G.R. No.
118943 September 10, 2001
MARIO HORNALES, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JOSE CAYANAN AND JEAC INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONTRACTOR SERVICES, respondents.
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, JOSE CAYANAN AND JEAC INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONTRACTOR SERVICES, respondents.
FACTS:
Mario Hornales(herein
petitioner) filed with the POEA a complaint5 for non-payment of
wages and recovery of damages against JEAC International Management &
Contractor Services (JEAC) and its owner, Jose Cayanan(herein private
respondents). Petitioner alleged
that he was sent to Singapore by the respondent where another agency, the
Step-up Agency, owned by Victor Lim met them there and where he was sent to
work as a fisherman. Due to inhumane working conditions and long working hours,
the petitioner together with the other Filipinos left the vessel when they
docked at Mauritius Island.
Defense
of respondent is that the petitioner was a total stranger to them. To bolster the
claim, they offered in evidence the Joint Affidavitof Efren B. Balucas
and Alexander C. Natura, petitioner's co-workers in Singapore, stating that
while they were in Singapore, petitioner admitted to them that he did not apply
in any agency in the Philippines; that he came to Singapore merely as a
tourist; and that, he applied directly and personally with Step-Up Agency.
These statements were corroborated by the "Certification"
issued by Step-Up Agency.
To contradict the
allegations of the respondent, petitioner filed a Supplemental Affidavit claiming
that he was not a "total stranger" to private respondents, and that,
as a matter of fact, he knew respondent Cayanan since 1990, when they used to
go to the San Lazaro Hippodrome to watch horse races. He also averred that
while the vessel was docked at Mauritius Islands on June 1992, respondent
Cayanan reminded him and his co-workers of their loan obligations by sending
them photocopies of the PNB checks he (respondent Cayanan) issued in favor of
their relatives, and the agreements whereby they authorized Victor Lim
to deduct from their salaries the amount of their loan obligations.
PEOA ruled in favour of
Petitioner but the NLRC reversed the POEA’s decision, hence this position.
ISSUE:
Whether the PNB checks and
Agreement offered as evidence by petitioner are inadmissible being mere
photocopies.
Whether the Joint Affidavit
of Balucas and Natura constitutes as hearsay evidence.
RULING:
The scale of evidence must
tilt in favor of petitioner.
In a catena of labor cases,
this Court has consistently held that where the adverse party is deprived of
the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally
rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon.Private respondents' Joint Affidavit
has no probative value. It suffers from two infirmities, first, petitioner
was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the two affiants regarding the
contents thereof, and second, the two affiants merely swore as to what
petitioner told them but not as to the truth of the statements uttered.
In the same vein, the Certification
must not be given weight. Private respondents not only failed to present Victor
Lim before the POEA to be cross-examined by petitioner, but the Certification
was also not verified or under oath. To our mind, it is just a last-ditch
attempt on the part of Step-Up Agency to help private respondents free
themselves from liability to petitioner. It bears noting that private
respondents, Victor Lim and Step-Up Agency, as shown by petitioner's evidence,
acted in concert in his deployment to Singapore. Hence, such certification is,
at most, self-serving.
Private
respondents' argument that petitioner's evidence are mere, photocopies and
therefore cannot be considered as the best evidence on the issue does not
persuade us. The best evidence rule enshrined in the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that "when the subject of an inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself." This rule is not without exception. Some of the exception are
when the original has been lost or destroyed; cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror; or when the original is in the
custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. It would be
unreasonable to demand from petitioner the presentation of the original PNB
Checks considering that it is a banking practice that for a check to be
encashed, the same must be surrendered to the bank first. These checks are,
therefore, most likely in the possession of the bank. As to the agreements,
it is reasonable to conclude that respondent Cayanan was the one in possession
of the originals thereof. It maybe recalled that these agreements were
executed by the workers for his security and benefit. At any rate, it is worthy
to note that private respondents did not disown the PNB checks nor deny
the existence of the agreements.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS. RICARDO SANTOS AND ROMEO VICTORINO
DECEMBER 17, 2003
FACTS:
Victorino
and Santos were charged for kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Victorino’sdefense was alibi and alleged that he was in SidlakanSaguise, Pres
Garcia, Bohol, attending the town fiesta from April 5 to 9, 1995. Victorino
presented the following: 1) Ticket No 0808440 of Carlos Go Thong Lines dated
April 3, 1995 in the name of Romeo Victorino for the voyage of the “MV Our Lady
of Akita” from Manila to Cebu; 2) Photocopy of the Master’s Oath of the Chief
Mate; and 3) Photocopy of the passenger’s list. The trial court disregarded the
photocopies of the Master’s Oath of the Chief Mate and passenger’s list as
evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether
or not the photocopies of the Master’s Oath of the Chief Mate and passenger’s
list are admissible in evidence.
RULING:
No. The Master’s Oath of the Chief Mate and the
passenger’s list which were offered by the defense to show that the ticket
purchased in the name of Romeo Victorino was actually used on the date
indicated therein were correctly disregarded by the trial court. The said
dcuments were mere photocopies and their originals were not produced in court.
Likewise, the proper procedure for introduction of said secondary evidence as
prescribed under the rules on evidence, Sec. 3 of Rule 130, was not observed.
GR NO. 128073 MARCH
27, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RENE MAMALIAS Y FIEL
FACTS:
Accused Rene Mamalias Y Fiel
was convicted of murder and frustrated murder by the RTC Manila. He seeks his
acquittal on the ground that the trial court convicted him purely on the basis
of hearsay evidence but he escaped pending decision of his appeal.
The prosecution in this case
presented only two witnesses, namely police investigator SPO3 Manuel Liberato
of the Western Police District Command and Dr.Remigio Rivera of the Mary
Johnston Hospital. SPO3 Liberato testified that few days after the accused was
arrested, Epifanio Raymundo, an alleged eyewitness came to the police
headquarters with the relative of the murder victim, Francisco de Vera Y del
Valle. The sworn statement of Raymundo was taken by SPO3 Liberato which states
that he saw the De Vera standing in front of a house when two unidentified men
approached him and shot him in the head causing his death and thereby causing
also injury also to a fruit vendor who was a bystander, Alexander Bunag.
Consequently, Raymundo was able to identify
Mamalias as one of the men who shot De Vera. SPO3 Liberato also prepared
the Booking Sheet, Arrest Report and Progress Report of the case at bar. The
second witness, Dr.Remegio Rivera testified on the gunshot wound of the
bystander, Alexander Bunag.
The defense presented only
one witness, the accused Rene Mamalias.
ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of the
accused appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
The Constitution mandates
that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. This presumption of innocence is anchored on
the basic principles of justice. It cannot be overcome by suspicion or
conjecture, i.e., a probability that the accused committed the
crime or that he had the opportunity to do so. To overcome the presumption of
innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact essential to constitute
the offense with which the accused is charged must be clearly established by
the prosecution.
In the case at bar, the
trial court merely relied on hearsay evidence, particularly on the
testimony of SPO3 Liberato and the sworn statement of Epifanio Raymundo who did
not testify in the trial court. The records clearly show that prosecution
witness SPO3 Liberato has no personal knowledge of the facts surrounding the
shooting incident. The Progress Report and the Booking and Arrest Report he
prepared were based on information related to him by Epifanio Raymundo almost
five (5) months after the crimes were committed. In fact, contrary to the
factual finding of the trial court that SPO3 Liberato went to the locus
criminis shortly after the shooting incident, the records show that it was
PO3 Edgardo E. Ko who was dispatched by the WPD Command to investigate the
case. For unknown reason, PO3 Ko was not called to the witness stand. The records
also show that SPO3 Liberato was not even a member of the team of policemen
that apprehend the accused-appellant on January 4, 1993. He testified that the
accused-appellant was turned over to him only on January 6, 1993, and he did
not know how the accused-appellant was apprehended. He was also not aware
whether a warrant of arrest had been issued against the accused-appellant.
Clearly, his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the shooting incident
was limited to the matters relayed to him by his co-policemen and the alleged
eyewitness, hence, hearsay.
In the same vein, the sworn
statement of Epifanio Raymundo is merely hearsay evidence as he did not
personally appear in court to affirm its content. Its probative value, if any,
is little. We have held that in criminal cases, the admission of hearsay
evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision that the accused
shall enjoy the right to confront the witnesses testifying against him and to
cross-examine them. A conviction based alone on proof that violates the
constitutional right of an accused is a nullity and the court that rendered it
acted without jurisdiction in its rendition. Such a judgment cannot be given
any effect whatsoever especially on the liberty of an individual.
The
accused Rene Mamalias y Fiel was therefore acquitted of the crimes charged.
G.R. No. 119619 December 13, 1996
HIZON, et. al.
Vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The accused crew members and fishermen of F/B Robinson
owned by First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by Richard Hizon
were apprehended by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and the members of the Task Force
BantayDagat for allegedly fishing in the shoreline of coastal waters of Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance (sodium
cyanide), of more or less one (1) ton of assorted live fishes. Such acts
constitute an offense of Illegal Fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance penalized under PD No. 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975. A day
following the arrest, random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B Robinson
were gathered for laboratory examination. The specimens were brought to the NBI
sub-office to determine the method of catching the same for record or
evidentiary purposes. The NBI Forensic Chemist conducted two tests on the fish
samples and found that they contained sodium cyanide.
The trial court convicted the petitioners of the offense charged and CA
affirmed the decision, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the fish specimen, which yielded a positive result to the test
of the presence of sodium cyanide, are admissible being illegally seized on the
occasion of warrantless search and arrest.
Whether the statutory presumption of guilt under Sec. 33 of PD 704
prevails over the constitutional presumption of innocence.
RULING:
On the first issue, the court
sustained the warrantless arrest and therefore the evidence obtained was
admissible.
Our Constitution proscribes
search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a judicial warrant. As a
general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain
exceptions. Some of these are: (1) a search incident to a lawful of arrest; (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving motor vehicle; and
(4) search in violation of customs laws.
Search and seizure without
search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have
been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search
warrant. It is rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like
motor vehicles, can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the search warrant must be sought and secured. Yielding to this reality,
judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and
aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected.
The same exception ought to
apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws.
These vessels are normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to
elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast Guard and other government
authorities enforcing our fishery laws.
We thus hold as valid the
warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having
engaged in illegal fishing. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of
the search were properly admitted by the trial court. Moreover, petitioners
failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived
their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and seizure.
their right to question any irregularity that may have attended the said search and seizure.
On the second issue.
Petitioners contend that this presumption of guilt under the Fisheries Decree
violates the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Constitution. The
validity of laws establishing presumptions in criminal cases is a settled
matter. It is generally conceded that the legislature has the power to provide
that proof of certain facts can constitute prima facie evidence of the
guilt of the accused and then shift the burden of proof to the accused provided
there is a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact
presumed. To avoid any constitutional infirmity, the inference of one from
proof of the other must not be arbitrary and unreasonable. In fine, the presumption must be based on
facts and these facts must be part of the crime when committed.
The third paragraph of
section 33 of P.D. 704 creates a presumption of guilt based on facts proved and
hence is not constitutionally impermissible. It makes the discovery of
obnoxious or poisonous substances, explosives, or devices for electric fishing,
or of fish caught or killed with the use of obnoxious and poisonous substances,
explosives or electricity in any fishing boat or in the possession of a
fisherman evidence that the owner and operator of the fishing boat or the
fisherman had used such substances in catching fish. The ultimate fact presumed
is that the owner and operator of the boat or the fisherman were engaged in
illegal fishing and this presumption was made to arise from the discovery of
the substances and the contaminated fish in the possession of the fisherman in
the fishing boat. The fact presumed is a natural inference from the fact
proved.
The statutory presumption
is merely prima facie.It cannot, under the guise of regulating the
presentation of evidence, operate to preclude the accused from presenting his
defense to rebut the main fact presumed. At no instance can the accused be
denied the right to rebut the presumption. thus:
The
inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the common experience of men.
But the experience of men has taught them that an apparently guilty possession
may be explained so as to rebut such an inference and an accused person may
therefore put witnesses on the stand or go on the witness stand himself to
explain his possession, and any reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent
with his guilty connection with the commission of the crime, will rebut the
inference as to his guilt which the prosecution seeks to have drawn from his
guilty possession of the stolen goods.
In the case at bar, the
petitioner was able to overcome the presumption when they requested another
sampling of the fishes captured for laboratory examination where the result
yielded negative presence of sodium
cyanide . The prosecution was not able to explain the contradictory findings of
the laboratory examinations.
The
petitioners were acquitted of the crime charged.
GR No. 106025 February 9,
1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Vs
Carlos De Guzman Y Panaligan
FACTS:
Accused-appelant De Guzman
was apprehended in a buy-bust operation of PO3 Manzon and Patrolman Chiapoco of
the Western Police District. The buy-bust operation was conducted when P03
Manzon posing as a Metro Manila Aide casually approached de guzman and bought
from the accused a deck of shabu for 50pesos which money used has already been
marked. Upon the consummation of the transaction and upon confirmation that
foil handed by de guzman contained the crystalline granules, he was apprehended
and searched by the police officers where 4 more aluminium foils with
crystalline granules were found. Accordingly Po3 Manzon and Pat Chiapoco
executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension and the chemical analysis report
confirmed that the five aluminium foils contained methylamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Consequently, an Information
was filed against Carlos de Guzman y Panaligan for violation of RA 6425. After
the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented its own version of the
story. The accused claimed that while waiting outside her mother’s carenderia,
the police officers, for no apparent reason apprehended him and brought him to
the police precinct where he was charged with Illegal Sale of Shabu.
After the trial, RTC Manila
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in favouring the
arresting officers with the disputable presumption of regularity in the
performance of their function.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly gave
the apprehending officers the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duty.
A disputable presumption has been as a species of evidence
that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold
the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other
evidence. One such disputable / rebuttable presumption is that an official act
or duty has been regularly been performed.
Presumption of this nature is indulged by the law for the following
fundamental reasons: first, innocence, and not wrong-doing, is to be
presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and third, a
republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon
controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental
department or agent by every other such department or agent, at least to the
extent of such presumption. Thus, this presumption evidences a rule of
convenient public policy universally applied and without which great distress
would spring in the affairs of men.
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted,
it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of
the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or
unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.
In the case at bench, what is clearly established
is that the drug pushing activities of the accused-appellant have long before
been brought to the attention of the police authorities and that
accused-appellant had been the subject of a continuing surveillance. There is
not an iota of evidence that the police authorities who apprehended
accused-appellant had any ill-motive against him. The records clearly show that
accused-appellant was finally caught in flagrante delicto selling
"shabu", a regulated drug, without authority. He was rightfully
convicted.
Tañada vs Angara 272 SCRA 18
“If the defense is successful, the burden of
evidence shifts to plaintiff, who should disprove the evidence of defendant. In
other words, the burden of evidence shifts from side to side, as the trial goes
on”
FACTS:
The
World Trade Organization (WTO) participated by vast majority of countries in
view of propelling the world towards trade liberalization and economic
globalization have finally emerged on January 1, 1995. The Republic of the
Philippines through Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry
signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations agreeing “(a) to submit, as
appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective
competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures; and (b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations
and Decisions.” On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution
No. 97 which concurs the ratification by the President of the Philippines
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.”
ISSUE:
Whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction” on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via
Senate Resolution No. 97
RULING:
By
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Failure on the
part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the
dismissal of the petition.
The
Senate voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement
thereby making it “a part of the law of the land”. This is a legitimate
exercise of its sovereign duty and power. The court finds no “patent
and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal
hostility” in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that
this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners
that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate
Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to
attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its
decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of
our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was
a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was
wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march
toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our
people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the
WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political
desire of a member.
GR. No. L-30831 &
L-31176 November
21, 1979
PNB vs CA, et al.
Estoppel
as basis of conclusive presumption. – Sec. 2, Rule 131, Rules of Evidence
FACTS:
The spouses Leandro Solomon
and LeocadiaBusatmante (Solomon spouses) were the registered owners of Lot No.
230 situated in the City of Davao. The
spouses mortgaged the land in favor of Phil National Bank (PNB). Subsequently
the mortgage was foreclosed for failure to pay then loan and the property was
sold at public auction and a Cert of Sale was issued in favour of the Bank on
1934. As means to redeem the property the bank entered into a contract
denominated as Promesa de Venta whereby the bank, as the owner of the property,
bound itself to sell to the Solomon spouses for the consideration of 802.26
payable in 8 equal annual amortizations. Failure to pay the amortizations or comply
with the provisions shall automatically rescind and cancel the contract and all
payments shall be considered as rentals for the use and possession of the
property. Payments were regularly made except on the last two amortizations on
1941 and 1942 leaving a balance of 217.43. The war broke on 1941, and the
Solomon spouses died on the same year of 1943. On 1948, the sole heir, Delfin
Perez offered to pay the remaining plus the accrued interest which offer was
rejected by the bank requiring him to obtain first a declaration of heirship
from the bank. On 1956, Delfin Perez was declared as sole heir by the Court of
First Instance of Davao and on 1957, Perez notified the bank of such
declaration and offered to pay the balance which is now P535.45. The bank further
informed him that “as soon as he could cause full payment of the above account,
they shall cause the release of the mortgage”. However despite the offer of
Perez, the bank continually turned down his offer. On 1958, Perez’ offer
increased from P600 and finally to P8000.00 but such offer was still turned
down by the bank. On 1959, the bank advised Perez that a third party was
willing to buy the property for P13,500 and asked him if he would equal the
offer. Perez failed to equal the offer and so the Bank sold the property to the
spouses Joaquin de Castro and GracianaPasia and TCT T-8583 was subsequently
issued to the name of the De Castro spouses. A case was then filed by Perez for
Specific Performance and Damages against the bank and the De Castro spouses.
The CIF dismissed Perez complaint but CA reversed the decision, hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale
executed by the Bank in favour of the De Castro spouses was valid.
RULING:
The sale executed by PNB to
the De Castro spouses was null and void in view of the representation and
commitment made by the Bank to Perez through its Bank Manager that he be
allowed to redeem the property.
On equitable principles,
particularly on the ground of estoppel, the court must rule against the Bank.
“The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair
dealing, good faith and Justice and its purpose is to forbid one to speak
against is own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to
whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of
estoppel springs from equitable principles and equities in the case. It is
designed to aid the law in the administration of justice where, without its aid
injustice might result”.
Applied to the case at bar,
during all the ten years of negotiation, the Bank led Perez to believe that he
would be allowed to redeem the property, only to renege on that commitment when
it sold the property for P13,500 to the De Castro spouses. Perez justifiably
and reasonably relied upon the assurance of the Bank Manager that he would be
allowed to pay the remaining obligation of his deceased parents and he acted on
that basis. Even fair dealing alone would have required the Bank to abide by
its representations, but it did not. Clearly the equities of the case are with
Perez.
PNB is hereby
ordered to accept the payment from the Heirs of Perez and after receipt
thereof, to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale in favour of Perez and to
cancel the TCT issued to the De Castro spouses.
GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437
Grace
J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
FACTS:
Rederick A.
Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a
decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18,
1989.
On January 12,
1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the
couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s
marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE:
Whether the decree of divorce
submitted by RederickRecio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal
capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.
RULING:
The nullity of
Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized
Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a
divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by
the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground
of bigamy.
G.R. No. 128703
18 October 2000
Bańaset. al. vs. Asia Pacific Finance Corporation
FACTS:
On August 1980, Bañas executed a Promissory Note in favor of C.
G.DizonConstruction whereby for value received he promised to pay to the order
of C. G. DizonConstruction the sum of P390,000.00 in installments of
"P32,500.00every 25th day of themonth starting from September 25, 1980 up
to August 25,1981". Later, C. G. DizonConstruction endorsed with recourse the
Promissory Note to Asia Pacific FinanceCorporation (Asia Pacific), and to
secure its payment, it, through its corporate officers,Dizon, President,
executed a Deed of Chattel Mortgage covering three (3) heavy
equipment units of Caterpillar Bulldozer Crawler Tractors in favor of Asia
Pacific. Dizon also executeda Continuing Undertaking wherein he bound himself
to pay the obligation jointly andseverally with C. G. Dizon Construction.In
compliance with the provisions of the Promissory Note, C. G. Dizon
Constructionmade the installment payments to Asia Pacific totaling P130,000,
but thereafter defaultedin the payment of the remaining installments, prompting
Asia Pacific to send a Statement of Account to Dizon for the unpaid
balance. As the demand was unheeded, Asia Pacific suedBañas, C. G. Dizon
Construction and Dizon.While they admitted the genuineness and due execution of
the Promissory Note, theDeed of Chattel Mortgage and the Continuing
Undertaking, they nevertheless maintainedthat these documents were never
intended by the parties to be legal, valid and binding but a mere
subterfuge to conceal the loan with usurious interests and claimed that since
AsiaPacific could not directly engage in banking business, it proposed to them
a schemewherein it could extend a loan to them without violating banking
laws.The RTC issued writ of replevin against C. G. Dizon Construction for the
surrender of the bulldozer crawler tractors subject of the Deed of Chattel
Mortgage, which of the 3, only2 were actually turned over and were subsequently
foreclosed by Asia Pacific to satisfy theobligation. The RTC ruled in favor of
Asia Pacific holding them to pay jointly and severallythe unpaid balance. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not they can be held liable under the
said documents
RULING:
Petitioners are liable on the documents duly
executed by them.
Petitioners contention that respondent are not allowed to lend money
under the banking laws has no merit. Indubitably, what is prohibited by law is
for investment companies to lend funds obtained from the public through
receipts of deposit, which is afunction of banking institutions. But here, the
funds supposedly "lent" to petitioners havenot been shown to have
been obtained from the public by way of deposits, hence, theinapplicability of
banking laws.
On their submission that the true intention of the parties was to enter
into a contract of loan, the Court examined the Promissory Note and failed to
discern anything therein that would support such theory. On the contrary, the
terms and conditions of the instrument clear, free from any ambiguity, and
expressive of the real intent and agreement of the parties. Likewise, the
Deed of Chattel Mortgage and Continuing Undertaking were duly acknowledged
before a notary public and, as such, have in their favor the presumption of
regularity. To contradict them there must be clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant evidence. In the instant case, the records do not show even
a preponderance of evidence in their favor that the Deed of Chattel Mortgage
and Continuing Undertaking were never intended by the parties to be legal,
valid and binding .
With regard to the computation of their liability, the records show that
theyactually paid a total sum of P130,000.00 in addition to the P180,000.00
proceeds realizedfrom the sale of the bulldozer crawler tractors at public
auction. Deducting these amountsfrom the principal obligation of P390,000.00
leaves a balance of P80,000.00, to which must be added P7,637.50 accrued
interests and charges, or a total unpaid balance of P87,637.50for which they
are jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the unpaid balance should
earn14% interest per annum as stipulated in the Promissory Note, computed from
20 March1981 until fully paid.
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