chua digest

G.R. No. 123164                                                                                                                                                       February 18, 2000

NICANOR DULLA, petitioner,                                                                                                                                                   vs.                                                                                                                                                                                                   COURT OF APPEALS and ANDREA ORTEGA, represented by ILUMINADA BELTRAN, respondents.

FACTS

On February 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years old, came home crying, with bruises on her right thigh. She told her guardian, Iluminada Beltran, that her uncle, herein petitioner, touched her private part. In her own words, she said, "Inaano ako ng uncle ko," while doing a pumping motion with the lower part of her body to demonstrate what had been done to her. She also said that petitioner showed his penis to her.

The matter was reported to Barangay Councilor Carlos Lumaban who, with the child, the latter’s guardian, and three barangay tanods, went to the house of petitioner to confront him. As petitioner’s father refused to surrender his son to Lumaban and his party, Lumaban sought assistance from the nearby Western Police District (WPD) Station No. 7. It appears; however, that petitioner took advantage of the situation and ran away.

On February 8, 1993, Lumaban was informed that petitioner was in the nearby barangay. Together with some barangay tanods, Lumaban went to the place where petitioner was reported to be, but petitioner’s employer refused to surrender the latter to the authorities. Later, however, with the aid of two policemen from the WPD Police Station No. 1, Lumaban and his party were able to take petitioner to Precinct 1 and later to Precinct 7.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape, whereupon trial ensued. In her testimony in court, Andrea said that petitioner fondled her organ and showed her his penis. She said that when petitioner did a pumping motion, she had no panties on and that she was lying down. Petitioner was also lying down, according to her. The medical report on Andrea prepared by Dr. Maximo Reyes, who examined the child on February 3, 1993, showed that hymen of the victim is still intact.

Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He said that Andrea was coached by her guardian. He likewise denied that he escaped from Lumaban and his men on February 2, 1993, and said that he only went away to avoid any trouble that time. The trial court found petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness hence this appeal.

ISSUES

Whether Andrea is a competent witness.

RULING

The contention has no merit. As a general rule, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Under Rule 130, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, only children who, on account of immaturity, are incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully are disqualified from being witnesses. In People v. Mendoza, the Court held:

It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined.

The requirements then of a child’s competency as a witness are the following:

(a)    Capacity of observation,

(b)   Capacity of recollection

(c)    Capacity of communication

And in ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing, it is settled that the trial court is called upon to make such determination.

In the case at bar, Andrea was three years and 10 months old at the time she testified. Despite her young age, however, she was able to respond to the questions put to her. She answered "yes" and "no" to questions and, when unable to articulate what was done to her by petitioner, Andrea demonstrated what she meant. During her interrogation, she showed an understanding of what was being asked. She was consistent in her answers to the questions asked by the prosecutor, the defense counsel, and even by the judge.

The determination of the competence and credibility of a child as a witness rests primarily with the trial judge who has the opportunity to see the witness and observe his manner, his apparent intelligence or lack of it, and his understanding of the nature of the oath. As many of these qualities cannot be conveyed by the record of the case, the trial judge’s evaluation will not be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the record that his judgment is erroneous.

In this case, the defense did not even object to the presentation of Andrea as a witness, nor questioned her competence to testify. On the contrary, the defense cross examined her, and the result of her examination showed that she was intelligent and could make her answers known to others.

With respect to the fact that leading questions were propounded to Andrea during her direct examination, suffice it to say that under the Rules of Court, such questions are allowed considering the age (three years and 10 months) of the witness at the time she testified in court. Rule 132, Section 10 provides:

Leading and misleading questions.¾ A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:

(c)      When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf-mute; ..

Petitioner’s contention, therefore, that Andrea was incompetent to testify must be rejected.

G.R. No. L-58164                                                                                                                                                                   September 2, 1983

JOSE GUERRERO, MARIA GUERRERO, MAGDALENA GUERRERO ESPIRITU, assisted by her husband CANDIDO ESPIRITU, GREGORIO GUERRERO, CLARA GUERRERO, Et Al., Petitioner,                                                                v.                                                                                                                                                                                                          ST. CLARE’S REALTY CO., LTD., GUILLERMO T. GUERRERO, CECILIA GUERRERO, assisted by ANGELO CARDEÑO, PERLINDA GUERRERO, etc., Et Al., Respondents.

FACTS

The disputed lot was formerly owned by Andres Guerrero, father of the petitioners. Andres physically possessed and cultivated the land through a tenancy agreement. Shortly after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Andres entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina Guerrero, who was to enjoy the owner’s share in the produce of the land. After the death of Andres in 1943, Cristina continued as trustee of the deceased.

Petitioners alleged that the land was surveyed by the Bureau of Lands for and in the name of Andres Guerrero as early as 1957. Then, at about 1971, the petitioners discovered that the land was titled in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, on the basis of a “Deed of Sale of Land” dated 1948 purportedly executed by their Aunt Cristina. They further alleged that notwithstanding the opposition of the heirs of Cristina, Manuel was successful in his application of the registration of the land in his favor.

Manuel subsequently sold this lot in favor of the defendants Guerreros, also cousins of the petitioners. The defendants Guerreros later sold the disputed lot to a St.Clare’s Realty, a partnership constituted by them.

 According to the complaint, the Deed of Sale in favor of Manuel was fraudulently obtained and that the subsequent deeds of sale were likewise fraudulent and ineffective since the defendants allegedly knew that the property belonged to Andres Guerrero.

During trial, Laura Cervantes, a daughter of Cristina, was presented as witnesses for the petitioners. She testified that the money used for the illness of her mother was obtained from Manuel by mortgaging the land as security for the loans obtained. This was objected to by the counsel of the defendants based on Sec. 20 (a), Rule 130(now, Sec.23, Rule 130). Initially, the trial court allowed the witness to continue, but upon a written motion to disqualify on the same basis, the trial court declared Laura and Jose Cervantes disqualified from testifying in the case.

Subsequently, petitioners filed a “Motion for the Judge to Inhibit and/or to Transfer the case to another Branch.” This was denied. Petitioners then failed to appear at the set schedule for trial, and the trial court judge issued an order stating that petitioners “are deemed to have waived their right to further present or formally offer their evidence in court” as a consequence of their non-appearance.

Petitioners filed a “Manifestation” that they did not waive their rights to present further evidence, to cross-examine defendants’ witnesses, and to present rebuttal evidence. They added that they reserved such right upon the decision of the CA in a petition for certiorari which they were preparing to file.

Despite this, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the defendants Guerreros, even ordering the petitioners to pay damages in the amount of more than P2M. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES

Whether the witnesses Laura and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of the “dead man’s rule”?

Whether the exclusion of petitioners’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was correctly sustained by the CA?

RULING

Laura and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither is they assignors of the parties nor persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. They are mere witnesses by whose testimonies the petitioners aimed to establish that it was not Cristina who owned the disputed land at the time of the alleged sale to Manuel, and that Cristina merely mortgaged the property to Manuel.

The present case is not a claim or demand against the estate of the deceased Manuel Guerrero. The defendants Guerreros are not the executors or administrators or representatives of such deceased. They are being sued as claimants of ownership in their individual capacities of the disputed lot. The lot is not a part of the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Thus, the dead man’s rule is clearly inapplicable.

Aside from the disqualified witnesses, other witnesses testified and it was error to hold that the testimonial evidence should have been formally offered, or that without such offer, such evidence was waived. The offer of testimonial evidence is affected by calling the witness to the stand and letting him testify before the court upon appropriate questions.

The trial court rendered its decision solely on the basis of defendants’ evidence and without regard to the proofs that petitioner has presented. Therefore, exclusion of petitioners’ evidence and their preclusion from presenting further proof was incorrect.

G.R. No. 89420                                                                                                                                                                                   July 31, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.

FACTS

On March 16, 1987 between 2:00 and 3:00pm, the accused went to Mrs. Sigua's office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. After which he departed from the office with blood stained clothes, carrying a bloodied bladed weapon. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained 14 wounds, 5 of which were fatal.

The accused, in defense of him, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense.

The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child when their children quarreled with other children. Thereafter, he went back to the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when she was informed that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around, including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "That is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their conversation. Turning to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila. 

Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime charged. 

RULING

No. For insanity to relieve the person of criminal liability, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that he acts without or the least discernment and that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.

One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there is complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)

It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong.

Under Philippine jurisdiction, there's no definite test or criterion for insanity. However, the definition of insanity under Sec 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code can be applied. In essence, it states that insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties, which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.

Evidence of insanity must refer to the mental condition at the very time of doing the act. However, it is also permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period before and after the time of the act in question. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts.

It is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged him. But in the case at hand, the accused was able to Mrs. Sigua. From this, it can be inferred that the accused was aware of his acts. This also established that the accused has lucid intervals. Moreover, Dr. Echavez testified to the effect that the appellant could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it when he shouted (during laboratory examination) that he killed Mrs. Sigua. This statement makes it highly doubtful that the accused was insane when he committed the act. 

The fact that the accused was carrying an envelope where he hid the fatal weapon, that he ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, that he fled to Manila to evade arrest, indicate that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim.

G.R. No. L-27434                                                                                                                                                                              September 23, 1986

GENARO GOÑI, RUFINA P. vda. DE VILLANUEVA, VIOLA P. VILLANUEVA, OSCAR P. VILLANUEVA, MARINA P. VILLANUEVA, VERNA P. VILLANUEVA, PRAXEDES P. VILLANUEVA, JR., JOSE P. VILLANUEVA, SAMUEL P. VILLANUEVA, LOURDES P. VILLANUEVA, MILAGROS P. VILLANUEVA DE ARRIETA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and GASPAR VICENTE, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

The three (3) haciendas known as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombrede Maria situated in the Municipality of Bais, Negros Oriental, were originally owned by the Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas [TABACALERA].

Sometime in 1949, the late Praxedes T. Villanueva, predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, negotiated with TABACALERA for the purchase of said haciendas. However, he did not have sufficient funds to pay the price. Villanueva with the consent of TABACALERA, offered to sell Hacienda Sarria to one Santiago Villegas, who was later substituted by Joaquin Villegas.

The amount realized from the transaction between Villanueva and Villegas still fell short of the purchase price of the three haciendas, or in consideration of the guaranty undertaken by private respondent Vicente, Villanueva contracted or promised to sell to the latter fields’ nos. 3, 4 and 13 of Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria for the sum of P13, 807.00.

Private respondent Vicente thereafter advised TABACALERA to debit from his account the amount of P13, 807.00 as payment for the balance of the purchase price. However, as only the amount of P12, 460.24 was actually needed to complete the purchase price, only the latter amount was debited from private respondent's account.

As the amount of P12, 460.24 had already been debited from private respondent's account, it was agreed that lots 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria would merely be leased to private respondent Vicente for a period of five (5) years starting with crop-year 1950-51 at an annual rental of 15% of the gross income, said rent to be deducted from the money advanced by private respondent and any balance owing to Villanueva would be delivered by Vicente together with the lots at the end of the stipulated period of lease.

On December 10, 1949, TABACALERA executed a formal deed of sale covering the three haciendas in favor of Villanueva. Fields Nos. 3, 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria were thereafter registered in the name of Villanueva. Meanwhile, Fields nos. 4 and 13 were delivered to private respondent Vicente after the 1949-1950 milling season in January and February, 1950.

On June 17, 1950, Villanueva executed a "Documento de la Venta Definitive" in favor of Joaquin Villegas, covering Lot No. 314 of the Cadastral Survey of Bais with an area of 468,627 square meters, more or less. On November 12, 1951, Villanueva died.

On October 7, 1954, the day before the intestate proceedings were ordered closed and the estate of the late Praxedes Villanueva delivered to his heirs, private respondent Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and damages before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental against petitioner Goñi in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Praxedes Villanueva. Private respondent Vicente sought to recover field no. 3 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria, basing his entitlement thereto on the contract/promise to sell executed by the late Praxedes Villanueva in his favor on October 24, 1949.

Petitioner Goni filed an answer with counterclaim for accounting of the produce of fields’ nos. 4 and 13, as well as the surrender thereof on June 20, 1955, the end of the fifth crop-year, plus moral damages. On December 18, 1959, the trial court rendered a decision ordering therein defendants-heirs to deliver to Gaspar Vicente field no 3, to execute a formal deed of sale covering fields’ nos. 3, 4 and 13 in favor of Vicente.

ISSUE

Whether it was correct for the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have admitted Vicente’s testimonial on matters of fact before the death of Praxedes T. Villanueva, which constitutes a claim against his estate, in violation of Rule 130 Sec. 20(a).

RULING

Yes, they were correct to admit Vicente’s testimony. The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased. But in this case, such provision is inapplicable since such protection was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-examined Vicente. A waiver occurs when plaintiff’s deposition is taken by the representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased’s.

G.R. No. 110813                                                                                                                                                                                       June 28, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,                                                                                                             vs.                                                                                                                                                                                                        ERNESTO PARDUA, ROGELIO PARDUA, GEORGE PARDUA, and WARLITO PARDUA, accused-appellants.

FACTS

The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Roxas, Branch 23 convicting accused Ernesto Pardua, Rogelio Pardua, George Pardua and Warlito Pardua of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua.

Only accused Ernesto Pardua was charged in the original information. On May 13, 1991, at the arraignment, accused Ernesto Pardua pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely, Orlando Simpliciano and Alfredo Villanueva, on May 21, 1991, the prosecution filed a motion to admit amended information to include accused Rogelio, Warlito and George, all surnamed Pardua and one Robert dela Cruz, who remained at large. The two prosecution witnesses were recalled for the retaking of their testimony against the three other accused.  Of the two, only Orlando Simpliciano was presented for cross-examination because Alfredo Villanueva could no longer be located. On July 3, 1991, the trial court admitted the amended information filed by 4^th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Efren M. Cacatian of Isabela, charging accused Ernesto Pardua, Rogelio Pardua, Warlito Pardua, George Pardua and Robert Dela Cruz with murder. Upon arraignment on November 4, 1991, accused Rogelio Pardua and George Pardua entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged. Warlito Pardua, however, was arrested later on and was arraigned on December 9, 1991.  He, likewise, entered a plea of "not guilty." Robert de la Cruz remained at large.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court is correct in assessing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

Whether a testimony of a witness whose name was not listed in the information as among the prosecution witnesses is tenable.

RULING

We have carefully reviewed the testimonies of the witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense as well as other evidence. We are convinced that the trial court correctly held that the accused-appellants’ guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt. We have no reason to doubt the testimony of Orlando and Juanito.  They recounted details of the horrifying experience of seeing their uncle, Toribio, killed, in a manner reflective of honest and unrehearsed testimony. Their candid, plain, straightforward account of the untoward incident that happened in broad daylight and in an open field was free of significant inconsistencies, unshaken by rigid cross-examination. The discrepancy is not substantial enough to impair the credibility of Orlando or impair the evidence for the prosecution.  Rather, such minor lapse manifests truthfulness and candor and erases suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.

It is well settled that the findings of a trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of a trial judge over an appellate magistrate in the appreciation of testimonial evidence.  It is well-entrenched that the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.  These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth.  In the absence of any showing that the trial court’s calibration of credibility was flawed, we are bound by its assessment.

As long as a person is qualified to become a witness, he may be presented as one regardless of whether his name was included in the information or not. Thus the court affirmed such decision.

G.R. No. L-52688                                                                                                                                                                         October 17, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.

FACTS

In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering plants near the house of Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in an improvised hammock and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat. On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child to a neighbor, went to the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he (Honorato) had killed his wife Feling. After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife.

On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the municipal court. After a preliminary examination, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on March 4, 1977 the fiscal filed against Ambal an information for parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the defense of Ambal was insanity.

The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health officer, Doctor Maximino R. Balbas, Jr.,to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a report on the latter's mental condition. Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a "passive-aggressive, emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate personality".

Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month observation of mental cases and who in the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred cases of mental disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis, a disturbance of the functional nervous system which is not insanity (65 November 15, 1977). The doctor concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal was normal but nervous, he had no mental disorder.

ISSUE

Whether defense of Ambal as insane in the execution of the crime of parricide exempt’s him from criminal liability.

RULING

The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he was not insane and that he acted like a normal human being. Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition”. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary. When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he performed the criminal act charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of madness or of mental derangement, or that he was generally considered to be insane — his habitual condition being, on the contrary, healthy — the legal presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the burden is upon the defendant to overcome this presumption.

In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons, who get into a quarrel or fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word I "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane", "non compos mentis," "unsound mind","idiot", or "lunatic".

In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence. The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease or defect. Thus Ambal is guilty of parricide.

G.R. No. L-33304                                                                                                                                                                            December 13, 1930

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CONSTANTE SOTELO, ET AL., defendants.
CONSTANTE SOTELO, appellant.

FACTS

The Sotelo brothers, namely, Constante, Dominador, and Vicente, were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur for the crime of homicide under the following information:

That on or about the night of December 24, 1929, in the municipality of Narvacan, Province of Ilocos Sur, Philippine Islands, the said accused Constante, Dominador, and Vicente Sotelo, armed with a penknife, a stick, and an iron bar, respectively, acting together and helping one another, did willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and feloniously with treachery and evident premeditation attack, beat up, and commit assault upon the person of Ignacio Cambaliza, inflicting a mortal wound upon him on the level of the left nipple, which penetrated the left lung and the left ventricle of the heart, another on the outward surface of the right arm, a bruise on the nose and another on the upper lip: as a result of which said Ignacio Cambaliza died after a few minutes.

The record shows that at about 8 o'clock in the evening of the 24th of December, 1929, Ignacio Cambaliza started for the barrio of Ravadabia, in the municipality of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, accompanied by Baltazar Capistrano. They took the provincial road leading to said barrio and as they approached the Sotelo house, they bid the time of day, asking whether they might pass by, according to the custom of the place. They were barely 20 meters away from the house, when the defendant Constante Sotelo, who had just finished his supper, descended from the house towards the road, and, from the entrance of his yard, turned his flashlight on the passers-by to see who they were. When Ignacio Cambaliza saw this, he walked back to where Constante Sotelo stood and inquired why he turned his flashlight on them, and what it was he wanted, winding up with a vulgar remark. When Constante's brothers, who were then in the yard on the side of the road, saw Cambaliza's attitude, they approached their brother to separate or defend him, whereupon Cambaliza's commenced beating them with his iron crop, once striking Constante's arm. The brothers, in turn, fell upon Cambaliza, Dominador striking him across the face with the stick he carried, and Vicente wounding him in the right shoulder with a penknife. At this juncture, Capistrano attempted to intervene, but he was warned by Vicente and probably by Dominador also, for which reason he withdrew from the scene, and the fight then continued between Cambaliza and Constante. In the course of this fight, Constante thrust a penknife into Cambaliza at about the level of the left nipple, producing a wound which penetrated the left lung into the left ventricle of the heart, resulting in his death a few minute later.

ISSUES

Whether the trial judge erred in sustaining the fiscal's objection to having witness Capistrano explain the contradiction between his statement and his testimony before the trial court at the hearing. 

RULING

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts other than the facts in issue, which if proved, may tend by inference to establish the fact in issue. The witness Capistrano affirmed in Exhibit 10 that he saw Constante standing at the entrance of his yard, alone; that the deceased was the first to make vulgar remarks to Constante; and that during the fight Constante was under Cambaliza when he drew his penknife to stab him. On the other hand, testifying before the trial court, the said witness Capistrano stated that he and the deceased saw the three brothers, Constante, Dominador, and Vicente Sotelo in the yard of the house; that one of these brothers was the first to make insulting remarks to Cambaliza, and that while the two brothers were attacking Cambaliza, Constante stabbed him in the chest with a penknife. We believe Capistrano's testimony appearing in Exhibit 10 as to Constante's position when he wounded Cambaliza, must be accepted, not only because it was given two days after the incident, but because it has been corroborated by the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge erred in sustaining thus; Constante is guilty of the crime homicide.

G.R. No. L-2500                                                                                                                                                                                        April 27, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE QUEVEDO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

On 2 August 1946, at about 7:00 p.m. in the resident of the family of Ulysses Rous, a person armed with a .45 caliber grease gun entered the northwest door of the house from the rear, preceded by a barking of the dog, warned them in Tagalog not to move or shout if they did not want to be killed and asked for Ulysses Rous. Two armed persons entered the kitchen, one of them asking for Paling, referring to Rafael Rous, the married son, and Natividad answered that Paling went to Manila. Not long after the first person had left the kitchen the electric light went out. A noise was heard as if a door near the one through which they had entered was being opened. The two persons asked them to light a lamp and Teresa Rabena de Rous lighted up a kerosene lamp. And then a chatter of an automatic gun and a whistle were heard. One of the two persons, who entered the kitchen after the first and asked for Rafael Rous, sensing that he had been recognized by Natividad, covered his mouth with a handkerchief. As her husband could not be found in the upper floor, they went down and called him but no one answered. So they went up again and it was then when Natividad heard her father groaning. So she called the attention of a policeman who focused his flashlight outside the house and saw Ulysses Rous lying dead near a ditch riddled with gunshots and his head submerged in the water. he day following the death of Ulysses Rous, the acting Justice of the Peace of Binalonan, Jose F. Aquino, also went to the place to make an inquest and took the statement of Natividad Rous who, answering the question put to her by the Justice of the Peace as to whether she was able to recognize any one of them (referring to those who entered the kitchen of the deceased's house), said Yes. This statement was signed and sworn to by Natividad Rous before the acting Justice of the Peace of Binalonan.

 On 12 August, a complaint was filed by the Chief of Police in the Justice of the Peace Court of Binalonan charging Jose Quevedo and other unknown persons with the crime of murder. On the date of the filing of the complaint, he took their statement under oath. Upon these two sworn statements, the warrant of arrest was issued by the Justice of the Peace. On 19 August, at the preliminary investigation, the testimony of Teresa Rabena de Rous was taken by the Justice of the Peace. Thereupon, Jose Quevedo was bound over to the Court of First Instance, where the provincial Fiscal filed an information for murder against him only, the other alleged companions until then not having been apprehended for lack of identification.

ISSUE

Whether there was a probable cause to warrant the issuance of an order of arrest base on the investigation of Teresa Rabena de Rous and Rosy C. Rous.

RULING

The testimony of Teresa Rabena de Rous, taken together with her previous sworn statement, reveals that she was not sure that the appellant was among those who entered her house on the evening her husband was killed. Of course, that of Natividad Rous cannot be relied upon. And that of Rosy C. Rous does not merit any credit. On the evening of the commission of the crime she heard her mother-in-law mention the name of the appellant to the Chief of Police; so that she already knew his name, and yet on 5 and 12 August, when she said she recognized the appellant as one of those who entered their house on the evening when her father-in-law was killed, she persisted in saying that she did not know his name. She was new in Binalonan, she having married Rafael Rous in April 1946, and had no occasion to know the appellant well to enable her to recognize him. Thus the judgment appealed from is reversed, the appellant acquitted.