Aristotle A Ong
1. People v. Mesias G.R. No. L-67823, July
9, 1991
FACTS:
This is an
appeal from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXI, Quezon City, through Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz, finding Danilo Mesias y
Sebastian guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide committed against
Vivencio Cruz y Ramos. The dispositive part reads:
At around 8:00
o'clock in the evening of September 26, 1980, while Mrs. Olympia Cruz was
setting the table for dinner, five (5) armed men, four of them wearing masks,
barged into their house situated at No. 41 Kasunduan St., Barangay
Commonwealth, Quezon City. Her husband, Vivencio Cruz, was in the living room
while their son, Marlon, then six (6) years old, was in the bedroom watching
television. Three (3) men poked their guns at Vivencio.. Then, she heard the
armed men ransacking their house.
Marlon was
allowed by the malefactors to return to the bedroom to watch television. Then
through the open door, Marlon saw the robber without a mask stab Vivencio three
times, twice on the chest and once on the left neck, with what appeared to be
an icepick. Upon seeing his father wounded, Marlon ran to his mother and
exclaimed "Nanay, naku si Tatay!" Olympia removed her blindfold and
saw Vivencio apparently lifeless and bathed in his own blood.
Of the alleged
five offenders, only Mesias was charged. At his arraignment, he pleaded not
guilty to the crime of robbery with homicide. Trial followed. On January 26,
1982, the lower court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction.
In this appeal, accused Mesias insists on his
innocence. His principal defense is alibi. He
alleges that on the night of September 26, 1980, he slept early in his sister's
house located at the IBP site, Constitution Hills, Quezon City, about a half
(1/2) kilometer away from the crime scene. This was corroborated by his sister,
Leni Claudio, who testified that Mesias was in her house between 6:00 in the
evening of September 26, 1980 and 6:00 in the morning of September 27, 1989. 6
To further
support his claim of innocence, Mesias alleges that the victim's widow and
young son, mistook him for another person because there is another man who
looks just like him, which he calls his "double", and who happens to
live in the same area.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
the Defense of Alibi of Mesias is tenable given the facts of the case.
DECISION:
Accused's
defense of alibi deserves little consideration. In no way did it prove that
Mesias could not have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. In fact, Mesias even admitted that the house of his married sister
Leni where he was allegedly sleeping, was a mere one-half kilometer from the
Cruz' residence.
In the case of
People vs. Reunir, 10 it was held that for an effectual alibi, it must be shown
that not only was the accused at some other place at the same time but that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when
it occurred.
During direct
and cross-examination, the boy Marlon, a six-year old kindergarten pupil,
remained firm in his assertion that it was none other than Danilo Mesias, the
unmasked one, who stabbed his father. The defense, on cross-examination,
repeatedly asked Marlon who killed his father and each time Marlon replied that
it was the accused Mesias. In the light of Marlon's categorical and
straightforward testimony which recounted the violence that transpired on
September 26, 1980, as well as his consistent declaration that among the five
(5) men who entered their house, it was Mesias who fatally knifed his father,
we cannot but conclude that the boy Marlon was indeed telling the truth and
that what he stated on the witness stand was what he had actually witnessed on
the night in question.
Children of
sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within
their view than older persons, and their testimony is therefore likely to be
more correct in detail than that of older persons; and when once established
that they understood the nature and character of an oath, full faith and credit
should be given to their testimony.
FACTS:
This is an
automatic review of the Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh
Judicial District, imposing the death penalty upon Alberto Opida and Virgilio
Marcelo for the crime of murder.
On July 31,
1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian Galvan, stoned and
hit him with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed him to death. The
actual knife-wielder was identified as Mario del Mundo. 3 Nonetheless, Alberto
Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged with murder as conspirators and, after
trial, sentenced to death. 4
The basis of
their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two prosecution
witnesses, neither of whom positively said that the accused were at the scene
of the crime, their extrajudicial confessions, which were secured without the
assistance of counsel, and corroboration of the alleged conspiracy under the theory
of interlocking confession.
What is striking
about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his interrogation of the
two accused and their lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was hardly judicious and
certainly far from judicial, at times irrelevant, at Worst malicious. Reading
the transcript, one gathers the impression that the judge had allied himself
with the prosecution to discredit at the outset the credibility of the
witnesses for the defense.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confession
that was used as a basis for conviction was admissible as evidence.
2. Whether or not the evident hostility and bias
of the judge in the case at bar is proper.
DECISION:
1. We have
consistently held that, aside from the required assistance of counsel, the rights guaranteed during a custodial
investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated to the suspect,
especially if he is unlettered, but must be painstakingly explained to him so
he can understand their nature and significance. Moreover, manhandling of any
sort will vitiate any extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from him
and renders it inadmissible in evidence against him.
2. Time and
again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. we
have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. This guaranty was not observed in this case. Given the obvious hostility
of the judge toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the protestations
of the accused in this respect would be, as they in fact were, dismissed. And
once the confessions were admitted, it was easy enough to employ them as
corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy among the accused.
The judge
disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to convict the
accused, who had manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion
of the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?" 23, he was
betraying a pre-judgment long before made and obviously waiting only to be
formalized.
WHEREFORE, the
conviction of Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo is reversed and they are
hereby ordered released immediately. No costs.
3. People vs Concepcion G.R. No. L-1553,
October 25, 1949
FACTS:
This is an
appeal from a judgment of the People's Court finding the appellant, Francisco
Concepcion, guilty of treason and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs. The appellant was found guilty of treason.
The appellant
was found guilty of collaborating with the enemy – the Japanese Imperial Army
during the occupation in Cebu City. Appellant assails now the action of the
lower court of receiving new evidence after the prosecution has rested its case
during the trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
appellant’s assignment of error on the part of the lower court in receiving and
admitting new evidence after the prosecution has rested its case was correct.
DECISION:
No. The error
assigned by counsel for the appellant as having been committed by the lower
court has reference to its action in allowing the prosecution to present
evidence of appellant's Filipino citizenship after the prosecution had rested
its case and the defense had moved for dismissal. This assignment is untenable,
as the matter of reopening a case for the reception of further evidence after
either the prosecution or the defense has rested is within the discretion of
the trial court (23 C.
The appealed
judgment, being in conformity with the facts and the law, is affirmed. So
ordered with costs.
4. People vs Pido G.R. No. 92427, August 2,
1991
FACTS:
This is an
appeal from the decision of the lower court convicting, ROBERTO R. PIDO of the
crime of rape, committed as follows:
That on or about
the 15th day of April 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation, to wit: by holding the neck of the complainant
simultaneously poking a deadly bladed instrument against her, threatening to
kill her should she shout for help and ordering her to remove her entire
clothings, have sexual intercourse with the undersigned complainant, against
her will.
The complaint
was filed with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Manila. It was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 61752 and was assigned to
Branch 35 thereof.
The accused
entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on 13 July 1981.
On January 3,
1990, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the accused of the
crime of rape and sentencing him to a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In summary the
testimonial evidence as presented by the prosecution as part of or as res
gestae points to the accused as having committed rape based on the testimony of
the alleged victim Teresita Gam and her cousin Lydia Sulit who allegedly saw
the accused leave the house after committing the heinous act. (She did not see
the actual rape). On the other hand, the accused denies the accusation and on
his part alleged that it was Teresita Gam who invited her into the house and
had consensual sexual intercourse with him. He further narrates that they were
former sweethearts and they broke up previously because Teresita worked in a
club and became a prostitute. The alleged rape took place on April 15, 1980,
Teresita reported the alleged crime the following month – May 1980.
ISSUE:
The basic issue which these conflicting
theories raise is whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellant has been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
DECISION:
We have
carefully and meticulously reviewed and analyzed the evidence for the
prosecution in this case and, guided by the jurisprudential principles and
considerations adverted to in the exordium of this decision, We find that the
prosecution failed to discharge its duty to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Reversal of the decision appealed from is inevitable.
It is the
teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended
party must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. Common sense and logic,
and above all the duty to render impartial justice, which is expected from judges,
demand that the testimonies of witnesses must be viewed in their totality. This
of course means that due attention must be given to the cross-examination. It
is the province of the latter to test the credibility of the witnesses, expose
falsehood or half-truth, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct-examination
testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies on
substantial matters which create reasonable doubt. In short, cross-examination
is an indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give substance and
meaning to the Constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses
against him and to show that the presumption of innocence has remained
steadfast and firm.
This case then
provides one more occasion for this Court to take exception to the rule that
appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial
court considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying. 33 Two special considerations in this case justify such
departure. Firstly, it was another judge (Judge Alfredo Lazaro) who heard and
received the whole testimony on direct examination of the complainant and the
major portion of her testimony on cross-examination. Judge Makasiar, who
decided the case, did not then have sufficient basis to form an opinion as to
the complainant's deportment and manner of testifying. Secondly, the trial
court had ignored or overlooked substantial facts and circumstances, as
hereafter shown, which would affect the result of the case.
WHEREFORE, for
failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused for the crime
of rape as charged beyond reasonable doubt, the decision of the trial court in
Criminal Case No. 61752 is hereby REVERSED and another is hereby entered
ACQUITTING the accused Roberto R. Pido, with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
5. Talino vs Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos.
L-75511-14, March 16, 1987
FACTS:
It is settled
that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his
testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible
against the latter who was not able to cross-examine him. 1
The petitioner,
along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with
estafa through falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired
to defraud the government in the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the
cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not needed and
never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the
supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments. 2 Docketed as CC Nos.
6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the accused
until after the prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro
Macadangdang and petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were
allowed. They then presented their evidence at such trials, while the other
accused continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which
one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating
in detail his participation in the questioned transactions. 4 In due time, the
Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in all the four cases finding Talino,
Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient
evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it
violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
The issue in
this case is whether or not the testimony in a separate trial was considered by
the respondent court against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the
sole basis of his conviction.
DECISION:
NO. It was not
considered in its finding of facts but the court has this to say on the issue.
In its decision,
the respondent court * makes the following remarks about the separate trial:
It would really
have been simpler had there been no separate trial because the accused Pio B.
Ulat said so many incriminatory things against the other accused when he took
the stand in his own defense. But because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were
granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a
matter of fact, they were not even required to be present when the other
accused were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies cannot now be
considered against said three accused.
The grant of a
separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter
of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after
the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. 6 While it is true that
Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion for
such a trial should be filed, we have held in several cases that this should be
done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as an
exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall
have rested, where there appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses
of the accused. 7 In such an event, the evidence in chief of the prosecution
shall remain on record against an accused, with right of rebuttal on the part
of the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused. 8
The rule in
every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in
granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough
study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious
difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the
respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation.
The right of
confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution 9
to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his
accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges.
No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is
any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen
letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their
spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted
unless the affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred save only in
the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration. 11
We have
carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent
court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the
petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of
Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the
questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the
government.
The factual
findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial evidence other
than Ulat's testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is futile for the
petitioner to invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence because his
guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond reasonable
doubt, and we agree.
WHEREFORE, the
judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
6. Cosep vs People G.R. No. 110353, May 21,
1998
FACTS:
Petitioner,
Tomas Cosep, was the Municipal Planning and Development Coordination Officer of
Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur. In 1987,
the Municipality decided to construct an artesian well for one of its
localities. Hence, it secured the
services of private complainant Angelino E. Alegre to undertake the said
project, under a “pakyaw” arrangement for the contract price of P5,000.00
payable after completion of the project.
After the
project was finished, petitioner secured the amount of P5,000.00 from the
Municipal Treasurer. However, only P4,500 was given to the private complainant,
the balance being allegedly withheld by petitioner as reimbursement for his
expenses in processing the papers in the Municipal Treasurer’s Office.
On April 10,
1992, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The
Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the charge.
Petitioner has
filed the instant petition contending that:
(a) he was not accorded an impartial trial by the Sandiganbayan and (b)
his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt to justify his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
petitioner was accorded impartial trial by the Sandiganbayan and that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
DECISION:
Regarding the
first assignment of error, petitioner bewails the fact that during his
testimony the Justices of the
Sandiganbayan actively participated in the proceeding by propounding no
less than sixty-eight questions[4] which, in his opinion, were indications of
partiality or prejudgment of guilt.
We do not agree.
Admittedly,
petitioner, like any other accused individual, is entitled to a fair trial
before an “impartial and neutral judge” as an indispensable imperative of due
process.[6] Judges must not only be impartial, but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that the decision will be
just.[7] However, this is not to say that judges must remain passive or silent
during the proceedings. Since they are
in a better position to observe the demeanor of the witness as he testifies on
the witness stand, it is only natural for judges to ask questions to elicit
facts with a view to attaining justice for the parties. Questions designed to clarify points[8] and
to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper.[9] Also, the judge,
being the arbiter, may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to
expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time.[10]
While we do not
see any merit in petitioner’s first assigned error, we, however, agree with him
that his guilt was not adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution.
It is well
settled that whether the accused is guilty or not of the offense charged is a
question which involves a determination of facts as presented by the
prosecution and the defense. The duty to
ascertain which is more credible is lodged with the trial court which had the
opportunity to observe the witness directly and to test his credibility by his
demeanor on the stand. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan’s factual findings are generally accorded respect, even finality,
unless: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts or premised on the absence of evidence on the
record.[12] A re-examination of the entire proceedings of the instant case
compels us to take exception to the aforementioned general rule.
Where the state
fails to meet the quantum of proof required to overcome the constitutional
presumption, the accused is entitled to acquittal, regardless of the weakness
or even the absence of his defense[14] for any conviction must rest on the strength
of the prosecution’s case and not on the weakness of the defense.
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it
convicted and sentenced petitioner Tomas Cosep of violating Section 3(b) of
R.A. No. 3019 is hereby SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Cosep is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
7. People Vs Rivera G.R. No. 98376 August 16, 1991
FACTS:
The special
civil action of certiorari at bar instituted in this Court to annul an order
rendered by the Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City, Branch 129, in a
prosecution for arson docketed in that Court as Criminal Case No. 28820
(87).Accused in that case of arson is Wilfredo L. Sembrano. It is the
prosecution's theory that he wilfully caused the fire in the early morning of
May 21, 1987 which totally burned and destroyed the second and third floors of
the "I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath" owned by Juanita L. Tan,
located at No. 2 L. Bustamante St. Kalookan City
Among the
witnesses presented by the Government to demonstrate Sembrano's culpability was
Benjamin Lee, a room boy of the restaurant and bath. Lee testified on direct
examination at the hearing of December 8, 1987. His testimony was essentially
that Sembrano had run out of the VIP room where the fire had started and
refused to heed his (Lee's) call to stop.
The prosecution
completed presentation of its evidence-in-chief in due course. But before it
could rest its case, and two (2) months or so after Benjamin Lee had completed
his testimony, the defendant's original counsel, Benjamin Formoso, withdrew his
appearance and was substituted by another attorney, Eduardo S. Rodriguez. The latter then filed a motion on June 8,
1988 to recall Benjamin Lee for further examination. Motion granted.
ISSUE:
The basic issue
is whether or not it is proper for the court to grant the motion of the
Defendant Counsel and to order the recall to the stand of the witness Benjamin
Lee.
DECISION:
No. It was not
proper for the lower court to grant the motion to recall the witness for insufficiency
of grounds to do so.
There is no
doubt that a Trial Court has discretion to grant leave for the recall of a
witness. This is clear from a reading of Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, as amended,
Recalling
witness.- After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded,
the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant
or withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require.
The discretion
to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by an applicant's
mere general statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the
interest of justice," or "in order to afford a party full opportunity
to present his case," or that, as here, "there seems to be many
points and questions that should have been asked" in the earlier
interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient
ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer
discretionary but ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of the
need to propound additional questions is essential before the Court's
discretion may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing
of some concrete, substantial ground for the recall. There must be a
satisfactory showing on the movant's part, for instance, that particularly
identified material points were not covered in the cross-examination, or that
particularly described vital documents were not presented to the witness whose
recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so inept a
manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to
repeat, there would be no foundation for a trial court to authorize the recall
of any witness.
In the case at
bar, the respondent Trial Court granted the defendant's motion for recall on
nothing more than said movant's general claim that certain questions -
unspecified, it must be stressed - had to be asked. In doing so, it acted
without basis, exercised power whimsically or capriciously, and gravely abused
its discretion.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED and the respondent Court's challenged Order dated October
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