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People of the Philippines vs. Noel Navarro

FACTS: Two informations, one for murder of Ferdinand Rabadon and the other for violation of Presidential Decree 1866 were filed at the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan against Noel Navarro. The trial court declared the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and that the illegal possession of firearm is considered merely as an aggravating circumstances considering that the alleged firearm used was not recovered by the authorities and never presented in court. According to the prosecution, Jose Rabago saw the incident and reported the killing to a policeman Virgilio Rabadon. A day after, when investigated by policemen Rolando Rabadon he said he did not see anything, and explained that he did not divulge the identities of the assailant for fear of his life for some policemen in Alaminos Pangasinan were members of the Aguila gang allegedly led by Ramon Navarro. Lately, Rabago changed his testimony and swore that it was not the appellant who had shot Rabadon , but a “short and stout man”. Noel Navarro denied any participation in the killing of Rabadon and reiterated that he was arrested without any warrant of arrest by the NBI and Prossecutor Rabina charged him of murder without conducting a preliminary investigation. Appellant also contends that the testimony of Prosecution witness Jose Rabago was filled with serious and material inconsistencies, allegedly because he gave three versions of the incident.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the evidence of prosecution is credible and sufficient.

                2. Whether or not the statements of Rabago given to both Virgilio Rabadon and Rolando Rabadon were part of res gestae.

RULINGS: 1. YES. Rabago did not mention the name of the appellant when the reported the killing to Virgilio Rabadon and Rolando Rabadon because he was apprehensive about talking to the police as he suspected that some of them were members of the dreaded Aguila Gang. It must be stressed also that Rabago’s testimony was compatible with the findings of Dr. Francisco Viray, the medicolegal officer who autopsied the victim’s body. Rabago said that Rabadon has been shot five times. Such details of his testimony as a prosecution witness, aside from the fact that no ill motive or bias was ascribed to him by the appellant, lends earmarks of truth to said testimony. The court has held in the number of cases that a recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable for there is always the possibility that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retraction, because the can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration.

          2.  Res gestae pertains to the admissibility of evidence, and not to its weight and sufficiency. Res gestae is defined as “Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.” Rabago’s statement to SP02 Rabandon that someone had killed his companion can be considered part of the res gestae, and is thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. It was a spontaneous statement that was made right after a startling occurrence and that refers to such occurrence. However, the same cannot be said of his statement to Patrolman Rabadon, as it lacked the requisite spontaneity.  Apellant’s proposition that when Rabago reported the incident to SP02 Rabadon, his silence regarding the identity of the killers created a doubt as to the appellant’s culpability for such killing and, thus should have been considered by the lower court in his favor as part of the res gestae cannot be considered. Such omission cannot be taken to mean that he is not the culprit.

On the illegal possession of firearms issue to have aggravated the killing, the Court disagreed to such. To prove illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must establish two things: first, the existence of the subject firearm; second, the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed the firearm, did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry the same outside his residence. In the case at bar, said firearm was not presented in court or offered as evidence against the appellant.

People of the Philippines vs. Juvy Maribao

FACTS: On May 31 1992 accused Juvy Maribao went behind Georgie Vilando, placed his hand over the left shoulder of Georgie and simultaneously stabbed him twice on the chest with a hunting knife or “plamengco”. Juvy Maribao was charged with murder for stabbing to death Georgie Vilando. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty, but the trial court convicted Maribao of the crime of murder as qualified by treachery.

ISSUE: Is the conviction of murder is improper because the prosecution failed to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery?

RULING: NO. The combined testimony of the witnesses tends to establish that Juvy Maribao stabbed Georgie Vilando to death by a sudden attack. The attendance of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is found in the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which would insure the offender’s safety from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the offended party, meaning that no opportunity is given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately and consciously chosen. The above conditions are clearly present in the instant case. The act of accused-appellant in approaching Georgie Vilando from behind and placing his arm on the left shoulder of the latter and simultaneously stabbing Georgie twice shows that the manner of execution insured accused-appellant’s safety from any retaliation of the victim specially so when the wounds of the victim were fatal wounds on his chest. The speed and the suddenness of the unexpected action of accused-appellant prove treachery, for the essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.

Donato C. Cruz Trading Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Teresa Jalandoni

FACTS: On June 1 1989 private respondent Teresa Jalandoni purchased from petitioner Donato C. Cruz Trading Corporation one hundred bags of Urea Viking Ship Fertilizer valued at P20, 800.00. However despite repeated demands, private respondent failed and refused to pay her obligation. Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC of Bacolod City to collect from private respondent. For failure to file her answer, the trial court declared private respondent in default and petitioner was allowed to present its evidence ex parte consisting of among others, the following items: (a) Order Slip dated 31 May 1989, (b) Charge Invoice No. 0453 dated 1 June 1989, (c) Demand Letter dated 5 March 1990, and, (d) Demand Letter dated 20 July 1990. The trial court dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for lack of sufficient evidence, for failure of the documentary evidence to either supply material particulars which could establish the identity of the purchaser of the one hundred bags of fertilizer, or the signatures affixed therein were unintelligible which cast cloud on the identity of the signatory and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner by the weight of its evidence has sufficiency established the liability of private respondent to convince the Court to grant the relief it seeks.

RULING: YES. Respondent appellate court appears to have overlooked the fact that business forms which are issued by the seller in the ordinary course of business are not always fully accomplished to contain all the necessary information describing in detail the whole business transaction. Despite their being often incomplete, said business forms are commonly recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties and at the very least they serve as an acknowledgement that a business transaction has in fact transpired. Their probative weight must be evaluated not in isolation but in conjunction with the other evidence adduced by petitioner, such as the testimony of Donato Cruz, proprietor of petitioner corporation that on several occasions he called on private respondent demanding payment of the value of bags of fertilizer she purchased, and the demand letters. Private respondent Teresa Jalandoni is ordered to pay Donato C. Cruz Trading Corporation.

Ferdinand Trinidad vs. Commission on Elections and Manuel C. Sunga

FACTS: Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province of Cagayan in the may 8, 1995 elections. Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality. Sunga file with the COMELEC a complaint for disqualification against Trinidad accusing him of using three local government vehicles in his campaign, in violating Sec, 261, par. (e) referring to threats, intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion, and vote buying. Election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes. Sunga moved for the suspension of proclamation of Trinidad, but the latter was still proclaimed the elected mayor prompting Sunga to file another motion to suspend the effects of proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification but upon another motion the COMELEC was ordered to reinstate the case. Finally, the COMELEC promulgated the first questioned Resolution disqualifying Trinidad as a candidate in the May 8, 1995 elections. Trinidad filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming denial of due process and Sunga on the other hand filed his Opposition to the Motion at the same time moving for the cancellation of petitioner’s proclamation as elected Mayor in the 1998 elections and praying that he be proclaimed Mayor instead. All motion was however denied. Petitioner alleges that his disqualification, if any, cannot extend beyond the three-year term to which he was elected on May 8, 1995. The criminal cases filed against Trinidad with the RTC were dismissed.

ISSUES: 1. Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the May 8, 1995 elections was concerned?

               2. Was petitioner deprived of due process in the proceedings before the COMELEC insofar as his disqualification under the May 11, 1998 elections was concerned and may the petitioner’s proclamation as Mayor under the May 11, 1998 elections be cancelled on account of the disqualification case filed against him during the May 8, 1995 elections?

              3. May private respondent as the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes, be proclaimed as Mayor, in the event of petitioner’s disqualification?

RULINGS: 1. NO. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. In the case at bar, petitioner was able to file an Answer with Counter Petition and Motion to Dismiss. He was also able to submit his counter-affidavit and sworn statements. No deprivation of due process was committed considering that petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard.

               2. NO. Petitioner’s term as mayor expired on June 30, 1998. By the time the second questioned Resolution was issued on October 13, 1998 the issue of the case had already been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner’s challenged term of office. COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding to disqualify petitioner from his reelected term of office. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.

                3. NO. As held by the COMELEC, the succession to the office of the mayor shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Local Government Code which, in turn, provides that the vice mayor concerned shall become the mayor.

People of the Philippines vs. Abelardo Parungao

FACTS: On May 30, 1989, the detention prisoners in Cells No. 2 and 6 of the Pampanga Provincial Jail at the Provincial Capitol in San Fernando, staged a jailbreak.  Jail guards Conrado Basa and Emilardo Valencia were killed, while Jail Guard Arnel Aldana was seriously wounded. Several pieces of firearms valued at P41, 000.00 were also forcibly taken and carried away from the Provincial Jail Armory. Accused-appellant puts up the defense of denial, according to him, during the jailbreak, he was inside Cell No. 1 together with the rest of his cell mates. Pacheco, a jail guard trainee declared that he heard accused-appellant Parungao ask Briones to open Cell No. 1, shouting in the process, “Alright go ahead and kill those son of a bitch”. The court finds the accused guilty.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant is a co-conspirator and principal by inducement and it is reversible error on the part of the trial court in accepting and giving full probative value to the hearsay and uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

RULING: NO. The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However the lack of objection to hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected or not has no probative value. To give weight to the hearsay testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana, and to make the same the basis for finding accused-appellant a co-conspirator and for imposing the penalty of life imprisonment, gravely violates the hearsay rule. The Court held that for utterances of an accused to make him a principal by inducement, the same must be of such a nature and uttered in such a manner as to become the determining cause of the crime to serve such purpose, and that such inducement was uttered with the intention of producing the result. In the case at bar, considering that the accused-appellant uttered the words only after the prisoners who had escaped had already beaten up and killed jail guards Basa and Valencia and seriously injured Aldana, accused-appellant’s statement cannot be taken as an order to kill. Parungao is hereby ACQUITTED.

Catalino F. Banez and Romeo P. Busuego vs. Court of Appeals and Republic Planters Bank

FACTS: Ayala Corporation issued a BPI check for P33, 226,685.69 payable to PAL Employees’ Savings and Loan Association, Inc, (PESALA). The check with the words “FOR PAYEE’S ACCOUNT ONLY” written on its face was delivered in trust to Banez in his capacity as president of PESALA. However, on the same date, Banez and his co-officers Romeo Busuego and Renato Lim deposited the check in their joint account with Republic Planters Bank, Cubao Branch, which was not an official depositary bank of PESALA. Later they withdrew the amount and failed to account for it to PESALA. Aside from a criminal case of estafa against its officers, PESALA sued RPB for the face value of the check and damages for allowing the deposit and encashment of the check despite the fact that it was a crossed check payable only to the account of PESALA. RPB filed a third-party complaint against Banez, Busuego, Lim and Alberto Barican, the latter as manager of RPB, Cubao Branch, alleging that they were solely and exclusively responsible for the loss of the value of the check through their misrepresentation and it was granted. PESALA and RPB entered into a compromise agreement wherein RPB agreed to pay P 20,226,685.00. Upon the foregoing amicable settlement, Lim moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that it cannot stand on its own. Banez and Basuego, likewise moved to dismiss in grounds of lis pendens, forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. On July 14, 1994 trial court deferred action on the motion to dismiss anchored on ground of lis pendens and forum shopping , but denied the motion outright anchored on grounds of lack of jurisdiction an termination of the principal complaint. The motion of third-party defendants to reconsider the order was denied on October 27, 1994. On December 1, 1994 Banez and Busuego instituted a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the Orders of 14 July and 27 October 1994 attaching duplicate original copies. It was dismissed or failure of the petitioners to attach certified true copies.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the special civil action for certiorari for failure of petitioners to attach certified true copies.

RULING: NO. In the Court of Appeals, its Revised Internal Rules mandate that certified true copies of the questions order must be attached to a petition in special civil actions for certiorari although Revised Circular No. 1-88 issued by the Supreme Court itself allows either a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the assailed decision, judgment, resolution or order to be attached to the petition. The Court had occasion to rule that the submission of a duplicate copy of the questioned order of the trial court in a petition for certiorari constitutes substantial compliance with the rule requiring submission of the certified copies of the orders complained of. However, a similar liberal construction cannot be applied in favor of the petitioners since courts suspend their own rules or except a case from them only when substantial justice so warrants, as when the merit of the party’s cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements.

Richard Hizon et. al vs. Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines

FACTS: Crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson owned by First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by Richard Hizon, were charged with illegal fishing penalized under sections 33 and 38 of P.D. 704 for using of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium cyanide). The trial court found the thirty one petitioners guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment and also ordered the confiscation and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28 sampans and the ton of assorted live fishes and instruments and proceeds of the offense.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the evidence against petitioner in view of the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the subsequent arrest of the petitioners is admissible.

              2. Can petitioners be convicted of illegal fishing based on the prosecution evidence?

RULING: 1. YES. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without judicial warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is however, subject to certain exceptions which are: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; and (4) search in violation of customs laws. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. The same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. The Court thus holds as valid the warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly admitted by the trial court.

              2. NO. The only basis for the charge of fishing with poisonous substance is the result of the NBI laboratory test on fish specimens which they failed to assure that the integrity of the specimens had been properly safeguarded. Moreover, Muro ami is a method of fishing which needs approximately two hundred fishermen to execute. Only 28 fishermen in their sampans fishing by hook and line were there. And all the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. Petitioners were ACQUITTED.

Prats & Company vs. Phoenix Insurance Company

FACTS: Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership instituted an action in the RTC of the City of Manila for recovery from the Phoenix Insurance Co. the sum of P117,800.60 with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff from a fire for said loss was covered by insurance issued by the defendant company. Phoenix Insurance admitted the insurance of the insurance but by way of special defense, alleged that the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss in contravention of the express terms of the policy. The trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint with respect to the obligation created by the policy but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P11, 731.93 with interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account of moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant, of remnants of the insured stock.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner caused the fire to be set or connived therein and submitted fraudulent proof as the trial judge found.

RULING: YES. The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure manipulations were used by the plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the contents of the bodega before the fire. It appears that cases of old stock were shipped to Manila before the fire but instead of being taken directly to the bodega they were housed for a time in the back part of the lower floor where the petitioner had office. Also, the manipulation of one of their people to attend to the alarm box not to allow others to touch it and reasoned out that he already have done it, when in fact the fire chief noticed that it was never touched and he himself turned on the alarm.  The finding of the trial court in the effect that plaintiff had submitted false proof in the support of his claim is also well founded. First, the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of P 12,800 when the true value of the said jewelry was about P 600; and secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance company the value of the goods which had been surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire. As a conclusion, not only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or connive therein, but also that it submitted fraudulent proof.

Spouses Vicente and Gloria Manalo vs. Hon. Nieves Roldan-Confesor et.al

FACTS: Petitioners sued private respondents for illegal exaction, false advertisement and violation of other pertinent labor laws, rules and regulations. In its May 7, 1990 Order, POEA suspended the authority of Career Planners Specialists’ International, Inc. (CAREER), for four months for illegal exaction or in lieu thereof, a fine of P 40,000.00 was imposed plus restitution of P 28,714.00 to petitioner spouses, meted on respondent therein Filipino Manpower Services Inc. (FILMAN), also a fine of P 40,000.00 for misrepresentation, and reiterated its perpetual disqualification from recruitment activities. However the POEA reversed itself on the penalty imposed on illegal exaction reasoning that clear and convincing evidence was necessary to justify the suspension of the authority/license of CPSI. On appeal, Undersecretary Confessor sustained POEA in reversing itself and held that the charge of illegal exaction should be supported by other corroborative circumstantial evidence and denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners as well.

ISSUES: 1. What evidence is necessary to establish administrative findings of fact?

              2. Whether or not the failure of the petitioners to state in their testimonies the exact date of payment of the recruitment fee is to be considered?

              3. Whether or not POEA committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing its decision?

RULINGS: 1. Only substantial evidence is required to establish administrative findings of fact. This holds true even if the determination may result in the suspension of authority or license to operate a particular line of business and will not justify requiring a higher degree of proof.

                  2. NO. What is important is that peso bills were delivered to and received by respondent-spouses. Further stated, with the payment of a check for P10, 000.00, charge of unlawful exaction was clearly established since according to the POEA only P 3,000.00 was legally chargeable.

                3. YES. In this case, public respondent reversed the penalty, not on the basis that one version is more believable than the other, but that the testimonies of complainants, after describing them to be “more convincing that respondent’s stand” and which “inspired belief,” were not clear and convincing. Thus, to that extent, public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion correctable by certiorari.

Beam and Beam vs. Yatco

FACTS: On or before April 26, 1937, the Collector of Internal Revenue declared and assessed items of property of A. W. Beam and Lydia McKee Beam at the time of the death of the latter on October 18, 1934 at P8, 100,544.91. One-half thereof, appraised at P4, 050,272.46, was the estate to the deceased Lydia McKee Beam located in the Philippines and transmitted to plaintiffs by virtue of inheritance, devise, or bequest, gifts mortis causa or advance in anticipation of inheritance and the collector assessed and demanded inheritance taxes aggregating P343, 698.72 which the plaintiffs paid under protest that was overruled by the collector.  Plaintiffs filed a complaint praying that the amount paid by them be refunded, but the lower court dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in finding that appellant became a resident and citizen of California in 1923.

RULING: NO. The finding of the lower court is fully supported by the testimonies of A. W. Beam and John W. Haussermann, wherein the first stated that in 1923 he bought a house in Oakland, California, and used it as a residence until December, 1930, when he built another in Piedmont, California, which he has used and occupied as a residence since then, and his children were in school in California and Mrs. Beam wanted to be with them and made a home for them, and it was his intention to live in California and from 1923 on, his family spent most of their time in California, where he himself used to take long vacations, and that he never really intended to live permanently in the Philippines, while Haussermann testified that A. W. Beam left the Philippines somewhere along 1923 and 1924 when he established a home for his wife and children on Kenmore Avenue, Oakland, and he went there frequently. Also, because the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to establish their right to recover, in view of the fact that they had failed to establish that right based on their alleged Utah citizenship to invoke the laws of the state which, it is alleged, to the effect that properties acquired by the spouses during marriage belong to them separately,  the dismissal of the complaint is fully justified, and the defendant is entitled to take advantage of the plaintiff's failure to present sufficient proof and of the evidence adduced by themselves. Where plaintiffs themselves show a state of facts upon which they should not recover, whether defendant pleaded such fact as a defense or not, their claim should be dismissed. Evidence introduced without objection becomes property of the case and all the parties are amenable to any favorable or unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence .As correctly stated by Yatco, even granting appellant's contention that the deceased became a resident of California only in 1934, she was a citizen of that state at the time of her death and her national law applicable to the case, in accordance with article 10 of the Civil Code, is the law of California which, in the absence of contrary evidence, is to be presumed to be the same as the Philippine law.