kristy lim digest

[G.R. No. 115191.  December 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LOLITO MORENO y LANCION alias “LOLOY”,
Facts:

    The private complainant, is a 14 years old, who was allegedly raped by Lolito Moreno, her first-degree cousin, at her parents’ house situated in a coconut land in Ilaya, Sayao, Marinduque. During the said incident, her parents were in the farm at the time and they returned when the said rape was already consumated in the afternoon of the same day, July 7, 1991.
    On October 8, 1991, three months later,b she was brought for medical examination to the Rural Health Unit, where she was examined by Dr. Reynaldo Montegrejo, Rural Health Physician of Mogpog, Marinduque. The same examining physician suggested that private complainant submit to a pregnancy test. The pregnancy test revealed that private complainant was about five (5) months pregnant.
    The private complainant testified on the facts of the incident. However, There were inconsistencies and contradictions on her testimony.
    The RTC convicted LOLITO MORENO of rape committed against his 14-year-old cousin TIFFANY MORENO. Hence, this is an appeal to the assailed decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Is the complainant's testimony credible enough to be relied upon?

Ruling:
    No, we find that the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of private complainant in convicting the accused-appellant.
    The inconsistencies in the testimony of private complainant on material and substantial matters detract from the credibility of her testimony.  First, her testimony on the exact location of the bolo allegedly used by accused-appellant in satisfying his bestial desire, while the latter was on top of private complainant, was not coherent and straight-forward. When asked by the trial court, private complainant claimed that while accused-appellant was on top of her, the bolo was on the makeshift bed but when the trial court clarified later on, she testified that the bolo was in the scabbard on accused-appellant’s waist. Second, when asked by the trial court, private complainant testified that she did not have sexual intercourse with accused-appellant prior to July 7, 1991, but she claimed that it was accused-appellant who impregnated her. When she was asked for the second time by the trial court if there was any occasion prior to July 7, 1991 that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her, she admitted that there was such an occasion. The foregoing inconsistencies and contradictions in private complainant’s testimony cannot be considered as minor and trivial as they impugn the credibility of her testimony.
    WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 1-93 is REVERSED and accused-appellant Lolito Moreno y Lancion is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his continued detention.

    SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 96202.  April 13, 1999]
ROSELLA D. CANQUE,  vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,

Facts:
    Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC Construction. She entered into 2 contracts with Socor Contruction as sub-contractor for her projects with the government. On May 28, 1986, Socor sent a bill (Exh. C), representing the balance of Canque for materials delivered and services rendered by Socor under the two contracts.  However, Canque refused to pay, claiming that private respondent failed to submit the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and the acceptance by the government.
    Hence, Socor brought a suit in the RTC to recover from the Canque. During the trial, Socor presented Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper to testify on the entries of their Book of Collectible Accounts. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Socor. Canque however, argues that the entries in Socor's Book of Collectible Accounts cannot take the place of the delivery receipts and that such entries are mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible.

Issue:
1. Whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts constitute competent evidence?
2. May the entries be admitted under Rule 132, §10 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling:
    No, for the following reasons.
Rule 130, §37 of the Rules of Court - Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

    First, Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the account. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.
    Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry.  She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her.  But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills.
    Second, under the provision (Rule 132, §10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence.  It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him.
    However, the entries recorded under Exhibit “K” were supported by Socor's Billings under the account of RDC Construction.  These billings were presented and duly received by the authorized representatives. The circumstances obtaining in the case at bar clearly show that for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to the aforestated billings submitted by plaintiff.  Neither did defendant immediately protest to plaintiff’s alleged incomplete or irregular performance.
    WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115809. January 23, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. MELVIN MENDOZA y ZAPANTA,
Facts:

    Danilo Manalus, a taxi driver, was stabbed to death near by the alleged assailant, Mendoza,  who was apprehended at the scene of the crime by a tricycle driver, Bonifacio Wycoco, subsequently turned over to the police and charged, together with a certain John Doe, with robbery with homicide.
    The prosecution presented witnesses, among whom were Wycoco. Wycoco testified that, on the date and time in question, while driving his tricycle, he came upon three men who were shouting hold-up. From where he was, he saw through the open right front door on the passengers side of the taxi the driver fending off the attacks of accused-appellant who was using a fan knife or balisong. Wycoco grabbed accused-appellant by the collar and tried to pull him away. As accused-appellant resisted, Wycoco hit him on the left leg with a lead pipe, causing him to fall on his knees and preventing him from fleeing from the scene.

    Witness Louie Jose came upon the two. He testified that he tied both hands of the accused-appellant.  Jose asked accused-appellant, Why did you say it is a hold-up (sic), to which the latter responded I am getting despondent because I do not have money to buy milk for my child. A policeman, Danilo Ramos, then arrived and Wycoco turned accused-appellant over to him.
    Accused-appellant denied there was a hold-up. He claimed he was merely forced to defend himself from the taxi drivers attack.

    The trial court finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to be credible and rejected the accused-appellants claim of self-defense rendered judgment finding the accused guilty. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
    The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of prosecution witnesses.

Ruling:
    The contention has no merit.
   
    Admittedly, all that the prosecution witnesses can testify of their own personal knowledge were the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged stabbing of Danilo Manalus, which was however, admitted by accused-appellant as being done by him in self-defense. It may be that Wycocos knowledge is limited to the stabbing of the victim. However, when taken in relation to the other evidence of the prosecution, Wycocos testimony shows that the violence resulting in homicide was committed in the course of a robbery. The key piece of evidence clearly showing robbery in this instance comes from the accused-appellant himself. He was asked by Louie Jose, Why did you say it is a hold-up? In response accused-appellant spontaneously answered, I am getting despondent because I do not have money to buy milk for my child.
    The test of admissibility for evidence as a part of the res gestae is stated with congency by Justice Ricardo J. Francisco thus: ...whether the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event which it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
    Tested by this standard, the extra-judicial admission of accused-appellant was clearly part of the res gestae and therefore correctly admitted by the trial court as evidence against the accused-appellant.There is every reason to give to the testimonies of Wycoco and Jose full evidentiary weight and credit, consistent with the rule that, where the defense fails to prove that witnesses are moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they are not so moved and their testimonies are therefore entitled to full weight and credit.
    Indeed, the evidence satisfies the Rules of Court criteria for circumstantial evidence sufficient to support conviction, to wit: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.



[G.R. No. 136303. July 18, 2000]  
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ANTHONY MELCHOR PALMONES, ANTHONY BALTAZAR PALMONES,
Facts:
     Brothers Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones were both charged with murder. That allegedly accused-appellants shot SPO2 ASIM MAMANSAL, in a dark place, together with his paramour, while riding home in Kidapawan, Sultan Kudaratthat last April 27, 1997. The inflicted gunshot wounds on the vital parts of MAMANSAL'S body caused of the death of the victim.
    The prosecution witnesses presented on trial were Sonny Boy Redovan, the nephew of the victim. He testified that in that same evening in the emergency room of Kidapawan Doctor’s Hospital the victim declared that his perpetrators were “Juany and Tony Palmones” which were the nicknames of the two accused-appellants. Another witness presented was  Police Inspector Alexander Tagum, who came in the emergency room about and hour later also testified that he was able to ask the victim, about the identity of his perpetrator, and that were Juany and Tony Palmones.
   
    The conviction of the two accused-appellants was based largely on the alleged dying declaration of the victim made to the two witnesses of the prosecution.

    Hence, this appeal by the accused-appellants to the Supreme Court.


Issue:
1. The court a quo erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of ASIM MAMANSAL as an exception to the hearsay rule.

2. The court a quo erred in considering the alleged dying declaration of ASIM AMAMNSAL as part of the Res Gestae Rule.

Ruling:

1. On the first issue:
    Yes, it was error for the court to consider  Mamansal's statement as dying declaration for failure to prove that the declaration was made “under a consciousness of impending death” which means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to die from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction that death is at hand, or there must be “a settled hopeless expectation.”
       
    Sec. 31. Dying declaration. – The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

    As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern the crime and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for murder, murder or parricide win which the decedent was the victim.
   
    In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the declarant concerning the cause and surrounding circumstances of his death were made under the consciousness of impending death.


2. On the second issue:

    Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.
   
    Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an appreciable amount of time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for deliberation.These circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res gestae.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment dated 8 May 1998 of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are being held for some other legal grounds.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 119311.  October 7, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO DIANOS
Facts:

    Involved in the incident were all residents of Cypress Point Village, Irisan, in Baguio City.  The relationship among them was due to a transaction apparently involving Teresita Ortiz (Teresita) and Josie Ortiz Santos (Josie), and accused Romeo Dianos, over a piece of land occupied by the latter.

    On 31 December 1990, at about five o'clock in the morning, Nancy Ortiz Dasudas (Nancy) saw the accused throw a hand grenade near the house of her parents.  Josie, who was standing near the site of the explosion was hit with a shrapnel on the left leg. Later that day, at around 9:30 in the evening, the accused, donned in military camouflage uniform and armed with an M-16 armalite rifle, was seen traversing the Cypress Point Road.  Following closely behind was his passenger jeepney with three unidentified men on board.

    That same evening, Teresita, together with her husband, Virgilio Ortiz (Virgilio), her daughter, Corazon Ortiz Ihanda (Corazon), her brother, Ricardo Pablo (Ricardo), and her son, Zaldy Ortiz (Zaldy), were on the terrace of their new house.  The three men, Virgilio, Ricardo and Zaldy, momentarily left the terrace, Virgilio to relieve himself by the side of the house, Zaldy to repair home and Ricardo to go to the house of Nancy Ortiz Dasudas (Nancy) across the street.  Ricardo met the accused near the waiting shed.  Without any warning, the latter suddenly struck Ricardo on the face with the butt of an armalite causing him to fall to the ground.  The accused then fired at Ricardo, hitting him on the chest and left arm.  The accused then directed his armalite at Virgilio.  The latter was hit  on the buttocks.  The accused thereupon fired indiscriminately at the house of Zaldy.  Zaldy received a bullet injury in his right thigh, while his daughter, Lizette Ortiz (Lizette), was hit in her abdomen and wrist.  The accused moved towards the direction of the new house and  fired at the terrace.  Teresita took a bullet wound on the neck from the volley of shots.

    In the aftermath,  two were found dead, namely, Teresita and Ricardo, while three others, Virgilio, Zaldy and Lizette, sustained injuries. A report on the bodies of Teresita and Ricardo  readily disclosed that their death were due to the gunshot wounds they had sustained.  While the accused, right after the shooting, boarded his jeep and sped towards Baguio City.

    Upon receiving a report on the incident, Pat. Ruben Forte (Pat. Forte), Pfc. Marianito Cosape (Pfc. Cosape) and Pat. Robert Credo (Pat. Credo)  were immediately dispatched to the crime scene. Cosape was able to gather several pieces of spent cartridges from the waiting shed and surrounding areas.  At the police station, P/Sgt. Gaydowen promptly met Dianos a burst of gunfire when the accused's jeepney was seen near the sub-station coming in from Baguio City. Somehow, the accused was able to escape.

    The accused disclaimed any knowledge of, or participation in, the grenade throwing and shooting incidents.  He recounted that while he was getting his passenger jeepney out from the carport, an unidentified man poked a gun at his back and instructed him to proceed to Cypress Point Road to fetch a companion.  When they were near the waiting shed area, he saw the unidentified man's companion, a "military man," clad in military camouflage uniform and armed with an M-16 armalite rifle, altercating with Ricardo.  The accused proceeded to Sub-station 1 to report the incident but he  was met with a burst of gunfire.  Sustaining an injury in his thigh, he then drove to Sub-station 2 to seek police assistance.  Sgt. Giovanni Gallardo  and Pat. Edward Ayochok took him to the Hospital.  On the way, the accused had the chance to narrate to the two police officers the shooting incident in Irisan.

    The RTC rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder, Frustrated and Attempted Murder, with which he was charged.
Hence this appeal.

Issue:

1. The court a quo erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
2. That Dianos' "utterances" made in the presence of, and later testified to, the police officers on their way to the hospital constitutive of the res gestae.
3. It was error for the court not to consider the parrafin examination result.

Ruling:
    1. It is doctrinally entrenched, that the issue on the credibility of witnesses is a question mainly addressed to the trial court for it to gauge and to pass upon.  Not only are its determination and findings accorded with great respect, but also even often treated with finality.  Accused-appellant belabors the fact that all, but one, of the prosecution witnesses are related to the victims.  He asserts that such relationship taints their credibility. Mere relationship by a witness to the victim, however, does not necessarily impair credibility. Unless the Court is convinced that the witnesses are clearly impelled by ulterior motives, it will not discard their testimony.  No such strong ill-motive has been shown here to make the Court conclude that the prosecution witness would thereby wish to have the wrong man callously sent to jail.

    2. Evidently, accused-appellant is under a misconception.  Res gestae rules relate to the admissibility of evidence and not to its weight or sufficiency. By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime, immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements constitute nothing but spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion there being no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement become admissible in evidence against the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility.  In order to admit such hearsay statements as part of res gestae, there must be a  confluenceof the following essential conditions: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements are made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statement must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.

There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a number of factors have been considered, including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement,  (2) the place where the statement is made,   (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given,  (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself. The Court, in People vs. Manhuyod,[14] has explained the import of the first four factors; thus:

"x x x (C)ases are not uniform as to  the interval of time  that should separate the occurrence of the startling event and the making of the declaration.  What is important is that the declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made 'so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate or explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the ideas of design or deliberation.'

"As to the second factor, it may be stressed that 'a statement made, or an act done, at a place some distance from the place where the principal transaction occurred will not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would render it admissible.'

"Anent the third factor, '[a] statement will ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if, at the time when it was made, the conditions of the declarant was such as to raise an inference that the effect of the occurrence on his mind still continued, as where he had just received a serious injury, was suffering severe pain, or was under intense excitement.  Conversely, a lack of spontaneity may be inferred from the cool demeanor of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of all danger,  his delay in making a statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a different statement prior to the one which is offered in evidence.'

"With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether there intervened between the event or transaction and the making of the statement relative thereto, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant which would thus restore his mental balance and afford opportunity for deliberation."

The startling occurrence of consequence to this case is not when accused-appellant was fired upon at police substation 1 but the shooting at the Cypress Point Village.  If at all, what might be so considered as part of the res gestae would be the statements of appellant when he was shot at  near the police station, but this incident is not at all the subject matter of the case against him.  Clearly, the fourth element, that there is no intervening event between the startling occurrence concerned and the making of the statement relative, is not here extant.

3. Accused-appellant capitalizes on the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on him.  A paraffin test has never been considered to be foolproof.  On the contrary, it has been held to be highly unreliable.  In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., this Court has held:"Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates.  Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has 'x   x   x proved extremely unreliable in use.  In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz:  when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of the firing."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 103737    December 15, 1994
NORA S. EUGENIO and ALFREDO Y. EUGENIO, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
Facts:
    Nora S. Eugenio was a dealer of the soft drink products of private respondent corporation. On March 17, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money against spouses Eugenio. In its complaint, respondent corporation claimed that petitioners had an unpaid obligation as spouses Eugenio allegedly failed to pay despite oral and written demands.
    In their defense, petitioners presented four trade provisional receipts (TPRs) allegedly issued to and received by them from private respondent's Route Manager Jovencio Estrada, showing payments. Petitioners contended that had the amounts in the TPRs been credited in their favor, they would not be indebted to Pepsi-Cola.
    The respondent company had its own investigation conducted by  Daniel Azurin, it was during such investigation that Estrada allegedly denied that he issued and signed the aforesaid TPRs and to support such denial he executed an affidavit to affirm his verbal statements but Estrada never testified in the court and what he is supposed to have done or said was merely related by Azurin.

Issue:
1. Does the testimony of Jovencio Estrada regarding his signatures on the disputed TPRs  as well as his affidavit dated February 5, 1982 wherein he affirmed his denial, are hearsay evidence?

Ruling:
    The rule is clear and explicit. Under the hearsay evidence rule, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules. In the present case, Estrada failed to appear as a witness at the trial. It was only Azurin who testified that during the investigation he conducted, Estrada supposedly denied having signed the TPRs. Under the measure on hearsay evidence, Azurin's testimony cannot constitute legal proof as to the truth of Estrada's denial. For that matter, it is not admissible in evidence, petitioners' counsel having seasonably objected at the trial to such testimony of Azurin as hearsay. And, even if not objected to and thereby admissible, such hearsay evidence has no probative value.

    It is true that the testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. Private respondent cannot, however, invoke this exception to the hearsay evidence rule. Firstly, the supposed investigation conducted by Azurin was neither a judicial trial nor an administrative hearing under statutory regulations and safeguards but merely an inter-office interview conducted by a personnel officer. Secondly, a perusal of the alleged stenographic notes, assuming arguendo that these notes are admissible in evidence, would show that the "investigation" was more of a free-flowing question and answer type of discussion wherein Estrada was asked some questions, after which Eugenio was likewise asked other questions. Indeed, there was no opportunity for Eugenio to object, much less to cross-examine Estrada. Thirdly, the stenographer was not even presented to authenticate the stenographic notes submitted to the trial court. A copy of the stenographic report of the entire testimony at the former trial must be supported by the oath of the stenographer that it is a correct transcript of his notes of the testimony of the witness as a sine qua non for its competency and admissibility in evidence. The supposed stenographic notes on which respondent corporation relies is unauthenticated and necessarily inadmissible for the purpose intended.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioners Nora and Alfredo Eugenio the amount of P5,710.60 representing overpayment made to the former. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 123546.  July 2, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOERAL GALLENO,
Facts:
    The victim Evelyn Obligar Garganera a 5-year old together with her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, live under the care and custody of their uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar.The accused-appellant, is 19-year old Joeral Galleno.  On August 16, 1994, Emetario and Penicola left their residence to work at sugarcane plantation and  the only persons left in the house were Evelyn and Eleazar.
    At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Galleno passed by the  Obligars' residence and found the two children left to themselves. The prosecution and the defense presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a laceration in her vagina which result in profuse, life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
    For the prosecution, the victim herself testified that Galleno took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting her. After lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn  sit on his lap, facing him. The penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain. Emeterio and Penicola also testified that when they came home from work, they arrived to find Evelyn crying. Emetario noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and she was pressing a rug against her genital organ. Dr. Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician reported, upon examining Evelyn, that he found (1) clotted blood, and (2) a  vaginal laceration.
    On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital were she was examined by resident physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada.  Dr. Lañada, testified that she found that "there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left anterior one-third of the vagina" and "the pressence of about 10-15cc of blood" at the vaginal vault.  Dr. Lañada recommended that evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital because the wound in her vagina, which was bleeding, had to be repaired.  The following day, Evelyn was examined at  Roxas Memorial General Hospital again where she was attended to by Dr. Machael Toledo, the resident physician on duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area. Dr. Toledo " … pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding and (he) … admitted the patient for possible repair of the laceration and blood transfusion because she  has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding."
    The trial deemed the following circumstances significant in finding accused-appellant culpable for the crime of Statutory Rape.
    Hence, the instant appeal and review.

Issue:
The Trial Court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical doctors.

Ruling:
    As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved.  However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, of for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.
    In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony the victim herself.  In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses.  Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts.  Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's interference is wrong.
    As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declaration, particularly as to what really caused the laceration, we are convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just confused.
    As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's testimony is just a concocted story of what really happened, we apply the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence (People vs. Cagto, 253 SCRA 455 [1996]). We likewise consider the fact that her uncle and aunt, virtually her foster parents, themselves support her story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma (People vs. Dones,supra.)

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on record, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.




G.R. No. 84220    March 25, 1992
BENJAMIN RODRIGUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and HADJI ESMAYATEN LUCMAN
Facts:

    Petitioner Rodriguez alias Uy Tian Kiu is a businessman from Cebu City whose business, includes the importation of various commodities from Hongkong which he ordered from Allied Overseas Commercial Co., Ltd., a Hongkong corporation. As a result the of business transactions with the Hongkong Corporation, Rodriguez incurred indebtedness to Allied Overseas.

    When payment was demanded by the Hongkong Corporation, the petitioner issued a pay-to-cash check dated September 11, 1970 covering the indebtedness. The check was, however, dishonored for lack of funds, the account having been closed two months earlier. Subsequently, the Allied Overseas Commercial Co., Ltd., assigned its credit to Lucman . The contract was evidenced by a Deed of Assignment (Exhs. "B-2" and "B-3") duly executed.For non payment, assignee filed an action to collect the indebtedness, in which the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent.
    Appealed to the Court of Appeals, however was dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
   
    The petitioner is now before us questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals

Issue;
That the judgment in the criminal case cannot be given in evidence in the civil action.

Ruling:
    We find the petition devoid of merit.

    The decision in the criminal case was only one of the pieces of evidence relied upon by the respondent court.

    It is clear from the records, both testimonial and documentary that the obligation exists. The documents, all testified to by private respondent Lucman as well as other witnesses had sufficiently proven that Rodriguez had an unpaid balance from previous transaction with Allied Overseas Commercial Co., Ltd. which arose from the importation of the 800 bales of Hessian sacks.

    The unpaid balance was evidenced by a record of transactions between Allied Overseas Co., Ltd. and Ben Rodriguez. The statement of account was sent to the petitioner and the receipt portion was duly signed by him and returned. (Exh. "E-3" and "E-3A")

    Lucman also took the witness stand and identified numerous documents consisting of Purchase Orders, Bills of Lading, Delivery Receipts, and other evidences of the purchase of a barge and other goods by the petitioner from Allied Overseas Commercial Co., Ltd. Hueng Huan Yuen Sabio, Assistant to the General Manager and in-charge of shipping of Allied Overseas Commercial Co., Ltd., further testified to the same transactions.

    We have no doubt from the records that the obligation actually existed.

    ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
    SO ORDERED.