JOSELITA SALITA vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS
G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994
FACTS:
Erwin Espinosa and Joselita Salita were married at the Roman
Catholic Church in Ermita, Manila. A year later, their union turned sour. They
separated in fact. Subsequently, Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of
Joselita’s psychological incapacity which incapacity existed at the time of the
marriage although the same became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with
the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of particulars which
the trial court granted. Subsequently, in his Bill of Particulars, Edwin
specified that at the time of their
marriage, Joselita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to
understand and accept the demands made by his profession — that of a newly
qualified Doctor of Medicine — upon his time and efforts so that she frequently
complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose
intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.
Still petitioner was not contented with the Bill of
Particulars. She insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars
constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment of ultimate facts, and fail to
point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able
to perform, and thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not
irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that her
insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the
corresponding circumstances of time, place and person does not call for
information on evidentiary matters because without these details she cannot
adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations in the petition for annulment
of marriage and the subsequent bill of particulars filed in amplification of
the petition is sufficient.
HELD:
Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which
either directly from the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly
make up the wrongful acts or omission of the defendant. It refers to acts which
the evidence on trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required
to prove the existence of those facts. The Supreme Court ruled that on the
basis of the allegations, it is evident that petitioner can already prepare her
responsive pleading or for trial. Private respondent has already alleged that
petitioner was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his
profession. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for information
on evidentiary facts — facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. The additional facts called for by
petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and
to obtain evidentiary matters is not the function of a motion for bill of
particulars.
WHEREFORE,
there being no reversible error, the instant petition is DENIED and the
questioned Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
RAMON L. BLANCO vs. JOSE BERNABE
G.R. No. L-44970, March 31, 1936
FACTS:
In
compliance with Section 76 of Act No. 190 which states the requisites in
perfecting an appeal, herein petitioner filed an appeal for civil case No.
105831 of the municipal court of Manila, following all the requisites
enumerated in the above-cited section. On October 7, 1935, there was received
in the clerk's office of said court the notice of appeal of the defendant,
together with a money order for the sum of P16 and a copy of the communication
addressed by the attorney for the defendant to the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The money order referred to in the communication was returned to the
sender by the Collector of Internal Revenue, the latter alleging that he had no
authority, under the law, to be its depositary, whereupon, the defendant caused
the same to be attached to the record of the case. As a result thereof,
petitioner failed to present to the court from
whose judgment he appealed the deposit certificate referred to in the last
portion of the above-cited section.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has duly
complied with the requisites of Section 76 of Act 190.
HELD:
Technicalities, when they are not in aid to
justice deserve scant consideration from the court. To interpret the law otherwise is to sacrifice the ends of justice to
technicalities. It is true that procedural laws are no other than
technicalities in their entirety, but they were adopted not as ends in
themselves for the compliance with which courts have been organized and
function, but as means conducive to the realization of the administration of
the law and of justice. The provision of the Code of Procedure should be
liberally construed in order to promote the purpose of the legislator, which is
to assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. It is the general and
constant practice of the courts to give every opportunity to the parties to
have exceptions and appeals from reviewable rulings and decisions taken before
the superior court, unless such action is manifestly contrary to the law.
The only purpose of the law in requiring the
presentation of the certificate in question is to evidence duly that the
deposit required by law has been made. If the deposit has in fact been effected
in the form and time prescribed, the fact that the corresponding receipt
thereof has not been issued, or has been destroyed or mislaid, or the failure
to present the same in due time, should not affect the remedy. It appears that the non-presentation of this
certificate was not due to petitioner's failure or omission but to the refusal
of the Collector of Internal Revenue to receive the deposit tendered by said
petitioner. Wherefore, the remedy prayed for is granted, with the costs of the
present proceeding to be assessed against the respondent, "The Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing Co."
PRIMO T. TANALA, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 116588, January 24, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner
was employed as a service driver of respondent company for almost fifteen years
without any derogatory record. However, on November 9, 1992, an incident
occurred outside company premises after office hours where petitioner had an
altercation with his co-employee, Rodolfo Laurente, which could have resulted
into a fight were it not for the timely intervention of some bystanders. The
security guard on duty reported the incident to respondent company. Based on
said report petitioner allegedly took a knife from his bag inside the garage of
the company, which was a violation of house rules. Private respondent placed
both petitioner and Rodolfo Laurente under preventive suspension for thirty
days. By reason of his suspension, petitioner filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal
suspension, non-payment of allowances, separation pay and retirement benefits
and was later on amended and consolidated in a complaint for illegal dismissal
when petitioner was not readmitted to work after the lapse of the period of
preventive suspension. Two of his witnesses executed their affidavits stating
the course of the incident. In their said affidavits, affiants merely attested
to the fact that they did not
notice petitioner carrying
any knife or deadly weapon, whereas in the written report of the security guard
it was specifically affirmed in a detailed and straightforward manner that
petitioner brought out a knife from his bag inside the company’s garage.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
excess or lack of jurisdiction and without regard to the facts on record, the
law, as well as established jurisprudence.
HELD:
Positive
testimony is entitled to greater weight. Testimony is positive when the witness
affirms that a fact did or did not occur, and negative when he says that he did
not see or know of the factual occurrence. In the instant case, the findings of
the labor arbiter and the NLRC are contrary to each other. Hence there is a
necessity to review the records to determine which of them should be preferred
as more conformable to the evidentiary facts. A review of the decision rendered
by the NLRC discloses that in upholding the legality of the dismissal of herein
petitioner, the commission relied on the fact that on the day of the incident
herein petitioner took a knife from his bag inside the garage of respondent
company in violation of its Company House Rules and Regulations. The Supreme Court agree with the finding of
the NLRC which was based on the report made by the security guard on duty who
has not been shown to be harboring any ill feeling against petitioner.
CLEMENTE CALDE vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 93980 June 27,
1994
FACTS:
Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang, the decedent, left behind nine thousand pesos
(P9,000.00) worth of property. She also left a Last Will and Testament, and a
Codicil and named Nicasio Calde the executor or the Will and Codicil. Both
documents contained the thumbmarks of decedent. They were also signed by three
(3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A. Tolete, then the
Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province. The named
executor filed a Petition for its allowance. Unfortunately, he died during the pendency of the
proceedings, and was duly substituted by petitioner. Private respondents,
relatives of decedent, opposed the Petition filed by Calde, questioning the
legality and validity of the said documents under Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Two
(2) of the six (6) witnesses testified that only one ballpen was used in
signing the two testamentary documents and were subscribed and attested by the
instrumental witnesses during a single occasion. However, on the face of the
document, the signatures of some of the attesting witnesses in the decedent’s
will and its codicil were written in blue ink while the others were in black. In
addition, Judge Tomas A. Tolete testified in narration as to how the documents
in question were subscribed and attested, starting from decedent’s thumbmarking
thereof, to the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in
consecutive order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the evidence submitted, respondent
appellate court erred in concluding that both decedent’s Last Will and
Testament, and its Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on
separate occasions.
HELD:
Evidence
may generally be classified into three (3) kinds, from which a court or
tribunal may properly acquire knowledge for making its decision, namely: real
evidence or autoptic preference, testimonial evidence and circumstantial
evidence.
In
the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence
produced by petitioner. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent
court to disbelieve petitioner’s claim that both testamentary documents in
question were subscribed to in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of
the Civil Code. Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord great
weight to the testimony of Judge Tomas A. Tolete since nowhere in Judge
Tolete’s testimony is there any kind of explanation for the different-colored
signatures on the testaments. The petition for review is denied. The Supreme
Court affirmed in toto the Decicion
of the Court of Appeals.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
RENE MAMALIAS Y FIEL
FACTS:
Accused Rene Mamalias y Feil was convicted of
murder and frustrated murder, for the death of Francisco de Vera y Del Valle,
and the gunshot wound inflicted on Alexander Bunag. He seeks his acquittal on
the ground that the trial court convicted him purely on the basis of hearsay
evidence but he escaped pending decision of his appeal.
The prosecution presented only two (2) witnesses, namely
police investigator SPO3 Manuel Liberato of the Western Police District
Command, who took the Affidavit of Epifanio Raymundo, the alleged eyewitness of
the shooting incident and Dr. Remigio Rivera, a resident physician at Mary
Johnston Hospital in Tondo, Manila, who testified that he treated the gunshot
wounds of Alexander Bunag.
The prosecution tried to present Alexander Bunag, the heirs
of Francisco De Vera and Epifanio Raymundo as additional witnesses but the
authorities could not locate them. For lack of other material witnesses, the
prosecution rested its case.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the guilt of the
accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
To overcome the presumption of innocence,
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact essential to constitute the offense
with which the accused is charged must be clearly established by the
prosecution. The Constitution mandates that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption of innocence is
anchored on the basic principles of justice. It cannot be overcome by suspicion
or conjecture, a probability that the accused committed the crime or that he
had the opportunity to do so.
In
the case at bar, the trial court merely relied on hearsay
evidence, particularly on the testimony of SPO3 Liberato and the sworn
statement of Epifanio Raymundo who did not testify in the trial court. The records
clearly show that prosecution witness SPO3 Liberato has no personal knowledge
of the facts surrounding the shooting incident. The Progress Report and the
Booking and Arrest Report he prepared were based on information related to him
by Epifanio Raymundo almost five (5) months after the crimes were committed. Clearly, his knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the shooting incident was limited to the matters
relayed to him by his co-policemen and the alleged eyewitness, hence, hearsay.
Wherefore the accused is acquitted for the crimes charged due to reasonable
doubt.
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20,
1948
FACTS:
The
petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for
trial, praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the
peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner
might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the
accused. The accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary
investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of
the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he
entered the plea of not guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and
cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection
was sustained. In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention
to renounce his right to present evidence, and the justice of the peace
forwarded the case to the court of first instance.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the Justice of the Peace court of Masantol committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record.
HELD:
Evidence
is the mode and manner of proving competent facts and circumstances on which a
party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings. It is
fundamentally a procedural law. The Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108
does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the
matter. Said section defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the
preliminary investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting
the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action
reasonably calculated to bring out the truth.
The
foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther
than the majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of
the peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the
complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon
the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs
against the petitioner.
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO,
JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant
in civil case entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin
Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages on the theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert with the
principal defendants in the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder
of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other
acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power; (2) he acted as dummy, nominee or
agent, by allowing himself to be incorporator, director, board member and/or
stockholder of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by the
principal defendants; (3) he
acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in
flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers, with gross and scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, embarked upon a
systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth ; (4) he (petitioner) taking undue
advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave
failure to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in
concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated
and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of
government funds; and (5) he acted
as dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be used as instrument in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government concessions, orders and/or
policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or member
of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in
order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained.
On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and
inspection of documents was
denied by respondent court in its resolution dated
9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts allegedly
committed by him as (a) a public officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit,
(b) as a private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a complaint couched
in too general terms and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the
factual and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know
with certainty the particular acts allegedly committed by him and which he is
now charged with culpability, it is necessary that plaintiff furnish him the
particulars sought therein.
In
his petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the
petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan,
dated 21 April 1989, denying his motion for a bill
of particulars as well as its
resolution, dated 29 May 1989, which denied his motion for reconsideration; to
compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of particulars, or that
said respondent be ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No.
0035 should they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and to enjoin the
respondent Sandiganbayan from further proceeding against petitioner until the
bill of particulars is submitted, claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
promulgating the aforesaid resolutions and that there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him in the ordinary course of law other
than the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed resolutions.
HELD:
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and
evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions
from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The ultimate facts
which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts
essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence
on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove
the existence of those facts.
The
complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why
he is perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the
complaint how petitioner allowed himself to be used as instrument in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the concessions, orders and/or policies
prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what petitioner had
to do with the granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions,
orders, and/or policies. Moreover, the complaint does not state which corporations
petitioner is supposed to be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee
and/or agent. More significantly, the petitioner's name does not even appear in
annex of the complaint, which is a listing of the alleged "Positions and
Participations of Some Defendants". The allegations in the complaint,
above-referred to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that
they merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported by
factual premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner's
motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner can not
intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars
prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations, dates, amounts
involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the
particular transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a
statement of other material facts as would support the conclusions and
inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary,
those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely
averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be
informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to
meet the issues at the trial.
The Supreme
Court ruled that respondent
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions. The petition is
granted and the resolutions in question are annulled and set aside. The
respondents are ordered to prepare and file a Bill of Particulars containing
the facts prayed for by petitioner, or otherwise, respondent Sandiganbayan is
ordered to exclude the herein petitioner as defendant in the above-mentioned
civil case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEODEGARIO RAMOS
FACTS:
Accused-appellants
Leodegario Ramos and Nilo Alfaro together with Willy Anova, who remains at
large, were charged with the crime of murder. The accused, with intent to kill,
with treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, armed with deadly
weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and hack with said
weapons one Bienvenido dela Cruz, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal
wounds which have been the cause of his direct and immediate death. When
arraigned, accused-appellants pleaded “Not Guilty”. Trial on the merits was ensued wherein
the prosecution and the defense adduced their respective evidence.
The prosecution presented
their witnesses, namely: Nelia Denila, the principal witness, gave a vivid and
detailed account of how the accused attacked and killed the victim with their
bolos and knife; Leonora dela Cruz and Delia Fetalver, the victim’s wife and
daughter respectively, who testified seeing all the accused with bladed weapon
while looking for the victim; and Dr. Rodolfo Jovellano who testified relative
to the examination he conducted on the remains of Bienvenido de la Cruz and his
findings were indicated in the Medico-Legal Certificate. The testimony of
Denila is consistent with and corroborated by the testimonies of all the other
witnesses.
The defense on the other
hand presented accused-appellants Leodegario Ramos who testified that he was
inside his residence helping his wife cook at the time of the killing as corroborated
by his wife Elsita Ramos, and Nilo Alfaro and corroborated by his wife Cristina
Alfaro, testified that he was also busy cooking as preparation for the
baptismal of his two (2) children the following day; Desabilita Dawis, a local
quack doctor who testified that she was inside the house of the principal
witness from 5:30-7:00, treating her as
she was suffering from swollen neck, making it impossible for her to have
witnessed the crime; and Raymundo Regudo who testified only to the good
character of the accused-appellant Leodegario Ramos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the
evidence adduced by the prosecution has established proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and aggravating circumstances as to justify the
imposition of the severe penalty of reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
Circumstantial evidence is
that evidence that which indirectly proves a fact in issue. The fact-finder
must draw an inference or reason from the circumstantial evidence while direct
evidence is that evidence which proves a fact in issue directly without any
reasoning or inference being drawn on the part of the fact-finder.
And in the present case, the
consistency of the testimony of the principal witness as corroborated by the
testimonies of the two (2) relatives of the victim plus the findings of the
medico-legal, all indirectly proved the fact in issue beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the Supreme Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the trial court’s
appreciation of the testimony of the witnesses in this case. The decision of
the trial court, as modified by the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABE
VALDEZ
FACTS:
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz,
accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was
allegedly caught in flagrante
delicto and without authority
of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants
known as Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived.
Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Trial on the merits
then ensued.
The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo
Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and
PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force, who testified how the
information was received, the commencement of their operation and its details
under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found
appellant alone in his nipa hut. They,
then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away from his
nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked
appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter
admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took
photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One
of the said plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
for analysis which produced a positive result. The prosecution also presented a
certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the
land cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants were found, was
part of the public domain. Appellant
was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot, but no
Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified
he was weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity
he does not know. He was asked to
go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant
to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters
away from his nipa hut. Five
armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he
knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof,
SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The
police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. At the police
headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana
plants seized by the police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law
enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were
found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his residence, his
papers, and other possessions.
ISSUE:
(1)
Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in
the present case is lawful and the seized evidence admissible.
(2)
Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against
the accused.
(3)
Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
(4) Whether or not the
sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.
HELD:
In the instant case, there
was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain
said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants. The
mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and
guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless
of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
With respect to the first
issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search
and seizure. As to the second
issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for
the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and
seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial
poisoned tree. It was, therefore,
a reversible error on the part of the court a
quo to have admitted and
relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
In the third issue, it is
fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of
a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a
crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the
accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be credible and
competent. Competent evidence is
"generally admissible" evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is
evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive
it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it
was error on the trial court's part to have admitted evidences against the
accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is
doubly tainted.
In the fourth issue, the
Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." To justify the
conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on
its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
accused. Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME RAMOS
G.R. No. L-30420
September 22, 1971
FACTS:
Herein
accused Jaime Ramos who is charged of the crime of murder, allegedly attack,
assault and use personal violence with intent to kill upon one Rogelio Dumasig
by then and there stabbing the latter with a sharp pointed instrument on the
abdomen, inflicting upon him a mortal wound which was the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.
The
prosecution, presented Bibiana Baclit as lone witness who testified to have
witnessed the stabbing incident and identified the accused as the assailant. She
further stated that there were several persons during the incident, one of whom
was Lydia Brinzon, the defense’s counter witness.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the accused who
claimed he was not at the scene of the crime at that ill-fated time and date
but working at a Pet Shop in Pasay City, and disclaimed knowledge of the
stabbing incident.
Another witness presented by the defense is Lydia Brinzon who
testified to have been a few meters away from the scene of the crime at that
ill-fated time and date and have talked to the deceased a few minutes before he
was stabbed. She testified in details the events of the incident and said to
have had a good look at the assailant’s face and that it’s not the accused. She also denied having seen the prosecution’s witness as one of those present at
the scene of the stabbing.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the evidence presented is enough to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
A distinction must be made between testimony which is
negative in form and that which is negative in character; so testimony may be
positive in character even though it amounts to a negative statement or tends
to show a negative situation, and if a witness who was in a position to observe
testifies not merely that he did not see or hear, but that the event did not
occur, this is clearly positive testimony.
Considering
that Brinzon's presence at the locus
criminis was admitted by
prosecution's sole witness Baclit; that the latter is without corroborative
support and that there is nothing to contradict appellant's own sworn assertion
of his whereabouts on the time and date of the crime, the guilt of the
accused-appellant is not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence on record
is meager, thus he is entitled to an acquittal.
People of the Philippines vs. Rodrigo
Calma
G.R. No. 127126, September 17, 1998
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Rodrigo Calma was charged with two (2)
counts of Rape on his two
daughters, namely, Annalyn and Roselyn, ages 15 years old and 11 years old
respectively, and one (1) count of Acts of
Lasciviousness on his youngest daughter, Irene, age 5 years old.
All
three witnesses testified on the repeated loathsome acts done by their own
father to them in details as examined and cross-examined by both prosecution
and defense. The testimony of the three victims,
withstood the test of cross-examination. They spontaneously, clearly and
credibly spoke of the details of their defilement. Their testimonies
were also corroborated by the medico-legal report conducted by Dr. Jesusa Vergara,
the medico-legal officer who examined them. The
defense did not dispute the time, the place, the manner and the frequency of the
sexual abuses. Neither did the defense show that their hymenal lacerations were
the results of other causes.
On
defense, the accused-appellant denied his daughters' accusations. He charged
that Myrna Ignacio, his common law wife and mother of his children, coached his
daughters to lie. He claimed that he had seriously hurt her in the past, twice
by electrocution on suspicion of infidelity. Also, seeking to help accused-appellant, his mother, Catalina Calma, and their neighbors,
testified that accused-appellant's daughters, especially Annalyn, showed much
affection towards their father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused of
the crimes charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD:
A reasonable doubt is
not such doubt as any man may start by questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor
a doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts or testimony, for it
is possible always to question any conclusion derived from testimony, but such
questioning is not what reasonable doubt is. Rather, it is that state of the
case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence
leaves the mind of the judge in that condition that he cannot say that he feels
an abiding conviction to a moral certainly of the truth of the charge. Absolute certainty is not demanded by
the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and
this certainty must attend every proposition of proof requisite to constitute
the offense. Absolute,
mathematical, or metaphysical certainty is not essential, and besides, in
judicial investigation, it is wholly unattainable. Moral certainty is all that
can be required. The
arguments of accused-appellant are premised on the misconception that
reasonable doubt is anything and everything that removes a statement from the
matrix of certitude. It bears repeating that even inconsistencies and
discrepancies in the prosecution evidence, unless treating of the elements of
the crime, would not necessarily bring about a judgment of acquittal. In this
case, there is not even any inconsistency or discrepancy to speak of. All
things considered, the evidence against the accused-appellant established his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt on all three (3) charges. The appeal is denied.
Death penalty is accordingly imposed.
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