RAFFY RUIZ BULADO
March 17, 1930 G.R. No. 32636
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
A.W. FLUEMER, vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX
In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.
A.W. FLUEMER, vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX
FACTS:
The petitioner is a
special administrator of the estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latter’s
will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had
his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of that state govern. To
this end, the petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts 1882,
c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914,
p. 1690 and as certified to by the Director of National Library. The Judge of
the First Instance however denied the probate of the will on the grounds that
Sec 300 and301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied with. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether it is necessary
to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law in West Virginia as a
prerequisite to the allowance and recording of said will.
RULING:
Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various states of the
American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the requirements of the
law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was
taken was printed or published under the authority of the state of West
Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the
extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge
of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia as provided in
Sec 301. No evidence was introduced showing that the extract from the laws of
West Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was executed. The court
therefore did not err in denying the probate of the will. The existence of such
law in West Virginia must be proved.
G.R.
No. 110844 April 27, 2000
ALFREDO
CHING vs. CA
FACTS:
In the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines,
Chingexecuted a trust receipt agreement in favor of Allied Banking Corporation
which became due. Under the terms of which the petitioner agreed to sell the
same for cash with the express obligation to remit to the bank the proceeds of the sale and/or to turn
over the goods, if not sold, on demand. But Ching, once in possession of said
goods, far from complying with his obligation and with grave abuse of
confidence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
said goods and/or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated
demands, failed and refused and still fails and refuses, to account for and/or
remit the proceeds of sale thereof to the Allied Banking Corporation to the
damage and prejudice of the said complainant bank.
Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati with four counts of estafa punishable under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree 115, otherwise known as
the "Trust Receipts Law.”
An "Omnibus Motion to Strike Out Information, or in
the Alternative to Require Public Prosecutor to Conduct Preliminary
Investigation, and to Suspend in the Meantime Further Proceedings in these
Cases," was filed by the petitioner.
Later, petitioner Ching, together with Philippine
Blooming Mills Co. Inc., filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(RTC-Manila), Branch 53, for declaration of nullity of documents and for
damages.
The RTC-Makati issued an order which denied the petition
for suspension and scheduled the arraignment and pre-trial of the criminal
cases. As a result, petitioner moved to reconsider the order but the same was
denied. Subsequent appeal was made to the CA but was again denied.
Notwithstanding
the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Manila (civil case), in
an order dated 19 November 1993 in Civil Case No. 92-60600, admitted
petitioner's amended complaint.
ISSUE:
When
will allegations in a complaint cease to be judicial admission?
RULING:
Under the Rules, pleadings superseded or amended
disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings and cease to be
judicial admissions. While they may nonetheless be utilized against the pleader
as extrajudicial admissions, they must, in order to have such effect, be
formally offered in evidence. If not offered in evidence, the admission
contained therein will not be considered.
Consequently, the original complaint, having been
amended, lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required
no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the admissibility of
which, as evidence, required its formal offer.
In virtue thereof, the amended complaint takes the place
of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any
further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of
the record.
G.R.
No. L-22415 March 30, 1966
FERNANDO
LOPEZ, ET AL.vs.
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS,
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS,
FACTS:
Senator Lopez et al made reservations for 1st
class accommodations in a flight of Pan Am from Tokyo to San Francisco. The
reservations were confirmed in a phone call. Tickets were also issued. However,
Lopez et al were not accommodated in the first class for the reason that there
was no accommodation for them. They instead took the tourist passengers without
prejudice to any claim against Pan Am. Subsequently, a suit for damages was
filed against Pan Am. Pan Am answered admitting its breach of the contract of
carriage but however denied the allegation of bad faith. It contends that the
failure to provide 1st class accommodations was made in honest
mistake: That the accommodation was mistakenly cancelled, and expecting
that there would be subsequent cancellation of bookings, they withheld the
information regarding the cancellation from Lopez et al.
ISSUE:
Whether
admissions on trial should be proved.
HELD:
From the foregoing evidence of defendant it is in effect
admitted that defendant — through its agents — first cancelled plaintiffs,
reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and intentionally
withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the fact of said cancellation,
letting them go on believing that their first class reservations stood valid
and confirmed. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets
in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the same, when in
fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the
position of having to breach its aforesaid contracts with plaintiffs should
there be no last-minute cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as
it turned out in this case. Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been
prompted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in holding on
to Senator Lopez and party as passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their
chances to seek the services of other airlines that may have been able to
afford them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal contemplation
such conduct already amounts to action in bad faith. For bad faith means a
breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill-will.
Accordingly, there being a clear admission in defendant's
evidence of facts amounting to a bad faith on its part in regard to the breach
of its contracts with plaintiffs, it becomes unnecessary to further discuss the
evidence adduced by plaintiffs to establish defendant's bad faith. For what is
admitted in the course of the trial does not need to be proved (Sec. 2, Rule
129, Rules of Court).
G.R.
No. 109173 July 5, 1996
CITY
OF CEBU vs.CA
FACTS:
Private respondent MerlitaCardeno is the owner of a
parcel of land located at SitioSto. Nino, Alaska-Mambaling. The petitioner,
City of Cebu, filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondent
with Branch II of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City seeking to expropriate
the said parcel of land. The complaint was initiated pursuant to Resolution No.
404 and Ordinance No. 1418, dated February 17, 1992, of the
SangguniangPanlungsod of Cebu City authorizing the City Mayor to expropriate
the said parcel of land for the purpose of providing a socialized housing
project for the landless and low-income city residents, which a copy thereof, also
annexed on the complaint.
Private
respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said complaint on the ground of lack
of cause of action, which is, lacking a previous valid offer.
ISSUE:
Whether
the annexedphotocopy of the ordinance for the expropriation of the land should be admissible as evidence.
RULING:
Yes.
All documents
attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not
denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint
without need of introducing evidence thereon. Additionally, the general rule is
that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged
in the complaint. Thus, Ordinance No. 1418, with all its provisions, is not
only incorporated into the complaint for eminent domain filed by petitioner,
but is also deemed admitted by private respondent. A perusal of the copy of
said ordinance which has been annexed to the complaint shows that the fact of
petitioner's having made a previous valid and definite offer to private
respondent is categorically stated therein.
G.R.
No. 117434 February 9, 2001
BENGUET
EXPLORATION, INC vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner
Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a complaint for damages against
SeawoodShipping and Switzerland General Insurance, Co., Ltd.
Switzerland Insurance filed a third-party complaint
against Seawood Shipping, praying that the latter be ordered to indemnify it
for whatever might be adjudged against it in favor of petitioner.Thereafter,
the cases were jointly tried, during which petitioner Benguet presented its
employees, Rogelio Lumibao and Ernesto Cayabyab, as witnesses.
Rogelio Lumibao, marketing assistant of Benguet, was in
charge of exportation. His responsibilities included the documentation of
export products, presentations with banks, and other duties connected with the
export of products. He explained that private respondent Seawood Shipping was
chartered by petitioner Benguet to transport copper concentrates. The bill of
lading stated that the cargo, consisting of 2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper
concentrates, was loaded on board Sangkulirang No. 3 at Poro Point, San
Fernando, La Union. It was insured by Switzerland Insurance (marine insurance
policy was marked. When the cargo was unloaded in Japan, however, Rogelio
Lumibao received a report dated August 19, 1985, from a surveyor in Japan
stating that the cargo was 355 metric tons short of the amount stated in the
bill of lading. For this reason, petitioner Benguet made a claim of the loss to
Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance. In its letter, dated August 21,
1985, petitioner Benguet made a formal demand for the value of the alleged
shortage. As both Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance refused the
demand, petitioner Benguet brought these cases against Seawood Shipping and
Switzerland Insurance.
Ernesto Cayabyab had been with Benguet for 13 years and,
at the time of his testimony, he was secretary of Nil Alejandre, manager of
Benguet. According to Cayabyab, he was sent to the warehouseat La Union to
assist in the loading of the copper concentrates. These copper concentrates
were to be loaded on the ship Sangkulirang No. 3. Cayabyab said he was
present when the cargo was loaded on the ship, as evidenced by the Certificate
of Loading, Certificate of Weight, and the Mate's Receipt all dated July 28,
1985. According to Cayabyab, the Marine Surveyor and the Chief Mate would go
around the boat to determine how much was loaded on the ship. Cayabyab stated
that he saw petitioner Benguet's representative and his immediate superior, Mr.
Alejandre, and the Inspector of Customs, Mr. Cardenas, sign the Certificate of
Weight. Cayabyab also witnessed the ship captain sign the Certificate of
Weight, which stated therein that 2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper
concentrates were loaded on the ship. Cayabyab likewise confirmed the
authenticity of the Mate's Receipt, saying that he witnessed the Chief Mate
sign the document.
ISSUE:
Whether
the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented were properly established by the
testimony of the plaintiff’s witness, resulting to prima facie presumption that their contents are
true.
RULING:
The admission of the due
execution and genuineness of a document simply means that "the party whose
signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another
for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and
figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that
the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law,
such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived
by him. When the law makes use of the phrase 'genuineness and due execution of
the instrument' it means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious,
counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed.
The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to
make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a
defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which does not contradict
the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence
In this case, respondents presented evidence which casts
doubt on the veracity of these documents. Respondent Switzerland Insurance
presented Export Declaration No. 1131/85 which petitioner's own witness, Rogelio
Lumibao, prepared, in which it was stated that the copper concentrates to be
transported to Japan had a gross weight of only 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845
dry metric tons, 10 percent more or less. On the other hand, Certified
Adjusters, Inc., to which Switzerland Insurance had referred petitioner's
claim, prepared a report which showed that a total of 2,451.630 wet metric tons
of copper concentrates were delivered at Poro Point.
Thus, whatever presumption of regularity in the
transactions might have risen from the genuineness and due execution of the
Bill of Lading, Certificate of Weight, Certificate of Loading, and Mate's
Receipt was successfully rebutted by the evidence presented by respondent
Switzerland Insurance which showed disparities in the actual weight of the
cargo transported to Poro Point and loaded on the vessel.
G.R.
No. L-39059 September 30, 1974
CABALLERO
vs.DEIPARINE,
ET AL.
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero are
the children by the first marriage, and the defendants, Tomas Raga, Olimpio
Raga, Adriano Raga and Magdalena Raga, are the children by second marriage of
VicentaBucao, now deceased, who died sometime in February, 1943 in Tabunoc,
Talisay, Cebu.
VicentaBucao in her lifetime and Tomas Raga acquired by
joint purchase a parcel of land from the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate
identified as Lot 2072 situated in Tabunoc, Talisay, Cebu and now more particularly
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. Rt-2485 (T-17232) of the
Registry of Deeds of Cebu and further declared for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 15954 and at P100.00;
Defendant Tomas Raga and VicentaBucao jointly sold 1/4 of
said Lot 2072 to plaintiff Antonio Caballero, which sale was evidenced by a
deed of sale; and since the title to said lot at the time of the conveyance to
him had not as yet been issued to them they held the subject portion in trust
for said Antonio Caballero until its title could be delivered to the latter
Long before the death of VicentaBucao in 1943, plaintiff
Antonio Caballero had been, paying the yearly land tax and asking the former to
deliver the title to the portion sold to him, but he was told by his mother to
wait, as after all, according to her, he (plaintiff) was already in possession
thereof and, besides, his mother was then still living
After the death of VicentaBucao in 1943, plaintiff
Antonio Caballero asked defendant Tomas Raga to deliver the title to the
portion sold to him from Lot 2072, but he (Tomas Raga) told him to wait until
it could be segregated and that there was no hurry since he (Antonio) was
already in possession thereof.
Plaintiff Antonio Caballero received from defendant Alma
Deiparine a letter demanding that he vacate the portion of Lot 2072 which he
was holding for she had bought it from defendant Tomas Raga, and as the new
owner she would like to construct a house thereon and would further improve
said lot;
Upon refusal of the plaintiff to vacate the portion in
question defendant Alma Deiparine brought an action for ejectment against him
in the Municipal Court of Talisay, and after trial said Court rendered judgment
in favor of Antonio Caballero, the plaintiff.
Before the case was called for hearing, the parties
through counsel entered into a stipulation of facts on March 13, 1968, which
provides as follows:
STIPULATION OF FACTS
The
PLAINTIFFS and the DEFENDANTS in the above-entitled case duly assisted by their
respective counsels, unto this Honorable Court hereby respectfully submit the
following stipulation of facts:
XXX
7. That during the lifetime of VicentaBucao,
she, with the conformity of her husband,
sold her undivided 1/2 of the above parcel to her co-owner, Tomas Raga;
XXX
9. That on March 28, 1963 Alma Deiparine
acquired in good faith, with a just title and
for a valuable consideration, the whole of Lot 2072 from Tomas Raga as per deed of absolute sale identified as
Annex "C" in the complaint which cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-2482 (T-17232) and the issuance in her name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9934 on April 1, 1963, a
certified true copy of which
is identified as Annex "D" in the complaint;
XXX
WHEREFORE, it is most
respectfully prayed that the foregoing Stipulation of Facts be approved and that a decision he handed down on the
legal issues submitted on the
basis of said Stipulation of Facts.
XXX
The
trial court on April 30, 1968, rendered a decision based on the stipulation of
facts, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered against the plaintiffs, dismissing
the complaint insofar as the defendant Alma
Deiparine is concerned, but awarding to said plaintiffs and against the other defendants Raga, jointly and
severally, the amount of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00),
as moral damages, and FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees. The defendants Raga are likewise ordered
to pay the costs.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new
trial and for leave of court to admit an amended complaint which the lower
court in its order of August 26, 1968, denied. Hence, this appeal to the Court
of Appeals by Antonio Caballero and Concordia Caballero, which was certified to
this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether
the written stipulation of facts entered into by the counsel for both parties without the signature of the
latter is valid and binding.
RULING:
No.
The conduct of the counsel for plaintiffs-appellants in
entering into a compromise agreement or stipulation of facts which practically
confesses judgment, without the consent and conformity of his clients, is not
in keeping with the sworn duty of a lawyer to protect the interest of his
clients. It is a grossly reprehensible act which amounts to fraud. The
stipulation of facts should not have been tolerated by the trial court by
giving its seal of approval thereto. And to top it all, plaintiffs-appellants'
counsel made the unauthorized admission therein that principal defendant Alma
Deiparine acquired in good faith with a just title and for a valuable
consideration the whole of Lot 2072. Their counsel even admitted also in said
document that during the lifetime of VicentaBucao, she, with the conformity of
her husband, sold her undivided ½ of Lot 2072 to her co-owner Tomas Raga. No
document was ever shown to him by the Ragas in support of this claim and the
record do not disclose that there was such document.
Rule
138, Section 23 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that:
Authority of attorneys to bind clients.
— Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in
relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters
of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot,
without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive
anything in discharge of a
client's claim but the full amount in cash.
It may be true that during the pre-trial hearing held on
February 3, 1968, the parties concerned agreed to execute a stipulation of
facts but it does not mean that the respective counsels of the contending
parties can prepare a stipulation of facts the contents of which is prejudicial
to the interest of their clients and sign it themselves without the
intervention of their clients. In the case at bar, the then counsel for
plaintiffs-appellants, Atty. Melecio C. Guba, agreed that defendant-appellee
Alma Deiparine bought the land in question in good faith and for a valuable
consideration; that during the lifetime of their mother VicentaBucao, she, with
the conformity of her husband, sold her undivided ½ of the land in question to
her co-owner and son, Tomas Raga. All these adverse facts were made the basis
of the appealed decision against the plaintiffs. No further evidence was
presented as there was no hearing. The attorney for the plaintiffs in making
such admission went beyond the scope of his authority as counsel and
practically gave away the plaintiffs' case. The admission does not refer to a
matter of judicial procedure related to the enforcement of the remedy. It
related to the very subject matter of the cause of action, or to a matter on
which the client alone can make the admission binding on him.
A.M.
No. MTJ-90-400 July 14, 1995
SUSIMO
MOROÑO vs. LOMEDA
FACTS:
Complainant SusimoMoroño was charged as one of the
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 7592, 7593, and 7594 for Murder
While under
detention, complainant together with another accused, TanoBarotag, executed
separate in-custody confessions subscribed by respondent Judge Aurelio Lomeda.
At the trial of the aforementioned triple murder cases,
complainant SusimoMoroño and his co-accused TanoBarotag, assailed the validity
of their extrajudicial confessions for having been taken after they were made
to sign the same without the assistance of counsel. After they signed their
separate extrajudicial confessions at the police station, they were brought by
the policemen to the house of Atty. Rogue Amante in Bindoy where Atty. Amante
signed the extrajudicial confessions to make it appear that accused
SusimoMoroño and his co-accused TanoBarotag were assisted by counsel at the time
it was taken and prepared.
Then complainant SusimoMoroño and his co-accused
TanoBarotag were taken by the police to the Office of respondent Judge Aurelio
Lomeda in Manjuyod, Negros Oriental where the said respondent signed the
confessions as subscribing officer without the presence of Atty. Roque Amante, alleged
counsel for the accused. The contents of the confessions were not read and
translated by the respondent Judge before the complainant SusimoMoroño and his
co-accused TanoBarotag prior to his signing of the confessions as subscribing
officer. The confessions were already signed by complainant SusimoMoroño and
TanoBarotag at the police station of Bindoy, Negros Oriental before Atty. Roque
Amante signed the said confessions at his house in Bindoy. Atty. Roque Amante
had no participation in the preparation and execution of the confessions. He was not the accused's counsel nor was he
present when respondent Judge Lomeda signed the confessions as subscribing
officer. The the accused in the aforementioned triple murder cases were all
acquitted after the Court rejected the admissibility of the extrajudicial
confessions for being violative of Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution.
Whether or not respondent
Judge Aurelio Lomeda was remiss in the performance
of his judicial duties as subscribing officer of the in-custody extrajudicial confessions of complainant
SusimoMoroño and his co-accused TanoBanotog
in relation to Criminal Cases
RULING:
Yes.
The act of respondent Judge in subscribing the
confessions without diligently ascertaining whether or not the confessants were
apprised of and accorded their constitutional rights is contrary to what is
expected of him as a judge.
Respondent Judge Lomeda failed to ascertain that the
guarantees of the Constitution had been respected in connection with the
execution of the extrajudicial confession. As shown by the thumbmark on his
supposed confession, complainant Moroño was illiterate. Respondent Judge,
therefore, should have proceeded with extra caution in order to prevent the
constitutional guarantees from being reduced to futile platitudes. 7He
should have satisfied himself that the accused had been effectively informed of
their constitutional rights and that these had been explained to them in a
dialect or language known to them, and in a manner comprehensible to them.While
respondent claims that there were no visible marks of torture or injury on
complainant (something vigorously contested by complainant), respondent Judge
exerted no appreciable effort to ascertain whether the confessions had in fact
been voluntarily executed by complainant and the latter's co-accused.
G.R.
No. 128538 February 28, 2001
SCC
CHEMICALS CORPORATION vs. CA
FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation
through its chairman, private respondent DaniloArrieta and vice president,
Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc
(hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest
rate of 30% plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of
the principal upon non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the
payment of the loan, DaniloArrieta and private respondent LeopoldoHalili
executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding themselves jointly and
severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then
sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt
thereof, no payment was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer
for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of
action. Petitioner contended that the promissory note upon which SIHI anchored
its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding effect for lack or
failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were
allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to settle the dispute amicably. No
settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1.
Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and that it has jurisdiction to
try and decide this case on its merits and that
plaintiff and the defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
2.
Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984
together with a statement of account of even
date which were both received by the herein defendant; and
3.
Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical Corporation the latter acting
through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983
for the amount of P129,824.48
with maturity date on January 12, 1984.
The case
then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were
liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The
cross-examination of said witness was postponed several times due to one reason
or another at the instance of either party. The case was calendared several
times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite
notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to
cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
On March
22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether
the testimony of private respondent’s witness is hearsay.
2.
Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as required by law.
3.
Whether the “best evidence rule” should be applied.
RULING:
1. The
Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent
witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the
admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Rule
130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36.
Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify only
to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and
carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an exception. Where
a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.The
rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to
cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which
negates the claim that the matters testified to by a witness are
hearsay.However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure
of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial court to
cross-examine the other party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to take
advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent
court when it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had waived its
right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for
petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the
promissory note by it through private respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at
pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of signatures. The
admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the
parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section, 4 Rule 129
of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
3. Respondent SIHI had no
need to present the original of the documents as there was already a judicial
admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note
and receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be
questioning their authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these
documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner failed to
submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of
extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by
the appellate court when it held petitioner liable on its obligation
GARCIA,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY
FACTS:
In 1980, Dynetics Inc., through its president, acquired a
P25M export loan from Security Bank. In 1982, a
credit accommodation (SWAP loan) was opened by Security Bank in favor
of Dynetics allowing it to acquire an additional $700k loan. This loan was
secured by an Indemnity Agreement signed by Antonio Garcia acting as
a surety. This loan was not availed of by Dynetics however.
In 1993, the SWAP loan was renewed but it was reduced to
$500k. This time, Dynetics availed of it. Garcia still acted as surety but
there was no Indemnity Agreement involved. Later, Dynetics, without
Garcia’s knowledge, executed several Chattel Mortgages in favor of
Security Bank.
Dynetics defaulted from paying. Security Bank foreclosed
the mortgages. The proceeds were applied to the SWAP loan leaving a balance of
P3.5M. The Export loan has a balance of P464M.
Security
Bank is now demanding Garcia, as surety, to pay for the deficiency in both
loans.
During
cross-examination of a witness of SBTC by the petitioner’s lawyer, Atty. Bello,
counsel of SBTC, said:
ATTY.
GANGOSO:
But,
I'm not asking what the counsel is after. I'm trying to show that
the Swap Agreement is not covered by a
Continuing Agreement of Mr. Garcia, because,
the Swap Loan Agreement is . . .
ATTY.
BELLO:
But
we are willing to admit, Your Honor.
ATTY.
GANGOSO:
There
was a statement, that the Continuing Agreement did not cover the Swap
Agreement.
ATTY.
BELLO:
I'm
admitting that as far as the Swap Loan is concerned, this was secured; the chattel
mortgage only secured the swap loan.
ATTY.
GANGOSO:
Considering
then, for that matter that I will stop asking Mrs. Marquez between the relations of the Swap Loan Agreement, and the
Continuing Suretyship.
ATTY.
BELLO III:
I
was saying that the chattel mortgage more or less, secures the swap loan.
(tsn,
May 10, 1991 p. 36-37)
ISSUE:
Whether
the above admission on cross-examination is conclusive against SBTC.
RULING:
YES.
Judicial admissions verbal or written made by the parties
in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same
case are conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same and cannot be
contradicted unless shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.
Insofar as the SWAP loan was concerned, SBTC did away
with the Indemnity Agreement and the Continuing Surety, opting instead to rely
solely on the chattel mortgage. The afore-quoted declarations of
Atty. Bello in the course of the trial are conclusive. Such
admission is binding and no amount of contradictory evidence can offset it.
The Supreme Court did not allow SBTC at this time to
water down the admission it made in open court, more so after the opposing
party relied upon such judicial admission and accordingly dispensed with
further proof of the fact already admitted. An admission made by a
party in the course of the proceedings does not require proof. The
record here does not show any attempt on the part of SBTC to contradict such
judicial admission on the ground of palpable mistake.
G.R.
No. L-26398 October 25, 1968
TALASTAS
vs.
ABELLA,.
FACTS:
Abella and Talastas entered into an oral contract of
partnership for the operation of a dance-hall or cabaret, known as the Sambat
Recreation Center — hereinafter known as the Center — in Samal, Bataan. Pursuant
to said contract, plaintiff contributed one-third (or P1,546.54) and defendant
two-thirds (or P3,093.08) of the partnership capital, aggregating P4,639.62,
with the understanding that the profits would be divided among them in the same
proportion.
As managing partner, defendant was bound to render an
accounting and deliver plaintiff's share in the profits, at the end of each
month.After rendering accounts for four (4) months, or beginning from February,
1956, defendant failed and refused to make said accounting or give plaintiff's
share in the profits.
A corner space in the building housing the Center was
leased to a refreshment concessionaire, at P6.00 a night, from September to
December, 1955 and defendant caused said concessionaire to be ejected from said
nook and then operated therein his own refreshment business, since January,
1956.
In September, 1955, the partnership hired taxi-dancers
and lent them, by way of advances, the total sum of P327.00, one third of which
had been contributed by the plaintiffand the taxi-dancers had already refunded
said sum of P327.00 to the defendant. The latter however had failed and refused
to deliver plaintiff's share therein in the aforementioned earnings for the
lease of part of the Center and in the proceeds of its operation, as well as to
render an accounting thereof.
Plaintiff prayed, therefore, that said partnership be
dissolved and liquidated; that the defendant be ordered to render accounts and
to deliver to the plaintiff his share in the proceeds of the operation of the
Center, in the monthly rentals received or due for the lease of the corner
space above referred to and in the above-mentioned advances made to
taxi-dancers, as well as to pay moral damages, attorney's fees and the costs.
Upon being summoned, the defendant filed an answer
denying "the allegations contained" in plaintiff's complaint,
alleging that there had been no oral contract of partnership between them and
setting up a counterclaim for attorney's fees and moral damages.
Plaintiff then filed a "motion for summary
judgment," upon the ground that "no genuine issue of fact had been
raised in defendant's answer," for one and the other: the same is in the nature of a general denial,
and, thus, amounts to an admission of the material averments contained in the
complaint
ISSUE:
Whether
the answer of the defendant constitutes a general denial.
RULING:
YES.
It
should be notedthat "material averment in the complaint, other than those
as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically
denied ...Moreover, to be specific, within the purview of the Rules of Court, a
denial must not only"specify each material allegation of
fact the truth of which" is not admitted. He must, also,
"whenever practicable, ...set forth the substance of the matters which
he will rely upon to support his denial." This, the defendant herein
has not done. Defendant's answer limited
itself to saying that he "denies the allegations contained in the specific
paragraphs of the plaintiff's complaint." Surely, defendant could have
said something else about the specific topics of these paragraphs, if he had
any concrete matter on which to rely in controverting the allegations made
therein, instead of making a mere denial thereof.
The conclusion is inevitable that defendant has indulged
and is indulging in no more than a general denial of the material allegations
in plaintiff's complaint.His aforementioned general denial of the material
allegations in the complaint resulted in the admission of the truth of said
allegations, including the allegation about the oral contract of partnership
between the parties.
No comments:
Post a Comment