation.
Section
5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
We are reasonably persuaded that the People's so-called string of
circumstances presented in evidence is insufficient to produce that total moral
certainty in an unprejudiced mind which can overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence in appellant's favor. Moreover, much of the
prosecution's evidence presented in court were either hearsay or based on
speculations and were consequently inadmissible in evidence. It is elementary
law that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge, 28 save in certain instances which, however, do
not obtain or are inapplicable in the instant case. Furthermore, the
testimonies of some prosecution witnesses, far from bearing down on appellant's
putative guilt, even bolster his innocence.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and another one is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused-appellant.
(12)Bagajo v. Hon. Marave and People
86 SCRA 389 (G.R. No. L-33345)
FACTS:
MARCELA M. BAGAJO (petitioner) was
convicted by the Municipal Trial Court for the crime of slight physical
injuries committed against her pupil Wilma Alcantara.
There
was an accident happen in the petitioner’s classroom which causes one pupil to
be hurt and fainted, allegedly cause by the complainant Wilma Alcantara. The
petitioner asked Wilma about what happen but the later denied having to do with
what had just taken place. Petitioner thereupon became angry and with a piece
of bamboo stick whipped Wilma, which causes injuries to the latter.
Petitioner
on her defense said that, she was just trying to discipline her pupil and she
was not actuated by any criminal intent.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence rendered
constitute criminally liability against the petitioner?
RULING:
NO, petitioner did
not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, in the
circumstances proven in the record. Independently of any civil or
administrative responsibility for such act she might be found to have incurred
by the proper authorities, we are persuaded that she did not do what she had
done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her
feel such punishment may be true, but we are convinced that the means she
actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred
or any malevolent intent. The nature of the injuries actually suffered by
Wilma, a few linear bruises and the fact that petitioner whipped her only
behind the legs and thigh, show, to Our mind, that indeed she intended merely
to discipline her. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve to be
discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of petitioner to
commit any criminal offense. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
There
is no indication beyond reasonable doubt, in the evidence before the trial
court, that petitioner was actuated by a criminal design to inflict the
injuries suffered by complainant as a result of her being whipped by
petitioner. What appears is that petitioner acted as she did in the belief as a
teacher exercising authority over her pupil in loco parentis; she was within
her rights to punish her moderately for purposes of discipline. Whether or not
she exceeded the degree of moderation permitted by the laws and rules governing
the performance of her functions is not for us, at this moment and in this
case, to determine.
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