napigquit digest

G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999

ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, petitioners, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DRA. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents

FACTS:

Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaint of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of the stone in her gall bladder. Because of discomfort which interfered her normal ways, she was advised to undergo an operation. However, on her scheduled gall bladder operation in the Delos Santos Medical Center, she sustained brain damage from wrongful intubation by her anesthesiologist Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Petitioners filed an action for damages and presented the testimony of Herminda Cruz, her sister in law, Dean of the College of Nursing in the same institution, who was in the operating room right beside her when the tragic event occurred. It was rebutted that Cruz is not competent to testify since she is not an anesthesiologist, therefore she had no expertise in the matter at hand.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY IS NECESSARY IN DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICES WHEN THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR IS APPLICABLE

RULING:

No. Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suit to prove that a physician has done a negligent act, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor ( “the thing speaks for itself”) is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negilence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to such matters clearly within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated and operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care, However, testimonies as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances and manifest conditions which are observable by anyone may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where res ipsa loquitor is applicable, the court is permitted to find the physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that a patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care.

G.R. No. L-14148             February 25, 1960

ALFREDO PUA, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
EULOGIO LAPITAN, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

Eugelio Lapitan filed an action against Alfredo Pua for specific performance and for damages alleging that the latter, by the use of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, caused the former to sign a document which purported to be a lease agreement when their true understanding is that they would enter into a partnership contract, and that by reason thereof, Lapitan and his family suffered mental anguish, wounded their feelings, besmirched their reputation in the community, and consequently  suffered moral damages.

Pua answered the complaint denying the allegations against him, and as a counterclaim, alleged that "as a result of the unjustified and unwarranted filing of the complaint by the plaintiff, suffered mental torture and anguish, his reputation having been adversely affected, thereby suffering in the form of moral damages.

The trial court rendered judgement in favor of Lapitan but the Court of Appeals reversed the the judgement. The court, however, did not make any mention of the counterclaim of Pua. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THE TRIAL COURT WHERE A COUNTERCLAIM WAS ALREADY IN ISSUE, WHICH IS THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT ACTION, HAS THE EFFECT OF A PRIOR JUDGEMENT IN THE PRESENT CASE UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA

RULING:

YES. It is a rule that a judgment between the same parties is conclusive, not only as to the subject-matter in controversy in the action involving the same question, but upon all matters involved in the issues which might have been litigated and decided in the case, the presumption being that all such issues were met and decided. It is the policy of the law to put an end to litigation, and to aid the vigilant and not those who sleep upon their rights. It is not the policy of the law to allow a new and different suit between the same parties, concerning the same subject-matter, that has already been litigated; neither will the law allow the parties to trifle with the courts by piecemeal litigation.

It is clear that an adjudication is finally conclusive not only as to the matter actually determined, but as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated and have had decided incident to or essentially connected with the subject-matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action, both with respect to matter of claim and of defense. The purpose of this ruling is to avoid multiplicity of actions.

 [G.R. No. 138961.  March 7, 2002]

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.

FACTS:

William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case which is an action for compulsory recognition as “the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao” against herein respondents. The complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner “was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao,” petitioner having been “recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.

Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo(her husband) for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao (who was also legally married) from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. Accordingly, the latter had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt acts. Several witnesses were presented to support such claim including the legitimate child of Corazon who further testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and separated from his family.

Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story. Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.^[16] Linda grew up and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court

It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues which relate solely to the sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?

RULING:

NO. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs and not by any other persons. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.

  

G.R. No. L-41166 August 25, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AMELIA K. DEL ROSARIO and DIONISIO CERBO,Petitioners, vs. HON NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and GREGORIO OJOY respondents

Facts:

In Criminal Case No. 2891, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gregorio Ojoy, accused", of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, after the accused himself had testified in his defense, his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other matters pertinent and material to the case. Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the petitioners here, objected to the proposed procedure but this notwithstanding, respondent Judge gave his conformity thereto and subsequently issued the questioned Order. Contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires that the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners instituted the present petition

 

Issue: 

Did the judge’s orders violate Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which requires that testimony of witnesses be given orally in open court?

Held:

Yes. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly require that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. The essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. Cross-examination cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. Personal appearance of the witness before the judge also enables the judge as the trier of facts, to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. Indeed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based upon his having had just that opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses.

Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule requires that in determining the superior weight of evidence on the issues involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein enumerated, may consider the "witness manner of testifying" which can only be done if the witness gives his testimony orally in open court". If a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the conclusion of the trial, with the evidence and his impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is much more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply reviews the evidence from a typewritten transcript, without having had the opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions and utterances of the witnesses.

PEOPLE VS CASINILLO  GR no. 97441 September 11, 1992

FACTS:

The accused DOMINGO CASINILLO was guilty for the crime of rape. On appeal, accused-appellant  raised several issues. He interposed the defense of alibi in that at the day said crime was allegedly committed, he was in his house together with his wife and son. Appellant insisted that the offended party was not able to positively identify him as evidenced by entries in the Police Blotter which show that the persons who committed the crime of rape were wearing masks of white cloth. Appellant also questions the three (3) police "lineups" of the four (4) accused on the ground that the same were conducted without the assistance of counsel; moreover, the accused were not informed of their right to counsel. Finally, he maintains that the prosecution deliberately failed to the police officer who led the police team that effected the arrest, and barangay captain.

ISSUES:

What is then in issue in this appeal is the credibility of the offended party

RULING:

1. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; BASIC PRINCIPLES IN REVIEWING RAPE CASES. — Thus, this Court has set three (3) basic guiding principles in reviewing rape cases: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two (2) persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

2. CONVICTION; ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY OF GUILT NOT DEMANDED BY LAW; ONLY MORAL CERTAINTY IS REQUIRED. — Absolute certainty of guilt is not, however, demanded by law for a conviction. The sphere of criminal law does not call for such degree of proof as would exclude the possibility of error. Only moral certainty as to the presence of the elements, constituting the offense, as well as to the identity of the offender, is required; in short, what is needed is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged: that not only did he perpetrate the act, but that it amounted to a crime. The strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment; if a reasonable doubt exists, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused and he must be acquitted.

3. APPELLANT’S GUILT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE CONVINCING AND CREDIBLE. — Guided by the foregoing principles, this Court undertook a careful and meticulous review, analysis and evaluation of the evidence in this case and reached the inevitable conclusion that the appellant’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The findings of fact of the trial court are supported by convincing and credible evidence upon which Our minds can rest unburdened by any doubt. The said court has not overlooked any fact of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of this case. We find then no reason to disturb such findings. This is a settled rule in this jurisdiction.

4. OFFENDED PARTY POSSIBILITY IDENTIFIED APPELLANT. — In the instant case, the offended party positively recognized the appellant from the time he and his companions barged into the kitchen which was then well lit. His face was exposed from the time he dragged her out of the house to the time he raped her by the bushes and brought her back to the house. Hence, the appellant was not only clearly and unmistakably seen in the vicinity of the crime, he was also positively identified by the offended party as her assailant and ravager. Aside from the fact that her testimony is full of sincerity and candor, there is absolutely no proof that she was improperly motivated to testify against the Appellant.

5. POLICE BLOTTER; NOT NECESSARILY ENTITLED TO FULL CREDIT; REASONS. — Appellant’s reliance on the police blotter deserves nothing more than the scantest consideration. In the first place," [t]he entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestion or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject." In the second place, the entries relied upon by the appellant are sadly wanting in material particulars; this clearly shows that no effort at all was exerted by the policeman on duty to accurately obtain the facts of the reported crime. Thirdly, as indicated therein, it is not the offended party, but rather her mother Consolacion, who is alleged to have personally made the report. Fourthly, there is no evidence that the entries were read to the offended party or that they were presented to her. Not having been entered by her and there being no sufficient showing that she actively participated in their preparation, these entries cannot fairly or logically bind her.

6. POLICE LINEUPS; NOT ENCOMPASSED IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST TESTIMONIAL COMPULSION AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL. — The grievance concerning the police lineups is misplaced. The trial court’s finding as to the identification of the accused did not even consider the said lineups. Moreover, in People v. Olvis, this Court ruled, in effect, that a police lineup is not encompassed in the Constitutional right against testimonial compulsion and the right to counsel. Thus: ". . . an act, whether testimonial or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition of the Constitution. This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test to extract virus from body, or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his mouth, or making her submit to a pregnancy test, or a footprinting test, or requiring him to take part in a police lineup in certain cases. In each case, the accused does not speak his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with the guiding hand of counsel."cralaw virtua1aw library

7. ALIBI; MUST BE PRESENTED WITH STRONG CORROBORATION; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF AN ACCUSED. — As to appellant’s defense of alibi, We have time and again ruled that the same remains to be a patently weak defense when corroborated only by the testimony of the accused’s spouse or parents who would naturally be expected to give statements that would free their spouse or son from criminal liability. For alibi to be acceptable, it must be presented with strong corroboration for it is inherently weak and easily fabricated. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of an accused.

8. DELIBERATELY SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE; SECTION 3 (e), RULE 131 DOES NOT APPLY IF THE EVIDENCE CLAIMED TO BE SUPPRESSED IS MERELY CORROBORATIVE OR IS EQUALLY AVAILABLE TO THE ACCUSED. — Equally without merit is appellant’s contention that the prosecution deliberately suppressed evidence by not presenting P/Sgt. Arnold Malintad and Barangay Captain Patricio Cabingatan. The suggested reason, of course, is obvious - their testimonies would have been adverse to the prosecution if produced. This rule, embodied in Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, does not apply if the evidence claimed to be suppressed is merely corroborative, or is equally available to the accused because in the latter case, the evidence would have the same weight against one party as against the other. In the instant case, the testimonies of Malintad and Cabingatan would have been merely corroborative; furthermore, there is no showing at all that they were not available to the appellant even through compulsory process.

G.R. No. L-101003 March 24, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JONATHAN BARLIS Y MERCADO, FERDINAND DOE and EDUARDO DOE, accused. JONATHAN BARLIS Y MERCADO,Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

The above named accused was charged for the crime of robbery with homicide. Trial proceeded against Jonathan Barlis only because the two other accused remained at large. The prosecution presented witnesses one of which is the house helper who witnessed the crime. She was able to identify Jonathan "because he is tall and had no hat. Another was presented who was the uncle of the accused, a policeman, to whom the accused surrendered and accordingly, made a confession (extrajudicial confession).On the part of the accused, he surrendered because he is innocent and his witnesses tried to corroborate such alibi. The trial court rendered a judgment oof conviction finding jonathan barlis guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI RAISED BY THE ACCUSEDirtual law library

2.  WHETHER OR NOT THE PROSECUTION WILFULLY SUPRESSED THE EVIDENCE

3  WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED JONATHAN BARLIS OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE BASED ON EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION

RULING:

1.We have ruled time and again that alibi is a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. The appellant's defense of alibi was rightly rejected by the trial court not only because it was belied by his sworn statement (Exhibit "B") but also because he was positively identified by Adela Argate. The appellant admitted in his sworn statement that he was one of three persons who entered the house of HonorinA. Adela Argate positively identified the appellant as one of the three persons who entered the house of the victim which had a sufficient illumination inside the house when they entered it.

2.The appellant's claim that the prosecution suppressed evidence is without merit. It was not necessary for the prosecution to present Adela Argate's statement before the police authorities since Adela Argate was herself presented as a witness and the prosecution had explained that it opted not to present such statement because the same was not sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oaths. ²⁴ Moreover, the defense had access to a copy of such statement and even marked it as its Exhibit "2." The presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced ²⁵ does not apply where the evidence is available to the accused. Furthermore, the defense did not comply with Section 13, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ²⁷ in attempting to impeach Adela's credibility by evidence of a prior inconsistent statement (Exhibit "2"). In this case, while Adela was cross-examined by the counsel for the appellant, she was never confronted regarding her alleged inconsistent statements in Exhibit 2.

3.rt The prosecution failed to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of the appellant on the robbery with evidence of corpus delicti. In short, the robbery was not conclusively proved.To sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. ³²The taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things are the essential elements of robbery. ³³ There is robbery with homicide when by reason or on occasion of a robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of person, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.alAs shown above, the only evidence of the taking of the personal property of the victim is the extrajudicial confession of the appellant. Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, "an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti." Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. ³⁵ It is made up of two elements: 
(a) that a certain result has been proved, for example, a man has died or a building has been burned; and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act. ³⁶ Section 3, Rule 133 does not mean that every element of the crime charged must be clearly established by independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession law library

[G.R. Nos. 115338-39.  September 16, 1997] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario.  In addition, she was indicted for estafa by means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan alone.

A judgment was rendered by said court convicting appellant of both crimes as charged. In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court adopted a previous decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa involving the same circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa.   In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the court adopted the facts and conclusions established in the estafa decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale for the conviction in the case before it.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ADOPTION OF THE TRIAL COURT OF THE FACTS STATED IN THE DECISION OF THE PARAÑAQUE TRIAL COURT FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION AS THE EXCEPTION CONTEMPLATED BY LAW PURSUANT TO SEC. 47 OF RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT

RULING:

NO. Under the law, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation. This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious (section 47 of Rule 130). Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts stated in the decision of the Parañaque trial court does not fall under the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments. In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case.  Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale was the previous decision in the estafa case. A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. ^[30] It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision is hearsay.  To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB respondent.G.R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999

FACTS:

Respondent Hubbert Webb, an accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide, filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition, to take the testimonies of some vital witnesses residing in the U.S., before the proper Philippine consular authorities since the Philippine court had no jurisdiction over them and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify. Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly ‘material and indispensable’ to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court. The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion averring that Rule 24, Section 4 of the Rules of Court has no application in criminal cases. The trial court denied the motion but was thereafter reversed by the COA on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which would be used in the criminal case before her Court

HELD:

NO. As defined, a deposition is the testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories, not in open court, but in pursuance of a commission to take testimony issued by court, or under a general law or court rule on the subject, and reduce to writing and duly authenticated, and intended to be used in preparation and upon the trial of a civil or a criminal prosecution. A pretrial discovery device by which one party (through his or her attorney) ask oral questions of the other party or of a witness  for the other party. The purpose of which are to give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury, expedite litigation, safeguard against suprises, prevent delay and etc. A deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice — particularly on the defense of alibi, which is respondent's main defense in the criminal proceedings against him in the court below — states that when a person intends to rely on such a defense, that person must move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for filing a pre-trial motion.

It need not be overemphasized that the foregoing factual circumstances only; serves to underscore the immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying respondent's motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record. Grave abuse of discretion ". . . implies such capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of Law.