Ryan M Henandez digest

 [G.R. No. 124853.  February 24, 1998]

FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

In her complaint^[4] filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940.  At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes).  As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family.  In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that FRANCISCO support and treat her as such. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not MONINA is an illegitimate child of Francisco

Ruling:

Carefully evaluating appellant’s evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-vis [FRANCISCO’s] controversion thereof, We find more weight in the former.  The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her] witnesses xxx all bearing on [FRANCISCO’s] acts and/or conduct indubitably showing that he had continuously acknowledged [MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have not been succeessfully [sic] refuted.  In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his deposition, only casually dismissed [MONINA’s] exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with respect to those given by [MONINA’s] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired [them] from their employment.  Needless to state, [FRANCISCO’s] vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of [MONINA’s] testimonial evidence.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established, thus:

ART. 172.   The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1)      The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2)      An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1)      The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2)      Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 127356 June 29, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
DAVID SILVANO y HAYAG, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

David Silvano y Hayag was charged of raping his own daughter Sheryl Silvano

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can be convicted based on uncorroborated statement by the victim

Ruling:

The contention that he cannot be convicted on the sole testimony of his daughter with respect to the rape easily crumbles in the light of the doctrine that only two people are privy to the crime of rape and the evaluation of the evidence presented ultimately resolves around the credibility of complainant. The trial court, giving full faith and credence to the victim's testimony found it to be "logical, straightforward and candid manner, without any artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the credibility of her testimony". It even observed that she "shamelessly cried as she was narrating the tragic experience" and her "stern demeanor evinces the hatred she had for the accused". Notwithstanding that the victim's testimony is uncorroborated, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof so long as it meets the test of credibility, and the prosecution is not bound to present witnesses other than the victim. 

[G.R. No. 121027.  July 31, 1997]

CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.

Facts:

This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a pacel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel opf land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the disputed property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay and is inadmissible

2. Whether or not such evidence is sufficient to prove filiations

Ruling:

The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent’s failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were offered in evidence.

The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora’s niece.^[16] Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

[G.R. No. 133925.  November 29, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN GOPIO, accused-appellant.

Facts:

In the year 1995, Agustin Gopio y Arcillas was charged of raping Ma. Princess Millano y San Diego, 11 years of age.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape

Ruling:

Accused-appellant claims that in May and June of 1995, he was in Novaliches selling fish.  This defense merits no consideration. Accused-appellant has not shown that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.  Moreover, other than the testimony of accused-appellant and his wife that the latter never leaves their house, no evidence was presented to substantiate his defense of alibi.

Alibi as a means of defense is weak when not substantiated by the testimony of a credible witness.

[G.R. No. 110129.  August 12, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDELCIANO AMACA @ “EDDIE” and “JOHN DOE”  @ “OGANG,” accused, EDELCIANO AMACA @ “EDDIE,” accused-appellant.

Facts:

 Accused Amaca and another known as “Ogang” were charged for shooting Wilson Vergara.

Another witness testified, PO Mangubat,  a police officer , who interviewed the victim (Wilson Vergara) right after the shooting. Mangubat  testified that he saw the victim already on board a Ford Fiera pick-up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die.  He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of the victim and made latter affixed his thumb mark with the use of his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor. 

 Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted from further prosecution of the case. the former because of the "financial help" extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina had already "consented to the amicable settlement of the case." Despite this, the Department of Justice found the existence of a prima facie case based on the victim's ante mortem statement.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the dying declaration should be admitted

2. Whether or not the offer of compromise is admissible against the accused

Ruling:

A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware of his impending death to accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the
truth." This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased made the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case where the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is complete in itself. All these concur in the present case.

Finally, Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty. There is nothing in the circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Amaca. Even the accused testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police Officer Mangubat and knew no reason why the latter would falsely testify against him.

The "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise may be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant's criminal liability. The victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial help" extended to her family by the accused-appellant. 

[G.R. No. 111149.  September 5, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO BAUTISTA, ARMAN HERNANDEZ, ARNOLD MENDOZA & JESS SABARIN (At large), defendants-appellants.

Facts:

On December 14, 1989, at around 8:30 in the evening, Rodel Yarza arrived at his home located at 1325 Abad Santos Street Tondo, Manila, from Divisoria, where he had been selling pants, t-shirts and bags. After dinner, he told his wife, Zenaida, that he would play a game of cards, locally called “pusoy,” somewhere in their neighborhood.

At about 9:00 o’clock that evening, his wife went out of their house to fetch her husband. She saw him playing cards with accused Arman Hernandez, Jess Sabarin, Arnold Mendoza and appellant Renato Bautista. When Rodel Yarza saw her, he told his wife to go home ahead and that he would soon follow.

Shortly after she reached home, Zenaida’s brother, Alex Tablizo, informed her that her husband was seriously stabbed and that he was brought to the Mary Johnston Hospital.

Zenaida left immediately for the hospital where she saw her husband lying down, “profusely perspiring, pale and very weak.’

She went beside her husband and noticed a stab wound on the lower part of his armpit. She asked him who it was who stabbed him. Rodel replied, “Nette, my playmates and the one who stabbed me was Rene.” “Nette, he was the son of Efren Baculaw, the short-changer in Divisoria.”

About 10 to 15 minutes prior to Zeniada’s arrival at the hospital, Efren Bautista, the father of appellant, and his wife, Teresita, were already there obviously waiting for Zenaida. Efren Bautista assured Zenaida that they will help defray part of the hospital expenses. And, in the course of his conversation with Zenaida, Efren Bautista said that, before the stabbing incident, he saw appellant enter their house, get a knife and then leave immediately. His son’s unusual behavior moved Efren to follow him.

Because Zenaida could not afford the fees at Mary Johnston Hospital, she was forced to transfer her husband to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital at Avenida Rizal Tondo, Manila. At about 11:00 o’clock that evening, Rodel was rushed to the emergency room of the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was operated on. At around 2:30 o’clock down , the following day, Rodel expired.

Issue:

Whether or not the testimony of the wife of the victim can be admitted as evidence

Ruling:

In this case, particularly, there is no iota of evidence presented by the defense that would show that the declarant as well as his wife, Zenaida Yarza, had any ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant to the crime other than to seek justice for the victim’s death.

Moreover, the fact that Rodel Yarza did not expire right after his declaration to his wife at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of December 14, 1989, but survived until 2:30 o’clock the following morning, or about four (4) hours from the time he made the declaration, will not alter the probative force of his dying declaration since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible.

Furthermore, Zenaida Yarza’s testimony that Efren Bautista, father of Renato Bautista, told her at the hospital that accused-appellant, on the night the crime was committed, went home, took a knife and ran away from him, remains unrebutted by the defense. There is also the fact that Efren Bautista offered to help defray the medical expenses of the victim. This does not at all support accused-appellant’s claimed innocence.

In any case, Zenaida Yarza’s testimony on her conversation with accused-appellant’s father at the hospital cannot be challenged on the ground of being hearsay for they constitute independently relevant statements. Zenaida Yarza merely testified as to what Efren Bautista told her at the hospital. Cetainly, this is within Zenaida’s personal knowledge for she actually saw and heard the things that Efren Bautista told her. The statements attributed to Efren Bautista were offered not to prove the truth of the facts stated therein but only to prove that those statements were actually made.