bagarinao digests

BACOBO v. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 576 (1990)

FACTS:

Petitioner Daniel T. Bocobo and private respondent Luisito M. Reyes were candidates for Governor in the Province of Marinduque in the 1988 elections. Reyes won with a margin of 3,145 over Bocobo, who in due time filed an election protest with the Commission on Elections. The Third Division dismissed the protest which was affirmed by the COMELEC en banc in its resolution dated June 24, 1990, denying the protestant’s motion for reconsideration. Bocobo then came to the Court in this petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion to the public respondent. Petitioner maintains that he was denied due process when certain ballots protested by him were admitted by the public respondent without giving him an opportunity to support his objections.

ISSUE:

Whether evidence aliunde is necessary to prove that a ballot is marked?

RULING:

No. The ballots are the best evidence of the objections raised. Handwriting experts, while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting; this can be done by the COMELEC itself. We have ruled that evidence aliunde is not allowed to prove that a ballot is marked, an inspection of the ballot itself being sufficient (Penson v. Parungao, 52 Phil. 718). As for the allegedly fake ballots, no better authority than the COMELEC itself can determine their authenticity, having itself ordered and supervised the printing of all the official ballots. Hence, the petitioner’s objection should not have been summarily rejected for lack of such evidence. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.

PEOPLE v. PADERO, 226 SCRA 810 (1993)

FACTS:

In a complaint  filed on 21 January 1992 with Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Negros Oriental and docketed therein Criminal Case No. 741-B, Jocelyn Cadeliña, a sixteen-year-old lass and a resident of sitio Amalao, barangay Tagpo of Bais City, charged Henry Padero, her uncle-in-law, with the crime of rape committed. A plea of not guilty having been entered by the accused. The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Jocelyn Cadeliña and Cherryl Palacios for its evidence in chief, and Clara Cadeliña, Rev. Lemuel Felecio, and Damiana Cadeliña on rebuttal. The accused took the witness stand in his defense and presented Loreta Samane, Elsa Garcia, Macrina Padero, and Marietta Padero as his witnesses.

Despite the positive testimony of the accused which squarely traversed the complainant's version of force or intimidation by stating that he and the complainant had an intimate relationship, with the latter as the more aggressive partner, and that their first sexual encounter in August of 1991 was followed by fifteen more encounters at the same place during week-ends when the complainant was alone, all of which were new facts, the complainant was never recalled to the witness stand to rebut these obviously damaging revelations of the accused. The trial court convicted the accused giving full faith and credit to the version of the complainant who it said testified "with sincerity, honesty and candidness and with answers direct to the point, in a logical and straightforward manner, and free from inconsistencies." The accused seasonably appealed from the judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether the act of the prosecution of not recalling the private complainant to rebut the testimonies of the accused engenders doubt as to the credibility of said private complainant?

RULING:

Yes. The function of the rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adversary. Its office is "to meet the new facts put in by the opponent in his case in reply" and is "necessary only because, on a plea in denial, new subordinate evidential facts have been offered, or because, on an affirmative plea, its substantive facts have been put forward, or because, on any issue whatever, facts discrediting the proponent's witnesses have been offered." While the presentation of rebuttal evidence is discretionary with the prosecution in a criminal action, in the instant case, the overwhelming import of the new facts disclosed by the accused which have a damaging effect on the complainant's version made it imperative for the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence. Relegating the complainant to the background and presenting other witnesses to rebut minor or trivial matters brought out in the evidence in chief for the defense engender serious doubts on the integrity of her story.

PEOPLE v. DEKINGCO, 189 SCRA 512 (1990)

FACTS:

            In an information dated September 30, 1988 and filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, at Kalibo, Aklan, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 4 (Sale of Prohibited Drugs) and Section 8 (Possession of Prohibited Drugs) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972”. Appellant, through counsel, offered to plead guilty to a violation of the aforesaid Section 8 of the law, but the said offer was not accepted by the prosecution hence appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Barangay Captain Allen Alcedo, Sgt. Dionisio Magwale, Forensic Chemist P/Lt. Zenaida Sinfuego and T/Sgt. Rizaldo Labitan, Jr. The defense consists of the testimonies of appellant himself and his cousin, Alejandro Aquino, and are limited to denials of the charges. After trial, judgment was rendered finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs. Hence, this present appeal. He disputes the report of P/Lt. Zenaida Sinfuego as unreliable, it having emanated from a person whose expertise on prohibited drugs has allegedly not been adequately established.

ISSUE:

WON P/Lt. Zenaida Sinfuego lacks the necessary knowledge to qualify as an expert in the field subject of her testimony?

RULING:

            No. This submission is untenable. The rule is that an expert must have made the subject upon which he gives his opinion a matter of particular study, practice, or observation, and he must have particular and special knowledge on the subject. However, there is no exact standard by which to determine the degree of skill or knowledge which a witness must possess in order that he may testify as an expert.

We are satisfied that the unrebutted recital of P/Lt. Sinfuego's qualifications and duties as a forensic chemist since 1980, her having conducted professional examination of marijuana leaves in more than a thousand cases, and her explanation of the procedure followed in examining the drugs in question resulting in her official conclusion bespeak sufficient expertise on her part and warrant judicial acceptance of her testimony.

CLAVERIAS v. QUINCO, 207 SCRA 66 (1992)

FACTS:

            The original complaint in Civil Case No. 615, an action instituted by petitioner against private respondents for annulment of title and reconveyance with damages involving more than fifteen (15) hectares designated as Lot No. 737 of the Himamaylan Cadastre located at Himamaylan, Negros Occidental. It is alleged therein that Lot No. 737 was originally decreed and registered in the names of petitioner Teodora Claverias and her brother Federico. The latter died unmarried and without any issue, leaving Sinforosa as his only heir. They also alleged that the owner's copy of the original certificate of title was lost during the last world war. However, after the war, private respondent Adoracion Quingco, taking advantage of plaintiff's illiteracy, had the original title reconstructed in the name of petitioner Claverias and her deceased brother.

Thereafter, through fraud, Quingco had the said title cancelled and obtained a new certificate in her name. Subsequently, in connivance with private respondent Tongson, she executed a fictitious and simulated deed of sale of Lot No. 737 in favor of the latter and, by virtue thereof, a new transfer certificate of title was issued in Tongson's name. Subsequently, through force and intimidation, Tongson succeeded in evicting petitioner and her mother from the premises which they had been occupying until then. The trial court overruled the theory of fraud relied upon by petitioner on the ground that the facts established do not support it. It then held that the petitioner and her mother had in fact twice sold the property in question to Venancia Alarcon de Quingco, mother of respondent Adoracion Quingco, as evidenced by Exhibits "17" and "18" Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter sustained the trial court and affirmed its decision. The motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision having been denied for lack of merit in the 17 February 1987 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, petitioner took this present recourse. He contended that respondent court erred by not finding that exhibits. "17" and "18" being merely true copies of the alleged original and under the law the documents are not admissible as evidence.

ISSUE:

            Whether exhibits "17" and "18" being merely true copies of the alleged original, not the best evidence, and under the law the documents are not admissible as evidence?

RULING:

            Yes. Exhibits “17” and “18” are not the best evidence and under the law the documents are not admissible as evidence. Exhibit "17" is not the best evidence and should have been rejected because the grounds for non-production of the original deed of sale under Section 3, in relation to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, were not duly established. Said sections provide:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5 When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Private respondents failed to present the original deed of sale and do not claim that they did. No justification has been adduced to show why they could not produce the original or the duplicate originals thereof. Indeed, serious doubts surrounds the existence of said deed of sale. Moreover, there is no showing that the same had been registered. The reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-7111 (17502) does not carry any entry regarding the said sale.

On the other hand, Exhibit "18" is not a deed of sale. It is but a certification of an entry in the notarial register of notary public Vallejera. The certification states that "no copy of the above-mentioned document has been received by this office for file." It was, therefore, erroneous for both the trial and the respondent appellate courts to declare that it is a deed of sale. While the certification may be taken as evidence that sometime in the past the notary public did make that entry in his notarial book, the entry is neither a substitute for the document, nor the best evidence thereof. In this regard, private respondents again failed to show why they could not produce the best evidence. The testimony of the notary public that the document was acknowledged before him was insufficient to prove the contents thereof. We also note that aside from the fact that this so-called sale was not registered, no entry relating thereto appears in the reconstituted Original Certificate of Title.

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. CA, 201 SCRA 165 (1991)

FACTS:

            From the decision rendered by respondent court dated November 27, 1989, declaring respondent Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) as the registered owner of the disputed parcel of land, petitioner Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (Widora), interposes this petition for review seeking to annul the aforesaid judgment and prays that the case be remanded to the trial court and there be tried on the merits.

Based on the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas at the hearing of its application for preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from proceeding with the hearing of LRC Case No. Q-336, respondent court held that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, albeit reflecting their origins as OCT Nos. 337, 19, 336 and 334, are actually derivatives of OCT No. 351, the latter having been issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that since OCT 351 is allegedly a copy of Decree 1425, the mere fact that the original copy of Decree 1425, or a certified copy thereof, can no longer be located or produced, does not mean that Decree 1425 covering the lots embraced in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 was not issued. Concluding, respondent court said that it may be that TCT 77652 and 77653 do not show on their face (sic) that they were derived from OCT 351. But the fact remains, as shown above, that the parcel of land covered by OCT 351 embraced the parcels of land, Lots 7 and 8, of TCT 77652 and 77653. There was, therefore a mistake in the entries in TCT 77652 and 77653 when the same referred to OCTs 337, 19, 336, 337 (sic) and 334, as their source, for the correct OCT insofar as Lots 7 and 8 are concerned, should be OCT 351.

Petitioner argues that respondent court erred in sustaining the validity of TCTs Nos. 77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration and instead utilized secondary evidence, OCT 351 which is supposedly a copy of Decree 1425.

ISSUE:

Is the Original certificate title No. 351 is secondary evidence and should not be admitted as evidence?

RULING:

            Yes. Undoubtedly, the evidence adduced by private respondent to prove the contents of Decree 1425 and admitted by respondent court is merely secondary and should not have been admitted in the first place. Before secondary evidence may be admitted, there must be 1) proof of the execution of the original writing and 2) that it has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court or that it is in the possession of the adverse party who has failed to produce it after reasonable notice (Michael and Co. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 [1915]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 146 [1976]). Private respondent has not shown compliance with the above requisites which would justify the admission of the secondary evidence used and erroneously relied upon by respondent court.

PEOPLE v. BELARMINO, 133 SCRA 461 (1984)

FACTS:

            In G.R. Nos. 93808-09, accused BELARMINO DIVINA alias "Bejar" and MECRITO BAGA y HIYOG appealed from the judgment ** rendered by the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 35 of Dumaguete City convicting both accused for murder and frustrated murder for the death of Concepcion Baillo and the gunshot wounds sustained by Jaime Baillo. Accused-appellants contend that the court a quo erred in finding that their guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt and in convicting them of the crime charged. Accused-appellants, Belarmino Divina and Mecrito Baga interpose the defense of denial and alibi by stating that it is impossible for them to commit the crime since they were drinking tuba with the relatives of the former at the time the incident had happened. They also alleged that the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Jaime Baillo, is far from credible for being conflicting, uncorroborated, unreliable and inconclusive. In support of this contention, accused-appellants point out that Jaime Baillo upon admission in the hospital on the night of the incident allegedly told Dr. Calumpang that he (Jaime) was shot by an unknown assailant. The defense also makes a big issue of the fact that the prosecution witnesses Ambrocio Baillo, Jaime Baillo and Rogelio Baillo reported the identities of the accused only after one month and nine days have elapsed despite the fact that the accused's identities were already known to them on the very night of the incident. Accused Belarmino Divina further argues that as stated in the police blotter, the shooting incident happened at around 7:40 o'clock in the evening of June 17, 1988 and not 6:30 o'clock as claimed by the prosecution witnesses. It was therefore, not possible for the victim Jaime Baillo to have seen the accused without the aid of a lighted torch.

ISSUES:

Is the police blotter conclusive evidence?

RULING:

No. A police blotter is a book which records criminal incidents reported to the police. Entries in official records, as in this case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. It is undisputed that the alleged time of the commission of the crime, i.e., 7:40 in the evening of June 17, 1988, was supplied only by the parish priest Fr. Badoy who was neither present when the shooting incident happened nor presented as a witness during the trial. The information supplied is therefore hearsay and does not have any probative value.

TUASON v. CA, 241 SCRA 695 (1995)

FACTS:

Petitioner Alvin Tuason y Ochoa, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with Robbery  for robbing the vault and other valuable items in the house CIPRIANA F. TORRES (Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised penal Code) and Carnapping (republic Act No. 6539) for carnapping the latter’s car which the former used for escaping. Of the four (4) accused, only petitioner was apprehended. The other three (3) are still at-large. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges and was tried.

Torres reported the robbery to the police authorities at Fairview, Quezon City and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). On July 25, 1988, Madaraog (Torres’ maid) and Quintal (neighboring maid) described the physical features of the four (4) robbers before the NBI cartographer. On August 30, 1988, petitioner was arrested by the NBI agents. The next day, at the NBI headquarters, he was pointed to by Madaraog and the other prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crimes at bench. Throughout cross-examination petitioner testified that during line-up at the NBI, the reason why he was testified and pointed as one of the robbers is that an NBI agent pointed at him before the witnesses did. The trial court in a Joint Decision convicted petitioner of the crimes charged. The respondent Court of Appeals gave no credence to the exculpatory allegations of petitioner and affirmed in toto the assailed Decisions.  Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Is the testimony of Alvin Tuason self-serving?

RULING:

No. Again, the ruling misconstrues the meaning of self-serving evidence. Self-serving evidence is not to be literally taken as evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under our law of evidence, self-serving evidence is one made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination. Clearly, petitioner's testimony in court on how he was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI headquarters is not self-serving.

PEOPLE v. CUI, 314 SCRA 153 (1999)

FACTS:

            In the evening of December 5, 1990, some ten (10) armed robbers raided the compound of Johnny and Rose Lim on Edison Street, Lahug, Cebu City.  The Lims, their three (3) children, and the employees of the family-owned business, William’s Educational Supply, were able to see the faces of the leader Wilfredo alias “Toto” Garcia and two of his men, Mawe Garcia and a certain Edgar.  The other robbers could not be identified as they had flour sacks over their heads. The gang’s base of operation was pinpointed at Quiot, Pardo, Cebu.  When the police learned from Lim that his house guard, Eduardo Basingan, hailed from Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City, they decided to interrogate him.

Basingan’s interrogation broke the case wide open. Basingan said he was asked to join the plot and was assured that he would not be under suspicion because he would be placed at gun point together with the other members of the Lim household when the crime is committed.  However, he refused to join the plot. Basingan executed a sworn statement reiterating these revelations in writing.  On May 15, 1991, Basingan, the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte were arraigned and they all pleaded not guilty. On June 27, 1991, Basingan escaped from prison. Trial on the merit ensued against the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte.  Basingan was tried in absentia. The trial court used the statements of Basingan, as testified to by Sgt. Ouano, as proofs of the guilt of the Cuis, Obeso and Sarte. The trial court convicted the Cuis as accomplices, Obeso, Sarte, and Basingan.

Obeso and Sarte appealed the judgment contending that the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants on the basis of the extra-judicial statement made by Eduardo Basingan and the testimony of Sgt. Narciso Ouano Jr.  thereon, which are hearsay evidence. The Cuis also filed their brief contending that the trial court erred in not excluding hearsay evidence offered to prove alleged conspiracy and participation of appellants-spouses Leonilo Cui and Beverly Cui, as accomplices in the crime charged.

ISSUE:

            Is the extrajudicial statement made by Basingan and the testimony of Sgt. Ouano Jr hearsay evidence?

RULING:

            Yes. Undeniably, they are hearsay for any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who was never presented on the witness stand. Conviction cannot be based on hearsay evidence.  In the 1996 case of People v. Raquel, we squarely addressed the issue of whether or not the extra-judicial statements of an escaped accused implicating his co-accused may be utilized against the latter.  There we ordered an acquittal and held:

 “The extra-judicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open court.  If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s extra-judicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused.  That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar. “Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused.  A distinction, obviously, should be made between extra-judicial and judicial confessions.  The former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-examination and rebuttal.

This Court, however, holds that the Cuis profited from the kidnapping of Stephanie Lim and are liable as accessories.

ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD v. CA, 357 SCRA 30 (2001)

FACTS:

This is a consolidated petition filed by (1) Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and (2) Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Coporation (Shell), engaged in the business of importing crude oil, refining the same and selling various petroleum products through a network of service stations throughout the country, against Court of Appeals and Petroleum Distributors and Services Corporation (PDSC) which owns and operates a Caltex service station at the corner of the MIA and Domestic Roads in Pasay City.

Shell filed an application to the Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) for authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila, to Imelda Marcos Avenue of the same municipality. PDSC filed an opposition to the application on the grounds that: 1.] there are adequate service stations attending to the motorists’ requirements in the trading area covered by the application; 2.] ruinous competition will result from the establishment of the proposed new service station; and 3.] there is a decline not an increase in the volume of sales in the area. The BEU rendered a decision denying Shell’s application on a finding that there was “no necessity for an additional petroleum products retail outlet in Imelda Marcos Avenue, Parañaque.” Dissatisfied, Shell appealed to the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA).

Meanwhile, Executive Order No. 172 was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the BEU. Thus, OEA remanded the case to the ERB. The latter board granted the application of Shell which was opposed by PDSC and appealed to CA. The CA reversed the decision of ERB. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA gravely erred in making findings of facts contrary to those of the ERB whose findings were based on substantial evidence?

RULING:

Yes. Time and again this Court has ruled that in reviewing administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant; that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of evidence; that the administrative decision in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. [26] Petitioner ERB is in a better position to resolve petitioner Shell’s application, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.  The power to determine whether the building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading area would benefit public interest and the oil industry lies with the ERB not the appellate courts.

In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence and substantial evidence, in that order. A litany of cases has consistently held that substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.

YTURRALDE v. AZURIN, 28 SCRA 407 (1969)

FACTS:

            This is a suit to annul a notarial deed of donation inter vivos, covering ten (10) parcels of land in Sibalom, Antique, executed by plaintiff's sister, Carmen Yturralde, in favor of defendant Consuelo G. Azurin, which deed plaintiff himself, a minister of the Philippine Independent Church, signed as a witness and which his nephew Apolonio Yturralde also signed as a witness at plaintiff's instance. Plaintiff's claim is that the execution thereof is tainted with fraudulent misrepresentation — that the document is merely one for the administration of properties, not a donation. The lower court, in its decision of July 8, 1963 penned by His Honor, Judge Conrado O. Honrado, dismissed the complaint, declared the deed of donation legal and valid and Consuelo G. Azurin owner of the donated ten (10) parcels of land, with costs. Hence, this appeal direct to this Court.

ISSUE:

            Is the document signed was one for administration, not a donation?

RULING:

            No. A rule of long standing which, through the years, has been adhered to is that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. To contradict all these, as plaintiff now seeks to do, there must be evidence that is "clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant." Our task now is to weigh the evidence with a view of ascertaining whether plaintiff has made out a case conformably to the foregoing standard. It is undisputed that plaintiff has been a priest of the Philippine Independent Church for a long time. He talks and writes Spanish very well. He knows how to read English. The judge below, who signed the decision and who had the opportunity to observe plaintiff on the witness chair, gave the opinion that although plaintiff was already old and a little bit deaf, he was "fairly intelligent to say the least, and definitely ... not feeble-minded." This is the man who claims to have been misled by defendant Dr. Raymundo Azurin.

PEOPLE v. PAYAWAL 247 SCRA 424 (1995)

FACTS:

            Accused-appellant stood trial and was convicted by the court a quo for the crime of murder. When arraigned, the accused pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. On 11 February 1994, accused-appellant filed his notice of appeal. Convinced of Gamaliel's guilt, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused. The latter moved for a new trial. He argued that his rights were not properly protected by his former counsel. The motion was denied by the presiding judge.

Accused-appellant was convicted by the trial court on the strength, it said, of the following circumstantial evidence; viz:

1. The accused ordered the purchase of the air fresheners one of which was on top of the steel cabinet and the other was inside the steel cabinet;

2. The last time when Gerry Centenera was seen alive was when he was fetched by the accused from the house of his sister Corazon;

3. The room where the body of Gerry Centenera was found stuffed inside the steel cabinet is the bedroom of the accused; and

4. From April 2 to 8, 1992, comprising the period (approximated to be) when Gerry Centenera was murdered until his body was found on April 8, the bishop had been holding office everyday from morning till evening at his office at 1706 Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila. On said April 8, he stayed in his office for only one and a half hour.

Prosecution witness Rolando Villena, however, refused to acknowledge the statement attributed to him — the first of the four circumstances — to the effect that he had been requested by accused-appellant to get half a kilo of cement and some air fresheners.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

            Whether the trial court erred in arriving at its conclusion of guilt of the accused for the charge of murder based upon questionable alleged circumstantial evidence?

RULING:

            Yes. The second circumstance relied on by the trial court, i.e., that Centenera had last been seen alive with accused-appellant, was a mere hearsay account of PO3 Geronimo (allegedly related to him by Corazon T. Payawal). Corazon herself, however, was not called to the witness stand. Parenthetically, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated 17 August 1993, she belied the statement of PO3 Geronimo.

The result is that only the remaining two circumstances could be of real consequence in ascertaining the guilt of accused-appellant. The Rules of Court, on circumstantial evidence, provides:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) The is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The circumstances to warrant conviction must constitute an unbroken chain of events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion so pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. Logically, it is here, where the evidence is purely circumstantial, that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of the accused.

It appears that the prosecution has, at the main trial, merely adopted the testimonies taken during the hearing of appellant's petition for bail. It is fair to assume that the evidence to support such a petition can in no way come close to or approximate that which is normally given during the trial proper.