pacatang digests

IVEN B. PACATANG

PEOPLE VS. PALACIO

G.R. No. L-13933             May 25, 1960

FACTS:

A case of murder was filed against 5 accused for the death of Jaime Salinel. The information as filed before the CFI of Camarines Sur. The defense counsel asked the Court to order the prosecution to furnish the defendants at least all the names of the witnesses for the prosecution. However, the prosecution failed to comply with the order so that the defense objected during the trial the prosecution’s presentation of witnesses to testify alleging that their names were not included in the information; and which the Court granted the motion.

ISUUE:

Whether or not the prosecution may still be allowed to present witnesses whose names were not included in the information?

RULING:

YES. Under Rule 112 Section 1, it provides that:

The defendant must be arraigned before the court in which the complaint or information has been filed unless the cause shall have been transferred elsewhere for trial. The arraignment must be made by the court or clerk, and shall consist in reading the complaint or information to the defendant and delivering to him a copy thereof, including a list of witnesses, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty as charged. The prosecution may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. 

The defendant is entitled as a matter of right to be furnished by the prosecution with a list of the witnesses to be presented against him during the trial. But the prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. Therefore, the prosecution need not furnish the defendant with a list of all its witnesses. That is the meaning of the last sentence of the above quoted provision of the Rule. While the accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, yet it does not mean that he is entitled to know in advance the names of all the witnesses for the prosecution. The success of the prosecution might be endangered if such right be granted to an accused, for the known witnesses might be subjected to pressure or coerced not to testify. The time for the accused to know all the witnesses against him is when they take the witness stand.

The fact that some of the witnesses for the prosecution who are not listed in the information were present in the courtroom and heard the testimony of the other witnesses does not disqualify them from being witnesses. Counsel for the defense should have asked for the exclusion of all the witnesses who have not testified under and pursuant to section 14, Rule 115.

CANQUE VS. CA

G.R. No. 96202 April 13, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC Construction. At the time material to this case, she had contracts with the government for (a) the restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road; (b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and (c) the asphalting of Babag road in Lapulapu City. In connection with these projects, petitioner entered into two contracts with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation. 

On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C), containing a revised computation, for P299,717.75, plus interest at rate of 3% a month, representing the balance of petitioner's total account of P2,098,400.25 for materials delivered and services rendered by private respondent under the two contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the amount, claiming that private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and the acceptance thereof by the government. 

Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to recover from petitioner the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.

On June 22, 1988, the trial court rendered its decision ordering petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P299,717.75 plus interest at 12% per annum, and costs. It held:

. . . . [B]y analyzing the plaintiff's Book of Collectible Accounts particularly page 17 thereof (Exh. "K") this Court is convinced that the entries (both payments and billings) recorded thereat are credible. Undeniably, the book contains a detailed account of SOCOR's commercial transactions with RDC which were entered therein in the course of business. We cannot therefore disregard the entries recorded under Exhibit "K" because the fact of their having been made in the course of business carries with it some degree of trustworthiness. Besides, no proof was ever offered to demonstrate the irregularity of the said entries thus, there is then no cogent reason for us to doubt their authenticity.

ISSUES:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AS ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS THE ENTRIES IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S BOOK OF COLLECTIBLE ACCOUNTS CONSIDERING THAT THE PERSON WHO MADE SAID ENTRIES ACTUALLY TESTIFIED IN THIS CASE BUT UNFORTUNATELY HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF SAID ENTRIES.

II. WHETEHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED AS IT HAS ONLY INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.

RULING:

First. Petitioner contends that the presentation of the delivery receipts duly accepted by the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) is required under the contracts (Exhs. A and B) and is a condition precedent for her payment of the amount claimed by private respondent. Petitioner argues that the entries in private respondent's Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) cannot take the place of the delivery receipts and that such entries are mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible in evidence. 

The question is whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) constitute competent evidence to show such delivery. Private respondent cites Rule 130, §37 of the Rules of Court and argues that the entries in question constitute "entries in the course of business" sufficient to prove deliveries made for the government projects. This provision reads:

Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. 

Second. It is nonetheless argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot be considered an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, §10 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

LIM VS. CA

G.R. No. L-39381 July 18, 1975

FACTS:

In 1962 Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco Miguel Romualdez Uy Chen Hong in the Court of First Instance of Manila for (1) declaration of nullity of the affidavit Uy executed in which he adjudicated to himself, as the only son and heir of Susana Lim, a lot (120 square meters) with the house thereon located at Tayabas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; (2) cancellation of the certificate of title issued in the name of Uy; and (3) issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in her favor.

Both Uy and Felisa Lim claimed they inherited, to the exclusion of each other, the property in question from Susana Lim. Felisa Lim claims to be the natural daughter of Susana Lim. To support her claim, she presented (1) her certificate of baptism, which certificate states that Felisa Lim is the natural daughter of Susana Lim; and (2) her marriage contract, which contract states that Susana Lim gave consent to Felisa Lim's mother. Felisa Lim also alleges continuous possession of the status of a natural child.

On the other hand, Uy claimed to be the only son and heir of Susana Lim. To support his claim, he presented, among others, (1) his application for alien registration in the Bureau of Immigration, which application names Susana Lim as Uy's mother; (2) the order of the Bureau of Immigration cancelling his alien registration, which order describes Uy as a Filipino citizen by derivation from his mother Susana Lim; and (3) his identification certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration, which certificate likewise describes Uy as a citizen of the Philippines by derivation from his mother Susana Lim.

Felisa Lim assails the finding of the appellate court that she "has no right to inherit from Susana Lim, even on the assumption that she is her natural daughter, as she had not been recognized by any of the means provided for by the New Civil Code." Felisa Lim alleges that Susana Lim's consent to her marriage, given pursuant to Act 3613 (The Marriage Law), amounted to an admission and recognition on the part of Susana Lim that she (Felisa) is her natural daughter. Felisa Lim adds that the records in the office of the Local Civil Registrar pertaining to her marriage license, "together with the supporting papers which included the consent given by Susana Lim, were destroyed during the liberation of the City of Manila." However, that Susana Lim gave consent to her marriage, Felisa Lim asserts, the marriage contract evinces. Felisa Lim states that the marriage contract partakes of a public document and thus fulfills the provisions of the old Civil Code (re recognition "in some other public document") and the new Civil Code (re recognition "in any authentic writing").

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage contract partakes of a public document as contemplated by law.

RULING:

At the outset, it should be noted that Felisa Lim claims that her recognition by Susana Lim as her (the latter's) natural child took place in 1943. Since the recognition allegedly took place during the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889, such recognition should be reckoned in accordance with the requisites established by the said Civil Code. For, the law in force at the time of the recognition governs the act of recognition.

Section 131 of the Civil Code of 1889 requires that the recognition of a natural child "be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document." Felisa Lim argues that her marriage contract partakes of a public document.

According to article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, public documents "are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law." Thus, "there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office." "The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class." 

The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a written act with the intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and certified by him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by the said contracting parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the requisites of a public document of recognition. Be it remembered that recognition, under the Civil Code of 1889, "must be precise, express and solemn." 

  PNB VS. CA

G.R. No. L-34404 June 25, 1980

 FACTS:

This case was commenced on May 17, 1954 when herein respondents Pedro, Fernando, Gregorio, Guillermo and Clarita, all surnamed Bitanga, filed a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte against the Philippine National Bank, the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte and Felizardo Reyes, for reconveyance of real property and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of an ex-parte writ of pre injunction restraining and enjoining the PNB and Felizardo Reyes from consummating the sale of the property in question and prohibiting the Register of Deeds from registering the sale in favor of Felizardo Reyes. As prayed for, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. All three of the defendants named in the complaint filed their respective Answers. During the pendency of the case, herein respondent-spouses, Melitona Lagpacan and Jorge Maracas, filed a Motion to admit their complaint in intervention, alleging that they had a legal interest in the subject matter of the case, and the same was granted.

On appeal by PNB and Felizardo Reyes to the Court of Appeals, respondent Court affirmed the judgment appealed from in all respects 

Petitioner also stresses that respondents Bitangas and Rabago filed the complaint for reconveyance and annulment of mortgage on May 17,1954, after nineteen (19) solid years have already elapsed from the time the mortgage was executed on October 20, 1936 by Rosa Ver, and the lot in question had been the subject of several transactions during which time said respondents never did anything in assuming or vindicating their right to institute a suit against the petitioner though with ample opportunity to do so and, therefore, said respondents slept on or neglected in asserting their right, hence they are guilty of laches.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that estoppel and/or laches has not stepped in to defeat the right of respondents Bitanga's and Rabago over the lot in question, specifically to the one-half portion thereof representing their undivided share of the lot as their inheritance from their father Iñigo Bitanga.

RULING:

Petitioner's contention is without merit. First, it must be clarified that not all the respondent heirs signed the mortgage deed as instrumental witnesses. An examination of the mortgage contract (Exhibit "1") that of the five (5) Bitanga respondents, namely, Pedro, Fernando, Gregorio, Guillermo and Clarita only Guillermo Bitanga signed as one of the instrumental witnesses, the first being Mary B. Castillo.

Even as regards Guillermo Bitanga, who signed as witness of the deed of mortgage, PNB's reliance upon the case of Vda de la Cruz vs. Ilagan is unavailing. In the De la Cruz case, the heirs of the decedent, who were the es sought to be estopped from questioning the validity of the sale made by their co-heir and the administrator of the decedent's estate, did not merely sign as witnesses to the deed of sale. In the words of Justice Zaldivar who penned the decision, they "gave their approval and conformity to the made and to the administrator's motion by signing with appropriate expressions both papers." (Cruz vs. Ilagan, 81 Phil. 554, 556). Thus, that the heirs gave their consent to the sale could not be doubted, as in fact it was expressed in words in the deed itself and in the motion submitted to the court for judicial approval of the sale, and on the basis of this express approval and conformity, the Court held them in estoppel and bound as co-vendors. In the instant case, on the other hand, the party sought to be estopped signed merely as an instrumental witness. A distinction should be made, as indeed there is, between one who signs a document merely as an instrumental witness, and one who affixes his signature as proof of his consent to, approval of, and conformity with, the contents of the deed or document. The former simply attests that the party or parties to the instrument signed the same in his presence, so that he is frequently referred to as a "Witness to the signature," and he is not bound to know or be aware of the contents of the document; while the latter is not only presumed to know the subject matter of the deed, but more importantly, binds himself thereto as effectively as the party if would be bound thereby.

The foregoing distinction makes clear the inapplicability of the ruling in Vda de la Cruz vs. Ilagan to the facts obtaining in the case at bar. We cannot hold Guillermo Bitanga in estoppel by declaring that he bound himself to the mortgage as effectively as the mortgagor Rosa Ver when he signed the mortgage deed as a witness in the absence of clear proof that he was in fact aware of the contents of the document at the time of its execution. We can only go as far as stating that the deed was signed by the parties thereto in his presence.

   CHUA VS. CA

G.R. No. 88383 February 19, 1992

FACTS:

On September 1, 1983, respondent State Financing Center, Inc. (State Inc. for brevity) filed a complaint for sum of money with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against AsiaPhil Timber Corporation, Johnny Sy Ping Sing, Delfin S. Lee, Philip Escolin, Lee Chi Uan and petitioner Harris Sy Chua based upon documents attached to the complaint. These documents are the following: 
1) Term Loan Agreement, 2) Promissory note, 3) Comprehensive Surety Agreement dated January 25 and June 19, 1979, 4) Demand letters, and 5) Statement of outstanding past due account as of August 15, 1983.

On November 27, 1984, respondent State Inc. filed a formal offer of exhibits in writing, attaching thereto the documents enumerated therein. Petitioner filed a written opposition thereto alleging that the documents offered in evidence have not been properly presented and identified by any witness during any proceeding before the trial court and considering that the ex parte presentation of evidence against him had already been set aside, there is no more document or testimony that could be taken into account against him.

On March 6, 1985, for failure of petitioner Chua to appear for the presentation of his evidence, the trial court issued an order considering petitioner as having waived his right to present evidence. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision based on the evidence on record.

On June 3, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment holding four of the defendants liable to pay respondent State Inc. but dismissing the complaint against petitioner Chua.

Not satisfied with the portion of the decision absolving petitioner Chua from any liability to respondent State Inc., the latter appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On February 22, 1989, respondent appellate court rendered a decision which reversed the ruling of the trial court.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

I.              Whether or not the appellate court erred in rendering a decision which is not based on the issues raised in the appeal brief of respondent State Inc.

II.            Whether or not  the documentary evidence which were formally offered by private respondent in a written offer of exhibits but which were not properly identified by any witness during the trial cannot be considered as evidence against petitioner in order to hold the latter liable to private respondent.

RULING:

We find the petitioner's contentions devoid of merit.

1.    It is an established rule that pleadings should be construed liberally in order that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities may be avoided (Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 81957, May 23, 1989, 173 SCRA 544). Moreover, issues though not specifically raised in the pleadings in the appellate court, may, in the interest of justice be properly considered by said court in deciding a case, if they are questions raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or the lower court ignored (Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, No. L-48278, November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 16). It is clear from the decision of the respondent appellate court that the latter made a discussion on the respondent's assigned error which was allegedly committed by the trial court. 

2.    Our rule on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary evidence before the court, as follows: firstly, the document should be authenticated and proved in the manner provided in the rules of court; secondly, the document should be identified and marked for identification; and thirdly, it should be formally offered in evidence to the court and shown to the opposing party so that the latter may have an opportunity to object thereon.

The authentication and proof of documents are provided in Sections 20 to 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Only private documents require proof of their due execution and authenticity before they can be received in evidence. This may require the presentation and examination of witnesses to testify on this fact. When there is no proof as to the authenticity of the writer's signature appearing in a private document, such private document may be excluded (General Enterprises, Inc. v. Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., No. L-18487, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 733). On the other hand, public or notarial documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. There is also no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documents the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party. These admissions may be found in the pleadings of the parties or in the case of an actionable document which may arise from the failure of the adverse party to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the document in his pleading.

After the authentication and proof of the due execution of the document, whenever proper, the marking for identification and the formal offer of such documents as evidence to the court follow.

SIAO TICK CHONG VS. REPUBLIC
 G.R. No. L-22151 March 30, 1970

FACTS:

Appeal taken by the Republic of the Philippines from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by the Honorable Agustin P. Montesa, in Civil Case No. 47737, reconsidering its decision of March 14, 1963 and providing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen under the existing laws, for which his petition is hereby granted. The certificate of naturalization, however, shall not issue until after the expiration of the period of two years from and after the date of the promulgation of this decision and only after hearing at which he shall establish the final conditions required for Philippine citizenship.

It appears that appellee, a Chinese citizen, filed a petition for naturalization in the abovementioned court on August 8, 1961. The same was subsequently amended so as to include a statement of the different places in which appellee had resided before the filing of his application.

Appellee filed his declaration of intention with the office of the Solicitor General on June 23, 1960. He also presented as evidence clearances of the City Fiscal, the Court of First Instance and the Municipal Court of Manila, the Bureau of Prisons, the Deportation Board, the Anti-Dummy Board, the Bureau of Immigration, the Municipal Court of Iligan City, the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, the office of the City Fiscal and the Police Department of Iligan City, together with a medical certificate showing that he was not suffering from any incurable contagious disease.

Appellee's character witnesses were Flaviano R. Pacheco and Abelardo J. Basilio, residents of No. 52, 7th Guillermo Avenue, Quezon City, and 17 Regalado St., Parañaque, Rizal, respectively.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the following grounds:

I.THAT PETITIONER IS NOT SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO BECOME A FILIPINO CITIZEN; AND

II.THAT THE WITNESSES TO THE PETITION HAVE NOT PROVED THAT PETITIONER HAS CONDUCTED HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF HIS RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES OR THAT PETITIONER HAS ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS NECESSARY TO BECOME A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND IS NOT IN ANY WAY DISQUALIFIED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW. (p. 13, rec. on appeal).

After appellee had filed a reply, the Court heard the case and on March 14, 1963 rendered a decision denying appellee's petition holding that he is "not qualified to become a Filipino citizen." However, within the reglementary period, appellee filed a motion for reconsideration and for the reopening of the case to enable him to present evidence regarding his sincerity to become a citizen of the Philippines, and to further qualify his character witnesses. In spite of the Government's opposition, the trial court reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and after the reception of additional evidence, issued the order appealed from. Not satisfied with said order, the State interposed the present appeal, claiming that the trial court committed the following errors:

ISSUES:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IS SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO BECOME A FILIPINO CITIZEN.

II.WHETHER OR NOT THE WITNESSES TO THE PETITION ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO VOUCH FOR PETITIONER'S GOOD REPUTATION AND IRREPROACHABLE CONDUCT.

III.WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION.

RULING:

After a careful study of the record, We have come to the conclusion that the order appealed from must be reversed on the strength of the second assignment of error which puts in issue the capacity of appellee's character witnesses "to vouch for petitioner's good reputation and irreproachable conduct."

Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires that the petition for naturalization must be signed by the applicant and be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for a period of time required by law, and that he is a person of good repute and morally irreproachable; that in their opinion petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines.

In as much as the matter of presenting at least "two credible persons" as witnesses is a legal requirement for the sufficiency of petitioner's case, it is clear that it is incumbent upon him to establish affirmatively that his character witnesses are "credible persons" in the sense above indicated. We find that in this connection petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.

With respect to witness Basilio, the record shows that he did not know anything about appellee's reputation in Iligan City because he did not meet him there, most of his meetings with him having taken place in the City of Manila. He also testified that whenever he visited appellee, he went direct to the latter's apartment and had never talked with any of appellee's neighbors regarding his reputation. He also said that he had seen appellee from three to five times on board a ship of the William Lines plying between Cebu and Manila during the period from 1949 to 1953 where he was a purser; that for sometime appellee had resided in Cebu. Appellee's residence in Cebu is not mentioned in his amended petition for naturalization as one of his former residences.

To qualify as a good character witness within the meaning of the law, and for testimony given as such to be sufficient to support the petition for naturalization, one must not be a mere acquaintance of the petitioner but must possess such intimate knowledge of him as to be competent to vouch for his qualifications and his lack of disqualifications (Cuaki Tan Si vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-18006, October 31, 1962; Go vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-18068, October 30, 1962) because he is the insurer of petitioner's character and his testimony is to be heavily relied upon by the courts. Considering that, as shown by the foregoing, the character witnesses of appellee do not satisfy the standard required.

     PEOPLE VS. ZINAMPAN

G.R. No. 126781             September 13, 2000

FACTS:

Before us on appeal is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 02, in Criminal Case No. 1339 convicting herein appellant, Elvis Doca, of the crime of robbery with homicide.

Appellant Elvis Doca and his co-accused, Calixto Zinampan alias Gorio, Artemio Apostol alias Temy, Ignacio Cusipag, Robert Cusipag, Roger Allan and Miguel Cusipag were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information that reads:

That on or about December 8, 1988, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Calixto Zinampan alias Gorio, Artemio Apostol alias Temy, Ignacio Cusipag, Elvis Doca, Robert Cusipag, Roger Allan, and Miguel Cusipag together with one John Doe who was not identified, armed with guns, conspiring together and helping one another went inside the house of one Mr. and Mrs. Henry Narag, and once inside the house, with intent to gain and by the use of force, violence against and intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously ransack the house of the said Mr. and Mrs. Henry Narag and after which, take, steal and carry away against the will of the owner.

Accused Robert Cusipag, Ignacio Cusipag and Miguel Cusipag were arrested by the police on February 6, 1990; while accused Elvis Doca was arrested on February 14, 1990. Accused Calixto Zinampan, Artemio Apostol and Roger Allan were never arrested and remain at large up to the present.

Upon being arraigned on May 29, 1990, accused Robert Cusipag, Ignacio Cusipag, Miguel Cusipag and Elvis Doca, assisted by their counsel, separately entered the plea of "not guilty" to the information in this case.

Appellant Elvis Doca contends that the testimony of Marlyn Calaycay was marked with infirmities and material contradictions hence, unreliable. Specifically, Elvis pointed out the following alleged material inconsistencies in her testimony: 1) Marlyn gave conflicting dates with respect to the execution of her sworn statement before the police authorities of Tuguegarao, Cagayan involving the robbery and killing of Henry Narag on December 8, 1988; 2) The pertinent entry in the police blotter of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for the period of December 1988 allegedly provided by Marlyn Calaycay does not reflect any names of the alleged perpetrators of the crime contrary to the claim of Marlyn in her testimony that she knew the names of the malefactors even prior to December 8, 1988 when the incident happened; and 3) Marlyn gave perjured testimony when she retracted on cross examination her testimony on direct examination that accused Manuel Cusipag, Ignacio Cusipag and Robert Cusipag remained outside the house of Henry Narag while the crime was in progress to serve as look out.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING DUE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION ALLEGED LONE EYEWITNESS DESPITE ITS INHERENT INFIRMITIES AND MATERIAL CONTRADICTION AND UNRELIABILITY.

RULING:

The appellant may not validly impeach the credibility of Marlyn Calaycay on the basis of the entry in the police blotter of the Tuguegarao, Cagayan police pertaining to the robbery and killing on December 8, 1988. Appellant claimed that the pertinent entry in the said police blotter which was elicited from prosecution witness Calaycay does not reflect any names of the alleged perpetrators of the crime contrary to her testimony during the trial of the instant criminal case that she knew the names of the malefactors even prior to December 8, 1988. In impeaching a witness by evidence of prior inconsistent statements, Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

SEC. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.

It has been held that previous inconsistent statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given the opportunity to explain them.

It would be unjust to complainant at this stage to be declared an incredible witness as a result of the unauthorized procedure adopted by the appellant. It is evidentiarily proscribed to discredit a witness on the basis of the purportedly prior inconsistent statements which were not called to the attention of that witness during the trial, although the same are supposedly contained in a document which was merely offered and admitted in its entirety without the requisite specifications.

Unless expressly required by law, the testimony of a single witness, if found credible and positive such as in the case at bench, is sufficient to convict for the truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies.

ONG VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-10642 May 30, 1958

FACTS:

This is an appeal, taken by the Office of the Solicitor General from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, granting the petition for naturalization of appellee Alfredo Ong.

Primo Alvez and Miguel Relampagos were the two affiants whose affidavits were attached to the petition.

Said affidavits were signed by Primo Alvez and Miguel Relampagos. The former, said:

1. That I am a citizen of the Philippines;

2. That I had been a member of the Police Force of the City of Cebu before the war and at present, an attorney at law;

3. That I have known Alfredo Ong since he first came to live in this province; and during the entire period that I have known him, if always know him to be a hardworking, law-abiding and highly respected person, who can be considered a credit of the community in which he lives.

Relampagos stated:

1. That I am a citizen of the Philippines, residing in the above mentioned address.

2. That I am an Accountant by profession.

3. That I personally know Alfredo Ong for many years. He is a man of good moral character, honest, and law-abiding person.\

ISSUE:

Whether or not the two affiants satisy the requirements required by law as credible persons as far as naturalization is concerned.

RULING:

No. Section 7, of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides that every petition for naturalization: (a) "must be . . . supported by the affidavit of at least two (2) credible persons", (b) "stating that they are citizens of the Philippines" and (c) "personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act" and (d) "a person of good repute" and (e) "morally irreproachable", and (f) "that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines" and (g) "is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act."

A perusal of the above-quoted affidavits readily reveals that the same fail to live up to the requirements of said section 7, in that the affidavits do not state: (1) that the affiants personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by the Naturalization Law; (2) that petitioner and appellee is morally irreproachable; (3) that he has all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines; (4) that he is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of our Naturalization Law; and (5) that Relampagos personally knows petitioner to be a person of good repute.

As already adverted to, the petitioner must be sponsored by "credible" citizens, who are willing to warrant his fitness. Indeed, one who can not find two (2) such persons to back him up, must be "unwelcome" to our citizenry, and should not be admitted as a regular or full member of our democratic society, governed as it is by the majority rule.

Similarly, when the law ordains that certain specified statements be made in said affidavits, it follows, as an inevitable corrollary, that those statements must be established, on the witness stand, by the testimony of the affiants themselves. In other words, petitioner must prove by the testimony of, at least, two (2) credible persons, whose affidavits are attached to the petition:

1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;

2. That they are "credible persons";

3. That they personally know the petitioner;

4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by law;

5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;

6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;

7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines; and

8. That he "is not any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law.

It is not disputed that Alvez and Relampagos are Filipinos. However, we are not prepared to say — without the slightest intent to cast any aspersion upon them — that they have been proven to be "credible persons". 

SISON VS. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995

FACTS:

 Several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo.

The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.

The trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance. 

Hence, this petition.

One of the issues raised by the petitioner is that the Ca erred in admitting the photographs which were not properly identified.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in admitting the photographs which were not proprly identified.

RULING:

The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced.The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. 

This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used the photographs to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. 

The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. 

An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the 
victim. Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and Banculo.

MATIAS VS. SALUD

G.R. No. L-10907 June 29,1957

FACTS:

Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition for the probate of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel. Aurea Matias, likewise, appointed therein as executrix thereof, without bond. Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate of her alleged will, and, after appropriate proceedings, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued an order, dated February 8, 1956, sustaining said opposition and denying the petition for probate. Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter on appeal to this Court (G.R. No. L-10751), where it is now pending decision.

The document consist of 3 pages and it seems that after the attestation clause, there appears the siganture of the testatrix 'Gabina Raquel', alongside is a smudged in violet ink claimed by the proponents as the thumbmark allegedly affixed by the tetratrix. On the third page at the end of the attestation clause appears signatures on the left margin of each page, and also on the upper part of each left margin appears the same violet ink smudge accompanied by the written words 'Gabina Raquel' with 'by Lourdes Samonte' underneath it.

The probate was opposed by Basilia Salud, the niece of the decedent.

The CFI of cavite denied the probate on the ground that the attestation clause did not state that the testatrix and the witnesses signed each and every page nor did it express that Lourdes was specially directed to sign after the testatrix.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the thumbprint was sufficient compliance with the law despite the absence of a description of such in the attestation clause.

RULING:

The absence of the description on the attestation clause that another person wrote the testatrix' name  at her request is not a fatal defect. The legal requirement only ask that it be signed by the testator, a requirement satisfied by a thumbprint or other mark affixed by him.

Where a testator employs an unfamiliar way of signing and that both the attestation clause and the will are silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to be considered against the authenticity of the testament. However, the failure to describe the signature itself alone is not sufficient to refuse probate when evidence fully satisfied that the will was executed and witnessed in accordance with law.