dagpin digest

Valmonte vs Belmonte

 FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest."

 ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.

 HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

Legaspi Vs CSC

 FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

 ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department employees

 HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies

Feria vs CA

Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the judgment, was lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.

The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.

Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.

In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.

Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal records.

Held:  Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Prior to this in 1981 the accused was charged of Robbery with homicide. that after four years of trial the court found the accused guilty and given a life sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985 petitioner’s declaration as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under section 23 of rule 130 of the rules of court  It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Petitioner’s claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.

When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.

Lim vs Court of Appeals

Facts: On 25 November 1987, private-respondent filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia, before, during, after the marriage, and until the present.

Private respondent’s counsel presented 3 witnesses, one of whom was the chief of the female services of the National Mental Hospital. Petitioner’s counsel filed an opposition alleging that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witnesses is privileged since the latter had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.

Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that the witness would be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity. The lower court and CA denied the motion and allowed the witness to testify as an expert witness.

Issue: Whether or not an attending physician is qualified to be an expert witness, without violating the physician-patient privileged communication rule.

Held: the statutory physician-patient privilege, through duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical or mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his professional knowledge he may have concerning such patient. The physician must base his opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient acquired through the physician-and-patient relationship. If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge of the patient’s condition he should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion. An opinion of the expert witness is not binding with the court but it is only persuasive.

Estrada vs Desierto

FACTS:

The court looked at the events that occurred prior and immediately after the oath-taking of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as president of the Republic of the Philippines.

On May 11, 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada was elected as President of RP with GMA as his vice-President. By the late 2000, words spread of Erap’s alleged involvement in jueteng and his receiving jueteng money as “Jose Pidal”. Erap quickly loses popularity among different social groups and public officials, even high ranking members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), started defecting from his agendas. And because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding started on  December7, 2000. Upon its resumption in January, however, a vote of 11-10 against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with P3.3billion in secret bank account cut short the impeachment trial as prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying of people in the streets of Manila.

Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not to run as candidate, to regain stability in the country but such a move did little to quell the “wave” against him. Two rounds of negotiations were held between Erap’s camp and that of GMA in the early hours of 20 January 2001 and at 12nn of the same day, GMA took her oath as RP president. Both houses of Congress acknowledged her presidency, as well as the international community. Erap, on the other hand, left Malacanang and is now faced with legal action against him by the Office of the Ombudsman among other things.

Issue:  Whether the Angara Diary is inadmissible for being violative of the following rules on evidence: Hearsay, Best Evidence, Authentication, admissions and Res inter Alios Acta.

Held: The use of the Angara Diary did not violate the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of  Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29 of rule 130  with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. Executive Secretary angara as such was an alter ego of the Petitioner. He eas the little President indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned malacanang palace. Thus according to the angara diary, the petitioner told secretary angara: “ Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, Ikaw nalang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin “ This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after secretary angara briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave malacanang after taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 pm. The angara diary quotes the petitioner as saying to secretary angara “ ed, Do I have to leave now?” secretary angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that secretary angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The diary shows that petitioner was always briefed by secretary angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as president. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.

Under our rules of evidence, admission of an agent Secretary Angara are binding on the principal ( Petitioner Estrada)  reasons for the rule “ what is done by agent, is done by the principal through him as through a mere instrument. So whatever is said by an agent either in making a contract for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is, in legal effect said by his principal and admissible in evidence against the principal.

BANCO FILIPINO vs. PURISIMA

FACTS: Caturla, special agent of the Bureau of Customs, was accused by BIR before the Tanodbayan of having allegedly acquired property manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income, in violation of the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.”

In the course of the preliminary investigation thereof, the Tanodbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, commanding its representative to appear at the Office of the Tanodbayan and furnish the latter with duly certified copies of the records of the loans, savings and time deposits and other banking transactions appearing in the names of Caturla, his wife, their children and friends .

Caturla moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum arguing that compliance therewith would result in a violation of Sections 2 and 3 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits. Then Tanodbayan not only denied the motion for lack of merit, and directed compliance with the subpoena, but also expanded its scope through a second and third subpoena duces tecum,

BF Bank took over from Caturla in the effort to nullify the subpoenae. It filed a complaint for declaratory relief with the CFI of Manila, praying for a judicial declaration as to whether its compliance with the subpoenae duces tecumwould constitute an infringement of the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 1405 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. It also asked that pending final resolution of the question, the Tanodbayan be provisionally restrained from exacting compliance with the subpoenae.

Respondent Judge Purisima issued an Order denying for lack of merit the application by BF Bank for a preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.

This Order is now impugned in the instant certiorari action instituted by BF Bank before this Court, as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:  whether or not the “Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits”  precludes production by subpoena duces tecum of bank records of transactions by or in the names of the wife, children and friends of the accused

HELD: NO. The instant petition for certiorari must fail. The provisions of R.A. No. 1405 subject of BF’s declaratory action, read as follows:

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office,except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of litigation.

In Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco, we upheld the judgment of the Trial Court “sustaining the power of the defendants (special prosecutors of the Department of Justice) to compel the disclosure (by PNB) of bank accounts of ACCFA Administrator Jimenez (then under investigation for unexplained wealth), .. (it being ruled) that, by enacting section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Congress clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits ..

xxx

… while Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are “absolutely confidential .. and [therefore] may not be examined, inquired or looked into,” except in those cases enumerated therein, the Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits “shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.” The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank desposits.

People vs Agustin

Facts: In rape cases, if the testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted solely on that basis. Conchito Agustin (Agustin), uncle within the third civil degree of the offended party, AAA, a twelve year old minor, was convicted for two counts of qualified rape before the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan. On appeal, Agustin denied the allegation by stating an alibi that he was away from hishouse and was at his farm to supervise the planting of rice. He further contends it was thus impossible for him to have raped AAA at the unfinished house.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals in convicting appellant fortwo (2) counts of rape must be upheld base solely on the testimony of the victim

Held: In rape cases, if the testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted solely on that basis. The testimony of the young victim is entitled to full credence for no young and decent Filipina would publicly admit that she was ravished unless that is the truth because her natural instinct is to protect her honor.
The testimony of AAA as regards to the two (2) counts of rape was subjected by the Court to the minutest of scrutiny. As to her testimony regarding the July 7, 2001 sexual assault, the Court finds no reason to disbelieve AAA when she claims that she was forcibly deflowered Agustin in the second floor of the lattershouse at Mungo, Tuao, Cagayan. There appears no plausible reason for the young victim to falsely charge the accused who is her uncle-in-law, with rape. Thus, in the absence of any showing of an illicit motive to falsely impute so grievous a crime as qualified rape against the herein accused, the testimony of the young victim is entitled to full credence for no young and decent Filipinawould publicly admit that she was ravished unless that is the truth because her natural instinct is to protect her honor.
However, while the Court affirms Agustin‘s conviction for two counts of rape, the evidence points to only simple, not qualified rape. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, rape is qualified when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, in which case the death penalty should be imposed. The relationship of the accused to the victim cannot be established by meretestimony or even by the accused‘s very own admission of such relationship.