Darlyn Fegi Bucayon
Ø
Gonzales
Vs CA
90 SCRA 183
FACTS:
Isabel Gabriel died
on June 7, 1961. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a
petition for probate of Isabel’s will designating her as the principal
beneficiary and executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed
2 months prior to death of Isabel.
The petition was
opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the
following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and
attested as required by law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of the
will did not have testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness, and 4. the
will was procured through undue influence.
The trial court
disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said
decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC
claiming that the CA erred in holding that the will of the decedent was
executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof
that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE:
1. 1. Can a
witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be considered
credible as required by Art. 805?
2. Is it required
that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will has good
standing in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?
HELD:
1.Yes. The petitioner
submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires something more than just
being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under
Articles 820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The competency of a
person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute
(Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on the appreciation of his
testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said
witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del
Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held
and ruled that: “Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be
a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial
courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given matter because
he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe or not to believe
his testimony.”
2.No. There is no
mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for
trustworthiness and for being reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such
attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise
by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted
by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article
820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind
can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him,
that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or
competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or
dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court,
and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil
Code.
Ø
Marine
Electric Co. Vs NLRC
198 SCRA 682
FACTS:
Private
respondent Signo was employed in petitioner company as supervisor-leadman since
January 1963 up to the time when his services were terminated on May 18, 1983.
In 1981, a
certain Fernando de Lara filed an application with the petitioner company for
electrical services at his residence at Peñafrancia Subdivision, Marcos Highway,
Antipolo, Rizal. Private respondent Signo facilitated the processing of the
said application as well as the required documentation for said application at
the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. In consideration thereof, private
respondent received from Fernando de Lara the amount of P7,000.00. Signo
thereafter filed the application for electric services with the Power Sales
Division of the company.
It was
established that the area where the residence of de Lara was located is not yet
within the serviceable point of Meralco, because the place was beyond the
30-meter distance from the nearest existing Meralco facilities. In order to
expedite the electrical connections at de Lara's residence, certain employees
of the company, including respondent Signo, made it appear in the application
that the sari-sari store at the corner of Marcos Highway, an entrance to the
subdivision, is applicant de Lara's establishment, which, in reality is not
owned by the latter.
As a result of
this scheme, the electrical connections to de Lara's residence were installed
and made possible. However, due to the fault of the Power Sales Division of
petitioner company, Fernando de Lara was not billed for more than a year. As a
result, services of the respondent were terminated and this prompted respondent
to file a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages and separation pay. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision directing the petitioner to reinstate
respondent without back wages. Both parties appealed to the Commission and were
dismissed by the Commission for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
respondent Signo should be dismissed from petitioner company on grounds of
serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
HELD:
No. This Court
has held time and again, in a number of decisions, that notwithstanding the
existence of a valid cause for dismissal, such as breach of trust by an
employee, nevertheless, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too severe a
penalty if the latter has been employed for a considerable length of time in
the service of his employer. (Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R.
No. L- 54280, September 30,1982,117 SCRA 523; Meracap v. International Ceramics
Manufacturing Co., Inc., et al., G.R. Nos. L-48235-36, July 30,1979, 92 SCRA
412; Sampang v. Inciong, G.R. No. 50992, June 19,1985,137 SCRA 56; De Leon v.
NLRC, G.R. No. L-52056, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 691; Philippine Airlines,
Inc. v. PALEA, G.R. No. L-24626, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 489).
In a similar
case, this Court ruled:
As repeatedly
been held by this Court, an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue
with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of breach of trust
towards his employer and whose continuance in the service of the latter is
patently inimical to its interest. The law in protecting the rights of the
laborers, authorized neither oppression nor self- destruction of the employer.
However, taking
into account private respondent's 'twenty-three (23) years of service which
undisputedly is unblemished by any previous derogatory record' as found by the
respondent Commission itself, and since he has been under preventive suspension
during the pendency of this case, in the absence of a showing that the continued
employment of private respondent would result in petitioner's oppression or
self-destruction, We are of the considered view that his dismissal is a drastic
punishment. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
The ends of
social and compassionate justice would therefore be served if private
respondent is reinstated but without backwages in view of petitioner's obvious
good faith. (Itogon- Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 11 7 SCRA 528)
Further, in
carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations,
the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor
Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Abella v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 71812, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 140).
341 SCRA 25
FACTS:
Petitioner
Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried
marijuana leaves were found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made
a search on him
Petitioner
denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one
of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his
bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy.
Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were
found.
Petitioner
prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal,
that his warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search
that followed was likewise contrary to law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the
arrest and the search.
HELD:
The Court
ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was
acquitted by reasonable doubt.
Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions
permitting a warrantless arrest: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court held
that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the arrest.
The Court also
posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
None of the
petitioner’s actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon
approach of the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity to
validate the warrantless arrest.
However, the
Court’s decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact that
the lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue
of the chain of custody rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the
prosecution witnesses.
Failure of the
lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus
acquitted.
Ø
People
VS. Martinez
274 SCRA 259
FACTS:
Teofilo
Martinez, herein petitioner, was accused of homicide. Before the Regional Trial
Court, petitioner filed a motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper. However,
this was denied by the trial court and prompted petitioner to go to the Court
of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleged that the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it issued the assailed orders.
Later on,
petitioner also filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to litigate as pauper
attaching thereto affidavits by himself and two disinterested persons of his
eligibility to avail this privilege. The appellate court subsequently issued a
resolution denying the motion and directing the petitioner to pay the proper
docketing fees within five (5) days from notice. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but this was also denied by the appellate court.
Petitioner then filed a manifestation through his counsel that he was
transmitting the docket fees required "under protest" and that the
money was advanced by his counsel. The transmittal was evidenced by two (2)
postal money orders attached to the motion to litigate as pauper.
In the
assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground
that petitioner failed to pay the required docket fees. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration citing his compliance with the required docket fee. In the
second assailed resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the latest motion on
the ground that it was short of 150.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's motion to appeal as pauper litigant?
RULING:
In the case at
bar, the Supreme Court applied the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The Court
held that a motion to litigate as indigent can be made even before the
appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for
review or in special civil actions. It maintained that the interpretation of
the present rules is more in keeping with the Bill of Rights, which decrees
that "free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."
A perusal of
the records shows that petitioner complied with all the evidentiary
requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court as pauper. The
affidavits executed by himself and two other disinterested persons were enough
to convince the court that petitioner is qualified to litigate as indigent.
The assailed
resolutions of the Court of Appeals were set aside for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the case is remanded for appropriate
action to the Court of Appeals which is further ordered to allow the petitioner
to litigate as pauper and to return to him the docket fees he paid.
Ø
Ignacio
VS. ELa
99 SCRA436
FACTS:
1. Petitioners
Fernando and Simeon dela Cruz are members of the Jehovah’s Witness, whose
tenets and principles are derogatory to those professed by the Catholic
organization.
2. Desiring to
hold a meting in furtherance of its objectives, petitioners asked respondent
Mayor Norberto Ela of Zambales to give them permission to use the public plaza
together with the kiosk.
3. Instead of
granting the permission, respondent Mayor allowed them to hold their meeting on
the northern part corner of the plaza.
4. The mayor
adopted as a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any
religious denomination as it is his belief that said kiosk should only be used
“for legal purposes.”
5. Petitioners
contend that the action taken by respondent is unconstitutional being an
abridgment of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Was there a
violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights?
HELD:
The right to
freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our
Constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not
be “injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the right of the community or society,” and this power may be
exercised under the “police power” of the State, which is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
The power
exercised by respondent cannot be considered as capricious or arbitrary
considering the peculiar circumstances of this case. It appears that the public
plaza particularly the kiosk, is located at a short distance from the Roman
Catholic Church. The proximity of said church to the kiosk has cause some
concern on the part of the authorities that to avoid disturbance of peace and
order, or the happening of untoward incidents, they deemed it necessary to
prohibit the use of the kiosk by any religious denomination as a place of
meeting of its members. This was the policy adopted by respondent for sometime
previous to the request made by petitioners. Respondent never denied such
request but merely tried to enforce his policy by assigning them the northern
part of the public plaza. It cannot therefore be said that petitioners were
denied their constitutional right to assembly for such right is subject to
regulation to maintain public order and public safety. This is especially so
considering that the tenet of petitioners’ congregation are derogatory to those
of the Roman Catholic Church, a factor which respondent must have considered in
denying their request.
Ø
State
Prosecutor’s Vs. Muro
236 SCRA 505
FACTS:
The state
prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint
against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The
case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in
violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central
BankCircular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the
basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes
to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines
lifted all foreign exchange restrictions. The respondent’s decision was founded
on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the
newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its
jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the
case. He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in
the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the
judge to take judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
The
complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking judicial notice
on matters he purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of
the newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign exchange
restriction. It was also an act of inexcusable ignorant of the law not to
accord due process to the prosecutors who were already at the stage of
presenting evidence thereby depriving the government the right to be heard. The
judge also exercised grave abuse of discretion by taking judicial notice on the
published statement of the Pres. In the newspaper which is a matter that has not
yet been officially in force and effect of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not
the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial
notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange
restriction published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case?
HELD:
The Supreme
Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It
cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the
publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the President’s
announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is
absolute and without qualification and is immediately effective and such matter
becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion.
It is a mandatory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in
a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivity. When the President’s
statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having
seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to
take judicial notice on this matter which is merely based on his personal
knowledge and is not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for
the court to take judicial notice of.
For the court
to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be present:
(1) the matter
must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be
well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
(3) it must be
known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
The fact that
should be assumed as judicially known must be on such notoriety that such fact
cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge where the
personal knowledge of the judge does not amount to the judicial notice of the
court. The common knowledge contemplated by the law where the court can take
judicial notice must come from the knowledge of men generally in the course of
ordinary experiences that are accepted as true and one that involves
unquestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he obtained
from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking
cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and ordered the dismissal of the
case without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process.
The court ordered for the dismissal of the judge from service for gross
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu
proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on
matters that are hearsay and groundless with a reminder the power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution at all times.
Ø
People
Vs. Cairo
288 SCRA 404
FACTS:
This is an
appeal of finding the accused guilty of murder.
Accused, then
being armed with an improvised shotgun or “sumpak” shot one ROLANDO B. SOBREO,
thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds affecting his internal organs
such as heart, lung, liver, stomach and part of intestine, which ultimately
caused his death.
Arlene Sobreo
testified that she was on her way home when she heard a “shot.” As she passed
by the store she saw accused-appellant carrying a “sumpak,” a homemade shotgun.
When she got home, Bernadette Mata, a neighbor, told Arlene that her husband
was shot by accused-appellant. Arlene rushed to the scene of the incident,
which was a short distance from “Nognog” store, only to find her husband
wounded and lying on the ground in front of “Medy” store. While there were
people milling around at the crime scene, she was unable to recognize them as
she was thinking of her husband. Roberto Maxwell testified that he was able to
positively identify accused-appellant as the one who shot the victim as Roberto
had been seeing accused-appellant at the public market.
Accused-appellant
maintains that granting arguendo that Roberto Maxwell’s testimony was credible,
it could not support a conviction for murder since the elements of treachery
were not proven. In his defense, while accused-appellant expressly admits
having killed Rolando Sobreo, he interposes a combination of accident and what
appears to be self-defense.
ISSUE:
Whether
accused-appellant acted in self-defense.
HELD:
Where an
accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent
upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in
self-defense; and as the burden of the evidence is thus shifted to him, he must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved
after the accused’s open admission of responsibility for the killing. Thus, to
successfully invoke self-defense, the accused’s evidence must prove the
existence of the essential requisites thereof, namely: (1) unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
Unlawful
aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or an imminent
danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. Unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. In other words, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the
person defending himself. Simply put, unlawful aggression is indispensable, it
being the main ingredient of self-defense.
Accused-appellant’s
invocation of accident deserves scant consideration. Under paragraph 4 of
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who, while performing a lawful
act with due care, causes an injury by accident without fault or intention of
causing it, is exempt from criminal liability. Having ruled, however, that
self-defense was not present, then it cannot be said that accused-appellant was
performing a lawful act.
We agree,
however, with accused-appellant and the Solicitor General that treachery was
not duly proved. To qualify a killing to murder it must be shown that the same
was committed with either treachery or evident premeditation, or cruelty; or in
consideration of a price, reward or promise; or through means involving great
waste or ruin, or on the occasion of a calamity. The crime thus committed is
only homicide, not murder as held by the trial court.
Ø
People
Vs. Galleno
291 SCRA 761
FACTS:
Evelyn Obligar
Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera who had to
leave the province to find work in Manila after separating from her husband.
Evelyn, together with her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus
left under the care and custody of their
uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar.
Less than
kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-appellant, 19-year
old Joeral Galleno, known well Evelyn's family due to his frequent visits at
the Obligars' abode as he was paying court to Emetario's eldest child, Gina.
On August 16, 1994,
Emetario and Penicola left their residence to work at sugarcane plantation
owned by Magdalena Dasibar. Their three children had all ealier left for
school. The only persons left in the house were niece Evelyn and nephew
Eleazar.
At around 4
o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola Esing to have his pants tailored.
Since it was drizzling, he passed by the
Obligars' residence and found the two children left to themselves. The
prosecution and the defense presented conflicting versions on what occurred at
said residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a
laceration in her vagina which result in profuse, and to our mind,
life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
The
prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligars' residence is based on
the testimony of Evelyn herself, her uncle Emetario, and the doctors who
examined and treated her. The Solicitor General summarized the same in this
wise:
2. Appellant
took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. After lowering
her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his
lap, facing him. As Evelyn was only five-years old while appellant was
fully-grown man, the penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her
cry in pain. (pp.10-11 and 18-25, tsn, Garganera, January 10, 1995).
3. Appellant
tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of "madre
de cacao" leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left
Evelyn grimacing and crying in pain. (pp. 14-15, tsn Garganera, January 10,
1995; pp. 6-7, tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).
4. Shortly,
Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. The spouses were laborers in a
sugarcane plantation about two kilometers away from their house. They arrived
to find Evelyn crying. Emetario noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress
and she was pressing a rug against her genital organ. (pp. 11-12, tsn, Obligar,
January 10, 1995; pp. 8-9, tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).
5. Emeterio
asked Evelyn what happened but she did not answer. Emetario spread the child's
legs and saw that her vagina had been lacerated and blood was oozing therefrom.
He summoned a "quack" doctor who applied herbal medicine on Evelyns's
vagina but did not stop the bleeding. (pp.12-14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
6. The
following day, August 17, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the clinic of Dr.
Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician of Maayon, Capiz. Dr. Orosco
reported, upon examining Evelyn, that he found (1) clotted blood, about 1
centimeter in diameter, in her vaginal opening, and (2) a vaginal laceration, measuring 1.0 centimeter
x o.5 centimeter, between the 3:00 o'clock and 6:00 o'clock position. He also
affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have been by blunt instrument
inserted into the vigina, that it was possible that a human penis in full
erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina, and that a human penis in
full errection is considered a blunt intrument (pp. 4-7, tsn, Orosco, November
28, 1994; p. 14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).
7. While he
was examining Evelyn, Dr. Orosco asked Evelyn what caused her injuries. The
child told him that a penis was inserted into her vagina and that its insertion
caused her pain. (pp. 9-10, 14 and 18-19, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994).
8. Since his
clinic lacked the proper medical facilities
needed to treat Evelyn, Dr. Orosco, after dressing the victim's wound
which continued to bleed, advised Emeterio and Penicola to bring the child to
the hospital for further medical treatment. (p.8, tsn, Orosco, November 28,
1994; pp. 14-16, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995)
9. On August
18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital were
she was examined by resident physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada. Dr. Lañada, upon examining Evelyn found that
"there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left anterior one-third of the
vagina" and "the pressence of about 10-15cc of blood" at the
vaginal vault. Dr. Lañada recommended
that evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital because the wound in
her vagina, which was bleeding, had to be repaired. Due to financial constraints, Evelyn was not
admitted into the Hospital that day and went home with Emeterio to Barangay
Balighot. (pp.6-8,tsn Lañada, January 4, 1995; pp. 15-16, ts, Obligar, January
12, 1995).
10. Upon her
examination of the victim on August 18, 1994, Dr. Lañada opined that "a
lot of things will cause the lacerated wound in the vagina." (p. 9, tsn,
Lañada, January 4, 1995). According to Dr. Lañada, the vaginal laceration may
be caused (1) by trauma to the area, when a girl falls and hits her genital
area on a blunt instrument; (2) by medical instrumentation, like the insertion
of a speculum into the vagina; or (3) by the insertion of blunt foreign object
into the vagina, like a finger or a penis of a man in full erection. (pp. 8-9,
tsn, Lañada, January 4, 1995).
11. On August
19, 1994, Emetario brought Evelyn back to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital
where she was attended to by Dr. Machael Toledo, the resident physician on
duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area. Dr.
Toledo " … pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding and (he) …
admitted the patient for possible repair of the laceration and blood
transfusion because she has anaemia
2ndary to bleeding." Two hundred fifty five (255) cc of blood was
transfused to Evelyn and she was given antibiotics to prevent infection.
However, she was no longer operated on because the laceration had healed. Five
days later, Evelyn was discharged and sent home with medication. (pp. 11-13, 17
and 26, tsn, Toledo, December 2, 1994).
12. Upon his
examination of Evelyn on August 19, 1994, Dr. Toledo disclosed that the child
suffered severe compound laceration which could have been caused by a normal
and fully developed penis of a man in a state of erection that was forcibly
inserted into her vagina and that the insertion caused her vagina to hemorrhage
which thus required the transfusion of 255 cc of blood (pp. 14-16 and 26, tsn,
Toledo, December 2, 1994.
13. Prior to
her confinement in the Roxas Memorial General Hospital on August 19, Emetario
and Penicola Obligar brought Evelyn to the Maayon Police Station on August 18, 1994, where they reported the
crime to SPO1 Paulino Durana. That same day, appellant was apprehended in a
house near the Balighot Elementary School and brought to the police station
(pp17-19, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995; pp. 5-9, 16-17 and 21, tsn, Durana,
January 16, 1995).
ISSUE:
Can expert
testimony be given weight on rape cases?
HELD:
As a general
rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It
is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions
upon the facts proved (Francisco,
Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. I. 1989 ed., pp. 889-890). However, conclusions and opinions of
witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony,
based on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert
knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under
observation, of for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching
a judgment.
The trial
court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony
of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's
laceration, but also the testimony of the other prosecution witness, especially
the victim herself. In other words, the
trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial
court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated
various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial
court's interference is wrong.
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